Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Strong Artificial Intelligence: Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to computer systems emulating human-like cognitive functions. Strong AI, or Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), implies a system with human-level intelligence, capable of learning and performing any intellectual task, akin to human capabilities across diverse domains. See also Artificial Intelligence, Artificial General Intelligence, Human-level AI, Artificial consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Chalmers on Strong Artificial Intelligence - Dictionary of Arguments
I 314 Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any computation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Consciousness, >Mind, >Experience, >Computation, >Information Processing, >Brain. I 320 A computational description of a system provides a formal description of the causal organization of this system. >Artificial intelligence, >Computer model, cf. >Neural networks. I 321 Invariance principle: every system with conscious experiences, which has the same functional organization as another system with conscious experiences, will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. There may be corresponding causal relations between electronic components like there is between neurons in the brain. Fading Qualia/dancing Qualia: we can use these kinds of qualia for arguments for the strong artificial intelligence. >Qualia/Chalmers. I 322 If there were two organizationally identical systems, one of which had conscious experiences, and the other not, one could construct a system with fading or dancing qualia that lay between these two systems. That would be implausible. If fading and dancing qualia are excluded, the thesis of the Strong Artificial Intelligence applies. (> Qualia/Chalmers). I 329 VsArtificial Intelligence/Goedel/Chalmers: in a consistent formal system which is expressive enough for a certain kind of arithmetic, one can construct a sentence which is not provable in this system. Contrary to the machine, the human being can see that the sentence is true. >Provability. I 330 Therefore the human has an ability which the formal system does not have. ChalmersVsVs: there is no reason to believe that the human is aware of the truth of the sentence. At best, we can say that if the system is consistent, the sentence is true. We cannot always determine the consistency of complex systems. >Consistency. PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Penrose 1994)(1) brings an argument on a lower level: it may be that not all physical processes are computable. >Calculabilty. ChalmersVsVs: But this is based on the above mentioned Goedel argument. Nothing in physical theory itself supports it. VsArtificial Intelligence/VsSimulation/Chalmers: what if consciousness processes are essentially continuous, but our simulations are discrete? >Simulation. I 331 ChalmersVsVs: there are reasons to assume that absolute continuity is not essential for our cognitive competence. However, it might be that a system with unlimited precision (achieved by continuity) has cognitive abilities that a discrete system does not achieve. Cf. >Analog/digital. 1. R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford 1994_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Strong Artificial Intelligence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27