Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism. b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G.W.F. Hegel on Experience - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 359 Experience/Dialectic Experience/Hegel/Aristoteles: [In Hegel] the moment of historicity wins its right. He thinks of experience as the accomplishing skepticism. We saw (>Experience/Gadamer) that the experience that one makes changes his whole knowledge. Strictly speaking, one cannot have the same experience twice. Gadamer I 360 [Hegel] has shown in his "Phenomenology of the Spirit" how the consciousness, which wants to become certain of itself, makes its experiences. The object of consciousness is the "in itself", but what is "in itself" can only be known in the way it presents itself to the experiencing consciousness. Thus, the experiencing consciousness experiences this very thing: the appearance of the object is "for us" itself(1). Hegel: "The dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself, both on its knowledge and on its object, in so far as the new true object springs from it, is actually that which is called experience. Gadamer: We recall the above and ask ourselves what Hegel, who obviously wants to say something here about the general nature of experience, means. HeideggerVsHegel: It seems to me that Heidegger was right to point out that Hegel here does not interpret experience dialectically, but conversely, what is dialectical, thinks from the essence of experience.(2) Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, experience has the structure of a reversal of consciousness and therefore it is a dialectical movement. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Consciousness. Hegel pretends that what would otherwise be understood by experience is something else, provided that we generally "make the experience of the untruth of this first concept on another object" (and not so that the object itself changes). But it's only apparently different. In truth, the philosophical consciousness sees through what the experiencing consciousness actually does when it goes from one to the other: it reverses itself. So Hegel claims that the true essence of experience itself is to reverse itself in this way. Hegel/Gadamer: (...) Experience [is] first always the experience of nothingness. Faced with the experience of another object, both our knowledge and its object change. One now knows it differently and better, and i.e. the object itself "does not endure". The new object contains the truth about the old one. Consciousness/Hegel: What Hegel describes as experience in this way is the experience that the consciousness makes with itself. "The principle of experience contains the infinitely important provision that for accepting and keeping for oneself a content, the person him- or herself must be present, more specifically, that he or she must find such content united with the certainty of him- or herself(3). Gadamer I 361 Reversal/Hegel/Gadamer: The concept of experience means just this, that such unity with oneself is only established. This is the reversal that happens to the consciousness of recognizing oneself in the stranger, the other person. >Subject-object problem, >Subject/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity. Absolute Knowledge/Hegel: According to Hegel, it is of course necessary that the path of experience of consciousness leads to a knowledge of oneself that no longer has any other, foreign, apart from oneself. For him, the completion of experience is the "science", the certainty of him- or herself in knowledge. The standard by which the person thinks experience is thus that of knowing oneself. Therefore, the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all experience, which is achieved in absolute knowledge, that is, in the complete identity of consciousness and object. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie, Einleitung (ed. Hoffmeister p. 73) 2. Heidegger, Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung (Holzwege p. 169). 3. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, § 7. - - - Brandom I 156 Representation/Kant: involved in inferential relations between sentences - Hegel turns the order: resulting from experience as inferential activity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against Hegel
> Counter arguments in relation to Experience
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26