Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Instantiation | Bigelow | I 39 Instantiation/Universal/Antisymmetry/Bigelow/Pargetter: Instantiation is an antisymmetric relation: If x instantiates y, y cannot inversely instantiate x. Order: from the antisymmetry arises an order that can be a) linear b) a tree structure. For example, the relation "parents of". >Asymmetries, >Relations, >Universals. I 94 Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above Chapter 2) cannot be a universal itself. (Example: chemical molecules require more than one instance of a universal, the element. Absurd: 2 hydrogen atoms cannot be two different universals within one molecule). Universals/Strawson: (1959)(1) there is a "non-relational connection" between a particular and a universal. Armstrong: (1978)(2): ditto. >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Strawson. 1. Strawson, P.F. (1959). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metyphasics. London: Methuen. 2. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Armstrong, D. | Meixner Vs Armstrong, D. | State of Affairs/st.o.a./Meixner: Def elementary instantiation fact: e.g. that Anna loves Fritz, e.g. that every living being is mortal (includes that every human being is mortal) Def higher level state of affairs: example "that is greater than a transitive relation". Def conjunctive state of affairs: example "that Anna loves Fritz and Is greater than a transitive relation". Def negative state of affairs: e.g. that Nuremberg is not located between Regensburg and Munich Def possibility state of affairs: e.g. that it is possible that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013. Def necessity state of affairs: e.g. that it is inevitable that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013. These classes are not unconnected: every state of affairs is an elementary instantiation state of affairs negative state of affairs: every is also a negative state of affairs by being identical with the negation of its negation. I 122/123 All conjunctive state of affairs are negations of disjunctions of state of affairs. All disjunctive negations of conjunctions of state of affairs, all necessity state of affairs are negations of possibility state of affairs and vice versa. All at least one state of affairs negations of all-state of affairs and vice versa. Meixner: nevertheless it is surprisingly controversial among ontologists whether there are negative state of affairs. Parallel to the discussion whether there are negative universals: ArmstrongVsNegative Universals. MeixnerVsArmstrong: pro negative state of affairs: one cannot deny the sentence A does not express a proposition and thus also a state of affairs. (Although state of affairs is not equal to propositions). ArmstrongVsDisjunctive state of affairs MeixnerVsArmstrong: much clearer is the occurrence of negative and disjunctive state of affairs in names for disjunctive and negative state of affairs: For example, the police inspector is convinced that 1. the gardener or butler is involved in the murder 2. not both 3. no one who is different from both the gardener and the butler (so no one else). Absurd: that the police inspector would not be convinced of any state of affairs as a consequence. He is rather convinced of three state of affairs. I 124 The same can be said for all- and at least one- state of affairs: their names appear in descriptions of the exemplification of propositional attitudes. Here they cannot be eliminated. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Davidson, D. | Avramides Vs Davidson, D. | Avra I 119 Antireductionism/Avramidis: the anti-reductionist does not need to deny thought without language (Thw/oL). But at least one anti-reductionist makes this position incompatible with ontological asymmetry: Davidson: a conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological involves an ontological symmetry. (compare Dav. 1984e and 1982). AvramidisVsDavidson: that does not work: Beliefs/Convictions/Davidson: is essential for all types of thinking. The system (of endlessly interlinked) beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. (94). ((s)> holism). Avramidis: with that he says that there can be no Thw/oL. 1) a being can only have a belief if it has a concept of belief, 2) a being can only have a concept of belief if it is part of a linguistic community. Davidson: more precisely: it does not need to have a concept of a particular belief, only a general one. In order to have a general concept of belief the being must be able to imagine what it is like to be wrong. (Dav 1984e, p. 157) I 120 That requires the idea of an objective public truth (to set up a context of interpretation). (Dav 1984e, p. 157). AvramidisVsDavidson: this can be can denied either by 1) arguing that one does not need the concept of belief to believe or 2) that being a member of a language community is not the only way to obtain the concept of belief. Detecting/Instantiation/Term/Davidson: because of the need of detecting the intersubjective truth we cannot instantiate the concept of belief without grasping itself and having it. I 122 AvramidisVsDavidson: there is a different way to be aware of the distinction subjective/objective I 123 a way which is also open to speechless beings (animals) (106): learning ability in animals. This applies to Bennett’s thesis. Bennett/Avramidis: the awareness of the distinction subjective/objective is sufficient for learning. (correcting things). To do that, speechless beings only have to be able to interact with their environment. VsDavidson; his strict requirement could be interpreted as anthropomorphism. DavidsonVsVs: it comes down to properties of certain concepts, not properties of people. (Dav 1982 S.319). Semantics/Psychology/Davidson: are interdependent. ((s) So no asymmetry but symmetry?). DavidsonVsontological asymmetry. Avramidis: for us, this is a rejection of conceptual asymmetry. (For Davidson as well). I 124 Davidson: rejection of the ontological asymmetry is a consequence of the rejection of conceptual asymmetry. AvramidisVsDavidson: it does not follow. (For the anti-reductionists). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Endurantism | Lewis Vs Endurantism | Schwarz I 32 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points. Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd. Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116). Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time. Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5) e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away. Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation. Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation. Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance. Schwarz I 33 Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them. 1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42. 3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] 4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. 5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. | I 208 Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L". PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there. E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell. I 209 But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time. In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from. Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing. Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs. Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions. But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands. Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions: 1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) states. 2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior. I 215 Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ. Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C. Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent. That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations! The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ". The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures. Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: "No representation, no computation". I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes. d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties. VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either: 1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or: 2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Geach, P. | Wiggins Vs Geach, P. | Simons I 213 "Relative Identity"-view of super position: a) (Representative: Geach): "Sortal Theory" of relative identity: known as "theory R": for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Nicholas Griffin: pro. WigginsVsGeach: that violates Leibniz' law. And because this applies necessarily, the theory is necessarily wrong. DoepkeVsGeach: "relative identity" is only a false name for similarity. b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins' thesis that things that are ever different are always different. GriceVsWiggins: the assumption depends on finding properties in which the objects differ in the times when they are not superposed. Then identity is relative to time. I.e. TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b] Where the quantifier runs only over properties whose instantiation does not include the instantiation of any other property at any other time. This excludes: the property, e.g. to be two years old, e.g. to be ex-president e.g. to be bride-in-spe. Simons: we can call this the relation of "temporal indistinguishability". It is characterized by a limitation of Leibniz's law. I 214 SimonsVsGrice: if we call this similarity "identity", then any other kind of similarity is possible, like for example "surface identity" of a body with its surface. Indistinguishability/Time/Simons: will turn out to be important below (in constitution). System CT/Simons: (see above) with him, we have already rejected "temporal identity". Ad (3): dichrone view of super position: Thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, the gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is replaced by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. For example, a person does not coincide with its body, it transforms into its body (the corpse). (Only if "body" is understood as "corpse", as is often, but not always the case). Dichrone view: Thesis: there is no substrate that survives the change. Change/Diachronic View: Thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic View: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Grice, P.H. | Quine Vs Grice, P.H. | Wright I 198 Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions. Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth. QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Lesniewski, St. | Prior Vs Lesniewski, St. | I 43 Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of non-nominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects. Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first: Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them. Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences. Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question. E.g. if φx is read as "x is red", I 44 then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction) "Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx. To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object. Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φ-ness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate: (λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...") One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation. But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification. E.g. all-quantification of higher order: a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx, i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then something results in either ψ or X. That's alright. Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first: b) C∏φΘφΘ() Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X". AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences. We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows: (A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx this turns the whole thing into: c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx. And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a). This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem. I 45 PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized: For c) gives us e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz) which can be instatiated to: f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y. From this, λ-conversion takes us back to a). Point: λ-conversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λ-abstraction is not bound to an individual variable. So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated. I 161 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the all-class is not empty. Russell himself found this problematic. LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty. Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe. PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious: Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell). But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names! Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a well-formed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true. Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is well-formed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell. I 162 Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: so-called "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names. This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names. So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all. Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation. Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product! And we can construct a name that is logically empty. E.g. the composite name "a and not-a". Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless. Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals. Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higher-order functors, etc.) Basic sentences are something like "x ε a". I 163 Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Lewis, D. | Martin Vs Lewis, D. | Arm II 182 Abwesenheit/Lewis: wie Quines "Anbetrachten" nur eine facon de parler eine "happenstance of idiom". MartinVsLewis/MartinVsQuine: das muß man überhaupt nicht deontologisieren. Anbetracht/Martin: ("sake"): ist der angenommene Nutzen von etwas, durch Instantiation eines Zustands oder einer Bedingung durch eine Aktion oder Unterlassen. Es genügt, daß wir ungefähr wissen, nach was in der Welt wir Ausschau halten sollen, wenn von "Anbetracht" die Rede ist. Auch wenn meistens herauskommt, daß es in Begriffen der theoretischen Physik nicht darstellbar (zu vervollständigen) ist. Aber auf der Ebene, wo wir über die beobachtbare Welt reden ist solche Vollständigkeit unnötig. Abwesenheit/Löcher/MartinVsLewis: auch hier ist eine Deontologisierung überflüssig. Lösung: statt "wie die Dinge sind" sollte man besser sagen: "Wie die Welt ist" oder "Wie es ist" entweder zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort, oder auch ganz allgemein. Dann werden "Dinge" gar nicht erwähnt. Arm II 183 MartinVsLewis: aber der Satz "Es gibt keine Falschmacher für "es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine"" ist genauso ein negativer Existenzsatz. Lösung/Martin: es ist kein negativer Existenzsatz über Dinge, sondern es geht um einen Zustand einer Raumzeit Region. Der Satz über die Abwesenheit von Falschmachern braucht einen Satz über einen Weltzustand als Wahrmacher. Problem: und zwar genauso wie "Es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine". Daher kann er auch nicht gebraucht werden, um zu zeigen, dass der letztere Satz keinen Zustand als Wahrmacher braucht. II 186 Leere/Abwesenheit/MartinVsLewis: dieser will immer den Doughnut ansehen und nicht das Loch. Das kann man aber durchaus konkreter fassen: Bsp wenn wir ein Hemd ohne Flecken aussuchen, dann halten wir nicht nach dem reinen Nichts Ausschau, sondern nach der Abwesenheit von Flecken. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Martin | Place Vs Martin | Arm II 110 Similarity/Martin: must be "exact" if it is to exist between particulars of the same kind. PlaceVsMartin: this is too big a concession to Armstrong according to whom a universal is a kind of particular that is somehow present itself in all instantiations. Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro, like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar so that they can be "of the same kind". And in this sense, they cannot be "inexactly" similar. But to say that it must be "exact" there is merely pleonastic. II 111 Categorical/Dispositional/Property/PlaceVsMartin: misunderstanding: attributed to Place: in his opinion there were two different properties so that the categorical (qualitative) property is the only cause of the dispositional property as effect. PlaceVsMartin: this cannot be my view, because there can never be any causal relation, if no dispositional property connects the two (separately) interacting objects. Place acknowledges the following principles: 1) Hume Mackie Principle causal necessity is a question of the truth of counterfactual conditionals. 2) The truth of counterfactual conditionals depends on the truth of a causal law statement. 3) Ryle Principle: dispositional statements are causal law statements, which are limited to the individual and to the time during which the disposition lasts. 4) Goodman Principle: the truth of a dispositional statement is all that is needed to support the truth of a causal counterfactual conditional. 5) Truthmaker Principle: the possession of a dispositional property consists in a state that cannot be characterized as other than that it is said that it is the state through which the dispositional statement becomes true. Conclusion: the structure must have both dispositional and categorical properties. VsArmstrong: So it cannot be right that all properties are ultimately categorical. pro Martin: the dispositional is just as real and irreducible as the categorical. II 113 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsMartin: I accept their actual existence here and now. But everything that exists is a property of the carrier of the properties, a substantial law of nature that can only be specified by reference to potential future manifestations. That's all there is. This is not about observability, but about the linguistic fact that extends it as far as the entailments of the dispositional predicates extend. (>Truthmaker). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Nominalism | Armstrong Vs Nominalism | Arm III 81 Nominalism/Armstrong: some allow the existence of objective relations of similarity between particulars. But they cannot analyze them in terms of common property, because that would lead them to realism. (Lit: 1978(1), ch 5: ArmstrongVsNominalism). Vs: here: In his opinion there is nothing common of F and G. F is similar to all other Fs, but one other F also resembles many other things. The same applies to the Gs. It is doubtful whether this wavering reason is sufficient to provide the necessary uniform connection between being-F and being-G. 1. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978 Arm II (c) 97 Similarity/ArmstrongVsNominalism: if one, on the other hand, regards the situation in a way where similarity is analyzed in terms of identity: Martin and Armstrong: agree that one thing causes the things it causes by virtue (of a subset) of its properties. If now causally effective property can also be identical between different instantiations, then one can explain why the same property produces the same effect in the same circumstances. Schiffer I 234 Realism/Schiffer: Realism equates these two relations: 1. between name and object 2. between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiates the second. Schiffer: this can be paraphrased: (b) Mother Teresa has the quality of being modest. Here the second singular term ((s) "property to be modest") has the same status as the first one. NominalismVsRealism/Schiffer: reasonable (sensitive) nominalism denies all this. FN I 288 The unreasonable nominalist takes the reference to properties too seriously. E.g. ArmstrongVsNominalism (Armstrong 1978), besides the exchange between Armstrong 1980, Devitt 1980, Quine 1980. (SchifferVsArmstrong) I 235 Schiffer: there is no entity "the quality of being modest" that is related to "modest", as Mother Teresa is related to "Mother Teresa". Understanding/Schiffer: example (a) only requires knowledge (awareness) of Mother Teresa, not modesty. Property/Schiffer: Thesis: Properties do not exist, they are not to be found among the things that really exist. Existence/"there is"/Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Schiffer: nevertheless, the rational nominalist should be careful and not say "there is no quality to be modest". Realism/Nominalism/Referential Quantification/Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer: the dispute arises over what kind of quantification is present in (b). I 236 Nominalism: the apparent singular term refers to nothing at all. The "logical form" of (b) is not Fab With "F" = "x has a", "a" for Mother Teresa, "b" for modesty. But only Fa. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Plato | Meixner Vs Plato | I 104 Exemplification/E./Meixner: the actual (strong, not Meinongean) exemplification has still two forms: the predicative exemplification, in which the exemplified entity y is a predicative universal (U), i.e. a single-digit or multi-digit U, and the type exemplification, in which the exemplified entity is a non-predicative U, i.e. a type-object. Predicative Exemplification: can be traced back to the actuality of instantiation facts. Type Exemplification/Meixner: reminiscent of Plato's "Participation": "x is sufficiently similar to the idea (the type object)". Today: when we think of "beauty" we think of a certain universalism, namely the property of being beautiful (= o1[o1 is beautiful]). Plato: thought on the other hand of a certain type object; the idea of beauty. Participation/Plato: For example, Diotima participates in beauty because it is different from beauty. Meixner: undoubtedly, beauty is now sufficiently similar to beauty (timeless), because it is even identical to it. Thus follows Plato's original interpretation of type exemplification, I 105 that the beauty EXEM T the beauty. It follows that the sentence "Beauty is beautiful" is true! This is the most famous Platonic self-predication. The fact that beauty is beautiful, justice just, ugliness ugly and injustice unjust could perhaps still be accepted. MeixnerVsPlato: Problem: if bravery is supposed to be brave and dirtiness dirty (quite apart from the fact that the idea of dirtiness no longer suits the upscale society of beauty, justice, etc.). It becomes completely implausible with the type object human being: according to Plato's original theory, the type object human being would be a human being itself. (Because of self-identity, not only similarity). Solution/Meixner: each type object (TO) should have a unique property. x EXEM T y = y is a TO and y EXEM P is the y corresponding property. The corresponding property is known to us, namely "the y corresponding property is a one-digit universal and is a fact and actual". Question: is there a better alternative to this exemplification theory? (So not type exemplification as "predicative exemplification turned into non-predicative" as it were?). I 106 Exemplification/Plato/Meixner: originally: mirroring from more or less great distance, where in the borderline case image and original coincide. Participation: here another alternative already suggests itself. Concatenation: also exemplification as concatenation is at least indicated in Plato. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Putnam, H. | Field Vs Putnam, H. | III 113 Pure Mathematics/Putnam: should be interpreted in a way that it asserts the possible existence of physical structures that satisfy the mathematical axioms. FieldVsPutnam: pure mathematics should not be interpreted at all. I 211 Properties/Relations/Putnam: (1970): are predicative, according to them we have a few basic physical prop and rel from which all others are derived: 1st order: Allows no reference to a totality of physical objects when a new property is constructed. 2nd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st order. 3rd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st and 2nd order. - Every physical property appears on any level of the hierarchy -> functionalism. Functional properties are 2nd or higher order properties - the prop that the role has may differ from person to person. I 214 FieldVsPutnam: instead of properties provide instantiations of properties with steps. I 268 Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: ("Mathematics without foundations", 1976b, 1975 "What is mathematical truth?"): Field: Putnam Thesis: the mathematical realist does not have to accept the "mathematical object picture". He can formulate his views in purely modal terms. And that not as an alternative, but only as another formulation of the same view. I 269 Indispensability Argument/Putnam: appear in the subsequent text. Field: If "Mathematics as a modal" logic was really an equivalent description of mathematics in terms of mathematical objects (MO), then it should also be possible to reformulate the Indispensability Argument so that there is a prima facie argument for one or the other kind of modalized mathematics and mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: but Section 6 and 7 show that we cannot formulate the indispensability argument like that: it requires MO and modalized mathematics does not bring them forth. VSVs: but beware: I have not studied all the possibilities. I 269 FieldVsPutnam: his mathematical realism seems puzzling: Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: Thesis: there is a modal translation of pure mathematics: he presents a translation procedure that turns mathematical statements into modal statements, one that transforms acceptable mathematical statements (E.g. axioms of set theory) into true modal assertions that include no quantification, unless it is modalized away. (I.e. no mathematical entities (ME) in the modal statements). I 270 FieldVsPutnam: two general questions: 1) what kind modality is involved here? 2) what benefit is the translation to have? ad 1): Putnam thinks that the "object-image" (the starting position) and its modal translation are equivalent at a deeper level. FieldVs: that’s really not interesting: "mathematically possible" should coincide with "logically possible" in any reasonable view (this is stated by conservatism). ((s) contrary to the above). Important argument: if A is not mathematically possible, then "~A" is a consequence of mathematics - i.e. if A (and then also its negation) are purely non-mathematically, then "~A" is logically true. If Putnam now says that his modal translation involves a "strong and clear mathematical sense of possibility", then a mathematical possibility operator must be applied to sentences that contain ME. However, such a sentence A could also be a mixed sentence (see above, with purely mathematical and purely physical components). I 271 FieldVsPutnam: for purely mathematical sentences mathematical possibility and truth coincide! But then the "modal translations" are just as ontologically committed as the mathematical assertions. FieldVs"Mathematical Possibility"/FieldVsPutnam: we had better ignore it. Maybe it was about 2nd order logical possibility as opposed to 1st order for Putnam? I 271 FieldVsPutnam: what benefits does his modal translation have? Does it provide a truth transfer (as opposed to the transmission of mere acceptability)? And what value has it to say that the mathematical statements are both true and acceptable? Etc. Mathematics/Realism/Putnam/Field: Putnam describes himself as "mathematical realist": Difference to Field’s definition of realism: he does not consider ME as mind-independent and language-independent, but (1975): Putnam: you can be a realist without being obliged to mathematical objects. I 272 The question is the one that Kreisel formulated long ago: the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question the existence of mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: this is puzzling. I 277 Model Theory/Intended Model/Putnam/Field: this morality can be strengthened: there is no reason to consider "∈" as fixed! Putnam says that in "Models and Reality": the only thing that could fix the "intended interpretation" would be the acceptance of sentences that contain "∈" through the person or the community. Putnam then extends this to non-mathematical predicates. ((s)> Löwenheim-Skolem). FieldVsPutnam: this is misleading: it is based on the confusion of the view that the reference is determined, E.g. by causal reasoning with the view that it is defined by a description theory (description theory, (labeling theory?), in which descriptions (labels?) that contain the word "cause" should play a prominent role. (> Glymour, 1982, Devitt, 1983, Lewis 1984). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quidditism | Verschiedene Vs Quidditism | Schwarz I 105 Possible Worlds/Roll/VsQuidditism/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis/Schwarz: uncomfortable notion, two possible worlds could only differ in that things have changed roles. Isn't the term "charge 0" defined by its role in our theories? Lewis ditto. Lewis/N.B.: but this role only serves to fix the property in the real world: in order to earn the designation "charge 0", a property has to play the appropriate role for us. Nothing is said about the role in other possible worlds. Strictly speaking, not the properties but their instantiations play this or that causal role. From this follows: Lewis Thesis: Membership in a perfectly natural class is not a question of causal nomological roles. Role/Quidditism/Lewis/Schwarz: For example, split roles: (Black, 2000(1),95f): Assuming that two fundamental properties have only partially exchanged their roles: e.g. on odd days the particles with charge -1 behave like those with charge 0 and vice versa: nobody would notice anything! (>"If everything were different"/Davidson, >Skepticism/Davidson). We also do not know if we do not live in such a world ourselves! Schw I 106 This is a consequence of quidditism. To avoid it, one would have to say: Solution: VsQuidditism: some of the causal nomological roles are essential to the fundamental properties. So: For example, if something does not behave like charge, it is not charge. 1. Robert Black [2000]: “Aggainst Quidditism”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 87–104 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Prior I 39 Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. I 40 The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.) Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx". But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ". Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur. E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander." logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__". ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies). Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property" logical form: "For a φ, φ __" "Σφφ". (Σ: there is a) Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order. Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's". Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols. That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems. E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..." "If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact. Symbolically: 1. CΠφNφxNψx. I 41 "If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong) 3. CΠφNφx. The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory. Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions). Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented: E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong. logical form: 1. CΠpNpNq by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?) 3. NΠpNp, Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself. And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2. RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order". VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom. By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again. Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification. Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements). E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form) Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences. Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves. E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc. RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between "p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters. Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Cresswell Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 129 Labeling/Name/Reference/Solution/Stalnaker/Thomason: Thesis: descriptions cannot be treated consistently as a names, but we will try to get as close as possible to them. CresswellVsStalnaker/CresswellVsThomason: this solution has its drawbacks, because not all things that function syntactically as names are real names, in the sense that they can be used for variables in valid wff. This also applies to the intensional object viewVsStalnaker. > universal instantiation: it, too, will fail ... + ... |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Tichy, P. | Armstrong Vs Tichy, P. | Arm III 90 ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlaton: Universals are abstractions, but not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers: III 91 Abstract/Quine: called Platonic universals "abstract". (Different meaning than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions.) Abstraction/Armstrong: A relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Laws of nature/LoN/Abstraction/Armstrong: So if they also are abstractions, what kind of A and from what? We get a fairly clear answer: they are abstractions of particulars (P) which instantiate the law (positive). Vs: here one could mention another objection than Tichy’s: we really need the complex formula: ((N (F, G)(a’s being F, a’s being G))? Could we not just represent the instantiation of the laws as follows: N(a’s being F, a’s being G)? The fact that these two states of affairs involve the two U F and G, and only those, seems sufficient to ensure that the necessity exists by virtue of universals. So it is a rel of U. Whether this instantiation would then be an instance of N(F,G), i.e. whether N(F,G) itself is a universal, is less clear, see below: in the next section we see that we might not need the more complex representation. III 97 ArmstrongVsTichy: so in the end we have the right view of the entailment: N(F,G)>(x) Fx>Gx) (s) necessity includes reg. (= universal proposition, universal quantification). Armstrong: if we accept the necessity of individual cases, we can add an intermediate term: N(F,G)>(x) N(Fx,Gx)>(x)(Fx>Gx). In no case shall the inversion is also true!. III 98 Necessity of individual cases/ArmstrongVsTichy: if we introduce them between individual states, we have an intuitively satisfying picture: on the first stage, we have nothing else but states of affairs of the first stage which make another first stage state necessary: be N(a’s bein F, a’s being G). At the second stage, we have a universal 1st stage, a type state 1st stage which makes another Universal 1st stage and a type 1st stage state necessary. E.g. ((N(F,G) (a’s being F, a’s being G)). With this necessity between universals we have laws of nature. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Mentalese | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 55 Mentalese/Propositional Attitude/Fodor: Thesis: A belief sentence is a sentence in the speaker's thought language. CresswellVsFodor: Problem; then the original speaker and the attribution speaker must have the same sentence in mentalese in their inner system; Newen/Schrenk I 131 Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with the assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: thesis that thinking is lived in such a way that it already has all the core characteristics of natural language (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. For example, fuel gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized by brain states. I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p.199) Thesis: One cannot give a construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (embodiment) of another formal system: "Properly" requires: a) There must be a general procedure for assigning formulae to states of the organism. b) For each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism, so that c1) the state can be interpreted as a relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingent identical) to have propositional attitudes for it. d) Mentalese representations have their causal role by virtue of their formal characteristics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Supervenience | Lewis, D. | Staln I 98 Supervenience/Contingent/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis combines the intuition that some supervenience theses are contingent with a liberal reductionist approach. Lewis Thesis: In every possible world there is a set of basic properties and relations sufficient and necessary to determine these worlds. Def Materialism/Stalnaker: one could define it (here) as: contingent thesis that the physical properties in our real world are the basic properties. Other worlds may have others that are "alien" to our real (actual) world. Def alien property/Lewis/Stalnaker: a property that does not exist. A distinction is made between existence and instantiation. Existence/Instantiation/Lewis: Difference: an existing property does not have to be instantiated. For example the complex property "golden mountain" (uninstantiated). |
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| Exemplification | Meixner, U. | I 108 Exemplification is simply the actuality of the instantiation of the state of affairs. |
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