Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burge, T. | Davidson Vs Burge, T. | I (d) 74 Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism. Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything. DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves. I (e) 116 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses). Glüer II 167 Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time. Frank I 665 Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken. But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that. Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge. 1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me. 2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents. Fra I 665/666 DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’. Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion. Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me. DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point: Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common. If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically. We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought. E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners! Fra I 667 If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right. BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis). DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought. Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice". DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show: a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say! b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs. ((s) that the meanings are not so). c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks. I 667/668 Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis. Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58 Frank I 710 Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents. It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude. Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject. As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible. I 711 Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view. How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent." But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal). Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal". DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved! We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the Background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Nominalism Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 260 Universals/VsChisholm/Heckmann: he represents an extreme Platonic universals realism. Thus he brings himself into a contradiction to both the moderate Aristotelian universals and to the ontological nominalism. I 261 Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contradiction to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the importance of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but that's no approach to universalism of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first and then express with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate can use it in compliance with the rules. I 262 Nominalism/Utility Theory/VsChisholm: the meaning of predicates and sentences cannot be explicated mentalistically (by resorting to intentional performance) >(Humpty Dumpty Theory). MentalismVsNominalism/Chisholm: everything semantic has its origin in the mind. Direct Attribution/Attribution Theory/VsChisholm: E.g. an infant recognizes his mother, but not by first judging that it recognizes the mother and then attributing this state to himself. (Chisholm: must actually assume that the mother is only an indirect object of attribution). I 263 Consciousness/Chisholm: emerges from an act of direct consideration of a self-presenting property. VsChisholm: this ignores a fundamental trait of any type of consciousness or fails to make it understood: the self-disclosure of the self-translucency of consciousness. Consciousness should be acquainted and familiar with itself whenever it occurs, and that in a pre-reflective and irreflexive way. (Frank, >Sartre). E.g. I have direct knowledge of my pain, not only by reflection and subsequent direct attribution. (That would be of a higher level). Consciousness/HeckmannVsChisholm: there is a third between the self-presenting and self-presented: the self present: the which has always been disclosed, known and familiar by pre-attributive knowledge. (>Background). Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Definition Theory | Newen Vs Definition Theory | NS I 159 Predicate/Extension/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. "cardioid": set of all creatures with kidneys Intention/Predicate/Carnap: in contrast the property of being a creature with kidneys. Formal: a function of possible worlds on the set of all creatures with kidneys. Intention: is the contribution to the sentence content that makes the difference between the sentences "Peter is a creature with kidneys" and "... with heart". Predicate/Meaning/Concept/Newen/Schrenk: we assume the Background assumption that the meanings of predicates are concepts. Concepts/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: are then determined as properties with him. Property/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: for him it is fixed by what extension they have in a possible world. Problem: this is not sufficient for all mathematical predicates. E.g. "equilateral" and "equiangular" applies to the same sets of triangles. However, this is part of the basic question of what the meanings of predicates are. Definition Theory/Concepts/Criteria/Newen/Schrenk: classical theory: thesis: the meaning of a predicate is specified by a definition that provides necessary and sufficient conditions of use. VsDefinition Theory: Problem: 1) for most concepts we do not find such definitions and our everyday concepts do not have limits as sharp as definitions would require. 2) We usually only have partial knowledge or partially false knowledge about what we associate with an expression. NS I 160 3) typicality effects: i.e. some objects are typical examples of things that fall under a concept, others are less typical, even if they are both unambiguously subsumed under the concept. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Donnellan, K. | Searle Vs Donnellan, K. | IV 160 Referential/attributive/reference/regard/referring/Donellan: two different uses of descriptions. >Attributive/referential. Most philosophers VsDonnellan: both are referential in the sense that is spoken to them about objects, the only difference is the extent to which this intention is made explicit. Def attributive/tradition: specifies truth conditions laid only against a Background of assumptions. IV 162 SearleVsDonellan: even after his own account is not correct, because there are counter-examples: E.g. Smith died of natural causes, but was recently attacked, and the trail of destruction leave us to call the "murderer of Smith" insane. Then we can say that the finding was true, although no descriptions were met (but that would have been a (possible) attributive use, and thus the distinction is threatened). DonellanVsVs: in such cases is "near miss", but that it still had something else as truly referential uses. It goes just nearly wrong when the single thing was a little misdescribed. Only in referential cases it may "go wrong for miles." IV 165 Reference/SearleVsDonnellan: how is it at all possible for speakers to talk about objects? Reference can be made by a variety of syntactic means: descriptions, proper nouns, pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, etc. The point is that the speaker has a certain relationship to them. He must have some linguistic representation. This representation may represent the object from one or another aspect. IV 166 Then under any aspect the speaking is always done. In the absence of knowledge it can then be that the term does not express the aspect exactly. (E.g. that he thinks Smith will be pronounced "Schmidt"). But that must be distinguished from a real confusion. Distinction Meaning/To Mean. Donnellan's cases are quite simple: under any aspect you have to speak, but you are only choosing exactly this aspect. In indirect speech acts they say even a bit more. It is only necessary that the speaker and hearer can identify the subject because of the aspect. (That even works if both think the aspect is incorrect! IV 168 E.g. Both speak of the "king" although they consider him an usurper). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dretske, F. | Lehrer Vs Dretske, F. | Brendel I 218 Knowledge/Externalism/Internalism/Lehrer/Brendel: (Lehrer 1990b. 252) Thesis: LehrerVsInternalism, LehrerVsExternalism: Both answers to the question of what needs to be added to true conviction in order to obtain knowledge are wrong. (Lager) Solution/Lehrer: Thesis: Connection of internalism and externalism: Def knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Is a rational connection of subjective states and truth, of mind and world. [ist eine rationale Verbindung subjektiven Zuständen und Wahrheit, zwischen Geist und Welt.] Three conditions: 1. knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true conviction 2. It must be "articulable" in principle 3. The epistemic subject must know and must be able to recognize the difference between information and misinformation. Metaknowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: The third condition makes it necessary to have the term "metaknowledge". LehrerVsExternalism: Cannot represent metaknowledge (to recognize misinformation in light of my knowledge of information). LehrerVsDretske: Creating information is not a sufficient condition for knowledge; It also needs to know that the information is correct, e.g. defective measuring instruments do not lead to knowledge. I 219 Important argument: the temperature can coincidentally match the one indicated on the display of the defective measuring instrument. Solution/Lehrer: We need Background information (e.g. barn facades) LehrerVsReliability theory: There would not be knowledge there as well. Reliability theoryVsVs: this is only valid for causal theories, die die r.th. selber ablehnt. Causal Theory/c.th.Lehrer/Brendel: It exceeds c.th. if Lehrer demands that the subject can recognize wrong information. LehrerVsExternalism/Brendel: By recognizing misinformation any variety of externalism must be rejected as well. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Dummett, M. | Schiffer Vs Dummett, M. | I 221 Verificanistical semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): verification conditions instead of truth conditions. Dummett: (like Davidson): we must ask what form a meaning theory (m.th.) would have to take to find out what meaning is. This M.Th. should be able to specify the meaning of all words and propositions. (Dummett 1975, p. 97). Dummett: pro compositionality (with Wittgenstein): no systematic meaning theory is possible without explaining the understanding of infinitely many sentences. Therefore one must, like Chomsky and Wittgenstein, accept that we have an implicit capture some general principles. (Dummett 1978, p. 451). DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain any truth theory (tr.th.). Verification condition/verification conditions/Dummett: (for propositions) the verification conditions are also recursively specified. Schiffer: but that does not follow that a compositional truth-theoretic semantics does not exist as well. I 222 Dummett: with the specification of the verification conditions the meaning theory could at the same time specify the truth conditions (Dummett 1978 Foreword). Verification conditions/SchifferVsDummett: it is not clear how the verification conditions should look like. Relation theory/meaning theory/Schiffer: when I argued VsRelation theory, I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics (tr.th.sem.). Otherwise, it would be true!. Verificationist meaning theory/Verif. m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: with a verificationist meaning theory could the relation theory maybe also be true?. I 225 Use theory/Dummett/Schiffer: for Dummett the point of use theory is: "the meaning of a word is uniquely determined by the observable characteristics of its linguistic use". (Dummett 1976, 135). SchifferVsDummett: but what counts as "observable characteristic" and what as "openly shown" ?. Does Dummett think that a description of the use in purely behavioral, non-semantic and non-psychological terms would be sufficient that a word has a specific meaning? That would be too implausible as that Dummett would accept that. Still, he notes that the description should not use any psychological or semantic terms. Meaning/Dummett/Schiffer: should therefore also become understandable for beings who have no semantic or psychological concepts themselves! So even for Marsians. (Also McDowell understands him like this, 1981, 237). McDowellVsDummett: according to Dummett it must be possible to give a description of our language behavior that is understandable for extraterrestrials. That does not work, because the intentional "(content-determining) is not reducible to the non-intentional. Content/McDowellVsDummett/SchifferVsDummett: is not detectable for extraterrestrials. ((s) Not "speechless", but only those who do not share our intentional vocabulary). I 226 Ad. 4: ("To know which recognizable circumstances determine a proposition as true or false"). Schiffer: that means how do we get from behaviorism to anti-realism?. Manifestation/SchifferVsDummett: this one makes do here even with pronounced psychological terms!. 1. Recognizing (that the conditions are met) is itself a form of knowledge, which in turn contains belief. You cannot describe that non-psychologically. 2. How can one then achieve the further conclusion that a purified attribution should ascribe a skill that can only be "openly shown"? (The showing understood behavioristically). Behaviorism/Dummett/Schiffer: However, I am not ascribing any behaviorism to Dummett, I ascribe him nothing, I just wonder what his position is. meaning theory/m.th./Dummett: thinks that natural languages have a m.th.! Their core will be recursively definable verif. cond.. Anti-Realism/Schiffer: here Dummett is uncertain whether the m.th. should have falsification conditions, but that will not affect my subsequent criticism. 1. Whether the knowledge that a state of affair exists, counts as verification of a proposition. I 227 Could depend on extralinguistic knowledge and not by the understanding of the proposition! We usually need background information. Understanding/SchifferVsDummett: then it should not be about verification conditions!. Direct verification conditions/Dummett: has to exist for each single proposition!. QuineVsDummett/Schiffer: (Quine 1953b): direct verification conditions cannot exist for every proposition. ((s) ~Theories are not verifiable proposition by proposition). 2. Surely there are meaningful propositions that have no recognizable conditions that would turn out this proposition as true or false. Dummett/Schiffer: insists, however, that a proposition must be shown as true or false and in fact "conclusively" (conclusive verifiability). (1978, 379). This leads to anti-realism. ((s) Def anti-realism/Dummett/(s): is exactly to demand that the verification must be performed in order to understand a proposition. The realism would waive the verification.) Anti-realism/Dummett: you still should not rely too heavily on the anti-realism! Because often a "conclusive verification" is not to obtain!. Schiffer: so Dummett itself holds the verification conditions contestable!. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett quotes Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behaviors can be refuted. (Dummett 1978, S. XXXV) SchifferVsDummett: then the m.th. needs contestable criteria as well as contestable conditions!. Problem: this applies to most empirical judgments E.g. "That is a dog". 3. We know what kind of semantic values we must attribute to the non-logical constants (predicates and singular term) in the conditional sentences in a truth-theoretic semantics. But how shall that look like in the alternative with verification conditions instead of truth conditions?. Solution/Dummett: the verificationist semantics will make every predicate an effective means available, so that it can be determined for each object whether the predicate applies to the object or the singular term references to the object. I 230 Relation theory/SchifferVsDummett: the by me disapproved relation theory for propositional attitudes (belief as a relation to belief objects) seems inevitable for Dummett. ((s) because of the relation of predicates to objects to which they must apply verifiable). Problem: that can only happen in a finite theory, and for propositional attitude it would have to be infinite, because for each prop the VB would have to be found individually. Relation theory/Schiffer: has to assume propositional attitude as E.g. "believes that Australians drink too much" as semantically primitive - namely, 2-figure predicate between believer and content). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Empiricism | Goodman Vs Empiricism | IV 17 Empiricism claims that knowledge depends on experience. GoodmanVs: this can be misleading: because the dependence is mutual: experience also depends on knowledge. Routine often goes unnoticed. Beliefs and expectations provide category systems. Background knowledge is almost always necessary. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Evans, G. | Verschiedene Vs Evans, G. | Frank I 571 Background/VsEvans: Question: is the following not unnecessarily involved? 1. a knowledge of what it means that any item is F, and 2. a knowledge of what it means that any object is a. The second would be a piece of knowledge of exactly the same kind as the first. So you may not have to assume that there are singular thoughts that somehow more closely contain the exercise of this knowledge and consequently you need not to have a notion of basic identification! EvansVsVs: a knowledge of what it means that something is F is a knowledge of how it is that any element of the objective order is F, and correspondingly for a. I.e. even if one were to drop the idea of basic identification, the overall picture of "I" thinking, "here" thinking and "this" thinking would be fundamentally similar: the role that the notion of the basic level played in this book would instead have been taken over by the notion of the objective or impersonal conception of the world, whereby the mastery of such thinking would be dependent upon an understanding of how it relates to the objectively viewed world. But it is not easy to tell exactly what that means: what it means to know exactly that any element is or is here or I am any element of the objective order! It is not clear what we want at all with this demand, if we do not assume that the subject formulates the truth of such statements Fra I 572 and can make decisions under favorable circumstances. It also seems that we could not make such an assumption at all: (Section 6.3 (not in this file): "Reference system": Reference System/Evans: such a thinking mode will not be able to reach a higher degree of impersonality. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Friedman, M. | Fraassen Vs Friedman, M. | I 109 Theory/Fraassen: it could be argued that a theory as a whole needs to have more properties than just acceptability. Local Property/Theory/Friedman: E.g. that a theory explains a particular fact Global Property/Theory/Friedman: Science teaches more a global than a local understanding, it’s not about understanding individual phenomena. (FN 15). Explanation/Friedman: relation "theory T explains phenomenon P": in general regularities, which are represented by law-like sentences. I 110 K: is a set of law-like sentences (background theory) S: a candidate for an explanation (law, theory, hypothesis) of P P: can itself be represented by law-like sentences. Def Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff. P is a consequence S, relative to K, and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. Def Relative Consequence/Friedman/Fraassen: A is a consequence of B relative to K iff. A is consequence of a B and K together. FraassenVsFriedman: he has to modify the concept "reduces" in the following, and then he does not do anymore what Friedman needs. (FN 16). Explanation/Friedman/Fraassen: interesting about his approach: we evaluate an explanandum relative to a Background K. 1) Suppose a theory contained additional information that is not law-like, E.g. the age of the universe (boundary condition), but of course it cannot contain all our knowledge. 2) relative to K implies that P (the sentence about the phenomenon) is true. I suppose that Friedman wants to weaken this Hempel-like condition in the sense of Salmon (The probability does not have to be high). 3) Problem: it is the character of K plus additional information, considered as a complex theory, that determines whether we have an explanation. ((s) I.e. it would depend on accidental previous knowledge or the age of the universe, if something is an explanation). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Heidegger, M. | Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. | I 165 Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology. I 178 HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one. I 179 HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence. I 180 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence. The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation). I 182 HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason. I 183 HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Hempel, C. | Nagel, E. Vs Hempel, C. | Schurz I 93 Law of Nature/LoN/Schurz: strict spatio-temporally unlimited universal sentences are candidates for LoN. If they were true, they would express real LoN. They are called lawlike. I 94 Lawlike/Schurz: spatio-temporally unlimited E.g. All objects attract each other ((s) only true if protons, electrons, etc., are not objects.) E.g. All living things must die spatio-temporally limited: E.g. mammals in polar regions have - compared with their counterparts in warmer areas - a more rounded shape (Germann's law). Scientific/Schurz: depends on the size of the area in this case. Universal Sentence/Schurz: to avoid differences of degree they were called fundamental and derived universal sentences Def Fundamental Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: does not contain any individual constants and no spatio-temporal limitations. Def Derived Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: can be derived from background knowledge from other universal sentences together with singular starting conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: according to this, no accidental universal sentence can be a derived law: E.g. "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/Nagel: only fundamental universal sentences can be laws. Hempel: admitted this, thus the lawlikeness remains gradual! Lawlike/Statistics/Schurz: even here there is lawlikeness: E.g. 50% of all cesium-137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. E.g. 80% of all lung cancer patients used to be heavy smokers. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Black Vs Hume, D. | III 80 Deduction/Hume/Naturalistic fallacy/Black: the core of the argument is that in a deduction nothing can follow that is not already contained in the premises. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: but there is a way how new evaluative or normative material can appear in a valid conclusion: E.g. premise: you cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. (This can be seen as factual) But it follows now: Conclusion: if you want to make an omelet, eggs should be broken. Hume/Black: What he means is that no categorical or unconditional "should" follows. BlackVsHume: that seems convincing at first glance. But: Problem: the absence of the word "should" is not a reliable criterion. E.g. the fact that murder is a sin implies the conclusion that you should not kill. But how are we to judge based on the mere linguistic form that the premise is non-normative. Now one could say that the sentence about murder is unverifiable. III 81 Behind this are difficult questions about how we are to understand the objectives and procedures of science. Science/Black: should we see it as a special way of approaching truth, or as a discipline that shares the objectives of the whole spectrum of activities which are after the truth? BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe that certain categorical sentences with "should" have a truth value! I.e. they can be recognized as true without reference to hopes and wishes. Then Hume is mistaken if he assumes them to be different from scientific principles. knowledge/Values/Standards/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (beyond the narrow sense of science) knowledge can be understood in a way that some normative and evaluative sentences can be known to be true. If that is the case, Hume’s argument caves in. Then moral and practical questions can no longer be easily separated logically from scientific truths. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume/VsHume: many contemporary authors reject his argument (of the separation of science from moral sentences). III 81 Ethics/Morals/Values/Standards/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume’s criticism of the naturalistic fallacy is valid, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious background. We must assume that in order for a rational discourse becoming possible at all. III 82 BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: Then even in the case of a logical separation of factual and normative or evaluative sentences it is the introduction of certain generally acceptable non-factual premises that would enable the derivation of normative conclusions. In addition: (see below): every representation that regards scientific propositions as isolated, is one-sided. The biggest problems of neutrality are not affected by the assumed gap between the factual and the normative. If we look at science as something concrete, things look different. BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: is one of the great half-truths or popular mistakes of Western culture. We should be wary of the following syllogism: 1) Science is a good thing 2) Science is necessarily neutral 3) Therefore scientific neutrality is a good thing. This might well be true for "bad" instead of "good". |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Searle Vs Hume, D. | II 101 Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle. II 102 Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow. II 103 Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself). II 104 Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.) II 156 Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience! SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power. II 170 Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world. II 171 I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume. II 173 SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity. II 174 There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Internalism | Lehrer Vs Internalism | Brendel I 38 Internalism/Knowledge/Brendel: Thesis: It is demanded that there is a connection - known to the subject- to truth-producing facts. VsInternalism: Was sacrificed in Gettier's examples. I 219 LehrerVsInternalism/Brendel: But the internalist consistency of information with background information is also not yet sufficient for knowledge, e.g. evil demon. I 220 Demon/Internalism/Brendel: Thesis: The subject is justified to believe in simulation by a demon that the object (which is only simulated) stands before him. LehrerVsInternalism: E.g. suppose the demon forgets to manipulate the subject's brain cells for a moment: Internalism: Thesis: At that moment, the subject has knowledge. Lehrer: No, the subject does not have knowledge since it needs to recognize the situation. Solution/Lehrer: The Background system must not contain any false assumptions. Externalism/Lehrer/Brendel: this is Lehrer's externalist component. Def knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Unrefuted justification. 4 Adequacy Conditions: 1. p is true 2. S accepts p 3. S is fully justified to accept p 4. S is fully justified to accept p in a manner that is not based on any false statement. Coherence/Lehrer/Brendel: Thesis: The central term for Lehrer is the coherence with a system of acceptance. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Searle Vs Kripke, S. A. | Wolf II 30 Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality. Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a Background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions. Searle II 292 SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception. II 293 By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular. II 294 Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose". According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for? Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all. II 295 Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island? II 296 Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory. II 346 A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content. II 297 But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection. II 298 E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory. II 346 The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition. II 300 E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses. Searle IV 179 KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks. IV 179/180 Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker. The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention. SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them. E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention. IV 181 Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary. There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent. Stalnaker I 173 SearleVsKripke: (Searle 1969 (1)) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation I 174 SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969(2)) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense". I 175 And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that. Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object. Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above). 1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 93 2. Ibid. p. 80 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Lakoff, G. | Searle Vs Lakoff, G. | IV 199 Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean) IV 201 Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself. IV 202 They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule. Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained. IV 203 Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features. IV 204 SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?"). Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Popper, K. | Schurz Vs Popper, K. | I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities must agree with them when the objective probabilities are known. Lewis: (1980): singular principal principle: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear which property a singular propensity should correspond to at all. Solution/de Finetti: you can also accept the objective probability concept at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on any experience date E(b1...bn) about other individuals b1,...bn it is important to derive two further versions of the principal principle: 1. Principal Principle for random samples used for the subjective justification of statistical likelihood intuition 2. The conditional principal principle, for the principle of narrowest reference class and the inductive statistical specialization conclusion is subject. Principal Principle: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r Principal Principle for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk mal (1 r)n-k. Conditional Principal Principle: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,…bn)) = r. Principal Principle: is only useful for subjective a priori probabilities. I.e. belief degrees of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual Belief Degree/Belief Degree: the principle does not apply generally for it: for example if the coin is already showing head (=Fa) the belief degree of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. Apriori probability function: here all Background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedens of a conditional probability statement w( - I W). actual: = personalistic. apriori probability: connection with updated probability function: Strict Conditionalization/Schurz: w0 is the a priori probability or probability to t0 and w1 the current probability. I 116 Wt is the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A applies: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Narrowest reference class/n.r.c./Principle/Schurz: can be justified as follows: for a given event Fa, the individual can belong to a great many reference classes that assign very different probabilities to Fx. Then we got contradictory predictions. Question: but why should the appropriate reference class be the narrowest? Because one can prove that it maximizes the frequency value of true predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and Background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and Background. (Each with its own Background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special Background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own Background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Einstein Vs Quantum Mechanics | Esfeld I 256 Incompleteness/Quantum Mechanics/QM/EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics: For example, suppose two electrons are emitted from one source and move away with opposite spin in opposite directions. Overall state: singlet state. Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen/EPR: if the result of a measurement of the location or momentum of one system is given, then we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the same observables of the other system. (without intervention) I 257 Consequence: the quantum mechanics is incomplete. There is therefore an element of reality that corresponds to this physical quantity regardless of whether the second measurement is actually performed. This exists before the first measurement. The quantum mechanics is incomplete because it makes everything dependent on the measurement and therefore does not recognize this element. To justify this one needs the two principles of separability and local effect. Local Effect: to exclude that there is an interaction between the measurement on the first system and the reality on the second system. Separability: to exclude that the determination of the local properties depends on something other than the state the system is in. Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics: further conclusion: quantum systems simultaneously have a definite numerical value of two or more incompatible observables. I 258 For example, an experimenter only decides clearly after the emission which observable he wants to measure. Separability and local effect imply that this decision is irrelevant. Nevertheless, once the decision has been made, we can predict the value of the corresponding observable for the other system. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: therefore the two systems must have a definite value of all observables between which the experimenter can choose. Einstein did not consider this conclusion to be self-evident because it is based on the assumption of separability and the local effect. I 271/272 Metaphysics/Science/Esfeld: Separability and local effect are metaphysical principles in the sense that they are a precise formulation of assumptions that are at the center of our everyday view of nature. I 271/272 The question of whether quantum mechanics is complete also seems to be a metaphysical question. It depends on whether we underline separability and local effect as the foundation of science. Bell's inequality/Bell/Esfeld: Bell has eliminated the seemingly clear distinction between physics and metaphysics! Metaphysics: Einstein's realism shows that metaphysics has predictable consequences that can be tested. "Experimental Metaphysics"/Shimony: (Ferdinand Gonseth, 1948, Michele Besso, 1948): are similar to Quine's position: rejection of the separation between mathematics, science, and philosophy. Every element of our knowledge can be subject to revision. I 273 Thesis: metaphysical questions cannot be decided by experiments! On the contrary: EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics must be understood in the sense of the Quine-Duhem-Thesis: no separation between metaphysics and physics in quantum mechanics. For example, Bell's experiments can be seen as a test of two hypotheses, namely the conjunction of parameter independence and result independence. But the point is: what you think is what the Bell experiments confirm or disprove depends on what Background assumptions you base yourself on. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 216 Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics/EPRVsQM/Genz: incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics: Spin has an element of reality. Since quantum mechanics can only consider one of these elements of reality, it is incomplete. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument/Version Bohm: For example, a part of it rests in the laboratory and decays in a time interval into an electron and a positron. (There is no such thing, but it does not matter). (In the real experiment (Aspect) photons were assumed). If Gretel detects the electron, she can be sure that Hänsel has the positron. From a quantum mechanical point of view, the particle pair is a single system. VIII 216 The angular momentum of the particle decaying in its resting system is zero, since the conservation law applies to the angular momentum, it is also zero for the decay products. If, however, only the spins of the particles contribute to their total angular momentum, the law of conservation becomes a conservation law for the sum of the spins. Consequently, the two spins remain coupled. But now the coupling of the spins to the total spin zero guarantees more: that the sum of the settings of the spins in any direction is zero. If the total spin were not zero, it could be that it is zero in x direction, but not in y direction. VIII 217 Example Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm: Problem: Gretel can align her star Gerlach apparatus as she wants. The alignment of the device determines which component of the spin of the entering particle should have a "sharp" value with spin 1/2. Hänsel and Gretel choose directions for x or y (perpendicular to the direction of propagation z). Since the two particles fly apart, the chirality is different! Both now want to measure "transversal" spins perpendicular to the extension. VIII 218 Gretel: measures in x direction plus or minus. If she turns the apparatus by 90°, she measures in y direction, again plus or minus. N.B.: Hänsel always measures the opposite. If Gretel has the apparatus in the same direction as Hänsel, she measures the opposite of his spin. If she now turns it in y direction, she has to measure the opposite again, even if Hänsel has not turned his apparatus. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: now claim that Gretel can use it to determine Hänsel's spin in both the x and y directions without disturbing Hänsel's positron in any way. Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: actually it is not the case according to quantum mechanics. Before the measurement it is pointless to speak of a state at all. VIII 219 Bertlmann's Socks/Genz: are not particularly exciting. Corresponds to the "glove correlation": if I find one, I know that I have lost the other. VIII 220 Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: also the spin operators of the positron do not exchange with each other, but a statement about the "sum" is valid: σxσy - σyσx = 2iσz. Translated into the formalism of quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen is that the state | > of the positron must be both an eigenstate of σx and of σy for certain eigenvalues mx and my. But the quantum mechanics does not know such a state! Unlike the product of operators, the product of eigenvalues is independent of the order! 0 = (mxmy - mymx) | ψ > = (σxσy - σyσx) | ψ > = 2iσz | ψ >, so that | ψ > of σz would have to be destroyed (σy | ψ > = 0). But because σz, just like σx, and σy can have only 1 and -1 but not 0 as eigenvalue, there can be no such state! But the contradiction is one between the formalism of quantum mechanics and the demands of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and none with experimentally verifiable statements. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 62 FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both. Fodor II 114 Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar. Fodor/Lepore IV 54 Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely: IV 52 Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.). IV 76/77 Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note IV 237 13> IV 157 o Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!. IV 218 Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Searle, J.R. | Davidson Vs Searle, J.R. | Davidson I (b) 36 John Searle: It is incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to interpret one and the same thought or utterance of a person properly. I (b) 36 DavidsonVsSearle: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. I (b) 37 The threat which Searle and Fodor believe to recognize is a completely different one: one with regard to the condition according to which the meanings intended for the identification of thoughts used entities are somehow "captured" by consciousness so that they themselves would have to point out the thoughts as different, as long as these entities are different. DavidsonVsSearle: E.g. as if the difference between 1 meter and 100 centimeters was a difference in tape measure itself. Searle II 149 Causality/Searle: From this follows that causal laws express contingent truths!. DavidsonVsSearle: therefore, it depends only on the description whether events are logically linked or not. Searle IV 98 Metaphor/Searle: Problem: that with some metaphors such as: E.g. "Sally is a block of ice" we know exactly what is meant, but for others E.g. "Sally is a prime number 17-23" we know it less. Question: how can speakers saying something if they do not say what they mean? And why do some metaphors work and others do not?. Divergence of utterance meaning and word meaning. Recognized by speaker and listeners. (DavidsonVsSearle). IV 99 Even the relation between word and sentence meaning plays a role. Metaphorical meaning is always the utterance meaning. IV 116 Metaphor/Cavell: E.g. "Juliet is the sun": the day begins with Juliet: Searle: here, background knowledge about the work is necessary. Similarity/Searle: meaningless predicate: all objects are similar in one respect or another. IV 117 There are many metaphors in which similarity does not play a role at all: sun gas ball, block of ice human Nevertheless, E.g. "Sally is a bonfire" is a very different statement than "She’s a block of ice". IV 118 Comparison theoryVsSearle: "cold" is also metaphorical. SearleVsVs: this does not sting, the difficulty is that there are apparently no literal similarities between unfeeling humans and cold objects. IV 120 The sole fact that theory is so difficult to explain makes it implausible. Nevertheless, it is no difficulty for a native speaker to understand "Sam is a pig". It does not help to say that sweet things and sweet people are pleasant. IV 107 SearleVsComparison theories: allegedly, metaphors contain a comparison or a similarity between objects which is alluded to. IV 109 Searle: absurd question: E.g. "With which block of ice do you compare Sally?". IV 110 Searle: although similarity plays a role in understanding, the metaphor is not a finding about a similarity. A metaphor can remain true, even if the similarity turns out to be wrong. (for example, because gorillas are gentle). IV 111 Solution: The statement is only about Richard. The truth conditions are not helpful either if gorillas are gentle and Richard is cold. |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from Background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our Background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific Background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Tradition | Searle Vs Tradition | II 28 Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. II 49 SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience! SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength. II 190 Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski. II 191 This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained. II 192 They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the Background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently! The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. II 228 Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. " II 231 According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.) II 232 SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). II 246 de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states. III 165 Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true! Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects). V 176 Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology. IV 155 Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of Background assumptions without being ambiguous. ((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation). IV 156 SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence. IV 157 There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Cognitivism | Black, Max | III 81 BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe certain categorical sentences with "should have a truth value"! I.e. they can be recognized as true, without reference to hopes and desires. Then Hume is wrong when he assumes them to be different from scientific propositions. knowledge/Values/Norms/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (further than the narrower sense of science) knowledge can be understood in such a way that some normative and evaluative propositions can be known as true. Ethics/Morality/Values/Norms/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy is correct, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious Background. We must assume this in order for a rational discourse to become possible at all. |
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| Understanding | Searle, J.R. | VI 69 Meaning/ to mean / understanding / Searle: has to do with the background (knowledge) but not with special syntactic forms. |
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