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Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

William James on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

Diaz-Bone I 81
Truth/Pragmatism/Diaz-Bone: It is a misinterpretation of pragmatism: True is, what is useful as seeing it true.
I 85
Definition truth/James: true representations are those that we can appropriate, hear, verify, and make effective. False ideas are those in which we cannot do these things.
I 86
Being true is an event! However, it remains unclear what James means exactly with "accordance"!
Truth leads our actions to reality.
I 88
Truth/James: Analogy to Money: Credit: belief, can later turn out to be wrong.
Horwich I 17
Truth/Pragmatism/James: he naturally accepts the lexicon meaning: truth is a property of some of our ideas.
Problem: what is accordance, what is reality.
Horwich I 18
Thesis: we must ask what difference does the truth of a sentence make for our life? How is it recognized? How does it pay off in experience concepts? True ideas are those that we can evaluate, reaffirm, and verify.
Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, through events.
Verification: verification is a process as well as validity: namely validation.
Horwich I 19
The possession of true thoughts is the possession of instruments of action. One can say they are useful because they are true or true because they are useful. Truth is the name for what starts the verification process and what it accomplishes.
True ideas would never be selected if they were not useful.
Horwich I 20
Reality/Object/James: either "things" or also relations in the everyday sense like data, places, distances, types, actions.
Truth/Mathematics/James: it is either a principle or a definition that makes true, for example, 1 and 2 = 3, etc. Or, for example, that more differs from black than from gray.
Effect/James: the effect begins as soon as the cause begins.
These are all mental objects. No sense experience is required.
Logical truth/James: the only risk is to encounter these truths at all. You have to name them correctly because you cannot help it. (1)

1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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