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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Graeser | Grae I 52 Analyticity/Syntheticity/Graeser: the distinction analytic/synthetic comes from the distinction between reason and truths of fact. >G.W. Leibniz, >Reason, >Truth, >Facts, >Truth of reason, >Truth of facts. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Completeness | Leibniz | Holz I 73 Complete concept/Leibniz: contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind. Cf. >Concept/Hegel. Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid: for him, everything is a truth of reason, or just as well one can say, everything is for him a factual truth! For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts. Overarching general: the one includes its opposite. "the overarching general". |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Reason | Rorty | V 84 Facts/reason/truth/Davidson/Quine/Rorty: the distinction between timeless truths of reason and truths of fact that are time-bound is no longer clear. >Truth of fact, >Truth of reason, >Facts/Rorty. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | Leibniz | Holz I 44 Truth of reason/Truth of facts/Leibniz: Truth of reason: certain simple and original ideas, such as those of identity, are immediately seen as modes or forms of our sense-perception as categories of the givenness of beings. They are not mediated by perception, but are the determinateness of perception itself. >Perception/Leibniz. I 54 Def Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth appears as a statement relation, in which the identity of different things is determined against each other. Def Experience/Leibniz/Holz: experience is the return of something different to their connection in such a relation. Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth is not really in the identity of the subject A = A, but in the return of the predication to the identity of a certain predicate with a certain subject in which it is contained, thereby distinguishing the subject from other subjects. The truth of a proposition states that it can be traced back to an identical proposition (axiom). I 57 Truth/Leibniz: truth appears only mediated, in the medium of its opposite, of appearance (> Appearance/Hegel). Truth of facts/truth of reason/Leibniz: I gain the certainty of the facts, the vérités de fait only by means of their representation on the level of reason - the vérités de raison. This can show me the material truth but only as the not wrong. ((s) Double negation: is weaker.) In the reversal of the method of proof in truths of facts, the variety of experience and the unity of reason stand opposite to each other like a mirror image. I 63 Truth of facts/Leibniz: the truth of facts must exist, if anything should be said at all about the infinite manifoldness, and knowledge should thus be gained. Truth of reasons/Leibniz: truth of reasons is necessary, their opposite is impossible. Truth of facts/Leibniz: truth of facts is contingent, their opposite is possible. Holz: the difference between the two must not be misunderstood, otherwise Russell would be right: I 64/65 Russell: It is nonsense to say of a true proposition that it is not true in the sense of another, apotictically true proposition. ((s), for example, that a truth of reason contradicts a truth of facts). Holz: the difference lies in the argument. For the proof of truth of facts, we must examine the preceding chain of connections and because of the infinite divisibility of the bodies an infinite number of sentences. This can only do the infinite mind of God. >Order/Leibniz. Truth of reason/Leibniz: is the generic term for truths of reasons and truths of facts! The truth attribute of both lies in the fact that in the subject concept all its possible predicates are contained. "Praedicatum inest subiecto". Inclusion of the predicate in the subject: A is contained in Ax or Ax = A + B + ... X. I 66 This inclusion of the predicate is the foundation of truth. This is, according to structure, a reason of reason. >Predicate/Leibniz. Def truth/Leibniz/Holz: is then the constitution of that state in which identity comes to a being or a fact when it enters into a distinction between subject/predicate/definiendum/definiens. This state is where the fact appears as the concept of the fact. Truth is a reflexion relationship. I 68 "Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Nevertheless, he comprehends both of them analytically! Holz: in fact, the relationship is not a formal logical one, but a dialectical one. > Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, is necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason. I 73 Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind. Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid. For him, everything is a truth of reason, or, one can say as well, everything is a truth of facts for him! For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts. Overarching general: the one involves its opposite. Truth/Cognition/Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: This again has the astounding consequence that Leibniz can only speak sensibly of two kinds of truth (truths of facts/truths of reason) when he comprehends the idea of the infinite mind (for which the two coincide) only as a metaphysical auxiliary construction. >Truth of reason, >Truth of facts. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Ultimate Justification | Leibniz | Holz I 50 Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. I 50 Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. I 51 Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category. Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin. Logic/Husserl: Husserl has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content. >Content/Husserl. I 52 Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. I 75 Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! >Reason/Leibniz. Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series. Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all I 83 Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient: 1. Principle of contradiction 2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking. >Principles/Leibniz. HolzVsLeibniz/HolzVsHegel: This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form. Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted. Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate. I 123 Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles: 1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself) 2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all. One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place). I 124 But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths: Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first. According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all. >Possibility/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz. In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible). A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions). From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Leibniz Vs Descartes, R. | Leibniz I 35 "Clear and Distinct"/"Clare et Distincte"/LeibnizVsDescartes: Unsatisfactory, because not clearly determined. Perception: either dark or clear Def clear: either confused or distinct Def distinct: either adequate or inadequate Def adequate: either symbolic or intuitive Def Absolute Knowledge [Vollkommene Erkenntnis]: if it is both adequate and intuitive at the same time Def dark: is a term that is not sufficient for recognition Def clear: is a term if it is sufficient for recognition Def confused: if insufficient indicators can be enumerated separately. ((s) can still be clear, see above). Def distinct: e.g. the coin assayers' idea of gold I 36 Def symbolic: If we do not see the whole essence of a thing all at once, and use symbols there, then knowledge is symbolic. Def intuitive: Is knowledge if it is nevertheless possible to think of different terms constituting the object at the same time (constituting as in "the object shows its terms itself"). Important argument: They are all operationalistic definitions, which is sensible if the terms cannot be dissected further. I 43 Knowledge/Thinking/LeibnizVsDescartes: He needs a true God (who is not a fraud) so that the self-confidence does not remain imprisoned in a content-free "pure thinking in itself". Leibniz: instead: reasoning by truth of fact, e.g. about the ontological status of the world. I 59 LeibnizVsDescartes: To refrain from falling into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of facts must be proved. As such, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant! Construction/World/Experience/Rationality/Identity/Leibniz: The construction of Leibniz' ontology consist in two phases: 1. The possibility to deduce all meaningful, i.e. true and knowledge-contained sentences are shown by reducing them on identical sentences.(Deduction/Reduction). (Prädikative Evidenz). 2. The evidence of identity shall be proved itself as such in the world. The identity as the world's basis shall find its basis once again in the constitution of the world's being. I 78 Proof of God/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: Is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but modified. There is a difference between accepting God as author for the exterior or for the totality of the whole (and as such for the interior as well). I 80 Particulars/Leibniz: Depicts the effects of the interrelationship in itself and obtains the whole. Dual Inclusion: Of the particular in the whole and the whole in the particular. Problem: circular argument Solution/Descartes: Justification by God. LeibnizVsDescartes: This is not possible because metaphysics are based on a complete conjunction. Solution/Leibniz: The function of sensory perception cannot be deceived. I 99 Force/Passivity/Leibniz: Force is also the ability to adapt your own state to the changes of other substances. Sufferance [Erleiden] The original force is twofold: vis activa and vis passiva. Leibniz calls these "force points" also "metaphysical points". I 100 The original force is blocked from all sides by the individual substances which cannot unfold freely. So the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: A simple expansion is not sufficient! Therefore, force needs to be added. I 101 The merely expanded mass does not carry a principle of qualitative differentiation since expansion is purely quantitative. Only then motion and change can happen. Nature needs to be explained from its own definition! I 102 Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: Impenetrability is not sufficient! For Descartes the body was immobile. Substantial being needs a carrier. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
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