Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burke, Michael | Simons Vs Burke, Michael | I 195 Interrupted Existence/Simons: interrupted existence met us in connection with temporal sums and products and will meet us again below in connection with superposition (to be in the same place at the same time). Anyway, it is not clear to decide if it exists: E.g. an artifact can be taken apart and reassembled, for example for maintenance or repair. Here, we will say that it exists again when it resumes its old function. I 197 E.g. if some parts are scattered and may be lost and must be replaced by other parts it is a matter of chance. Then the question is whether an object exists in the state, not only dependent on the current physical state and on the history but also on the further course of development, and that seems wrong. Artifacts/Simons: of course, the conditions for the survival of artifacts are vague. We certainly allow the replacement of parts. E.g. a machine that is fed with any powder and water and busts of Mozart are made of it. After a while, the busts are crashed and the powder is filled again in the machine. Then again a bust of Mozart is made. Should it be the same? No, because the atoms are in another place. E.g. variant: in the variant Mozart and Beethoven busts are produced alternately. Then the case would be clear anyway. (For the defenders of continuity): there is a new bust every time, despite the complete continuity. Stronger example: Chisholm's toy castle: here the building blocks are always in the same place. E.g. Michael Burke: a table is created with thirty blocks, then disassembled and with the same building blocks a chair and a bird house are created. Then again a table. I 198 Burke: 1. The table ended its existence when being disassembled: 2. The same table is created again. Simons: then the continuity theorists are in trouble no matter what strategies they apply. But Burke leaves the way open for them to deny Identity across the gap: they can still claim that the example corresponds to the one of the busts, despite the fixed localization of parts: a new table is always created out of old material. BurkeVs: pro Identity. SimonsVsBurke: Burke's arguments for Identity are less convincing than for the ends of the existence of the table. His point is rather that so well controlled interruptions are ontologically harmless and not one has to search the traces of parts across the gap. "continuity Theory"/terminology/Simons: the continuity theory is the thesis that the "old" existence is resumed after the interruption. SimonsVs: it paid a price for it: namely the exaggeration of objects which are broken down into its parts or duplication of objects that do not take place. Simons: but both views seem benign: each has its arguments. The only problem is that the two are contradicting each other. This can be seen with e.g. the Ship of Theseus. I 199 Ship of Theseus/Simons: problem: there are conflicting claims: between a) the "Collector": he places value on substantive continuity and b) the "Pragmatist": he wants functional continuity. Problem: both sides have complementary things that speak for each of them. Wrong solution: "relativized Identity": then both sides would virtually no longer "touch" each other but that would not explain why there is a problem at all. SimonsVsBurke: that the type of an object is a function of its properties is regardless of it wrong: e.g. objects that are needed in a community: there are many pairs of objects which are physico-chemically exactly alike but belong to different types: e.g. holy/normal water, real/ perfectly counterfeit banknotes, originals/replicas, wedding rings/other rings, maybe also person/body. Of course, each of these objects falls under a higher sortal. Burke: thesis: various substantive objects cannot be simultaneously embodied in one and the same matter. SimonsVsBurke: on the contrary, e.g. (see above) different boards may have the same members. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Simons Vs Essentialism | I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same. Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub. Simons: this is the only example of "person and object". I 273 As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table: N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c]) Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...". Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected. Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the Identity of the table with the sum)! I 275 SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom. I 276 (...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm. SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such Identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change. I 278 Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally. Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music"). I 338 Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.) Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori. E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada. continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms. |
Peter Simons I P. Simons Parts Oxford New York 1987 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Bubner Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 44 BubnerVsHegel: shortens the concrete liveliness of Platonic dialogues to external reflection, because of his own strong understanding of methods. Plato's dialogues do not permit a clean separation of the philosophical statement from the pictorial decoration. To leave their mysteriousness standing demands the active cooperation of the conscious participant. I 47 At no point does the exact knowledge of the method correspond in a way with its practice that no rest would remain. Plato's method never represents the goal, but serves the better knowledge. I 49 Otherness/Hegel: the other is to be taken as isolated, in relation to itself, abstract as the other. not of something, but as the other of itself. BubnerVsHegel: the fascination of recognizing a basic form of one's own science of logic carries Hegel's interpretation far beyond Plato. He reads into Plato an Identity of Identity and difference that only German idealism has fully articulated. I 72 Paradoxes/Movement/Zenon/Hegel: Hegel adopts Aristotle's solution: the introduced distinction of two aspects in space and time, namely continuity and discretion. Bubner: but this is unhistorical, because Zenon could not yet have been aware of it. Solution: the continuum introduced by Aristotle makes the infinite divisibility of space and time compatible with its unity. Hegel: "the equality of oneself, continuity is the absolute connection, the extinction of all differences, all negatives, of being-by-oneself. The point, on the other hand, is the pure being-by-oneself, the absolute discriminating and abolishing of all equality and connection with others. These two, however, are set in space and time in one, space and time thus the contradiction (!). It is closest to showing it by movement: For in movement, the opposite is also set for the imagination. BubnerVsHegel: here Hegel discovers more than the translation gives. It is anachronistic to elevate Zenon to a dialectician. But anachronisms are the price of structural comparisons that are philosophically illuminating. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hintikka, J. | Quine Vs Hintikka, J. | I 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory. I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of Identity conditions. If no Identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed. Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations. Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification. I 139 Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes. I 140 Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby (2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby) Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E). Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from (3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby) i.e. (3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby. ... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise: (4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x) i.e. (5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is. Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke). Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is. HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it. I 141 Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway. I 145 HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of Identity. Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time. I 146 Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the Identity of these objects are pointless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them? Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited. Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds: Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator. ((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish). Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out. Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above) Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds). HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of Identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met. On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world. Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same. I 147 Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic. HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play. Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form (18) (Ex) K(b = x) and equally of (19) (Ex) K(b = x) become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences! Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description. I 148 World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form "knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19). HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. I 160 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same. The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question. I 161 Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hume, D. | McGinn Vs Hume, D. | I 86 Main tradition: retains the mentalist conception of self but explains self identity with the help of certain psychological conditions. (Hume) Russell: characterizes "the self as a series of classes of mental individual things" (as opposed to the "Needlepoint self"). The temporal Identity exists then because there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the self. The individual states of a person, etc. are connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. I 87 A mysterious substance that were constitutive for the self does not exist. Only the continued existence of the psychic relationships. McGinnVs: there are systematic problems with the concepts of necessity, sufficient condition and circularity. It is also easy to come up with counterexamples. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Nagel Vs Metaphysics | I 126 Moore's Hands/NagelVsMoore: Moore commits a petitio principii by relying on the reality of his hands, because if there are no material objects, not even his hands exist, and he cannot help to clarify this. III 105 Identity/Person/Personal Identity/Temporal/Objectivity/Subjectivity/Nagel: Problem: the search for the conditions that must be met to be able to attribute two temporally separate experience episodes to the same person. Attempted solution: Continuities of physical, mental, causal or emotional nature are considered. Basic problem: even if an arbitrary number of conditions is satisfied, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject under these conditions! (s) E.g. "Is it the same subject for which this causal continuity applies?" etc.). Nagel: E.g. "Would this future experience indeed be my experience?" III 106 Person/Identity/NagelVsMetaphysics: even assuming a metaphysical ego, the question arises again. If, on the other hand, temporal Identity was given solely by that it is still my ego, it cannot be the individual whose persistence guarantees my personal Identity. Outside perspective: here, the problem seems not to exist anymore: people arise and pass in time and that is how they must be described! Subjective Perspective: here, the question of Identity appears to have a content that cannot be grasped from any external description. III 107 You can inwardly ask about your identity by simply concentrating on your current experiences and determining the temporal extent of their subject. For the concept of the self is a psychological one. III 124 NagelVsMetaphysics/Problem: as soon as these things become part of the objective reality, the old problems arise again for them! It does not help us to enrich our image of the objective world by what the subjective perspective reveals to us, because the problem is not that anything has been omitted. This also applies to the prophecy (brain research) that the mental phenomena as soon as we will have understood them systematically, will be counted among the physical phenomena. NagelVsPhysicalism: we cannot solve these problems by incorporating everything in the objective (or even only the physical) world that is not already contained in it. Perhaps distancing and transcendence does simply not lead to a better description of the world. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Montague, R. | Hintikka Vs Montague, R. | II 97 Quantifier/Natural Language/HintikkaVsMontague: his theory is not appropriate because of his treatment of quantifiers. Terminology: "PTQ": Montague: "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English". Montague: Theses: (i) Meaning entities are functions of possible worlds on extensions. (ii) Semantic objects ((s) words) are connected to meaningful expressions by rules that correspond on a one-to-one basis to the syntactic rules by which the expressions are composed. I.e. the semantic rules work from inside out. (iii) Quantifiers: E.g. "a girl", E.g. "every man". II 98 Behave semantically like singular terms. I.e. E.g. "John is happy" and "Every man is happy" are on the same level. Hintikka: ad (i) is the basis of the possible worlds semantics. (It is a generalization of Carnap’s approach). ad (ii) is a form of Frege’s principle (compositionality). ad (iii) has been anticipated by Russell in Principia Mathematica(1). Individuals Domain/Possible World/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: this is precisely what leads to problems. In particular, in belief contexts. Individual/Montague: individuals are the range of functions that operate as a sense of a singular term. Belief Context/Opaque Context/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague dedicates no special treatment to contexts with propositional attitudes (attitude contexts). E.g. "knowing who", E.g. "remembering where," E.g. "seeing what". This is a deficiency, because Montague had admitted his interest in propositional attitudes. W-Questions/Who/What/Where/Hintikka: Thesis: are nothing more than quantified phrases. II 99 logical form: (1) John knows who the prime minister of Norway is analyzed as a that-construction: (2) (e.g.) John knows that (the Prime Minister of Norway = x) (= de dicto) Problem: you have to specify the individuals domain over which the variable "x" goes ((s) quotation marks from Hintikka). de re: (de re interpretation of (1)): (3) (Ex) (x = Prime Minister of Norway & (Ey) John knows that (x = y)) De Re/De Dicto/Hintikka: de re does not entail de dicto, i.e. (3) does not entail (2). ((s) Because otherwise omniscience would follow again). Knowledge/Hintikka: we do not need to analyze it here as the relation to the alternatives, which singles out one and the same individual in each possible world compatible with the knowledge. HintikkaVsMontague: problem: all this does not work in the context of Montague. Problem: in the natural extension of Montague semantics, which we are considering here, the following sentences are all valid: (4) ((x)(Ey)(x = y) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) John knows that y = z))) II 100 Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows of every currently existing individual who that is (de re). (5) (x)(Ey)(John knows that (x = y)) > (Ey)(y = x & (Ez) Bill knows that (y = z))) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: Bill knows of every individual whose Identity is known to John who this individual is (again de re). Problem: both are blatantly false. Non-Existence/Hintikka: However, that is not a problem as long as we do not need to consider the possible non-existence of individuals in epistemically possible worlds. Hintikka: Problem: but that does not change the problem. Possible Non-Existence/Hintikka: we do not allow it here, i.e. every individual is somehow linked to one or another individual in every possible world. Terminology/Kaplan/Hintikka: "TWA" "Transworld Heir Line" ((s) same pronunciation) world line that links an individual between possible worlds. Individual: it follows that every individual is well-defined in all possible worlds. This means that the sentences (4) and (5) are valid in our extension of Montague semantics. TWA/World Line//Hintikka: therefore, we must also allow the world lines to break off somewhere and not to be continued ad libitum. Non-Existence/Intensional Logic/Montague: according to Montague’s thesis we need not worry about possible non-existence. For one and the same individual occurs in every possible world as a possible denotation of the same name (name phrase). ((s) Because the individuals domain remains constant). HintikkaVsMontague: that is precisely why our criticism applies to Montague. Non-Existence/Montague Semantics/Hintikka: how can his semantics be modified to allow for possible non-existence in some possible worlds?. II 101 Important argument: Knowing-Who/Knowledge/Hintikka: for John to be able to know who Homer was, it is not necessary that his knowledge excludes all possible worlds in which Homer does not exist. Quantification/Opaque Context/Belief Context/Hintikka: therefor,e we need not assume with the quantification in intensional contexts that a world line exists that connects an existing individual in all knowledge worlds accessible to John. Solution: All we need is that we can say for each of these possible worlds whether the individual exists there or not. ((s) I.e. we do not allow any possible worlds in which the question of the existence or non-existence is meaningless.) E.g. I.e. in this example we only have to exclude those worlds for John, in which it is unclear whether Homer exists or not. World Line/Hintikka: this shows that world lines are independent of the question of the possible non-existence. Quantification/Intensional Contexts/Epistemic/Hintikka: i.e. an existence theorem with quantification in an epistemic (opaque) context E.g. (6) (e.g.) John knows that F(x) can be true, even if there is no world line that singles out an existing individual x in any knowledge world of John. Important argument: but it must always make sense to ask whether the individual exists in a possible world or not. Non-Existence/Hintikka: So there are two possible ways of failure of existence: a) non-existence b) Non-well-definedness (i.e. it does no longer make sense to ask whether an individual exists). World Line: breaks off in both cases, but there is a difference. TWA: can only be drawn if there is comparability between possible worlds, and that is no longer the case in b). II 102 Comparability/Hintikka: always needs regularity (continuity). E.g. spatiotemporal continuity. HintikkaVsMontague: with this distinction we move away from his oversimplified semantics with constant individuals domain. W-Questions/Non-Existence/Hintikka: Variant: Problem: (7) John knows that Homer did not exist. I.e. in every epistemically possible world of John Homer does not exist. This implies that it makes sense to ask about the existence. Uniqueness/Existence/Hintikka: i.e. we must distinguish between existence and uniqueness (determinacy) of an individual. Non-Existence/Hintikka: non-existence does not make the Identity of the individual unknown. ((s) otherwise the question would not make sense). II 103 Non-Existence/Not Well Defined/HintikkaVsMontague: Montague semantics does not allow the question of the existence or non-existence to be pointless, because an individual in a possible world is not well defined. ((s) Because the individuals domain is assumed to be consistent in Montague). Individuals Domain/Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow the domain of individuals to be inconsistent. But problem: Quantification/Belief Context/Existence/Truth/Hintikka: In the following example, we must presuppose existence, so that the sentence can be true: (11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is, too. ((s) the same unicorn). ((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)) Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural interpretation of (11) it must be assumed that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a longer range than "is looking for". ((s) I.e. both are looking for the same unicorn. Problem: how can you know whether both subjects believe in the same individual or have it in their heads?) ((s) >Geach E.g. „Hob, Cob, Nob, Hob/Cob/Nob E.g. (Geach 1967, 628) Cresswell. II 142 (Needs quantifier that is simultaneoulsy inside and outside the range of the attitude verb). Hob/Conb/Nob-E.g./Geach/(s): ~Hob believes that a witch killed his sow and Nob believes that it is the same witch who bewitched Cob’s horse: problem: the sentence must be true in order to preserve the ordinary language meaning of "believe". On the other hand, it must be wrong, because there are no witches, exacerbation: "the same witch" poses an additional condition to the truth of the sentence. The demanded Identity makes it harder to simply say that the three believe something wrong). II 103 Existence/W-Question/Unicorn/Hintikka: nevertheless, example (11) shows that the reading should not oblige us to assume the existence of unicorns. Non-Existence/Epistemic Context/Intensional/Belief/Hintikka: it is obviously possible that two people can seek the same thing, even if it does not exist. Solution: We allow that well-defined individuals do not exist in some possible worlds. For this purpose, only a slight modification is necessary. Problem: in more complex sentence, all the problems resurface: II 104 E.g. John does not know if unicorns exist, yet he is looking for a unicorn, because Mary is looking for one. Problem: here John must be able to recognize a particular unicorn. (because otherwise the sentence that uses "it" would not be true) although he is considering possible non-existence. World Line/Hintikka: to expand the Montague semantics we have to allow more or less unnatural world lines. HintikkaVsMontague: according to his semantics all sentences of the following form would be valid: (8) John knows that (Ex) (x = a) > (Ex) John knows that 0 (x = a) ((s) i.e. conclusion from de dicto to de re.) Everyday Language Translation/Hintikka: John knows the reference of a name immediately if he knows that the name is not empty. That is, of course, often wrong. World Line/Hintikka: therefore, the world lines cannot be identical with lines that connect names with their references. ((s) Otherwise again a kind of omniscience would follow. Moreover, it implies that names are non-rigid.) Species/Common Noun/Hintikka: the same applies to common names (generic names): They cannot identify the same individuals in all possible worlds, otherwise sentences like the following could not be analyze in the possible worlds semantics: E.g. (9) John holds this bush for a bear. Perception Concepts/Perception/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsMontague: here there are further problems: E.g. all sentences of the following form become contradictory accoridng to Montague semantics: (10) (Ex)(Ey)(x = y & it appears to John visually that x is right of y). I 105 SIolution: It may well be that John sees an object as two. World Line: can split or merge. But according to Montague semantics they are not allowed to! World Line/Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: a typical case would be if there were two sets of world-lines for one set of possible worlds, these also connected every individual with an individual in another possible world, but the two sets differed in which individual is connected with which. Perception: we need such a possibility for perception verbs ((s) because it may be that you confuse one object with another. Elegance/Theory/Cantor/Hintikka: elegance is something for taylors, not for mathematicians. II 106 Quantification/Quantifiers/Ambiguity/Any/HintikkaVsMontague: All in all, the Montague semantics shows how ambiguity is caused by the interaction of quantifiers and intensional expressions. E.g. (12) A woman loves every man (13) John is looking for a dog. HintikkaVsMontague: only explains why certain expressions may be ambiguous, but not which of them actually are. In general, he predicts too many ambiguities. Because he does not consider the grammatical principles that often resolve ambiguities with quantifiers. Range/Hintikka: determines the logical sequence. Quantifier/Quantification/Each/He/Montague/Hintikka: E.g. (14) If he exerts himself, he will be happy (15) If everyone exerts themselves, they will be happy. Problem: in English "if" has precedence over "every" so that "everyone" in (15) cannot precede "he" as a pronoun ("pronominalize"). II 107 HintikkaVsMontague: So we need additional rules for the order of the application of rules. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Parfit, D. | Lewis Vs Parfit, D. | IV 55 Identity/Continuity/Survival/Person/Lewis: Problem: we asked a question and got two answers: a) Identity: can only be total Identity. b) continuity: can be gradual. Which of these two should be relevant for survival? If we had to choose, we should prefer everyday platitude to philosophical subtlety. The only hope is that Identity view and continuity version are somehow reconcilable. That I would like to defend VsParfit. IV 57 Identity/Continuity/Person/Parfit: Thesis: not both answers (continuity and identity) can be right, so we have to choose. a) Identity: is a relation with a certain formal character: it is one to one and cannot be gradual. b) continuity: (and connectedness) (e.g. in relation to mental things) can be one to many or many to one as well as gradual. Parfit: therefore it is the continuity and connectedness that is relevant to personal (temporal) Identity (survival). c) what is important for survival is not Identity! At most a relation that coincides with Identity to the extent that problem cases do not occur. LewisVsParfit: someone else could just as well represent the argument in the other direction and make Identity relevant. And of course, Identity is what matters in the end! Therefore, the divergence between a) and b) must be eliminated! I agree with Parfit that continuity and connectedness are crucial, but it is not an alternative to Identity. Border case/Parfit: Problem: Border cases have to be decided arbitrarily somehow. Identity/continuity/survival/Person/LewisVsParfit: the opposition between Identity and continuity is wrong. Intuitively, it's definitely about Identity. It is literally about Identity! Def Identity/Lewis: the relation in which everything stands to itself and to nothing else. ...+.... R-relation, I-Relation IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connectedness among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the previous ones? But of course there are also I-Relations between the individual states! IV 73 ParfitVsLewis: we should not cross our common views with the common sense. I.e. it is about another sense of survival. For example, shortly after the split, one of the two dP (continuants) dies, the other lives for a very long time. S is the state divided to t0 (before the split), but after it is known that the split will take place. Then the thought that we found in S is the desire for survival, and extremely like common sense and quite unphilosophical. Since S is a shared state (stage), it is also a shared desire. Problem: C2 has the survival he desires and he depends on mental continuity and connection. (RR) but what about C1 (the prematurely dying continuant)? IV 74 Lewis: I had written that what matters is identity in survival. Then for the short-living C1, the stage S to t0 is actually IR to states in the distant future such as S2, namely via the long-living C2! ParfitVsLewis: "But isn't that the wrong person?" Lewis: in fact, if C1 really wants him to survive (C1), then that wish is not fulfilled. (Lewis, however, deals with the more difficult problem): LewisVsParfit: but I don't think he can have this wish! There is a limit to everyday psychological desires under conditions of shared states. The shared state S thinks for both. Every thought it has must be shared. It cannot think one thing in the name of C1 and one thing in the name of C2. If, on the other hand, C1 and C2 are to share something that is understandable in everyday life, then it must be a "plural" wish, "let us survive". Here we must now distinguish between two pluralistic wishes: a) weak: lets at least one of us survive b) strong: lets us both survive. Because these desires are plural and not singular, they are not common sense. This is because everyday psychological survival is understood in terms of survival of dP rather than of relations of states. The weak desire of C1 corresponds to the desire for IR for future states. Then the IR also corresponds to the RR. and the corresponding wish. If C1's wish is strong, he will not be satisfied. Then it does not correspond to the "philosophical wish" either. IV 75 After RR for future stages and parfit is right VsLewis. LewisVsParfit: but should we say that C1 even has this strong desire? I don't think so. Because if C1 can have it, C2 can also have it. Example Suppose (according to Justin Leiber): a wish is recorded from time to time, but deleted after a certain time. This corresponds to the weak desire for survival, but not the strong one. Suppose the recording takes place at the time of the split, C1 dies shortly afterwards due to an accident. C2, survives. Additional complication: C" then undergoes a body transplant. If his desire to survive is to be fulfilled, then it is predominantly the weak desire. Person/Survival/Identity/LewisVsParfit: For example, until now we had assumed that both knew before the split that there would be a split. Now Suppose (variant): both do not know about the coming split. Question: can we not perfectly share the wish: "Let me survive"? Problem: that C1 and C2 share the desire is based on the false presupposition that they are one person. I.e. the "me" is a wrong identification. It cannot refer to C1 in C1' thoughts and not to C2 in his thoughts. For these thoughts are one and the same. Vs: but their desire to survive is fulfilled! At least that of C2 and that of C1 is not different. Then their wish cannot only consist in the unfulfillable singular wish. They must both also have a weak pluralistic desire, even if they do not know the division beforehand. N.B.: that then also applies to all of us, although we are not often divided, many of our current desires are not current occurrences: E.g. The desire to be spared unimaginable pain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Russell, B. | McGinn Vs Russell, B. | I 86 Main tradition: retains the mentalist conception of self but explains self identity with the help of certain psychological conditions. (Hume) Russell: characterizes "the self as a series of classes of mental individual things" (as opposed to the "Needlepoint self"). The temporal Identity exists then because there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the self. The individual states of a person, etc. are connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. I 87 A mysterious substance that were constitutive for the self does not exist. Only the continued existence of the psychic relationships. McGinnVs: there are systematic problems with the concepts of necessity, sufficient condition and circularity. It is also easy to come up with counterexamples. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their Identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows Identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the Identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical Identity is a necessary condition of personal Identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented Identity, then there is no Identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal Identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal Identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the Identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for Identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about Identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of Identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal Identity | Lewis, D. | IV 58 Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a specific relation and attachment among person states. Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: which of the permanent persons are identical with the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! (see below I-relations also exist between several things (other than Identity). Thesis: every state (of a person) is I-relative and R-relative to exactly the same states. And also for all possible problem cases. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: Thesis: both are identical because they are coextensive! |
|
| |||