Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Judgment: the use of the concept „judgment“ is not uniform. If the judgment is interpreted as the determination of the truth value ("true" or "false") of a statement, this is indicated explicitly, e.g. with the judgment stroke I- introduced by G. Frege. See also truth value, judgment stroke, sentence, statement, utterance, assertion.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Franz Brentano on Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments

Chisholm II 231
Judgment/Brentano: Judgments are obvious from the concepts precisely when they are judgments about concepts.
Concept/Brentano: Knowledge about concepts is directly evident from inner perception.
II 232
From the existence of a conceptual relation, however, it does not follow yet that we acknowledge it. It must be made accessible to the perception.
Judgment/false/Brentano/Marek: Wrong judgment on concepts is therefore a modifying determination, such as e.g. "false gold". A wrong judgment is not a judgment at all.
((s): Frege would say: a false judgment is always about an object, not a concept.)
II 233
Truth/Evidence/Truth-Functional/Brentano/Marek: That there can nevertheless be a dispute about conceptual truth can be explained by the fact that not every judgment about concepts must be evident. Blind, non-evident judgments are also conceivable. For example, if you only trust authorities. But these are also real judgments.
II 234
Judgments are plausible precisely when the conceptual relationship is understood.


Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-05-12
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