Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Aesthetic perception: Aesthetic perception in philosophy refers to the act of apprehending or experiencing the sensory qualities, beauty, and artistic elements of an object, artwork, or environment. It involves a distinct mode of awareness focused on aesthetic features and their impact on our senses and emotions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Richard Hamann on Aesthetic Perception - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 95 Aesthetic Perception/Hamann/Gadamer: The basic aesthetic concept from which Hamann starts is the "self-importance of perception". With this concept, apparently the same is said with Kant's doctrine of the purposeful agreement, with the state of our cognitive faculty in general. Gadamer: What is self-important instead of externally-important wants to cut off the reference to that from which its meaning could be determined. GadamerVsHamann: Can such a term provide a solid basis for aesthetics? Can the term be used at all by a perception? Shouldn't one also grant the concept of the aesthetic what is due to perception, namely that it hears what is true, that it remains related to knowledge? It is indeed good to remember Aristotle. Perception/Aristotle/Gadamer: Aristotle showed that all aisthesis is general, even if every sense has its specific field and that what is directly given in it is insofar not general. But the specific perception of a given sense as such is an abstraction. In truth, we always only look in a general way at what is given to us sensually in detail(1). Gadamer I 96 A. GadamerVsHamann: Now seeing is certainly distinguished by the fact that it does not rush to relate the sight to a generality, the known meaning, the intended purpose or the like, but dwells on the sight as aesthetic. But that is not the reason why we do not stop referring in seeing in such a way, for example to see this white appearance, which we admire aesthetically, nevertheless as a human being. Our perception is never a simple reflection of what is given to the senses. Rather, the newer psychology, especially the astute criticism, which Scheler, as well as W. Koehler, E. Strauß, M. Wertheimer, among others, exercised on the concept of pure perception(2) teaches that this concept stems from an epistemological dogmatism. B. GadamerVsHamann: Even the perception conceived as adequate would never be a simple reflection of what is. For it would always remain an understanding as something. Every understanding as [something] articulates what is there by looking away from [something], looking at [something], seeing [something] together as [something] - and all this can again be in the centre of an attention or become exposed on the periphery and in the background. Thus there is no doubt that seeing, as an articulating reading of what is there, looks away, as it were, so that it is no longer there for seeing; but also that it is guided by its anticipations which are not there. This criticism of the doctrine of pure perception, which was practiced from pragmatic experience, was then turned into the fundamental by Heidegger. In this way, however, it also applies to aesthetic consciousness, although here seeing does not simply linger over what is seen, e.g. its general usefulness for something, but rather dwells on the sight. Dwelling in looking and hearing is not simply seeing the pure sight, but remains itself an understanding as ... Gadamer I 97 Art/Perception: The mode of being of the perceived is not presence. Where it is a matter of meaningful representation, e.g. in the case of works of fine art, insofar as they are not abstract and non-representational, the meaningfulness is obviously serving as a guideline for the reading of the sight. Only when we "recognize" what is represented we are able to "read" a picture - yes, only then is it basically a picture. >Seeing/Gadamer. C. Form/Content/GadamerVsHamann: It is therefore an inverted formalism, which moreover may invoke Kant to seek the unity of the aesthetic entity in contrast to its content solely in its form. Kant had something quite different in mind with his concept of form. Not against the meaningful content of a work of art, but against the mere sensual appeal of the material - the concept of form in his work describes the construction of the aesthetic structure. >Form and Content/Gadamer. 1. Aristoteles, De anima, 425 a 25. 2. M. Scheler, in »Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft«, 1926, S. 397 ff. Jetzt Ges. Werke 8, S. 315ff._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hamann, Richard Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Hamann
> Counter arguments in relation to Aesthetic Perception
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27