Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Berkeley | I 224f Absolute/time/space/science/BerkeleyVsNewton: there is no absolute time, no absolute space, absolute motion, absolute power. I 225 A force cannot be the cause of another force, only God is cause. >Cause, >Causation, Causality, >Forces. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Absoluteness | Field | III 48 Absolute Point of Rest/Newton/Field: Newton considers absolute rest possible and necessary to define absolute acceleration (bucket experiment). Absolute Acceleration/Newton: uses the laws of mechanics for explanation - acceleration can only be explained by absolute speed. For this we need an absolute point of rest. FieldVs: that does not work, because the theory itself cannot pick out a reference system. >Reference systems. III 49 MachVsNewton: theory change, does not need a resting point. FieldVsMach/FieldVsTheory Change: better: define acceleration without numerical speed and resting point. FieldVsTensors: they are arbitrary. Solution/Field: simultaneity. Point: sameness of place over time is absolute rest. Vs: that does not work within Newton's theory! Solution: concept of space without structure (intrinsic). Solution: affine geometry - (this also for Newton). IV 419 Relativism/Absolute/Field: statements about justification relative to a system are absolutely true or false. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Absoluteness | Fraassen | I 46 LeibnizVsNewton: VsAbsolute Space. - Fraassen: One cannot assume absolute space or absolute motion; there can be no experience of them. >Absoluteness/Feynman, >Space, >Motion, >Empirical Adequacy/Fraassen. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Axioms | Einstein | Genz II 320 Axioms/Einstein: axioms are at best suggested by the experience but not by induction. EinsteinVsNewton: thus axioms are Vs "hypotheses non fingo". |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Colour | Carnap | VI 126 Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity. VI 102 Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> Unit Sets. VI 152 Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity). >Experience. Then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do. >Perception, >Phenomena, >Qualia. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Empiricism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Positivism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Equilibrium | Newton | Kanitscheider I 119 Equilibrium problem/Newton: revived by Feynman: Problem with a static universe with finite matter density: if matter is evenly distributed, how can a body stay in the middle without moving if the slightest disturbance triggers all possible movements. If one does not want to claim divine help, the only consequence seems to remain to accept an infinite amount of matter, which balances out all disturbances. Newton: that's a fallacy: not all infinite sizes are the same! (Newton himself, however, felt that his teaching was compatible with a theistic attitude). Disturbances/LaplaceVsNewton: the planetary system is stable in the long term, the disturbances of certain planets are not arbitrarily strong, but balance out in the long term. Newton had embraced permanent corrective interventions. >Universe/Kanitscheider, cf. >Relativity theory, >Natural laws, >Laws/Newton, >Laws. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Numbers | Frege | II 18 f Numbers/Frege: e.g. 16 = 4², 4 x 4 = 4². Here we see that equality of meaning does not lead to equality of thought. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Thoughts, >Equality, >Equations. II 66 ff The figure contains the expression of a concept. >Concepts. Properties will be expressed by a concept. A concept may fall under a higher one. E.g. there is at least one square root of 4. This is not a statement about a certain number 2, nor about -2, but about a concept, namely the square root of 4. II 81 f There are no variable numbers. Variable: do we not denote variable numbers by x, y, z? This way of speaking is used, but these letters are not proper names of variable numbers, like "2" and "3" are proper names of constant numbers. We cannot specify which properties "x" has in contrast to y. >Variables. Variable: is not a proper name of an indefinite or variable number. X has no properties (only in the context). "Indefinitely" is not an adjective, but an adverb for the process of calculating. Generality/Frege: generality is not a meaning but a hint. Proper Names: π, i, e are not variables! Generality: here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. Function: has generality, is a law. To any number of the x-range a number from the y-range is assigned. A function is not a variable! (An elliptic function is not an elliptic variable). The function is unsaturated. >Unsaturated. II 77 Number/object/calculating/addition/Frege: only from the meaning of the words "the number 4" (Frege: = object) we can say that it is the result of combining 3 and 1. Not of the concept. Calculation result: is an object, the result of the calculation: is not a concept. II 85 Number/Frege: e.g. "a variable takes on a value". Here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. I 38 Numbers/Frege: from physical observations no conclusions can be drawn about numbers. I 47 Quantity/Frege: quantity is a concept. Number: is an object. >Objects. I 48 Numbers/Newton: numbers are the ratio of each size to another. FregeVsNewton: here, the notions of size and ratio are presupposed. I 49 Numbers/Frege: Problem: numbers as sets: here, the concept of quantity is pressupposed. I 60 Number/Frege: number is no multiplicity. That would exclude 0 and 1. I 62 Number/one/unit/property/Frege: "One" cannot be a property. Otherwise, there would be no thing that does not have this property. I 82 Not the objects but the concepts are the bearers of the number. Otherwise, different numbers could be assigned to the same example. Thus the abstraction is accompanied by a judgment. I 90 A number is not the property of a concept. Number: is an abstract object, not a property -> see below. Number Equality/equality: number equality is a concept (not an object). I 100/101 Def Quantity/Frege: the quantity which belongs to the concept F is the scope of the concept equal numbered to the concept F. I 100 Scope/concept scope/Frege: if the straight a is parallel to straight b, then the scope of the concept of straight parallel to straight a is equal to the scope of the concept straight parallel to the straight b and vice versa - scope equality. >Term scope, >Equality. I 110 Number/Frege/(s): comes from the distinction concept term scope (quantity)/object (number). If the object is zero, the quantity that belongs to this concept is one. ((s) This is how Frege gets from 0 to 1: one is the number-of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero", namely one object. Zero ist the number of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero-and-not-equal-to-zero"). >Zero, >One. I 121 Numbers/Frege: numbers are not concepts. They are (abstract) objects (see above). Quantities are concepts. I 128 Term: e.g. square root of -1. This cannot be used with the definite article. I 135 Number/Frege: a number is neither heaps of things, nor a property of such. I 130 Number system/expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning is not be established arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already invariably established before the definitions, but it is determined by them. ((s) Frege: wants to point at the meaning as use within a system.). The new numbers are given to us as scopes of concepts. I 136 Each figure is an equation. >Equations. Berka I 83 Number/Frege: numbers must be defined in order to be able to present completeness of evidence at all - (> sequence).(1) 1- G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Positivism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Empiricism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Space | Newton | Genz II Empty Space/Newton/Genz: Thesis: this opposes acceleration with resistance. MachVsEmpty Space/MachVsNewton: Empty space is not detectable. > Substantivalism., >Relationism. Genz II 338 Space/Newton/Genz: the Newtonian laws, instead of a space, know only one equivalence class of spaces which differ according to direction and constant velocity. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Terminology | Leibniz | Holz I 12f Monadology/Monads/Leibniz: nobody will take monadology today simply as an explanatory scheme, but as a model response to possible problems that arise in the question of the unity of the manifoldness and the overall context. I 24 Pre-stabilized harmony/Leibniz: this reciprocal relation, regulated in every substance of the world from the beginning, which produces what we call its intercourse, and which alone constitutes the union of soul and body. "The hypothesis is quite possible." (LeibnizVsNewton: Newton: "hypotheses non fingo"). "It is a wonderful idea of the harmony of the universe and the perfection of the works of God." I 48 Ratiocinatio/Leibniz: Ratiocinato is building a theory of argumentation chains about an object. Obtaining true sentences. I 49 Monad/Leibniz/Holz: title for the unity of the substantial and the structural aspect of being, as substance and concept of structure in one. The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent, the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connection) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. I 109 Windowlessness/Monad/Leibniz: states that in metaphysical severity changes of a substance result only from internal processes,... I 110 ...because they alone are the manifestations of the original force as vis activa and their self-restraint as vis passiva. (No connection to Maturana). There is no means of explaining how a monad could be altered by any other creature, since nothing can be transferred into it, nor can there be any inner movement in it, as can be done in composed things, where there are changes between parts . "The monads have no windows through which anything could enter or get out of them." (KS 441). I 113 Immanence/Leibniz: immanence of the substance in the world Inherent: the world in the individual substance. I 116 Monad/Leibniz: Expressing that substance is only a structural substance. (Determined by the whole of the universe). Soul/Leibniz: how the soul forms the structural unity of its body and the latter disintegrates when the soul escapes, so the monad is the unit-forming structure of the material body. I 117 Monads/Leibniz: they must be real units "animated bodies" (not just mathematical points). Solution: their nature must be in force. But as the soul may not be used to provide information on details of the animal organism,... I 118 ...we must assume the monads as the original forces. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Kant | Verschiedene Vs Kant | Kanitscheider I 434 KantVsNewton: Infinite unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: unimaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Kanitscheider I 441 EllisVsKant: (antinomies): the expressions "earlier" and "later" can be related to states before a fixed time t0, without assuming that all these states really existed. Just as one can speak of a temperature of 0 K, even if one knows that this temperature cannot be reached. Kant I 28 VsKant/Causality: Of course, he does not adhere to this himself! His critique of reason is about more than possible experience (namely about metaphysics through freedom and thus about the absolute value of our existence). Here Kant's concept of causality shows itself to be completely unaffected by Hume. - Intelligent Cause. I 47 Mind: has its own causality: "spontaneity of concepts". (VsKant: untouched by Hume). Antinomy of Freedom: VsKant: a bluff: we cannot do it with objects, "it will only be possible with concepts and principles that we accept a priori." I 49 Freedom Antinomy: solution: third cosmological antinomy: theme: the third constitution of the world as a whole: event context. - VsKant: Imposition: the "acting subject", i.e. I, should take myself as an "example" for things! It is not in itself subject to the condition of time. Spontaneous beginning of events. I 53 Freedom/Kant: The freedom of the other would be uncertain. VsKant: A freedom that could be both mine and that of the other cannot be thought of in this way. - VsKant: he misappropriates the problem of identification with the other. (> intersubjectivity, subject/object). I 52 For Kant this was not a problem: for him the rescue was not in the world of appearances. Concept: Predicates only have to be consistent. I 66 SchulteVsKant: this only applies to objects for which it can always be decided, not to chaotic diversity. I 67 Predicate/Kant: Kant simply omits the negative predicates. I 68 I 69 MarxVsKant: Dissertation from 1841: Kant's reference to the worthlessness of imaginary thalers: the value of money itself consists only of imagination! On the contrary, Kant's example could have confirmed the ontological proof! Real thalers have the same existence as imagined gods". I 104 Only through this idea does reason a priori agree with nature at all. This prerequisite is the "expediency of nature" for our cognitive faculty. > Merely logical connection. - VsKant: actually relapse into "thinking in agreement". Die ZEIT 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink: Rawls) RawlsVsKant: religiously influenced Manichaeism. Because the "good ego" that lives in the intelligent world of understanding is threatened by the "evil ego" of the natural world of the senses, moral action must be anchored in the belief that it is God's will to realize the "supreme good" of existence in accordance with the ideal realm of purposes. Moral/HegelVsKant: in a well-ordered state with a functioning legal system, the individual does not have to be committed to morality, but acts voluntarily in accordance with the moral constitution of bourgeois society. Menne I 28 Kant: transcendental reasoning of logic. It must apply a priori. Kant: analytical judgement: so narrowly defined that even the largest part of mathematics and logic falls within the realm of synthetic judgement. MenneVsKant: if he wanted to justify logic from the twelve categories, this would be a circular conclusion. Vaihinger I 333 Thing in itself/F.A. LangeVsKant/Vaihinger: If the thing itself is fictitious, then also its distinction from the apparitions. ((s)Vs: the distinction is only mental, not empirical). Vollmer I XIV World View/Konrad LorenzVsKant: in no organism do we encounter a world view that would contradict what we humans believe from the outside world. Limit/Lorence: The comparison of the world views of different species helps us to expect and recognize the limitations of our own world view apparatus. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
| Mach, E. | Field Vs Mach, E. | III 48 Newtonian Spacetime/Field: here the lack of a full Euclidean structure shows in two ways: 1) you cannot objectively compare spatial distance with time distance. And that although such a comparison could be arbitrarily defined: E.g. by saying that the spatial distance between two points should be equal to a temporal distance if the temporal distance is the same as for a certain uniform movement in the Bureau of Standards. ((s) Third aspect: to set speed in relation to temporal and spatial distance). 2) (In order to explain this, we need to come to the subject of the absolute rest point (absolute rest): In the Newtonian system, this only makes sense in relation to an arbitrarily chosen coordinate system. Absolute Rest/Rest Point/Newton/Field: He himself considered them as possible in his system. And also as necessary in order to define absolute acceleration. He did that in his famous bucket experiment. Absolute Acceleration/Newton: ....Thesis: absolute acceleration is needed to explain the laws of mechanics. Absolute acceleration, in turn, can only be explained by absolute speed, and if that is supposed to make sense, we need an absolute rest point (absolute speed = 0). FieldVsNewton: ...that does not work at all, because the theory itself cannot single out a reference system (rest frame) for the determination of absolute speed. MachVsNewton/Solution: a change of physical theory: to one that does not use absolute acceleration. III 49 FieldVsMach: it would be better to avoid changing theory. That means we treat absolute acceleration without assuming that it is defined by numerical speed. Absolute Acceleration/FieldVsNewton: we can have it without an absolute rest point. PlatonismVsNewton/Absolute Acceleration/Earman/Friedman/Field: Also a Platonic construction with 4-dimensional tensors is known and popular among science philosophers of today. FieldVsTensors: these are again arbitrary. (see below). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Newton, I. | Berkeley Vs Newton, I. | John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 318 Bucket Experiment/Newton/Gribbin: Newton: the water "knows" whether it moves relative to space - because: a) both at rest: flat, b) bucket accelerated against water: flat - c) both rotate: concave - d) bucket stops (again water moves against bucket) concave - BerkeleyVsNewton: not the absolute space, but the distant stars are decisive - > Mach's principle. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Newton, I. | Leibniz Vs Newton, I. | I 24 Pre-established Harmony/Leibniz: The relationship which is pre-regulated in all substances of the world, and which yields what we call its interaction [Verkehr]; Pre-established harmony creates the connection of mind and body. "The hypothesis is entirely possible." ["Die Hypothese ist sehr wohl möglich."] (LeibnizVsNewton: Newton: "hypotheses non fingo"). "Pre-established harmony is a wonderful idea of the universe's harmony and the perfection of God's work." ["Sie ist eine wunderbare Idee von der Harmonie des Universums und der Vollkommenheit der Werke Gottes".] |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Newton, I. | Verschiedene Vs Newton, I. | Feynman I 669 With sound waves, we should expect the temperature to rise in an area of compression. Newton assumed that the changes were too sudden. This is wrong. LaplaceVsNewton: the changes of pressure and temperature are adiabatic. However, this is negligible as long as the wavelength is long compared to the mean free path length. (Order of magnitude: in audible sound, the wavelengths are longer by the factor 1 million). There is a small absorption of the sound energy by the heat flow. The actual pressure change with the density in a sound wave is that which does not allow heat flow. This corresponds to the adiabatic change. John Gribbin Schrödinger's Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 85 FresnelVsNewton: if we let parallel light fall on a dark disc while the surroundings are completely translucent, the disc will cast a shadow with a bright spot in the middle. The experiment proved Fresnel was right. ("Oisson's spot") 1819. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Newton, I. | Einstein Vs Newton, I. | Feynman I 217 EinsteinVsNewton: mass increases with increasing speed. I 228 Lorentz Transformation/EinsteinVsNewton: modified mass: momentum: still mv. Still valid: action equals reaction, conservation of momentum. But the size that remains is no longer the old mv with constant mass. Kanitscheider I 167 Field Equations/Einstein/Kanitscheider: describe the mutual influence of matter and spacetime. EinsteinVsNewton: space-time and matter are causal partners - space-time itself has physical properties. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Newton, I. | Feynman Vs Newton, I. | I 211 Non-conservative Forces/FeynmanVsNewton: Do not exist, Newton: thought that friction was non-conservative - Solution: invisible shifts in piles or heat, etc. - solution: division into kinetic and potential energy. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Newton, I. | Laplace Vs Newton, I. | Kanitscheider I 119 Equilibrium Problem/Newton: revived by Feynman: problem when static universe with finite density of matter is present: if matter is equally distributed, how can a body hold itself in the middle without movement, if the smallest disturbance triggers all possible movements. If one does not want to take any divine help, only the consequence seems to remain, to accept infinitely much matter, which compensates all disturbances. Newton: this is a false conclusion: not all infinite quantities are the same! (However, Newton himself thought that his teaching was compatible with a theistic attitude). Disturbances/LaplaceVsNewton: the planetary system is stable in the long run, the disturbances of certain planets do not become arbitrarily strong, but balance themselves out in the long run. Newton had assumed permanent corrective interventions. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Plato | Aristotle Vs Plato | Bubner I 23 AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king. Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects. Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. I 120 Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé. I 164 Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. I 165 Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. I 184 Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". --- Kanitscheider II 35 Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe. Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position). "Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number". II 36 Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement. First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified. World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time. AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius: Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help". Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum. II 37 Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Various Authors | Berkeley Vs Various Authors | Ber I 224 Absolute/time/space/science/BerkeleyVsNewton: there is no absolute time, no absolute space, no absolute motion, no absolute force. I 225 Theological root: an idea is not cause of another idea, a force is not cause of another force. Cause of all natural things is only God. Reality/Time/BerkeleyVsNewton: God gives us a sequence of ideas. Therefore, there is no absolute time. Time is the series of these ideas. Bucket Experiment/BerkeleyVsNewton: tries to show that there is no absolute space, but its refutation is flawed. Yet there is no absolute space. Science/VsBerkeley: how is a natural science possible at all, if all perceptions are not confused, but directly caused by God? Solution/Berkeley: just as he clings to the reality of things, he also clings to the regularity of natural phenomena, which could also be broken by him as a result of the Creator's goodness and wisdom. Ber I 212 BerkeleyVsScholasticism: its "pros and cons" (Sic et Non) had become fashionable. Mirror only uncertainty. Since Descartes: there have been attempts to escape the controversy by withdrawing to unquestionable knowledge in order to begin a new construction. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Various Authors | Duhem Vs Various Authors | I XXIII DuhemVsLord Kelvin: (in which mechanical models play a fundamental role). Kelvin: If I have a model, I understand, if I have none, I do not understand. - Today more set-theoretic models that Duhem certainly would not have challenged. I 254 DuhemVsMaxwell: Helmholtz established an electrodynamic theory which arises completely logically from the best-supported principles of the theory of electricity, in which no fallacies occur in the formulation of the equations, which are so common in the works of Maxwell. I 115 Newton Thesis: in healthy physics, every theorem is deduced from the phenomena and generalized by induction (DuhemVs). I 255 DuhemVsNewton: on closer inspection, the method is not as strict and simple as Newton claimed. I 257 Question: is this principle of universal gravitation then rather a simple generalization of two expressions provided by Kepler and extrapolated by Newton on the satellites? Can induction derive it from these principles? DuhemVsNewton: not at all! In fact, it is not only more general than the two expressions, it is not only different, it contradicts them. If the theory of Newton is correct, Kepler’s laws are necessarily false. I 261 DuhemVsAmpère: The mathematical theory of electrodynamics is not derived solely from experience: the raw facts of the experiment as they are by nature would not be accessible to the mathematical treatment. They must be reformed and brought into symbolic form. (Ampere did this in reality) I 263 DuhemVsInduction: The need for the physicist to express the experimental data symbolically before introducing them into his thoughts, makes the purely inductive path unusable! I 357 DuhemVsEuler: Euler follows a circular argument: Definition: A force is the force which brings a body from rest to movement. (everyday language use). I 355 We would say instead: A body which is not subjected to any force remains motionless. A body that is subjected to a constant force moves at constant speed. If the force with which a body is moved is increased, the speed of that body is increased as well. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Various Authors | Frege Vs Various Authors | Brandom II 83 FregeVsBoole: no material contents, therefore unable to follow scientific concept formation. Boole: "scope equality". Frege I 32 Addition/Hankel: wants to define: "if a and b are arbitrary elements of the basic series, then the sum of a + b is understood to be that one member of the basic series for which the formula a + (b + e) = a + b + e is true." (e is supposed to be the positive unit here). Addition/Sum/FregeVsHankel: 1) thus, the sum is explained by itself. If you do not yet know what a + b is, you will not be able to understand a + (b + e). 2) if you’d like to object that not the sum, but the addition should be explained, then you could still argue that a + b would be a blank sign if there was no member of the basic series or several of them of the required type. Frege I 48 Numbers/FregeVsNewton: he wants to understand numbers as the ratio of each size to another of the same kind. Frege: it can be admitted that this appropriately describes the numbers in a broader sense including fractions and irrational numbers. But this requires the concepts of size and the size ratio!. I 49 It would also not be possible to understand numbers as quantities, because then the concept of quantity and the quantity ratios would be presumed. I 58 Number/Schlömilch: "Notion of the location of an object in a series". FregeVsSchlömilch: then always the same notion of a place in a series would have to appear when the same number occurs, and that is obviously wrong. This could be avoided if he liked to understand an objective idea as imagination, but then what difference would there be between the image and the place itself?. I 60 Frege: then arithmetic would be psychology. If two were an image, then it would initially only be mine. Then we could perhaps have many millions of twos. I 64 Unit/Baumann: Delimitation. FregeVsBaumann: E.g. if you say the earth has a moon, you do not want to declare it a delimited one, but you rather say it as opposed to what belongs to Venus or Jupiter. I 65 With respect to delimitation and indivisibility, the moons of Jupiter can compete with ours and are just as consistent as our moon in this sense. Unit/Number/Köpp: Unit should not only be undivided, but indivisible!. FregeVsKöpp: this is probably supposed to be a feature that is independent from arbitrariness. But then nothing would remain, which could be counted and thought as a unit! VsVs: then perhaps not indivisibility itself, but the be considering to be indivisible could be established as a feature. FregeVs: 1) Nothing is gained if you think the things different from what they are!. I 66 2) If you do not want to conclude anything from indivisibility, what use is it then? 3) Decomposabiltiy is actually needed quite often: E.g. in the problem: a day has 24 hours, how many hours have three days?. I 69 Unit/Diversity/Number/FregeVsJevons: the emphasis on diversity also only leads to difficulties. E.g. If all units were different, you could not simply add: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1..., but you would always have to write: 1" + 1"" + 1 """ + 1 """", etc. or even a + b + c + d... (although units are meant all the time). Then we have no one anymore!. I 78 ff: ++ Number neither description nor representation, abstraction not a definition - It must not be necessary to define equality for each case. Infinite/Cantor: only the finite numbers should be considered real. Just like negative numbers, fractions, irrational and complex numbers, they are not sense perceptible. FregeVsCantor: we do not need any sensory perceptions as proofs for our theorems. It suffices if they are logically consistent. I 117 - 127 ++ VsHankel: sign (2-3) is not empty, but determinate content! Signs are never a solution! - Zero Class/FregeVsSchröder: (> empty set) false definition of the zero class: there can be no class that is contained in all classes as an element, therefore it cannot be created by definition. (The term is contradictory). IV 14 VsSchröder: you cannot speak of "classes" without already having given a concept. - Zero must not be contained as an element in another class (Patzig, Introduction), but only "subordinate as a class". (+ IV 100/101). II 93 Euclid/FregeVsEuclid: makes use of implied conditions several times, which he states neither under his principles nor under the requirements of the special sentence. E.g. The 19th sentence of the first book of the elements (in each triangle the greater angle is located opposite the larger side) presupposes the following sentences: 1) If a distance is not greater than another, then it is equal to or smaller than the first one. 2) If an angle is equal to another, then it is not greater than the first one. 3) If an angle is less than another, it is not greater than the first one. Waismann II 12 FregeVsPostulates: why is it not also required that a straight line is drawn through three arbitrary points? Because this demand contains a contradiction. Well, then they should proof that those other demands do not contain any contradictions!. Russell: postulates offer the advantages of theft over honest work. Existence equals solvability of equations: the fact that √2 exists means that x² 2 = 0 is solvable. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Various Authors | Leibniz Vs Various Authors | Frege III 54 Number/LeibnizVsScholasticism: Numbers are very well applicable to incorporeal things. Number is something of a "incorporeal figure". What has no parts, has no measure; Something that has neither power nor property cannot be weighed. Hacking I ~ 84 Gravitation/LeibnizVsNewton: Rejected all of the Newtonian concept of gravitation. Obscure. I 27 Principium Individuationis/Negation/Leibniz: The logical aspect as negation, together with the ontological aspect as the reason for the principle of individuation (princ.indiv.) indicates the world as the sum of discrete individual things, and its unity is not a continuum. So the name "world" designates only the connection that we think of! [der logische Aspekt als Negation, verbunden mit dem ontologischen Aspekt als Grund des individuellen Einzelseins (princ.indiv.) führt auf die Welt als Summe diskreter Einzeldinge, deren Einheit kein Kontinuum ist. Dann bezeichnet der Name "Welt" nur den von uns gedachten Zusammenhang!] This is a nominalistic interpretation which Marius Nizolius, a philosopher of the Renaissance, advocated (his writings were published by Leibniz). LeibnizVsNizolius: "Nizolius tries to persuade us that the general is nothing else than the summary of the individual; and when I say "each human is a living being" the meaning is is "all humans are..." This is right but the conclusion is not: that the general term, the general [das Allgemeine], is only a collected whole(totum collectivum). Leibniz: because there is a different type of the differentiated whole: the distributed (distributivum). I 28 "If both were the same, we would (erroneously) say: The human race is a living being." [Wenn beides dasselbe wäre, würde man (fälschlich) sagen: Das Menschengeschlecht ist ein Lebewesen".] ((s) >Distribution). |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Various Authors | Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 433 Infinity/Material Existence/Physics: some models require physical infinity: the hyperbolic world of general relativity theory (AR), the steady astate theory (SST). Infinity/Mathematics/Physics: Gauss: is skeptical about actual infinite quantities. LucretiusVsArchimedes: is infinity mere possibility of an object to traverse new space-time points? (remains a discussion until today). Bolzano: the objective existence of infinite sets cannot fail due to the impossibility of imagining every single object. I 434 NewtonVsDescartes: not "indefinite" but actual infinite space! KantVsNewton: the infinite is unimaginable! NewtonVsKant: not imaginable, but conceptually comprehensible! Riemann: Differentiation infinite/unlimited (new!). Solution for the problem of the "beyond space". Three-ball (S³) conceptually analytically easy to handle. I 435 Sets/infinity: here the sentence: "The whole is larger than the parts" is no longer applicable. (But extensional determination is also not necessary, intensional is enough). Space: Question: Can an open infinite space contain more than Aleph 0 objects of finite size? Solution: "densest packing" of spatially convex cells: this set cannot be larger than countable. Thus no a priori obstacle that the number of galaxies in an unlimited Riemann space of non-ending volume is the smallest transfinite cardinal number. II 102 Measurement/Consciousness/Observer/Quantum Mechanics/QM: Psychological Interpretation: Fritz London and Edmund Bauer, 1939 >New Age Movement. II 103 Thesis: the observer constitutes the new physical objectivity through his consciousness, namely the rotation of the vector in the Hilbert space. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: then there is no definite single state of matter without the intervention of a psyche. 2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: on the one hand consciousness is included in the quantum-mechanical laws, on the other hand it should possess special properties within the observer, namely those which transfer the combined system of object, apparatus and observer without external impulse from the hybrid superposition state into the single state in which the partial elements are decoupled. 3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: strange that the Schrödinger equation, the most fundamental law of quantum mechanics, should not be applicable to consciousness. 4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: also doubt whether the consciousness can really be in the superposition of different completely equal soul states. (Bauer had adopted his thesis from Erich Becher's interactionalistic body soul dualism II 104). I 423 Space Curvature/Empirical Measurement/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Distortion of the triangle formed by the Earth's orbit parallax. Although the curvature factors are not known, one can conclude that if the space is hyperbolic (K < 0), the parallax of very distant stars must be positive. I 424 If you now observe stars with a vanishing parallax, the measurement accuracy provides an upper limit for the value of negative curvature. If the space is spherical - the parallax must be negative. Schwarzschild: in the hyperbolic case, the radius of curvature should be at least 64 light years, in the elliptical at least 1600 light-years. KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: such theory-independent experiments are today rightly regarded as hopeless. I 296 Time Travels/Kanitscheider: VsTime Machine/VsWells: H.G. Wells makes the mistake that he lets the traveler ascend and descend the world line of the earth on the same earthly space point. Exactly this leads to the conceptual impossibility of forward and backward movement in time. Time Travel/General Relativity Theory/Kanitscheider: this changes when matter comes into play. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| absolute | Newton, I. | Field III 48 absolute Beschleunigung/Newton: These wird gebraucht, um die Gesetze der Mechanik zu erklären. Die absolute Beschleunigung wiederum kann nur durch absolute Geschwindigkeit erklärt werden, und wenn das Sinn machen soll, brauchen wir einen absoluten Ruhepunkt. (absolute Geschwindigkeit = 0). (DF). FieldVsNewton: das geht gar nicht, weil die Theorie selbst kein Bezugssystem (rest frame) für die Feststellung der absoluten Geschwindigkeit herausgreifen kann. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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