Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Instrumentalism, science theory: the assumption that theories are useful tools for achieving goals. It is therefore secondary whether these theories are true. When comparing theories, truth ultimately plays the decisive role._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gerhard Schurz on Instrumentalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 211 Def Instrumentalism/Schurz: Instrumentalism denies that theoretical entities exist, i.e. that theoretical terms (TT) refer. TT possess only instrumental function in the organization of our empirical knowledge. Instrumentalism was influenced by logical empiricism of the 1950s and 1960s. Hempel 1958(1), Carnap 1956(2), Sneed 1971(3)). Today: Main representative: van Fraasen. >Bas van Fraassen. Theory/Truth/van Fraassen: Thesis: The question whether theories are true is meaningless, it can only be about empirical adequacy. VsInstrumentalism: late 60s: Putnam 1962(4), Maxwell 1962(5), Bhaskar 1978(6), Leplin 1984(7)): pro realism. >Realism/Schurz, >Realism, >J.D. Sneed, >H. Putnam. 1. Hempel, C. (1958). "The Theoretican's Dilemma. Studies in the Logic of Theory COnstruction".In: Feigl/Scriven/Maxwell (1958). 2.Carnap, R. (1956). "The Methological Character of Theoretical Concepts". In: Feigle,H./Scriven, M(eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol I, Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, pp. 38-76. 3. Sneed, J. D. (1971). The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel. 4. Putnam, H. (1962). "What Theories are not". In: Nagel, E./Suppes, P. and Tarski, A. (eds.),Logic,, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford, 240-251. 5. Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities". In: Feigl,H. and Maxwell,G. (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. 6. Bhaskar, R. (1962). A Realist Theory of Science. Sussex: Harvester Press. 7. Leplin, J. (1984) (Ed.) Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of california Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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> Counter arguments against Schurz
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26