Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 64 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Avramides | I 122 Concept/Instantiation/Davidson: a concept can be instantiated. (Realize, E.g. swimming) without having the concept. Davidson: but not with convictions. >Instantiation. I 122f Conviction/Belief/Davidson: Condition: Awareness of the distinction subjective/objective (because of the necessary ability to be surprised). >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. I 123 Bennett/AvramidesVsDavidson: in animals there is also learning ability (= distinction subjective/objective) instead of language ability. >Animals. DavidsonVsVs: this is about properties of concepts, not beings. Davidson: per conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. Therefore, there is no thinking without language. >Thinking without language. I125 Reductionism/Antireductionism/Avramides: both are not separated by the dispute over ontological asymmetry, both could accept ontological symmetry like asymmetry. - It is really about deep epistemic asymmetry. >Terminology/Avramides. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Causal Laws | Davidson | Glüer II 103f Causality/Davidson/Glüer: causal relation: is description independent - on the other hand: causal laws: operate on the level of description, refer to event types - (strict laws) - need a completed frame. - There may be many descriptions - also true singular causal statements, where x and y are not instantiations of a causal law - but there must be a law if the statement is true. Cf. >laws/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Conceptualism | Armstrong | Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Conceptualism | Place | Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. Armstrong II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Consistency | Bigelow | I 182 Consistency/Bigelow/Pargetter: a way to guarantee that a description is consistent is to show that something meets this description. Definition Principle of instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can call this the principle of instantiation (instantiation principle). Contradiction-free/Bigelow/Pargetter: is essential for mathematics, for other areas it is more like housekeeping. Consistency/Hilbert: precedes existence. A mathematical proof exists only if it is non-contradictory. Consistency/FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert/Bigelow/Pargetter: Existence precedes the consistency. Consistency requires the existence of a consistently described thing. If it exists, the corresponding description is consistent. If it does not exist, how do we guarantee consistency? --- I 183 Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: thinks here epistemically, in terms of "guarantees". But his view can be extended: if there is no object, there is no difference between a consistent and a contradictory description. Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro Frege: this is the basis for modern mathematics. This is also the reason why quantum theory is so important: it provides examples of everything that mathematicians wish to investigate (at least until recently). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Content | Schurz | I 23 Content/Schurz: A proposition is the more substantial, the more consequences it has. Probability and content of hypotheses are often opposite. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Theories, >Probability, >Truth. I 89 Content/stronger/weaker: The content strength decreases during the transition from all-phrases via singular phrases to existential phrases. E.g. A universal sentence (x)Fx is logically stronger than its singular Fa instances and these are stronger than the corresponding existential sentence (Ex)Fx). >Stronger/weaker, >Generalization/Schurz, >Falsification/Schurz. I 97 Def Logical Content/Schurz: the logical content of a proposition (or set of propositions) S is the set of all propositions or consequences logically following from S. Def Empirical Content/Schurz: only the set of empirical (and thus verifiable) propositions or consequences logically following from S, which are not already analytically true. Def Observational content/Schurz: is even narrower than empirical content: only the observational propositions that follow from S. This notion has very limited applicability: Only for purely universal law hypotheses. Observation proposition/Schurz: no observation propositions follow from an allexistence hypothesis Ex H:= (x)(Fx > (Ey)(Gxy). Schurz: From H follows by universal instantiation only Fa > Gay and this is no observation theorem, because (Ey)Gay is a spatiotemporally restricted existence theorem. Such allexistence hypotheses are therefore also not falsifiable. However, they are confirmable. But this is weaker than falsifiable. >Observation, >Observation sentences. Def Probabilistic content/statistics/probability/Schurz: Let S be a set of statistical hypotheses, this logically does not imply any observational propositions, but at best gives them a belief probability. Wrong: to assume that the content would be the set of propositions with a certain minimum probability. Because this set can be contradictory! Even if r is still so close to 1. Conjunction probability: the conjunction of many highly probable sentences can be very improbable on their part! Solution/Schurz: probabilistic content is the set of all probability propositions which follow from S according to the axioms of probability. >Probability, >Subjective propability. I 109 Def relevant content/relevance/logic/Schurz: (a) the relevant logical content of a proposition or set of propositions S is the set of its relevant consequence elements. Notation: Cr(S) b) the relevant empirical content of S is the set of those relevant consequence elements of S that are empirical and not analytic true propositions. Notation: Er(S). Each set of sentences is L equivalent to the set of its relevant consequence elements. >Relevance/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Dependence | Simons | I 293 Dependency/Simons: dependency is always in relation to something, e.g. logical: proposition A cannot be true without proposition B being true, e.g. functional: gas pressure, volume or temperature are functional, e.g. ontological: this whiteness of this paper. >Propositions, >Truth. I 294 Def general function/logical form/Simons: a depends as F in respect to G of b iff a cannot be F without b being G. Easier: necessary: if a is an F, then b is a G. I 294 Ontological Dependency/Simons: ontological dependency exists between objects (unlike other dependencies). It is a must de re, e.g. like an essential part. >de re, >Essence, cf. >de dicto. I 296 Ontological Dependency/Simons: e.g. the largest satellite of Jupiter cannot exist if Jupiter does not exist. However: it is wrong to say that Ganymede could not exist without Jupiter. Solution: let us assume a scope. Against: the dependence Ganymede's of Jupiter is instead a conceptual dependence. It could not be described as a moon of Jupiter if Jupiter did not exist. Conceptual: e.g. there is no husband without a wife. I 296 Def weak, rigid dependency/Simons/(s): y is not necessary, but if x exists, then it is ((s) that is not superimposed by self-dependency.) I 297 Generically Dependent/generic function/Simons: e.g. humans cannot exist without carbon atoms but it does not matter which carbon atoms are part of the human. I 300 Def rigid dependency/Simons: e.g. a smile is not only dependent on one face, but from his/her face. Conceptual rigid dependence: e.g. the species: twin, fiancee, partner, riverside > Independence/Simons. I 302 Dependency/strongest form/Simons: the strongest form of dependency is that of an object that is an essential part of another. I 303 Def strong rigid dependency/Simons: strong rigid dependency excludes cases where objects have significant parts as cases of dependency. An object is dependent, if it requires the existence of something that is not part of it. E.g. a heartbeat is not part of the organism - similar to Husserl's foundation: if an "a" can only exist in a broader unit, which connects it with a Âμ. Def moment/Simons: if "b" consolidates "a" or vice versa, "a" is a moment of "b". I 305 Def accident/Simons: a moment which is always dependent on its foundation is an accident. I 306 Def substrate: the substrate is then the basis for an accident, e.g. at events: "is not part ..." or at continuants: "is never part...". Accident/Simons: e.g. a smile is an accident of the face, or e.g. a headache, or e.g. a thought is an accident of its bearer, e.g. the instantiation of a quality of an object is an accident of the object(!) that it qualifies ((s) so it is not accident of the property). E.g. relational accident: weddings, or e.g. football matches. I 309 Dependency/Simons: accident: an accident excludes, i.e. the dependency of predecessors. Moment: the moment is the one of necessary essences and essential parts. Human: a human could be an accident of the universe at the most. Vs: then the universe would be necessary, then it would be more a description than a name. Solution: the dependence of the human on the environment is generic and not rigid. Human: a human could be an accident at most, because of certain processes in his/her inner side. Substance: substance must not be, in this sense, "absolutely independent". Solution: everything from which the substance is modally and temporally, rigidly dependent, is a part of it, that means it is a weak self-contained unit. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Empty Set | Bigelow | I 374 Empty set/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: how we transfer the plural essence to them. Solution: "rival theory" about which universals constitute sets. Thesis: Sets result from the relations of coextensiveness between universals. That is, a set is what is shared by coextensive universals. In general: if two universals are not coextensive, they can still have something in common that makes them overlap. This is the set of things that both instantiate ((s) average). Definition set/rival theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: is then a property of properties. This is something different than the plural essence. Plural essence/Bigelow/Pargetter: this needs not to be a property of properties, but could be a simple universal that is instanced by individuals. But it can also be instituted by universals, because universals of every level have plural essences. N.B.: but the fact that it can be instanced by individuals makes the set construction by plural essence to something other than that by coextensiveness. Definition theory of higher level/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we call the rival theory. (sets of coextensivity). Advantage: it makes the empty set easier to define. Empty Set/Coextensive Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: E.g. Suppose a pair of universals whose extensions are disjoint. These two still have something in common: what all disjoint sets have in common: the empty set. Then we have reason to believe in their existence. --- I 375 Theory of higher level/Bigelow/Pargetter: can derive plural essences: Plural essence: E.g. Suppose some things x, y, etc. instantiate a property F, and this in turn instances a property G. This structure now induces extra properties of the original things x, y, etc., and these properties, although they are instantiated by individuals of lower level, still involve the property of higher level G. Extra property: here: to have a property of the G-type. Alternatively: Suppose x has F which again has G. Suppose something else, e.g. z has another property, H, which also has G. We can assume that x has neither H nor G, but z does not have F and not G. Then it follows that x and z have something in common. But this is neither F nor G nor H, but: Commonality: to have a property that has property G. (As above, the "extra property"). Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: this can be applied to sets, we say that x, y, etc., instantiate a universal, e.g. F which, in turn, instantiates a universal G. G: that's what we call provisionally a set. Set: is a better candidate for the "extra property" than a property of properties. Definition element relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is here simply instantiation. --- I 376 It is an advantage of our theory that it explains the elemental relationship so simply. Property of Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: is separated by a layer in the type hierarchy. And yet x should also be an element of G. So then element-property could not be an instantiation. Definition quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then plural essences induced by characteristics of properties. Definition Empty set/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a property of properties, more precisely: a relation between universals. It is what disjunctive couples of universals have in common. This time, however, no extra property of things is induced two levels below. Therefore, it cannot be constructed as a plural essence. Nevertheless, the empty set exists. Thus we have all that justifies the infinity axiom. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Endurantism | Lewis | Schwarz I 32 Definition Endurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): Thesis: Things are wholly present (not only in part) at all times, at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). >Universals. LewisVsEndurantism (instead: Mosaic Theory). Schwarz I 31 Definition Perdurantism/Lewis/Schwarz: the thesis that temporally extended things usually consist of temporal parts. Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truths about our world also about the temporal extent of things, are based on the properties and relationships between spatially extended points. EndurantismVsLewis: since he has nothing to do with mosaic, this is no argument for him. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: if normal things do not have temporal parts but exist at different times, they cannot be round, nor large, but only round at time t. And that is absurd. Schwarz I 32 Properties/some authors: certainly, not all property are relational like "being remote" - but could they not be time-relational, ignoring this constant dependency? (Haslanger 1989: 123f,[1], Jackson 1994b, 142f,[2] van Inwagen 1990a, 116[3]). Properties/Lewis: (2004.4) At least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not generally a relation to times. Properties/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: one should not relativize the properties, but their instantiations temporally. (Johnston, 1987, §5) E.g. I am now sitting and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989): Thesis: time specifications (> time) are adverbial modifications of propositions: For example, I am sitting in the present way and am sleeping last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: that makes no big difference. These representatives, too, deny that form properties belong directly, simply, and themselves to the things. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: the debate has been settled, both are accusing each other to analyze change away. Endurantism: is an instantiation of incompatible properties and has nothing to do with change. Perdurantism: is a timeless instantiation of compatible properties, for example, being straight exactly at t1, being curved at t0, is not a change. Schwarz: both do not correspond to our intuitions. The change is not that important. Cf. >Perdurantism. 1.Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 — [1994]: “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339–359 2. “Metaphysics by Possible Cases”. In [Jackson 1998b] Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays. London: Routledge 3.“Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Existence | Lewis | Schwarz I 30 Existence Definition/Lewis : is simply to be one of the things that are there. >"there are"/existence. Lewis IV 24 Actual/actuality/ontology/existence/"there is"//Lewis: Thesis: There are many things that are not actual - e.g. overcountable many people, spread over many possible worlds. - LewisVsCommon sense: not everything is actual. - >Difference between "exist"/"there is". >Actuality/Lewis. IV 40 Existence/Ontology/Possible Worlds/Lewis: let's say an individual exists from the point of view of a world when, and only when, it is the least restricted area normally capable of determining the WW in the world. (This is not about modal metaphysics). Cf. >Modal realism, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. This area will include all individuals in the world, not others. And some, but not all, sets (e.g. numbers). Schwarz I 20 Quantification/range/Schwarz: Unlimited quantifiers are rare and belong to metaphysics. Example "There is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator. Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: then there are different "modes of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables. Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited. Four-dimensionalism/existence: statements about what exists ignore past and future from his point of view. Cf. >Four dimensionalism. Schwarz I 30 Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Chapter 19) Thesis: Some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(2),80f,1986e(3),212f): if you have already said "there is", then the game is already lost: if you say "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: simply means to be one of the things that exist. Schwarz I 42 Def Coexistence/Lewis: two things are in the same world, iff there is a space-time path from one to the other. Consequence: Possible worlds/Lewis: are space-time isolated! So there is also no causality between them. >counterparts, >counterpart relation, >counterpart theory. Schwarz I 232 Object/existence/ontology/Lewis/Schwarz: the question whether a thing exists in a world is itself completely determined by the distribution of qualitative properties and relations. Then the condition "what things exist there" is superfluous. With this we are with Lewis' "a priori reductionism of everything". (1994b(4),291). Truthmaker/Lewis: Pattern of the instantiation of fundamental properties and relations. >Truth maker/Lewis. 1. P. van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Existential Generalization | Existential generalization, logic: if an object that can be named, has a certain property, then there is at least one object with this property. See also universal generalization, universal instantiation. |
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| Expressions | Meixner | I 71 Expression/Express/Meixner: expressing something is not referencing - functions can be expressed by unconfirmed expressions - predicate: expresses property, does not denominate it! - Predicate linguistic indicator of universals, more direct than names. I 102 Expression/Denominating/Meixner: Facts are expressed by sentences and denominated by that-sentences (subordinate clauses). I 118 Expressions/Expressing/Meixner: sentences can express something that is not in line with their meaning, e.g. "the sentence on page n line 1 is wrong ...". I 152 Expressing: sentence expresses both a proposition and a fact (if it expresses something different from its meaning) - proposition: content of the sentence - fact: is unambiguously determined by this sentence content (proposition). I 153 Expressing: concepts such as universals through predicates - fulfillment: concepts are fulfilled by entities - exemplification: universals by entities - instantiating/instantiation: concepts and universals by entities (inverse to instantiation: concepts and universals apply to entities) I 154 Expression/Expressing: Predicates express concepts or properties (universals). - concepts do not express anything, universals do not express anything, properties express nothing, they are expressed - sentence: expresses proposition or fact - fact, proposition: express nothing, they are expressed - e.g. "author of Waverley", "the person who is identical with Scott" do not express the same universal singularisation, but they do denominate the same individual. - E.g. "brother of..."/"only brother of": ((s) can apply to the same individual, or "only" to none.) |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Facts | Armstrong | III 144 f Negative Facts/Negative States/Armstrong: negative facts are harmless: if something has a certain speed, then it has no other speed at the same time. - (But already implied: -> derived laws - III 147) b Solution: better assume negative properties than negative laws: otherwise laws are not instantiated ((s) >Instantiation). Negative facts: have a negative properties - But only as caused, not causal (-> derived laws.) II (d) 149 General Fact(s)/Russell/Armstrong: All quantification needs "general facts" as true makers -(Armstrong pro) - Armstrong: i.e. also a Regth needs general facts - Martin: nothing in the concept of "gen facts" helps to distinguish real laws from mere GF - Armstrong: dito - Gen Facts/Armstrong: do not involve universals either - we have to go behind the general facts, since they do not involve a direct connection of types - II 150 Lewis: if they are approved, they regulate the world by prohibiting certain additional states. Martin III 175 "General Fact"/Russell/Martin: no law, mere conjunction, aggregate, etc. But: Unexceptionality: can also be general fact (and still not a law). Martin III 181 General Fact/Totality: Martin: Problem: Negative facts. - Solution/Martin: the general term "what-and-how-something-exists" is of the first level ((s) not a summary of lower level entities). "what exists" has subdivisions on the same level. - Subdivisions should have the same level as the whole. - Then there is no need for a "general fact". ((s) Cf. >General facts). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Facts | Martin | Armstrong III 144 f Negative Facts/Negative States/Armstrong: negative facts are harmless: if something has a certain speed, then it has no other speed at the same time. - (But already implied: -> derived laws - III 147) b Solution: better assume negative properties than negative laws: otherwise laws are not instantiated ((s) >Instantiation). Negative facts: have a negative properties - But only as caused, not causal (-> derived laws.) Armstrong II (d) 149 General Fact(s)/Russell/Armstrong: All quantification needs "general facts" as true makers -(Armstrong pro) - Armstrong: i.e. also a Regth needs general facts - Martin: nothing in the concept of "gen facts" helps to distinguish real laws from mere GF - Armstrong: dito - Gen Facts/Armstrong: do not involve universals either - we have to go behind the general facts, since they do not involve a direct connection of types - II 150 Lewis: if they are approved, they regulate the world by prohibiting certain additional states. Martin III 175 "General Fact"/Russell/Martin: no law, mere conjunction, aggregate, etc. But: Unexceptionality: can also be general fact (and still not a law). Martin III 181 General Fact/Totality: Martin: Problem: Negative facts. - Solution/Martin: the general term "what-and-how-something-exists" is of the first level ((s) not a summary of lower level entities). "what exists" has subdivisions on the same level. - Subdivisions should have the same level as the whole. - Then there is no need for a "general fact". ((s) Cf. >General facts). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| I, Ego, Self | Heidegger | Frank I 566f I/Heidegger: the question "What am I?" is answered by itself: "I am the author of this question" Gabriel Marcel ditto - Kaplan ditto - EvansVs: that I am a physical entity, is not as safe as I think (Evans like Descartes, DescartesVsHeidegger) - Heidegger’s principle does not show the incoherence of the idea that I am different from my body - it can also not demonstrate that x in any instantiation is physical or not. >Body, >Identity/Evans, >Self-Consciousness/Evans, Subject. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Imagination | Strawson | McGinn I 210 Space/thinking/Strawson: Thinking without spatial awareness is not possible for us. The mere thought of several instantiations of the same property presupposes an idea of space. >Space/Strawson, >Identification/Stawson, >Exemplification, >Repetition, >Recognition, >Spatial order. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Instantiation | Baudrillard | Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 |
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| Instantiation | Bigelow | I 39 Instantiation/Universal/Antisymmetry/Bigelow/Pargetter: Instantiation is an antisymmetric relation: If x instantiates y, y cannot inversely instantiate x. Order: from the antisymmetry arises an order that can be a) linear b) a tree structure. For example, the relation "parents of". --- I 94 Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above Chapter 2) cannot be a universal itself. (Example: chemical molecules require more than one instance of a universal, the element. Absurd: 2 hydrogen atoms cannot be two different universals within one molecule). Universals/Strawson: (1959)(1) there is a "non-relational connection" between a particular and a universal. Armstrong: (1978)(2): ditto. 1. Strawson, P.F. (1959). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metyphasics. London: Methuen. 2. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Junctions | Armstrong | II (b) 47 Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities. >Regularities, >Universals. Martin II 126 Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between universal-instantiations. Armstrong: not formal, more like a >meaning postulate. - No mysterious necessary junction between separate things. II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection. II 128 Question: are connections between universals themselves 2nd-stage unversals? Martin II 128 Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particles*) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept Martin II 129 MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things. II (d) 149 Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176 * Martin: example: two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: there is no truth maker, no certain way, nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have reacted idiosyncratically... |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Junctions | Martin | Armstrong II (b) 47 Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities. >Regularities, >Universals. Martin II 126 Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between universal-instantiations. Armstrong: not formal, more like a >meaning postulate. - No mysterious necessary junction between separate things. II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection. II 128 Question: are connections between universals themselves 2nd-stage unversals? Martin II 128 Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particles*) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept Martin II 129 MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things. Armstrong II (d) 149 Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176 * Martin: example: two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: there is no truth maker, no certain way, nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have reacted idiosyncratically... |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Laws | Davidson | Glüer II 103 "Comprehensive, completed theory"/Davidson/Glüer: a) Def comprehensive: described in the terminology of the theory b) Def closed: subsumed under a law of the theory. Glüer II 105 Law/Natural law/theory/Davidson/Glüer: only the ideal physics represents such a closed system in which strict laws are possible. Outside of it there can be no strict laws. >Anomalous monism. Event/Causality/Laws/Description/Davidson/Glüer: if two events are in causal relation to each other, there must be descriptions on the basis of which they can be subsumed under a strict law. I.e. they must be tokens of types for which there is a causal law. There can also be other descriptions independently of this. I.e. there can be any number of true singular causal statements in which x and y are not described as instantiations of a causal law. Nevertheless, we know that there must be a law if the statement is true. >Description/Davidson. Glüer II 137 Laws/Davidson: three types: a) MM-laws (intentionalist vocabularies) between propositional attitudes and actions - these laws are not possible (no prediction of actions) b) MX-laws: connect the intentionalist with a physicalist vocabulary (these laws are available) c) physical laws. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Mathematics | Bigelow | I VII Mathematics/BigelowVsField: can be understood realistically when viewed as a study of universals, properties and relations, of patterns and structures of things that can be in different places at the same time. --- I 346 Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: Pro Realism of Mathematics. ((s) The thesis that numbers exist as objects. And thus also sets, and all possible mathematical objects or entities. (FieldVs.) We agree with the antirealists that there are human creations: For example, words, ideas, diagrams, images, terms, theories, texts, academic departments, etc. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: of mathematics: is well compatible with modal realism. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: no one believes that everything in science is real. There must be (useful) fictions. Therefore, one can in principle be a realist in relation to everyday things and at the same time a mathematical antirealist. For example, Field: Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: is at the same time a realist regarding space-time, particles and fields. --- I 347 Realism/Antirealism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there is something wrong with this marriage: mathematics is not a small element of science but a very large one. It is also not easy to isolate. Example: Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: did not know about instantaneous speed yet. For him, speed was simply a course divided by time. A falling object then had an average speed, although Galileo was not aware of this either. Therefore, he made the following mistake: if two bodies are dropped together and one of them continues to fly, they both have exactly the same speed until the first one stops. Galileo: but had to assume that this body was slower, because the other body needed less than twice as much for the eventual double distance. --- I 348 Rate of fall/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the average velocity cannot be proportional to the distance. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if anything is evidence for realism, it is this: an object that falls twice as far does not have twice the average velocity. If you find out, you are a realist in terms of how long it takes for an object to reach a given distance. This makes us realists in terms of velocity, time and distance. ((s) The problem arose from the fact that Galileo was forced to adhere to the definitions he had set up himself, otherwise he would have had to change his theory.). Average/VsRealism/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that average is only an abstraction. VsVs: we do not need the average here at all: it is simply true that the object falls faster in the second section, and that simply means that the average velocity cannot be the same. Velocity/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: he respects that it is physically real. And caused by forces and proportional to these forces, so velocity was causally effective for him. Velocity/today/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think today that it is the instantaneous speed which is causally effective, never the average velocity. --- I 349 Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the equations we use to describe the relations between different falling objects are human inventions, but not the relations themselves. Rate of fall/fall law/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: the distance is proportional to the square of the time traveled. How is this abstract law based on concrete physical facts? Galileo: in the first unit of time the body falls a certain distance, in the second unit not double, but triple of this distance, in the third five units, and so on. Predecessor/Bigelow/Pargetter: this had already been anticipated in the Middle Ages. --- I 350 Middle Ages/Thesis: an increment has been added to each section. One, three, five, seven... Now the sum of the first n odd numbers is n². Then it seems to be based on nothing but rules for the use of symbols that (1 + 3 +... + (2n - 1) = n². But this is a mistake: Numbers/Number/Bigelow/Pargetter: may be abstract, but they are present in an important sense in the physical objects: in a collection of objects that have this number, they are the common thing. For example, a collection of objects which has the number n². --- I 350 You can just see that the pattern has to go on like this. --- I 351 And so it is in Galileo's case. Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the differences to physical bodies should not blind us for the similarities. If objects instantiate the same numbers, the same proportions will exist between them. (>Instantiation). Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): For example, a collection of 3 objects instantiates the number three. --- I 352 Equation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (e.g. Galileo's fall rate, which was wrong) is a description of real relations between real objects. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: this view can roughly be called Platonist. Bigelow/Pargetter: pro Platonism, but without the usual Platonic doctrines: we do not assume forms or ideals taken from an earlier existence that we cannot see in our world, and so on. Realism/Universal Realism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is closer to Aristotle: the universals are here in our world, not in an otherworldly. BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative versus quantitative characteristics of objects. --- I 377 Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: (...) --- I 378 Patterns unfold patterns. The structures of mathematics show up not only in the hardware of physics, but also in the "mathware", through properties and relations in different areas of mathematics. For example, not only objects, but also numbers can be counted. Proportions, for example, stand in proportions to each other. This is the reflexivity within mathematics. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Modal Properties | Bigelow | I 126 Property, modal/possible worlds/existence/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes it is said that for an object to have a property, it must exist. That excludes fictional objects. BigelowVs. Bigelow/Pargetter: if we were to demand this, we would demand that an individual in the possible world w be mapped to a set of possible worlds all containing this individual. In this case, an n-digit predicate could not be mapped if there are not n individuals in one and the same possible world. This is worth investigating, even if modal realism rejects it. --- I 203 Instantiation/Existence/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: even uninstantiated properties exist. It is they who constitute the possible world. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals. Namely, complex structural universals. (see above Chapter 2, for example, chemical molecules: several universals are represented there with several instantiations, but a universal never occurs more than once in a constellation.) Possibility/Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that not every uninstantiated property is possible. There can only be non-contradictory properties. So modal terms come in again. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are simply no contradictory properties. That is why we are saving the modality here. Certainly there are contradictory predicates, but they do not correspond to universals. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Moral Reasoning | Social Psychology | Parisi I 143 Moral Reasoning/motivation/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: When decision-makers have a preference regarding the outcome, they sometimes engage in biased processing of information to make it more likely that their desired outcome is attained (Kunda, 1990)(1). Motivated cognition permits Parisi I 144 individuals to reach outcomes they desire while allowing them to maintain the illusion that they are acting objectively (Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum, 2009(2); Kunda, 1990(1); Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987(3)). (…) people engage in motivated mind reading when assessing mental states (Mueller, Solan, and Darley, 2012)(4), but this is one instantiation of a much broader phenomenon. It is likely that jurors' cognitive processes are influenced by their motivations across a wide variety of judgments. For instance, Sood and Darley (2012)(5) found that people's desire to punish behavior they view as morally offensive (e.g. going to the supermarket in the nude) changes their perceptions of the harmfulness of that behavior, but only when a finding of harm is required for liability. As a general matter, most people perceive that someone going to the supermarket in the nude is not harmful, though they still find it objectionable. However, when they are told that the harm principle requires that an action must be harmful to be criminalized, participants rate that behavior as more harmful. Thus, people reach the outcome they desire by perceiving the underlying behavior in a way that supports the outcome. Intention: Motivated reasoning can also operate when people assess the magnitude of harm, sometimes even emerging in rapid subjective assessments. For example, participants in a laboratory experiment were told that their partner could choose for them to receive an electric shock, or to hear a set of tones (Grey and Wegner, 2008)(6). a) In the intentional condition, the participant received a shock and was told that was the option their partner chose; b) in the unintentional condition, the participant received a shock and was told that their partner chose the other option of hearing the tones, but the opposite task was assigned unbeknownst to their partner. Participants who received intentional shocks experienced them as significantly more painful than those who received unintentional shocks. The extent to which harm is intended therefore seems to influence the perceived meaning of that harm, which in turn influenced the experience of pain itself. Damage estimation: Intentional harms can also influence jurors' evaluation of damages. In one set of experiments, people quickly viewed a series of damage amounts resulting from a river drying up (e.g. "crops destroyed: $759.87") and later were asked to estimate the sum total of damages (Ames and Fiske, 2013)(7). When the damage was caused intentionally (a man upstream diverted the river) participants Parisi I 145 inflated their estimate, whereas those who were told that the harm was unintentional were quite accurate in their assessment. 1. Kunda, Ziva (1990). "The Case for Motivated Reasoning." Psychological Bulletin 108(3):480. 2. Ditto, Peter H., David A. Pizarro, and David Tannenbaum (2009). "Motivated Moral Reasoning." Psychology of Learning and Motivation 50:307-338. 3. Pyszczynski, Tom and Jeff Greenberg (1987). " Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-testing Model." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 20: 297-340. 4. Mueller, Pam A., Lawrence M. Solan, and John M. Darley (2012). "When Does Knowledge Become Intent? Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers." Journal of Empirical Legal studies 9(4):859-892 5. Sood, Avani Mehta and John M. Darley (2012). " The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization Goals." California Law Review: 1313-1358. 6. Gray, Kurt and Daniel M. Wegner. "Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind." Personality and Social Psychology Review 14(1): 7-16. 7. Ames, Daniel L. and Susan T. Fiske (2013). "Intentional Harms Are Worse, Even When They're Not." Psychological Science 24(9): 1755-1762. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Music Industry | Benkler | Benkler I 50 Music Industry/Benkler: Music in the nineteenth century was largely a relational good. It was something people did in the physical presence of each other: in the folk way through hearing, repeating, and improvising; in the middle-class way of buying sheet music and playing for guests or attending public performances; or in the upper-class way of hiring musicians. I 51 Market-based production depended on performance through presence. With the introduction of the phonograph, a new, more passive relationship to played music was made possible in reliance on the high-capital requirements of recording, copying, and distributing specific instantiations of recorded music—records. What developed was a concentrated, commercial industry, based on massive financial investments in advertising, or preference formation, aimed at getting ever-larger crowds to want those recordings that the recording executives had chosen. (…) the music industry took on a more industrial model of production, and many of the local venues—from the living room to the local dance hall—came to be occupied by mechanical recordings rather than amateur and professional local performances. This model (…) created new live-performance markets—the megastar concert tour. As computers became more music-capable and digital networks became a ubiquitously available distribution medium, we saw the emergence of the present conflict over the regulation of cultural production - the law of copyright - between the twentieth-century, industrial model recording industry and the emerging amateur distribution systems coupled, at least according to its supporters, to a reemergence of decentralized, relation-based markets for professional performance artists. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Nominalism | Armstrong | II (b) 34 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals. II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals. II (c) 97 Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical" II (c) 97 Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Nominalism | Place | Armstrong II (b) 34 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) are all exactly similar properties Representatives of universals (Armstrong): assumes many individuals with the same property. Universal realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class. >Similarity, >Universals. Armstrong II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals. Armstrong II (c) 97 Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical" Armstrong II (c) 97 Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Numbers | Bigelow | I 352 Real Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Real numbers are universals of higher level. --- I 353 They are relations between relations (or between properties). They are precisely the relations of higher levels or proportions with which we had compared quantities (see above 2.5). Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be identified with real numbers. Real numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then themselves physical! Like other proportions and relations. They are instantiated by physical quantities such as length. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities such as length, mass, speed are in turn instantiated by individuals such as photons, electrons, macroscopic objects. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: being instantiated makes a causal difference. They are then abstract as universals, but not abstract in the sense that they would be causally inactive. Abstraction/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only a process of drawing attention to one or the other universal that are instantiated around us. But this does not create a new thing. --- I 354 Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is a strong tendency to assume that they are objects that instantiate relations and properties, but are not themselves properties or relations. They seem to be "abstract objects". Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: they can be that without ceasing to be universals. Numbers/Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theory we are discussing here is about relations of relations. This probably also applies to relations between properties. For example: length comparisons etc. Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we want to avoid them, we can also compare the endpoints instead of the lengths of two objects. Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can generally come from properties to relations by saying that there is a relation between objects by virtue of a shared property (e.g. length). For example "smaller than" etc. that is a derived relation. Derived relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: will then exist between the properties that generate these relations. Frege/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory is now based on relations between relations. For example, parent relation and grandparent relation. (Lit. Quine 1941(1), 1961(2)). --- I 355 Parents/Grandparents/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relations are different, but closely related, if two things are connected by the grandparent relation, the same two things will be connected by a chain involving two instances of the parent relation. If a is grandparent of b, there is a c so that a is a parent of c and c is a parent of b. Notation (see above 2.6): Rn: n-fold relation: e.g. (s) Grandparents-R = (parents-R)². X Rn y Means that we get from x to y through n applications of the relation R x R x1 x1 R x2 xn-1 R y. Grandparents/formal/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: if x is grandparent of y then x is parent² of y. Ancestor/Ancestor Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is just a generalization of it. Descent/predecessors/predecessor relation/ancestor/nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the predecessor relation or ancestor relation was one of the biggest problems for nominalism. Problem: you have to have a realistic attitude towards relations, there must be relations here. Frege/Whitehead/Bigelow/Pargetter: get much more out of the parent relation than one could have predicted. --- I 356 Definition grandparents/Frege/Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: x GE y iff x E² y Definition great-grandparents: x UGE y iff x E³ y etc. N.B.: because grandparent relation and great-grandparent relation are connected in different ways with the same basic relation (parents), there is now automatically a relation between these: If x UGE² y then x GE³ y. general: given are two relations R and S, we can have a relation between them, by virtue of the x Rn y iff x Sm y. Ratio/Proportion/logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: these relations of relations are called ratios or proportions. For example, in the above case, R to S is m:n. Negative ratios/Bigelow/Pargetter: we obtain by changing the variables x and y: x Rn y iff y Sm x. For example, grandchild-relation: has the ratio -2:1 ((s) inverse relation of the grandparents-relation) x grandchild y iff y E² x. Recursive rule/relationship/ratio/Bigelow/Pargetter: if R and S have a proportion (ratio) with respect to another relation Q: If there's a relationship between R and Q,... --- I 357 ...and one between S and Q, then there is a derived relation between R and S. Wiener: (1912)(3) varies the approach of Whitehead: when The ratio of R to Q is n:1 If the ratio of S to Q is m:1 Then we conclude the ratio of R to S is n:m. N.B.: this allows us to set up the ratio n:m between R and S, even if it is not possible to iterate R or S. For example, your relation to Eva and your mother's relation to Eva. The ratio of these two relations will then be n:(n+1) N.B.: We cannot simply get such relationships through iteration! For example, because no one stands in relation to them as you stand to Eve (you do not have so many successors). Solution/Wiener/Bigelow/Pargetter: no iteration of the relation to Eva, but iteration of the basic unit: here the parent relation. Rational numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: in order to receive them in their full complexity, we must assume that the given relation has the correct patterns of instances. Problem: the parent relation may not have enough instances to generate an infinite number of rational numbers ((s) Parent relation: is linear). Ratio/ratios/proportions/rational numbers/solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: set theory. 1. Quine, W.V.O. (1941). Whitehead and the rise of modern logic. In: The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed. P.A. Schilpp). pp.125-63. La Salle, Ill. Open Court. 2. Quine, W.V.O. (1961). From a logical point of view. Logico-philosophical essays 2d ed. New York, Harper & Row. 3. Wiener, N. (1912). A simplification of the logic of relations. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 17 (1912-14), pp.387-90. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Object | Armstrong | Martin III 178f Object/Martin: Objects are simple - even spread objects are possible, but not completely constituted by present awareness of place and time (spatial property is not sufficient). Universals/Armstrong: Universals are simply fully constituted in each instantiation. MartinVs: that is mysterious. Martin III 180 Complex object/MartinVsArmstrong: complex objects can be distributed: "what-it-is-and-what-it-is-not". - That is possible, but unlike a universal. - In all these distributed objects there is a difference between more or less "actually contained things" and that is not allowed for Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Object | Martin | Martin III 178ff Object/Martin: Objects are simple - even spread objects are possible, but not completely constituted by present awareness of place and time (spatial property is not sufficient). Universals/Armstrong: Universals are simply fully constituted in each instantiation. MartinVs: that is mysterious. Martin III 180 Complex object/MartinVsArmstrong: complex objects can be distributed: "what-it-is-and-what-it-is-not". - That is possible, but unlike a universal. - In all these distributed objects there is a difference between more or less "ctually contained things" and that is not allowed for Armstrong. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Platonism | Bigelow | I VII Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Bigelow/Pargetter pro Platonism, but a scientific Platonism. --- I 387 Universals/Realismus/Bigelow/Pargetter: Universal realism allows us to be realists in terms of causation. For this we have to recognize forces as vectors and proportions as causally active. --- I 388 Existence/Property/Instantiation/Uninstantiated/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: a property does not have to be instantiated to exist. Possible worlds/realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: statistical concluding can be realistically understood if we allow possible worlds. Chance: we can also realistically analyze objective chances with them, as well as natural necessity in natural laws and its connection with counterfactual conditionals. Explanation: can be realistically constructed with possible worlds. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker | I 17 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of actually existing worlds there are better ways how the world might have been. I 14 Possible Worlds/Time/Stalnaker: there are many analogies between times and worlds. >Actualism. Actualism: actualism corresponds to presentism. Def presentism/(s): only the present exists and only the current point in time. Four-dimensionalism/Stalnaker: four-dimensionalism corresponds to modal realism. >Four-dimensionalism. Def modal realism/(s): modal realism means that other worlds exist literally. Representative: a representative is David Lewis. >Modal realism, >David K. Lewis. Stalnaker: very few are realists in terms of possible world and times, but most are realists in terms of space. >Realism, >Space, >Time. I 27 Possible Worlds/StalnakerVsLewis: instead of something like "I and my surroundings" we assume a way how the world is, that is a property or state. >States, cf. >Situations. Important argument: properties may exist uninstantiatedly. >Instantiation. I 38 Possible Worlds: a possible world is no thing of a certain kind, nor an individual. A possible world is that to which truth is relative or what people differentiate in their rational actions. >Possibility, >Actions. I 52 Possible world: r: it is pointless to ask whether possible worlds satisfy certain conditions, e.g. is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? This is pointless, the answer will always have the form of a necessary sentence: P-or-not-P. - But doubt about that will be a doubt about the content of the sentence and not doubt about a possible world. The same applies to the problem that you might not believe a necessary truth. Possible worlds/conditions: it is pointless to ask whether a possible world meets certain conditions. Possible world/necessary/Stalnaker: if it is true, e.g. that water is necessarily H2O or e.g. that there are unattainable cardinal numbers, then these assertions express exactly this proposition, and the sentences that express these propositions tell us nothing about the nature of possible worlds. >Possible worlds/Kripke. Stalnaker: therefore it is impossible to characterize the entire range of all the possibilities. For then we would know the way how the range of all possibilities is different from that how it could be -> Wittgenstein: you should remain silent about things that you cannot talk about (Tractatus). StalnakerVsWittgenstein: but that does not help, because pointing also must have a content - therefore Ramsey says: "What you cannot say, you cannot whistle either". I 84/85 Possible worlds/Stalnaker: possible worlds are not just an exercise of our imagination, but part of our actions, e.g. scientific explanations. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Properties | Armstrong | III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Properties | Lewis | Frank I 357 Definition property/Lewis: the set of exactly those possible beings, actual or non-actual, that do or do not have a specified property - E.g. properties that segments of a street do or do not have. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- Lewis IV X Properties/Lewis: These are the appropriate objects of attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. IV 135 Properties/Lewis: Sets of individuals - "something that segments of things (in time or space) simply have. Also extrinsic properties (that things have because of their relation to other things) - in general: the property to live on one world from any set of possible worlds corresponds to these possible worlds - i.e. for each proposition there is a property to live in a world where this proposition is true. Ad IV 146 Proposition/Property/Lewis/(s): Proposition: not related to people, without spatiotemporal localization - simply true in possible world - E.g. Someone is happy - not possible to wish for me, because I do not know if I’m the one - in contrast, property: related to person - I am happy. --- Schwarz I 94 Properties/Quantity theory/Lewis: no properties: being no cat, identity, element-ship > heterology. Schwarz I 97 Disjunctive property/Lewis/Schwarz: 1) Any property is equivalent with a disjunction of two properties - disjunctive property: only if even more unnatural than the members: E.g. round is not disjunctive, as it clearly is not more unnatural than round and not red - E.g. round and lonely or not round and not lonely in contrast, are disjunctive, because it is less natural than round and lonely. Schwarz I 97 Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property. Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. >Possible world/Lewis, >Instantiation. Schwarz I 101 Class/Quantity/Properties/Lewis: things with E.g. same charge have to be more common than if they were an element of the same class. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Properties | Stalnaker | I 9 Def property/Stalnaker: a) Def thin/economic definition: a property is a way in which individuals can be grouped b) Def richer/Stalnaker: (more robust): a property is something in relation to which the individuals are grouped. To do this, we identify intrinsic properties with regions of a property-space. >Intrinsicness. Important argument: since the elements of the sets are not identical with the individuals that instantiate the property, this represents the independence of properties from their instantiation. ((s) So Stalnaker believes that properties also exist if they are not instantiated). >Instantiation, >Individuals, >Individuation. I 75 Modal Logic/ML/semantics/extensional/Stalnaker: e.g. property: a property is represented as a singular propositional function which takes an individual as an argument and delivers a proposition as a value. >Propositional functions. Equivalent to this: property: a property is a function that takes a possible world as an argument and delivers a set of individuals as a value. It is therefore intuitively a selection rule for a class of individuals, given the facts and vice versa: a selection selective procedure for a class of individuals is a property of the selected individuals. Cf. >Selection axiom, >Sets, >Set theory. Problem: there is no extensional equivalent to the distinction between referential and purely qualitative properties - unlike with the distinction between essential and accidental ones. >Essential properties, >Accidental properties. Def Referential properties: referential properties are defined in terms of the individuals that they have. Wrong solution: to stipulate that only accidental propositions may be selected for atomic predicates. This does not prevent that essential attributions could be true. It prevents only that they can be expressed. Anti-essentialism/solution: the property must be defined independently of the possible worlds and the individuals. >Essentialism. I 78 Intrinsic Property/bare particular/theory: to identify an intrinsic property we must distinguish possible world-indexed, time-indexed and referential properties from them. These do not correspond to any particular regions in the logical space. >Intrinsicness, >Bare particulars. E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. - This is how we can represent anti-essentialism. I 79 Kripke, early: Babe Ruth could have been a billiard ball. Kripke, later: there is a fallacy in that. Stalnaker: one cannot assume that he is actually a billiard ball, because then one could not refer to him as we already did. That is not what it is about (see below). This confuses the limits of what could actually be with the limitations of assumptions about what could counterfactually have been. >Conceivability. Essential property/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Kripke: thesis: names for natural species (natural kind terms) express essential properties. >Natural kinds, >Essence. Names for species are referential terms. Referential: referential means that they are determined by a causal connection. >Causal theory of reference. Natural kinds: natural kinds are not purely linguistic, but restrict the movement in the logical space. Bare particulars: if one allows Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball, then one must also allow it for any other thing - then this solution is uninteresting. I 81 Property/narrow/wide/propositional function: the distinction between 1) narrow P and 2) propositional functions: a propositional function in general is analogous to the distinction between possible individuals and concepts of individuals in general. >Narrow/wide, >Propositional functions. I 94f Physical non-property: a physical non-property is a complex combination of physical properties and relations (see below, e.g. golden mountain). Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience allows complex (composite) physical attributes to be physical properties. >Supervenience. Attribute: an attribute is an easy way of picking out. >Attributes. I 103 Def Property/Stalnaker: properties are simply a way to group individuals. Basic property/Stalnaker: basic properties must provide distinctions between individuals that could otherwise not be explained. Problem: then basic properties cannot supervene on something else. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Properties | Bigelow | I 40 Property/Relation/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is an ambiguity: For example, Russell admires wisdom: this is a relation between individual and wisdom instantiated by a pair of things, the second being a property. So the relation is a universal from the set (o,(o)). On the other hand, Wisdom: we can also consider it as a relation, rather than as a property of individuals. For example, as a love of knowledge. --- I 41 Problem: knowledge can be defined differently again, whereby the grouping into the hierarchy is changed. We are not dealing with a simple representation of words on universals. For example: Merit/virtue/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a property of properties. For example, Russell admires merits: logical form: is then not (o,(o)) as above but: (o,((o))). Question: does this mean that a thing belongs to several sets at the same time? Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need to define the sets (o),((o)), (o,(o)), etc. more precisely: For example (o) is a set of things instantiated by individuals, but do they only have to be individuals, or can they also be non-individuals as instances? (Example: Property of Property) Universal/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: we define them as belonging to at least one type, but perhaps also to several types. Definition "multigrade" relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: a relation that can exist between individuals, but also between sets of individuals or between an individual and a set of individuals. For example: living together: can be applied to individuals and groups of individuals. --- I 42 Definition "multigrades" Universal/Bigelow/Pargetter: a universal that belongs to more than one type. --- I 48 Properties/Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: correspondingly, there are two types: a) those where we can simply say whether things have them or not. ((s) > extensionally characterizable). b) those where this is not enough: for example fun: we cannot simply characterize it with which individuals belong to it? ((s) Non-extensionally characterisable). Example: mass, e.g. charge ((s) generic properties). For example, relative speed. --- I 163 Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: Instantiation: Assuming an individual has a property. Then what has to be in the world for it to be like this? The individual and the property. But that is not enough. Both could exist without one instantiating the other. That is, it is not enough for having a property that thing and property coexist side by side in the world. Wrong solution: to postulate instantiation as a relation: this only shifts the problem. The relation could exist in the world, without that certain thing having that certain property. Or without the thing being related to anything. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the problem lies in a wrong conclusion of quantification of the 2nd level to quantification of the 1st level. "Somehow" is not "any". For example, property F: in order to have it, it must be somehow in relation to it. ("there must be somehow that the individual stands to the property"). (Eψ)(ψ (a, F)) This "somehow" is not a "something". I.e. we must not conclude: (Ex)(Eψ)(ψ (x, a, F)) Problem: this would lead to a regress. This has always threatened the universals. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantification of the 2nd level should not be taken so seriously that it makes the "somehow" into a "something". --- I 164 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: a full theory of universals therefore needs a pre-semantic source for universals (pre-semantic/s): something that does not require any truthmakers. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need something that instantiates something without ever being instantiated. Existence of 2nd level/Bigelow/Pargetter: is also required by a theory of universals. From which, however, you cannot deduce an existence of the 1st level without additional premises. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Properties | Place | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Properties | Martin | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Reality | Armstrong | III 82 Reality/Armstrong: past and future are as real as the present. - Properties must be instantiated (principle of instantiation) i.e. there is no particular without properties ("bare particulars"). - Also there are no relations without particulars. >Past, >Future, >Instantiation. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Regularities | Armstrong | II (c) 42ff ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence. 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not. 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure. 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it. Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states. Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium. ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity). ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation). ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case. II (c) 45 Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant. >Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Regularities | Tooley | Armstrong II (c) 42ff ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence. 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not. 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure. 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it. Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states. Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium. ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity). ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation). ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case. Armstrong II (c) 45 Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant. >Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts. |
Tooley I M. Tooley Time, Tense, And Causation Oxford 2000 |
| Round Square | Chisholm | I 21 Meinong/Chisholm: Solution: there is the possibility of something round and there is the possibility of something quare - nothing has both. - There are properties that can not even be exemplified. >Exemplification, >Instantiation, cf. >Heterology. I 22 Solution: each property is such that there is a possibility that there is someone who thinks of it. >Properties, >Predication, cf. >Conceivability. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Set Theory | Bigelow | I 363 Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a child of the union of arithmetics and geometry. Descartes has done some preliminary work, the meta language was invented in the coordinate system. --- I 364 It allows us to expand the correlation between points in the coordinate system, a line corresponds to a set of number pairs, etc. Equations: many such quantities can be adequately described by equations. Example: set of points on a circle line (x - a)2 + (y - b)² = c². for fixed numbers a, b and c. This corresponds to a unique set and this is unambiguously equivalent to an equation. --- I 365 Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: reduces not only geometry to numbers and sets, but also numbers to sets. This cleared pure mathematics from empirical concerns. Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: for each logically consistent universal, there will be possibilia that instantiate it. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter: guaranteed by logical consistency. Platonism/modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our platonism is determined by the fact that we allow actualized uninstantiated universals. ((s) Not instantiated in the actual world). N.B.: then we do not need set theory to guarantee instantiations of geometric proportions a priori. They can be studied whether or not they are instantiated in the real world. --- I 366 Set theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, we say that there are sets of numbers that correspond to possible objects. One and the same geometric figure corresponds to an infinite number of different sets of pairs of numbers. ((s) The figure can be moved in the coordinate system). These different sets of number pairs have something in common, even if they do not have two pairs of numbers in common: a universal. Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: they exist whether or not one detects them. Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: also exist, e.g. if you discover that two equations are in the same relation to pairs of numbers: they have the same extension. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Similarity | Armstrong | II (b) 34/35 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place): then similar property (as particulars) means all exactly similar properties. Universals (Armstrong): many particulars with the same properties. Universal-realist: takes for each class exactly one universal. Martin I 72 Similarity/equality/property/Martin: Thesis: We need to rethink the ordinary exact and inexact equality between objects (these need a way, in relation to which they may be the same). Instead: similarity between properties. II (c) 97f Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of various universals for every similarity which is not exact! >Multiplication of entities. MartinVsArmstrong: similarity is ontologically the fundamental concept. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Similarity | Place | Armstrong II (b) 34/35 Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals). Nominalism (Place): then similar property (as particulars) means all exactly similar properties. Universals (Armstrong): many particulars with the same properties. Universal-realist: takes for each class exactly one universal. Martin I 72 Similarity/equality/property/Martin: Thesis: We need to rethink the ordinary exact and inexact equality between objects (these need a way, in relation to which they may be the same). Instead: similarity between properties. Armstrong II (c) 97f Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of various universals for every similarity which is not exact! >Multiplication of entities. MartinVsArmstrong: similarity is ontologically the fundamental concept. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Space | Strawson | McGinn I 210 Space/thinking/Strawson: thinking without spatial awareness is not possible for us. Just the thought of multiple instantiations of the same property presupposes a notion of space. >Identification/Strawson, >Individuation/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson, >I, Ego, Self/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Terminology | Lewis | Bigelow I 180 Definition Lagadonian Language/Lagadonian/Terminology/Swift/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: by this name Lewis calls such a language, following Gulliver's travels. (1986a(1), p. 145). It is a set theoretical structure on individuals, characteristics, and relations. 1. Lewis, David 1986a. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press Schwarz I 97 Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property. Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well. IV 58 Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive. Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states. Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question? For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both? Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former? But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states! IV 259 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification. "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension. I (b) 27 Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. I (b) 31 They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia. I (b) 34 Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships. Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds V 86 Principal Principle/main principle/probability/opportunity/Lewis: the Principal Principle is to be modeled according to our experience with direct conclusions. Exceptions: 1) it is about opportunity, not frequency. 2) Certainty of probabilities (opportunities) contributes to the resilience (resistance to new information). Schwarz I 99 Relations/Lewis: intrinsic: e.g., greater-relation (concerns only the two sides). Extrinsic: e.g. grandmother-relation (needs a third). Internal relation: (not equal to intrinsic relation): depends only on intrinsic properties and is reducible to them. External relation: is also intrinsic, but just not reducible. E.g., Spatiotemporal relation: "intrinsic with respect to pairs". Identity/partial relation/elementarity/Lewis: These are all no relations! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Terminology | Norvig | Norvig I 8 Terminology/Russell/Norvig: Although decidability and computability are important to an understanding of computation, the notion of tractability has had an even greater impact. Roughly speaking, a problem is called intractable if the time required to solve instances of the problem grows exponentially with the size of the instances. The distinction between polynomial and exponential growth in complexity was first emphasized in the mid-1960s (Cobham, 1964(1); Edmonds, 1965(2)). It is important because exponential growth means that even moderately large instances cannot be solved in any reasonable time. Norvig I 106 Pattern databases: The idea behind them is to store these exact solution costs for every possible subproblem instance (…) Norvig I 108 Def Problem: A problem consists of five parts: the initial state, a set of actions, a transition model describing the results of those actions, a goal test function, and a path cost function. The environment of the problem is represented by a state space. A path through the state space from the initial state to a goal state is a solution. Norvig I 135 And/or nodes/search trees: or: In a deterministic environment, the only branching is introduced by the agent’s own choices in each state. We call these nodes OR nodes And: In a nondeterministic environment, branching is also introduced by the environment’s choice of outcome for each action. We call these nodes AND nodes. A solution for an AND–OR search problem is a subtree that (1) has a goal node at every leaf, (2) specifies one action at each of its OR nodes, and (3) includes every outcome branch at each of its AND nodes. Norvig I 148 Competitive ratio: Typically, the agent’s objective is to reach a goal state while minimizing cost. (Another possible objective is simply to explore the entire environment.) The cost is the total path cost of the path that the agent actually travels. It is common to compare this cost with the path cost of the path the agent would follow if it knew the search space in advance—that is, the actual shortest path (or shortest complete exploration). In the language of online algorithms, this is called the competitive ratio; we would like it to be as small as possible. >Online search/Norvig. Norvig I 162 Def Pruning: Pruning allows us to ignore portions of the search tree that make no difference to the final choice. Def Heuristic evaluation functions: allow us to approximate the true utility of a state without doing a complete search. Def utility function: (also called an objective function or payoff function), defines the final numeric value for a game that ends in terminal state s for a player p. In chess, the outcome is a win, loss, or draw, with values +1, 0, or 1 2 . Some games have a wider variety of possible outcomes; the payoffs in backgammon range from 0 to +192. Def Zero-sum game: is (confusingly) defined as one where the total payoff to all players is the same for every instance of the game. Chess is zero-sum. “Constant-sum” would have been a better term, but zero-sum is traditional and makes sense if you imagine each player is charged an entry fee of 1/2 . Norvig I 165 Minimax Algorithm/gaming: The minimax algorithm (…) computes the minimax decision from the current state. It uses a simple recursive computation of the minimax values of each successor state, directly implementing the defining equations. The recursion proceeds all the way down to the leaves of the tree, and then the minimax values are backed up through the tree as the recursion unwinds. The minimax algorithm performs a complete depth-first exploration of the game tree. For real games, of course, the time cost is totally impractical, but this algorithm serves as the basis for the mathematical analysis of games and for more practical algorithms. Norvig I 208 Def node consistency: A single variable (corresponding to a node in the CSP network) is node-consistent if all the values in the variable’s domain satisfy the variable’s unary constraints. Def arc consistency: A variable in a CSP is arc-consistent if every value in its domain satisfies the variable’s binary constraints. More formally, Xi is arc-consistent with respect to another variable Xj if for every value in the current domain Di there is some value in the domain Dj that satisfies the binary constraint on the arc (Xi,Xj). >Constraint Satisfaction Problems/CSP/Norvig. Norvig I 210 Def Path consistency: Arc consistency tightens down the domains (unary constraints) using the arcs (binary constraints). To make progress on problems like map coloring, we need a stronger notion of consistency. Path consistency tightens the binary constraints by using implicit constraints that are inferred by looking at triples of variables. Norvig I 211 Def K-consistency: Stronger forms of propagation can K-CONSISTENCY be defined with the notion of k-consistency. A CSP is k-consistent if, for any set of k − 1 variables and for any consistent assignment to those variables, a consistent value can always be assigned to any kth variable. For forward chaining, backward chaining: see >Software agents/Norvig. Norvig I 266 Propositions: The idea of associating propositions with time steps extends to any aspect of the world changes over time. Fluent: We use the word fluent (from the Latin fluents, flowing) to refer an aspect of the world that changes. “Fluent” is a synonym for “state variable”. Norvig I 346 Skolemize: Skolemization is the process of removing existential quantifiers by elimination. In the simple case, it is just like the Existential Instantiation rule (…): translate ∃x P(x) into P(A), where A is a new constant. Norvig I 410 Nondeterministic action: The programming languages community has coined the term demonic nondeterminism for the case where an adversary makes the DEMONIC choices, contrasting this with angelic nonde- Norvig I 411 terminism, where the agent itself makes the choices. We borrow this term to define angelic semantics for HLA descriptions. Norvig I 468 Closed-world assumption: as implemented in logic programs, provides a simple way to avoid having to specify lots of negative information. It is best interpreted as a default that can be overridden by additional information. 1. Cobham, A. (1964). The intrinsic computational difficulty of functions. In Proc. 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, pp. 24–30. 2. Edmonds, J. (1965). Paths, trees, and flowers. Canadian Journal of Mathematics, 17, 449–467. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Terminology | Gray | Corr I 326 Terminology/Gray: Jeffrey Gray focused more heavily on neurobiology than on personality, with an emphasis on the development of a Def ‘conceptual nervous system’ describing functional systems that could be mapped onto brain systems. The main components of this conceptual nervous system are the Def BAS: behavioural approach system, which responds to cues for reward, and the Def FFFS: fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) and the Def BIS: behavioural inhibition system (BIS), which respond to two distinct classes of threatening stimuli (Gray and McNaughton 2000(1); Pickering and Gray 1999)(2). Immediately threatening, punishing or frustrating stimuli activate the FFFS, which produces active avoidance (panic and flight) or attempted elimination (anger and attack). RST: Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory. 1. Gray, J. A. and McNaughton, N. 2000. The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press 2. Pickering, A. D. and Gray, J. A. 1999. The neuroscience of personality, in L. A. Pervin and O. P. John (eds.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, 2nd edn, pp. 277–99. New York: Guilford Press Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 359 Terminology/Gray: Cf. Gray (1982)(1): BIS: (1) The behavioural inhibition system (BIS) was postulated to be sensitive to conditioned aversive stimuli, omission/termination of expected reward, and conditioned frustration (i.e., conditioning to stimuli that signalled expected reward, non-reward), as well as an assortment of other inputs, including extreme novelty, high intensity stimuli and innate fear stimuli (e.g., snakes, blood). The BIS was related to the personality factor of Anxiety (Anx). The neural instantiation of the BIS was postulated to be in the septo-hippocampal system of the brain. FFS: The fight-flight system (FFS) was postulated to be sensitive to unconditioned aversive stimuli (i.e., innately painful stimuli), mediating the emotions of rage and panic. This system was related to the state of negative affect (NA) (associated with pain) and speculatively associated by Gray with Eysenck’s personality factor of Psychoticism (P) (Eysenck and Eysenck 1976)(2). The neural instantiation of the FFS was postulated to be in the periaqueductal grey and (various nuclei of) the hypothalamus. BAS: The behavioural approach system (BAS) was postulated to be sensitive to conditioned appetitive stimuli, forming a positive feedback loop, activated by the presentation of stimuli associated with reward and the termination/omission of signals of punishment. This system was related to state positive affect (PA) and the personality dimension of Impulsivity (Imp). The neural instantiation of the BAS was postulated to be in the mesolimbic dopamine circuit. Cf. >Terminology/Corr: „Post-2000 RST“. 1. Gray, J. A. 1982. The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system. Oxford University Press 2. Eysenck, H. J. and Eysenck, S. G. B. 1976. Psychoticism as a dimension of personality. London: Hodder and Stoughton Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr II 124 Hope-Relief Hypothesis/Gray/McNaughton/Corr: ‘hope = relief hypothesis’ (Gray, 1971(1), 1972(2)), [is] derived from his concept of relieving nonpunishment (a mirror image of frustrative nonreward). Extraverting drugs do not impair avoidance unless some form of conflict is present (i.e., avoidance is passive, not active – a subtle but fundamental distinction). Provided we are dealing with learning, we can see an active avoidance response as one rewarded by stimuli that signal safety and generate the positive emotion of relief; and so we can explain the lack of effect of anti-punishment drugs. 1. Gray, J. A. (1971). The psychology of fear and stress. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 2. Gray, J. A. (1972). Learning theory, the conceptual nervous system and personality. In V. D. Nebylitsyn & J. A. Gray (Eds.), The biological bases of individual behaviour. London, New York: Academic Press. McNaughton, Neil and Corr, John Philip: “Sensitivity to Punishment and Reward Revisiting Gray (1970)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 115-136. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Thinking | Strawson | McGinn I 210 Space/Thinking/Strawson: Thinking without spatial awareness is not possible for us. The thought of multiple instantiations of the same property presupposes a notion of space. >Exemplification, >Space/Strawson, >Imagination, >Properties/Strawson, >Identification/Strawson. Strawson IV 131 Language/thinking/Strawson: at a certain point we can not say what we can not think - but thinking is not just talk - we need to understand our sentences. >Understanding, >Speaking, >Language and thought, >Thinking without language. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Token-Physicalism | Fodor | I 137 Token Physicalism/Fodor: 1) Token physicalism is weaker than materialism. Def materialism/Fodor: materialism asserts both: that the token physicalism is true and that every event falls under the laws of one or another science (so you can be token physicalist without being a materialist). >Materialism. 2) The token physicalism is weaker than the type physicalism. Def type physicalism/Fodor: any property that is mentioned in the laws of any science, is a physical property. Token physicalism does not include type physicalism, because the contingent identity of an event pair probably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the events, not even if the event identity is nomologically necessary. I 138 If, on the other hand, every event is the instantiation of a property, then the type physicalism includes the token physicalism: two properties will be identical when they exist in the instantiation of the same property through the same individual at the same time. Token physicalism is weaker than the reductionism. >Reductionism, >Reduction. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Truthmakers | Armstrong | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Truthmakers | Place | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. Armstrong II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. Armstrong II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Truthmakers | Martin | Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. Armstrong II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. Armstrong II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Universal Generalization | Universal generalization, logic: under the condition that an arbitrarily chosen object x has a certain property F, one can conclude that every object has the property F. See also existential generalization, universal instantiation. |
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| Universal Instantiation | Universal instantiation, logic: on the condition that all objects x have the property F, one can conclude that a particular object, which can be designated, has the property F. See also universal generalization, existential generalization. |
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| Universal Instantiation | Cresswell | I 129 Universal Instantiation/Cresswell: their laws are valid in this form: (x) (F(x) > F(y) where y is a variable. - It still fails if in (x) F (x)> F.(t). t is any term - according to Leibniz s principle. >Leibniz-Principle. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Universal Instantiation | Geach | I 142f UI / Geach: universal Instantiantiation: from (x) Fx to Fw. IE: instantial existentiation: from Fw to (Ex) Fx EI: existenial instantiation: from (Ex) Fx to Fw. IU: Instantial universalization of Fw to (x) Fx. Geach: a proof with IU may be replaced by one which only uses EI. IU and UI are valid also in not non-Shakespearian contexts. (>Shakespearian context: a rose would smell even if it were not be called a rose.) >Identification/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Universal Instantiation | Quine | VII (h) 146 Definition Universal Instantiation/Quine: E.g. from everything is identical with itself, or (x) (x = x), we conclude Socrates = Socrates. - This is together with the existential generalization two aspects of the same principle - but not if the terms denote nothing. - E.g. Giorgione disappears (falsely) as opaque context in existential generalization: (Ex) (x has 6 letters) words: Something has 6 letters. - Even worse: it contains 6 letters - the prefix there is simply irrelevant, the sentence is just wrong. >Description levels. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Universals | Armstrong | III 82 Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation. III 88 Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation). 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal. III 99 Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations. III 118 Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker. III 120 UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist. Place II 57 Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties. Martin I 77 "Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102). Martin II 129 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent. Martin III 179 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Universals | Bigelow | I VII Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: they help to create a unified picture and to understand probabilities. They help to establish a unified theory of modalities (possibility, necessity) that we find in science. --- I 82 Universals/science/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have encountered universals that are useful for physics, now we are looking at those that are useful for chemistry: Chemical components: are structures made up of elements. Universal: is the property of having a certain structure, which in turn is related to the universals that determine the elements. These are structural universals. Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargettesr e.g. expressed by the predicate "to be methane" or "Methane"; Instantiated: by a carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms in a certain constellation. This constellation is an essential property. Instantiation: by methane molecules. N.B.: this universal is intrinsically connected to other universals: the universals, being hydrogen, being carbon and be bound. --- I 87 Structural Universals/Level/Bigelow/Pargetter: Level 1: material individuals who have the property of being butane or methane, etc. These are then methane molecules, etc. These individuals have parts with different properties and relations. Level 2: Properties and relations of the individuals of the 1st Level. Property: For example, the property to be methane. Level 3: Relations or proportions between properties or relations between individuals, no matter whether they are properties of the 1st or 2nd level (sic) of these individuals. For example,"having the same number of instances as". Cardinal numbers/Frege: Frege needed this construction for the cardinal numbers. Family: this relation between properties have the form of a family, including e.g. "having twice as many instances","having four times as many instances", etc. Proportion: these "numerical" proportions will also exist between more complex properties of the 2nd level: e.g. "conjunctive property: being carbon and be part of this molecule". For example, if the molecule is methane, these two properties are in a ratio characterized by the proportion 4:1. Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can then characterize it as a relational property of an object. It relates the molecule to various properties. These properties are being carbon, being hydrogen and being bound. Universal: e.g. being methane: is then identical with a highly conjunctive relational property of the 2nd level of an individual (molecule). --- I 88 Property: the property of being methane stands in a pattern of internal proportions to other properties, e.g. being hydrogen, being bound, etc. Mereology/Chemistry/Bigelow/Pargetter: but these relations are not mereological. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: these relations are internal relations and they are essential. Essentialism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: we need essential properties here. But this is better than seeking refuge in magic (see above). --- I 89 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: could not exist as these universals if they were not in these relations with each other. These are the structural universals. --- I 164 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: a full theory of universals needs a pre-semantic source for universals (pre-semantic/s): something that does not require truthmakers. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need something that instantiates something without ever being instantiated. Existence of 2nd level/Bigelow/Pargetter: is also required by a theory of universals. From which, however, you cannot deduce any existence of the 1st level without additional premises. Causes as structural universals. --- I 293 Fundamental Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. Basic forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are aggregates of vectors: thesis: they are structural universals. For example, mass: each specific mass corresponds to a specific property. Nevertheless, massive objects have something in common: that they have mass. This corresponds to a relation of a higher level. These relations are internal and essential, not external. That is, the particular mass properties could not be them if they were in different relations to other objects. Common: this is the fact that all massive things are related to other massive things. Property of the 1st level: Example: velocity in the plane. Relation 1st level: For example, difference in velocity or direction. Therefore, there are two relations of the 1st level. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are more complex vectors, since they themselves are relations of the 2nd level. Fundamental forces can be of different sizes and directions. --- I 293 They are thus in a cluster of internal relations of higher degrees to other fundamental forces. That makes sure that they are a family with something in common. Necessary/Properties/Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: the fact that one fundamental force is twice as great as the other, or perpendicular to another; it is not contingent. Solution: they would otherwise be different from the forces they are. On the other hand, Contingent: whether things are connected by a force is contingent. Structural Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above: methane example) Forces: the constitutive properties of structural universals can also be fundamental forces, including vectors with size and direction. Internal relations: there are many of them within a structural universal. And they also establish the connections to individuals. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we said it is local. So it cannot be a relation only between completely nonlocal universals. Structural universals: must therefore have a local element. Solution: their relational properties embed particulars as well as universals. Fundamental cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: if it is a structural universal, it will be a conjunctive relation of a higher level between single events. --- I 294 Causal relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: after all, they have a rich and essential nature. And they are not primitive basic concepts. They are explained by vectors and structural universals. They exist independently alongside causes and effects. Modalities/Bigelow/Pargetter: some are essentially causal. But: Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not essentially modal for its part. --- I 378 Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: are things in the world like others. In particular, they are namable. --- I 379 There is no essential connection between universals and predicates. I.e. universals can be in subject position. ((s) But can we quantify via them?). Therefore, we have no problem with higher-level logic (2nd level logic). Universals: should not be dominated by semantic theory. They should not have to be arranged according to a hierarchy. Nevertheless, they have a hierarchical pattern with individuals as a basis. Paradoxes: are avoided by prohibiting universals from instantiating themselves or other universals. Self-reference/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, this is only a problem if mathematics is based a priori on logic alone. And we do not want that. For example, we do not assume that each linguistic description determines a quantity. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Universals | Place | Armstrong III 82 Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation. Armstrong III 88 Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation). 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal. Armstrong III 99 Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations. Armstrong III 118 Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker. Armstrong III 120 UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist. Place II 57 Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties. Martin I 77 "Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102). Martin II 129 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent. Martin III 179 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Universe | AI Research | Norvig I 545 Open Universe/probabilities/environment/AI research/Norvig/Russell: (…) a major part of human cognition seems to require learning what objects exist and being able to connect observations - which almost never come with unique IDs attached - to hypothesized objects in the world. For these reasons, we need to be able to write so-called open-universe probability models or OUPMs based on the standard semantics of first-order logic (…). A language for OUPMs provides a way of writing such models easily while guaranteeing a unique, consistent probability distribution over the infinite space of possible worlds. (>Bayesian networks/Norvig). The basic idea is to understand how ordinary Bayesian networks and RPMs ((s) Relational probability models; >Bayesian networks/Norvig) manage to define a unique probability model and to transfer that insight to the first-order setting. In essence, a Bayes net generates each possible world, event by event, in the topological order defined by the network structure, where each event is an assignment of a value to a variable. An RPM extends this to entire sets of events, defined by the possible instantiations of the logical variables in a given predicate or function. OUPMs go further by allowing generative steps that add objects to the possible world under construction, where the number and type of objects may depend on the objects that are already in that world. That is, the event being generated is not the assignment of a value to a variable, but the very existence of objects. One way to do this in OUPMs is to add statements that define conditional distributions over the numbers of objects of various kinds. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Verification | Chalmers | I 112 Consciousness/Verification/Chalmers: it is sometimes argued that alleged models of consciousness are not testable, not verifiable, because we cannot verify whether or not instantiations of these models are conscious. This is a problem, but there are deeper problems. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Armstrong, D. | Meixner Vs Armstrong, D. | State of Affairs/st.o.a./Meixner: Def elementary instantiation fact: e.g. that Anna loves Fritz, e.g. that every living being is mortal (includes that every human being is mortal) Def higher level state of affairs: example "that is greater than a transitive relation". Def conjunctive state of affairs: example "that Anna loves Fritz and Is greater than a transitive relation". Def negative state of affairs: e.g. that Nuremberg is not located between Regensburg and Munich Def possibility state of affairs: e.g. that it is possible that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013. Def necessity state of affairs: e.g. that it is inevitable that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013. These classes are not unconnected: every state of affairs is an elementary instantiation state of affairs negative state of affairs: every is also a negative state of affairs by being identical with the negation of its negation. I 122/123 All conjunctive state of affairs are negations of disjunctions of state of affairs. All disjunctive negations of conjunctions of state of affairs, all necessity state of affairs are negations of possibility state of affairs and vice versa. All at least one state of affairs negations of all-state of affairs and vice versa. Meixner: nevertheless it is surprisingly controversial among ontologists whether there are negative state of affairs. Parallel to the discussion whether there are negative universals: ArmstrongVsNegative Universals. MeixnerVsArmstrong: pro negative state of affairs: one cannot deny the sentence A does not express a proposition and thus also a state of affairs. (Although state of affairs is not equal to propositions). ArmstrongVsDisjunctive state of affairs MeixnerVsArmstrong: much clearer is the occurrence of negative and disjunctive state of affairs in names for disjunctive and negative state of affairs: For example, the police inspector is convinced that 1. the gardener or butler is involved in the murder 2. not both 3. no one who is different from both the gardener and the butler (so no one else). Absurd: that the police inspector would not be convinced of any state of affairs as a consequence. He is rather convinced of three state of affairs. I 124 The same can be said for all- and at least one- state of affairs: their names appear in descriptions of the exemplification of propositional attitudes. Here they cannot be eliminated. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Davidson, D. | Avramides Vs Davidson, D. | Avra I 119 Antireductionism/Avramidis: the anti-reductionist does not need to deny thought without language (Thw/oL). But at least one anti-reductionist makes this position incompatible with ontological asymmetry: Davidson: a conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological involves an ontological symmetry. (compare Dav. 1984e and 1982). AvramidisVsDavidson: that does not work: Beliefs/Convictions/Davidson: is essential for all types of thinking. The system (of endlessly interlinked) beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. (94). ((s)> holism). Avramidis: with that he says that there can be no Thw/oL. 1) a being can only have a belief if it has a concept of belief, 2) a being can only have a concept of belief if it is part of a linguistic community. Davidson: more precisely: it does not need to have a concept of a particular belief, only a general one. In order to have a general concept of belief the being must be able to imagine what it is like to be wrong. (Dav 1984e, p. 157) I 120 That requires the idea of an objective public truth (to set up a context of interpretation). (Dav 1984e, p. 157). AvramidisVsDavidson: this can be can denied either by 1) arguing that one does not need the concept of belief to believe or 2) that being a member of a language community is not the only way to obtain the concept of belief. Detecting/Instantiation/Term/Davidson: because of the need of detecting the intersubjective truth we cannot instantiate the concept of belief without grasping itself and having it. I 122 AvramidisVsDavidson: there is a different way to be aware of the distinction subjective/objective I 123 a way which is also open to speechless beings (animals) (106): learning ability in animals. This applies to Bennett’s thesis. Bennett/Avramidis: the awareness of the distinction subjective/objective is sufficient for learning. (correcting things). To do that, speechless beings only have to be able to interact with their environment. VsDavidson; his strict requirement could be interpreted as anthropomorphism. DavidsonVsVs: it comes down to properties of certain concepts, not properties of people. (Dav 1982 S.319). Semantics/Psychology/Davidson: are interdependent. ((s) So no asymmetry but symmetry?). DavidsonVsontological asymmetry. Avramidis: for us, this is a rejection of conceptual asymmetry. (For Davidson as well). I 124 Davidson: rejection of the ontological asymmetry is a consequence of the rejection of conceptual asymmetry. AvramidisVsDavidson: it does not follow. (For the anti-reductionists). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Endurantism | Lewis Vs Endurantism | Schwarz I 32 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory). Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points. Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory. LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd. Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116). Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time. Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5) e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night. Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night. LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own. Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away. Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation. Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation. Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance. Schwarz I 33 Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them. 1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125 2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael (ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42. 3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001] 4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107. 5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Peacocke Vs Fodor, J. | I 208 Perception/Mentalese/MT/Fodor: what happens in perception, is a description of the environment in a vocabulary is not expressible, that refers to the values of physical variables. E.g. "A butterfly is on the lawn" Instead, in Mentalese we shall speak of "light being the magnitude of the retina and region L". PeacockeVsFodor/PeacockeVsMentalese: what is actually the token of Mentalese, that refers to this localization L? There seems to be nothing there. E.g. a different retina area could supply information about a different localization, as well as the original cell. I 209 But that leads to no difference within Mentalese! There is only a difference of the relata: one refers causally to one area of the retina, the other to another one. VsPeacocke: it could be argued that something like "foggy" ("it's foggy here") corresponds to the individual spots. "Foggy" then has no relevant syntactic structure, but when it occurs in a statement, it will refer to a specific place and time. In fact, several central units of the nervous system must somehow receive non-indexical information from the periphery: E.g. someone who receives one hundred telegrams: "it is bright here", "it is raining here", etc. is not in a position to draw a map if he does not know where the telegrams come from. Peacocke: but an indexical strategy cannot work for more complex contents. A given nerve cell may be neurophysiologically indistinguishable from another one, with completely different content conditions for firing. Trivialization/Mentalese: but if these relations should count as part of the syntactic structure of a (mental) state, then the language of the mind is trivialized. There would be no true sentence analogs. Mentalese/Perception/Fodor/Peacocke: a similar argument is about e.g. approved detectors for lines, deep within the perceptual system: these suggest causal relations for perceptions. But possession of a structured content does not require a corresponding physical structure in the state, but there may be in the pattern of relations in which the state stands. Peacocke: a model that satisfies this relational paradigm, but does not require Mentalese must meet several conditions: 1) How can propositional content be ascribed without referring to syntactic structures? I.e. relatively complex contents must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (mental) states. 2) It must be shown how these states interact with perception and behavior. I 215 Computation/Language/Mentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: not even computation (calculation of behavior and perception) seems to require language: E.g. question whether the acting person should do φ. Fodor: E.g. the actor is described as computing the anticipated benefit of φ-s under the condition C. Peacocke: the extent to which the subject has the corresponding belief "C given that I φ" may consist in the presence of a corresponding physical state to a certain extent. That would in turn only be a matter of pure relations! The same applies to reaching the state "C and I φ". The states can interact without requiring syntactic structures. Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and of causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsFodor: it does not necessary apply: "No representation, no computation". I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p. 199) Thesis: there can be no construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (incarnation) of another formal system: "proper" requires: a) there must be a general procedure for the attribution of character formulas (assigning formulae) to states of the organism b) for each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism so that c1) the state is interpretable as relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingently identical) to have these propositional attitudes. d) Mental representations have their causal roles by virtue of their formal properties. VsMentalese/PeacockeVsFodor: we can have all of this without Mentalese! Either: 1) There are really sentence analogues in the brain or: 2) Fodor's condition could be met otherwise: there could be a semantics that is correlated with Frege's thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Geach, P. | Wiggins Vs Geach, P. | Simons I 213 "Relative Identity"-view of super position: a) (Representative: Geach): "Sortal Theory" of relative identity: known as "theory R": for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Nicholas Griffin: pro. WigginsVsGeach: that violates Leibniz' law. And because this applies necessarily, the theory is necessarily wrong. DoepkeVsGeach: "relative identity" is only a false name for similarity. b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins' thesis that things that are ever different are always different. GriceVsWiggins: the assumption depends on finding properties in which the objects differ in the times when they are not superposed. Then identity is relative to time. I.e. TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b] Where the quantifier runs only over properties whose instantiation does not include the instantiation of any other property at any other time. This excludes: the property, e.g. to be two years old, e.g. to be ex-president e.g. to be bride-in-spe. Simons: we can call this the relation of "temporal indistinguishability". It is characterized by a limitation of Leibniz's law. I 214 SimonsVsGrice: if we call this similarity "identity", then any other kind of similarity is possible, like for example "surface identity" of a body with its surface. Indistinguishability/Time/Simons: will turn out to be important below (in constitution). System CT/Simons: (see above) with him, we have already rejected "temporal identity". Ad (3): dichrone view of super position: Thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, the gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is replaced by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. For example, a person does not coincide with its body, it transforms into its body (the corpse). (Only if "body" is understood as "corpse", as is often, but not always the case). Dichrone view: Thesis: there is no substrate that survives the change. Change/Diachronic View: Thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic View: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Grice, P.H. | Quine Vs Grice, P.H. | Wright I 198 Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions. Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth. QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Lesniewski, St. | Prior Vs Lesniewski, St. | I 43 Abstracts/Prior: Ontological Commitment/Quine: quantification of non-nominal variables nominalises them and thus forces us to believe in the corresponding abstract objects. Here is a more technical argument which seems to point into Quine's direction at first: Properties/Abstraction Operator/Lambda Notation/Church/Prior: logicians who believe in the real existence of properties sometimes introduce names for them. Abstraction Operator: should form names from corresponding predicates. Or from open sentences. Lambda: λ followed by a variable, followed by the open sentence in question. E.g. if φx is read as "x is red", I 44 then the property of redness is: λxφx. E.g. if Aφxψx: "x is red or x is green" (A: Here adjunction) "Property of being red or green": λx∀φxψx. To say that such a property characterizes an object, we just put the name of the property in front of the name of the object. Lambda Calculus/Prior: usually has a rule that says that an object y has the property of φ-ness iff. y φt. I.e. we can equate: (λy∀φxψx)y = ∀φyψy. ((s) y/x: because "for y applies: something (x) is...") One might think that someone who does not believe in the real existence of properties does not need such a notation. But perhaps we do need it if we want to be free for all types of quantification. E.g. all-quantification of higher order: a) C∏φCφy∑φyCAψyXy∑xAψxXx, i.e. If (1) for all φ, if y φt, then φt is something then (2) if y is either ψt or Xt, then something results in either ψ or X. That's alright. Problem: if we want to formulate the more general principle of which a) is a special case: first: b) C∏φΘφΘ() Where we want to insert in the brackets that which symbolizes the alternation of a pair of verbs "ψ" and "X". AψX does not work, because A must not be followed by two verbs, but only by two sentences. We could introduce a new symbol A', which allows: (A’ φψ)x = Aψxψx this turns the whole thing into: c) C∏φΘφΘA’ψX From this we obtain by instantiation: of Θ d) C∏φCφy∑xφxCA’ψXy∑xA’ψXx. And this, Lesniewski's definition of "A", results in a). This is also Lesniewski's solution to the problem. I 45 PriorVsLesniewski: nevertheless, this is somewhat ad hoc. Lambda Notation: gives us a procedure that can be generalized: For c) gives us e) C∏φΘφΘ(λzAψzXz) which can be instatiated to: f) C∏φCφy∑xφx(λzAψzXz)y∑x(λzAψzXz)y. From this, λ-conversion takes us back to a). Point: λ-conversion does not take us back from e) to a), because in e) the λ-abstraction is not bound to an individual variable. So of some contexts, "abstractions" cannot be eliminated. I 161 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Prior: Theorem 24.52: the universe is not empty The universal class is not empty, the all-class is not empty. Russell himself found this problematic. LesniewskiVsRussell: (Introduction to Principia Mathematica): violation of logical purity: that the universal class is believed to be not empty. Ontology/Model Theory/LesniewskiVsRussell: for him, ontology is compatible with an empty universe. PriorVsLesniewski: his explanation for this is mysterious: Lesniewski: types at the lowest level stand for name (as in Russell). But for him not only for singular names, but equally for general names and empty names! Existence/LesniewskiVsRussell: is then something that can be significantly predicted with an ontological "name" as the subject. E.g. "a exists" is then always a well-formed expression (Russell: pointless!), albeit not always true. Epsilon/LesniewskiVsRussell: does not only connect types of different levels for him, but also the same level! (Same logical types) E.g. "a ε a" is well-formed in Lesniewski, but not in Russell. I 162 Set Theory/Classes/Lesniewski/Prior: what are we to make of it? I suggest that we conceive this ontology generally as Russell's set theory that simply has no variables for the lowest logical types. Names: so-called "names" of ontology are then not individual names like in Russell, but class names. This solves the first of our two problems: while it is pointless to split individual names, it is not so with class names. So we split them into those that are applied to exactly one individual, to several, or to none at all. Ontology/Lesniewski/Russell/Prior: the fact that there should be no empty class still requires an explanation. Names/Lesniewski/Prior: Lesniewski's names may therefore be logically complex! I.e. we can, for example, use to form their logical sum or their logical product! And we can construct a name that is logically empty. E.g. the composite name "a and not-a". Variables/Russell: for him, on the other hand, individual variables are logically structureless. Set Theory/Lesniewski/Prior: the development of Russell's set theory but without variables at the lowest level (individuals) causes problems, because these are not simply dispensable for Russell. On the contrary; for Russell, classes are constructed of individuals. Thus he has, as it were, a primary (for individuals, functors) and a secondary language (for higher-order functors, etc.) Basic sentences are something like "x ε a". I 163 Def Logical Product/Russell: e.g. of the αs and βs: the class of xs is such that x is an α, and x is a β. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Lewis, D. | Martin Vs Lewis, D. | Arm II 182 Abwesenheit/Lewis: wie Quines "Anbetrachten" nur eine facon de parler eine "happenstance of idiom". MartinVsLewis/MartinVsQuine: das muß man überhaupt nicht deontologisieren. Anbetracht/Martin: ("sake"): ist der angenommene Nutzen von etwas, durch Instantiation eines Zustands oder einer Bedingung durch eine Aktion oder Unterlassen. Es genügt, daß wir ungefähr wissen, nach was in der Welt wir Ausschau halten sollen, wenn von "Anbetracht" die Rede ist. Auch wenn meistens herauskommt, daß es in Begriffen der theoretischen Physik nicht darstellbar (zu vervollständigen) ist. Aber auf der Ebene, wo wir über die beobachtbare Welt reden ist solche Vollständigkeit unnötig. Abwesenheit/Löcher/MartinVsLewis: auch hier ist eine Deontologisierung überflüssig. Lösung: statt "wie die Dinge sind" sollte man besser sagen: "Wie die Welt ist" oder "Wie es ist" entweder zu einer bestimmten Zeit an einem bestimmten Ort, oder auch ganz allgemein. Dann werden "Dinge" gar nicht erwähnt. Arm II 183 MartinVsLewis: aber der Satz "Es gibt keine Falschmacher für "es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine"" ist genauso ein negativer Existenzsatz. Lösung/Martin: es ist kein negativer Existenzsatz über Dinge, sondern es geht um einen Zustand einer Raumzeit Region. Der Satz über die Abwesenheit von Falschmachern braucht einen Satz über einen Weltzustand als Wahrmacher. Problem: und zwar genauso wie "Es gibt keine arktischen Pinguine". Daher kann er auch nicht gebraucht werden, um zu zeigen, dass der letztere Satz keinen Zustand als Wahrmacher braucht. II 186 Leere/Abwesenheit/MartinVsLewis: dieser will immer den Doughnut ansehen und nicht das Loch. Das kann man aber durchaus konkreter fassen: Bsp wenn wir ein Hemd ohne Flecken aussuchen, dann halten wir nicht nach dem reinen Nichts Ausschau, sondern nach der Abwesenheit von Flecken. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Martin | Place Vs Martin | Arm II 110 Similarity/Martin: must be "exact" if it is to exist between particulars of the same kind. PlaceVsMartin: this is too big a concession to Armstrong according to whom a universal is a kind of particular that is somehow present itself in all instantiations. Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro, like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar so that they can be "of the same kind". And in this sense, they cannot be "inexactly" similar. But to say that it must be "exact" there is merely pleonastic. II 111 Categorical/Dispositional/Property/PlaceVsMartin: misunderstanding: attributed to Place: in his opinion there were two different properties so that the categorical (qualitative) property is the only cause of the dispositional property as effect. PlaceVsMartin: this cannot be my view, because there can never be any causal relation, if no dispositional property connects the two (separately) interacting objects. Place acknowledges the following principles: 1) Hume Mackie Principle causal necessity is a question of the truth of counterfactual conditionals. 2) The truth of counterfactual conditionals depends on the truth of a causal law statement. 3) Ryle Principle: dispositional statements are causal law statements, which are limited to the individual and to the time during which the disposition lasts. 4) Goodman Principle: the truth of a dispositional statement is all that is needed to support the truth of a causal counterfactual conditional. 5) Truthmaker Principle: the possession of a dispositional property consists in a state that cannot be characterized as other than that it is said that it is the state through which the dispositional statement becomes true. Conclusion: the structure must have both dispositional and categorical properties. VsArmstrong: So it cannot be right that all properties are ultimately categorical. pro Martin: the dispositional is just as real and irreducible as the categorical. II 113 Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsMartin: I accept their actual existence here and now. But everything that exists is a property of the carrier of the properties, a substantial law of nature that can only be specified by reference to potential future manifestations. That's all there is. This is not about observability, but about the linguistic fact that extends it as far as the entailments of the dispositional predicates extend. (>Truthmaker). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Nominalism | Armstrong Vs Nominalism | Arm III 81 Nominalism/Armstrong: some allow the existence of objective relations of similarity between particulars. But they cannot analyze them in terms of common property, because that would lead them to realism. (Lit: 1978(1), ch 5: ArmstrongVsNominalism). Vs: here: In his opinion there is nothing common of F and G. F is similar to all other Fs, but one other F also resembles many other things. The same applies to the Gs. It is doubtful whether this wavering reason is sufficient to provide the necessary uniform connection between being-F and being-G. 1. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978 Arm II (c) 97 Similarity/ArmstrongVsNominalism: if one, on the other hand, regards the situation in a way where similarity is analyzed in terms of identity: Martin and Armstrong: agree that one thing causes the things it causes by virtue (of a subset) of its properties. If now causally effective property can also be identical between different instantiations, then one can explain why the same property produces the same effect in the same circumstances. Schiffer I 234 Realism/Schiffer: Realism equates these two relations: 1. between name and object 2. between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiates the second. Schiffer: this can be paraphrased: (b) Mother Teresa has the quality of being modest. Here the second singular term ((s) "property to be modest") has the same status as the first one. NominalismVsRealism/Schiffer: reasonable (sensitive) nominalism denies all this. FN I 288 The unreasonable nominalist takes the reference to properties too seriously. E.g. ArmstrongVsNominalism (Armstrong 1978), besides the exchange between Armstrong 1980, Devitt 1980, Quine 1980. (SchifferVsArmstrong) I 235 Schiffer: there is no entity "the quality of being modest" that is related to "modest", as Mother Teresa is related to "Mother Teresa". Understanding/Schiffer: example (a) only requires knowledge (awareness) of Mother Teresa, not modesty. Property/Schiffer: Thesis: Properties do not exist, they are not to be found among the things that really exist. Existence/"there is"/Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Schiffer: nevertheless, the rational nominalist should be careful and not say "there is no quality to be modest". Realism/Nominalism/Referential Quantification/Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer: the dispute arises over what kind of quantification is present in (b). I 236 Nominalism: the apparent singular term refers to nothing at all. The "logical form" of (b) is not Fab With "F" = "x has a", "a" for Mother Teresa, "b" for modesty. But only Fa. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Plato | Meixner Vs Plato | I 104 Exemplification/E./Meixner: the actual (strong, not Meinongean) exemplification has still two forms: the predicative exemplification, in which the exemplified entity y is a predicative universal (U), i.e. a single-digit or multi-digit U, and the type exemplification, in which the exemplified entity is a non-predicative U, i.e. a type-object. Predicative Exemplification: can be traced back to the actuality of instantiation facts. Type Exemplification/Meixner: reminiscent of Plato's "Participation": "x is sufficiently similar to the idea (the type object)". Today: when we think of "beauty" we think of a certain universalism, namely the property of being beautiful (= o1[o1 is beautiful]). Plato: thought on the other hand of a certain type object; the idea of beauty. Participation/Plato: For example, Diotima participates in beauty because it is different from beauty. Meixner: undoubtedly, beauty is now sufficiently similar to beauty (timeless), because it is even identical to it. Thus follows Plato's original interpretation of type exemplification, I 105 that the beauty EXEM T the beauty. It follows that the sentence "Beauty is beautiful" is true! This is the most famous Platonic self-predication. The fact that beauty is beautiful, justice just, ugliness ugly and injustice unjust could perhaps still be accepted. MeixnerVsPlato: Problem: if bravery is supposed to be brave and dirtiness dirty (quite apart from the fact that the idea of dirtiness no longer suits the upscale society of beauty, justice, etc.). It becomes completely implausible with the type object human being: according to Plato's original theory, the type object human being would be a human being itself. (Because of self-identity, not only similarity). Solution/Meixner: each type object (TO) should have a unique property. x EXEM T y = y is a TO and y EXEM P is the y corresponding property. The corresponding property is known to us, namely "the y corresponding property is a one-digit universal and is a fact and actual". Question: is there a better alternative to this exemplification theory? (So not type exemplification as "predicative exemplification turned into non-predicative" as it were?). I 106 Exemplification/Plato/Meixner: originally: mirroring from more or less great distance, where in the borderline case image and original coincide. Participation: here another alternative already suggests itself. Concatenation: also exemplification as concatenation is at least indicated in Plato. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Putnam, H. | Field Vs Putnam, H. | III 113 Pure Mathematics/Putnam: should be interpreted in a way that it asserts the possible existence of physical structures that satisfy the mathematical axioms. FieldVsPutnam: pure mathematics should not be interpreted at all. I 211 Properties/Relations/Putnam: (1970): are predicative, according to them we have a few basic physical prop and rel from which all others are derived: 1st order: Allows no reference to a totality of physical objects when a new property is constructed. 2nd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st order. 3rd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st and 2nd order. - Every physical property appears on any level of the hierarchy -> functionalism. Functional properties are 2nd or higher order properties - the prop that the role has may differ from person to person. I 214 FieldVsPutnam: instead of properties provide instantiations of properties with steps. I 268 Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: ("Mathematics without foundations", 1976b, 1975 "What is mathematical truth?"): Field: Putnam Thesis: the mathematical realist does not have to accept the "mathematical object picture". He can formulate his views in purely modal terms. And that not as an alternative, but only as another formulation of the same view. I 269 Indispensability Argument/Putnam: appear in the subsequent text. Field: If "Mathematics as a modal" logic was really an equivalent description of mathematics in terms of mathematical objects (MO), then it should also be possible to reformulate the Indispensability Argument so that there is a prima facie argument for one or the other kind of modalized mathematics and mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: but Section 6 and 7 show that we cannot formulate the indispensability argument like that: it requires MO and modalized mathematics does not bring them forth. VSVs: but beware: I have not studied all the possibilities. I 269 FieldVsPutnam: his mathematical realism seems puzzling: Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: Thesis: there is a modal translation of pure mathematics: he presents a translation procedure that turns mathematical statements into modal statements, one that transforms acceptable mathematical statements (E.g. axioms of set theory) into true modal assertions that include no quantification, unless it is modalized away. (I.e. no mathematical entities (ME) in the modal statements). I 270 FieldVsPutnam: two general questions: 1) what kind modality is involved here? 2) what benefit is the translation to have? ad 1): Putnam thinks that the "object-image" (the starting position) and its modal translation are equivalent at a deeper level. FieldVs: that’s really not interesting: "mathematically possible" should coincide with "logically possible" in any reasonable view (this is stated by conservatism). ((s) contrary to the above). Important argument: if A is not mathematically possible, then "~A" is a consequence of mathematics - i.e. if A (and then also its negation) are purely non-mathematically, then "~A" is logically true. If Putnam now says that his modal translation involves a "strong and clear mathematical sense of possibility", then a mathematical possibility operator must be applied to sentences that contain ME. However, such a sentence A could also be a mixed sentence (see above, with purely mathematical and purely physical components). I 271 FieldVsPutnam: for purely mathematical sentences mathematical possibility and truth coincide! But then the "modal translations" are just as ontologically committed as the mathematical assertions. FieldVs"Mathematical Possibility"/FieldVsPutnam: we had better ignore it. Maybe it was about 2nd order logical possibility as opposed to 1st order for Putnam? I 271 FieldVsPutnam: what benefits does his modal translation have? Does it provide a truth transfer (as opposed to the transmission of mere acceptability)? And what value has it to say that the mathematical statements are both true and acceptable? Etc. Mathematics/Realism/Putnam/Field: Putnam describes himself as "mathematical realist": Difference to Field’s definition of realism: he does not consider ME as mind-independent and language-independent, but (1975): Putnam: you can be a realist without being obliged to mathematical objects. I 272 The question is the one that Kreisel formulated long ago: the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question the existence of mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: this is puzzling. I 277 Model Theory/Intended Model/Putnam/Field: this morality can be strengthened: there is no reason to consider "∈" as fixed! Putnam says that in "Models and Reality": the only thing that could fix the "intended interpretation" would be the acceptance of sentences that contain "∈" through the person or the community. Putnam then extends this to non-mathematical predicates. ((s)> Löwenheim-Skolem). FieldVsPutnam: this is misleading: it is based on the confusion of the view that the reference is determined, E.g. by causal reasoning with the view that it is defined by a description theory (description theory, (labeling theory?), in which descriptions (labels?) that contain the word "cause" should play a prominent role. (> Glymour, 1982, Devitt, 1983, Lewis 1984). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quidditism | Verschiedene Vs Quidditism | Schwarz I 105 Possible Worlds/Roll/VsQuidditism/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis/Schwarz: uncomfortable notion, two possible worlds could only differ in that things have changed roles. Isn't the term "charge 0" defined by its role in our theories? Lewis ditto. Lewis/N.B.: but this role only serves to fix the property in the real world: in order to earn the designation "charge 0", a property has to play the appropriate role for us. Nothing is said about the role in other possible worlds. Strictly speaking, not the properties but their instantiations play this or that causal role. From this follows: Lewis Thesis: Membership in a perfectly natural class is not a question of causal nomological roles. Role/Quidditism/Lewis/Schwarz: For example, split roles: (Black, 2000(1),95f): Assuming that two fundamental properties have only partially exchanged their roles: e.g. on odd days the particles with charge -1 behave like those with charge 0 and vice versa: nobody would notice anything! (>"If everything were different"/Davidson, >Skepticism/Davidson). We also do not know if we do not live in such a world ourselves! Schw I 106 This is a consequence of quidditism. To avoid it, one would have to say: Solution: VsQuidditism: some of the causal nomological roles are essential to the fundamental properties. So: For example, if something does not behave like charge, it is not charge. 1. Robert Black [2000]: “Aggainst Quidditism”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 87–104 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Russell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Prior I 39 Ramified type theory/rTT/Prior: first edition Principia Mathematica(1): here it does not say yet that quantification on non-nouns (non nominal) is illegitimate, or that they are only apparently not nominal. (Not on names?) But only that you have to treat them carefully. I 40 The ramified type theory was incorporated in the first edition. (The "simple type theory" is, on the other hand, little more than a certain sensitivity to the syntax.) Predicate: makes a sentence out of a noun. E.g. "φ" is a verb that forms the phrase "φx". But it will not form a sentence when a verb is added to another verb. "φφ". Branch: comes into play when expressions form a sentence from a single name. Here we must distinguish whether quantified expressions of the same kind occur. E.g. "__ has all the characteristics of a great commander." logical form: "For all φ if (for all x, if x is a great commander, then φx) then φ__". ΠφΠxCψxφx" (C: conditional, ψ: commander, Π: for all applies). Easier example: "__ has the one or the other property" logical form: "For a φ, φ __" "Σφφ". (Σ: there is a) Order/Type: here one can say, although the predicate is of the same type, it is of a different order. Because this "φ" has an internal quantification of "φ's". Ramified type theory: not only different types, but also various "orders" should be represented by different symbols. That is, if we, for example, have introduced "F" for a predicative function on individuals" (i.e. as a one-digit predicate), we must not insert non-predicative functions for "f" in theorems. E.g. "If there are no facts about a particular individual ..." "If for all φ, not φx, then there is not this fact about x: that there are no facts about x that is, if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it cannot be true. I.e. if it is true that there are no facts about x, then it is wrong, that there is this fact. Symbolically: 1. CΠφNφxNψx. I 41 "If for all φ not φ, then not ψx" (whereby "ψ" can stand for any predicate). Therefore, by inserting "∏φφ" for "ψ": 2. CΠφNφxNΠφNφx Therefore, by inserting and reductio ad absurdum: CCpNpNp (what implies its own falsehood, is wrong) 3. CΠφNφx. The step of 1 to 2 is an impermissible substitution according to the ramified type theory. Sentence/ramified type theory/Prior: the same restriction must be made for phrases (i.e. "zero-digit predicates", propositions). Thus, the well-known old argument is prevented: E.g. if everything is wrong, then one of the wrong things would be this: that everything is wrong. Therefore, it may not be the case that everything is wrong. logical form: 1. CΠpNpNq by inserting: 2. CΠpNpNPpNp and so by CCpNpNp (reductio ad absurdum?) 3. NΠpNp, Ramified type theory: that is now blocked by the consideration that "ΠpNp" is no proposition of the "same order" as the "p" which exists in itself. And thus not of the same order as the "q" which follows from it by instantiation, so it cannot be used for "q" to go from 1 to 2. RussellVsQuine/Prior: here propositions and predicates of "higher order" are not entirely excluded, as with Quine. They are merely treated as of another "order". VsBranched type theory: there were problems with some basic mathematical forms that could not be formed anymore, and thus Russell and Whitehead introduce the reducibility axiom. By contrast, a simplified type theory was proposed in the 20s again. Type Theory/Ramsey: was one of the early advocates of a simplification. Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Ramsey: Thesis: universal quantification and existential quantification are both long conjunctions or disjunctions of individual sentences (singular statements). E.g. "For some p, p": Either grass is green or the sky is pink, or 2 + 2 = 4, etc.". (> Wessel: CNF, ANF, conjunctive and adjunctive normal form) Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter of what "order" are always truth functions of indiviual sentences. Ramified Type TheoryVsRamsey/VsWittgenstein: such conjunctions and disjunctions would not only be infinitely long, but the ones of higher order would also need to contain themselves. E.g. "For some p.p" it must be written as a disjunction of which "for some p, p" is a part itself, which in turn would have to contain a part, ... etc. RamseyVsVs: the different levels that occur here, are only differences of character: not only between "for some p,p" and "for some φ, φ" but also between "p and p" and "p, or p", and even the simple "p" are only different characters. Therefore, the expressed proposition must not contain itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Cresswell Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 129 Labeling/Name/Reference/Solution/Stalnaker/Thomason: Thesis: descriptions cannot be treated consistently as a names, but we will try to get as close as possible to them. CresswellVsStalnaker/CresswellVsThomason: this solution has its drawbacks, because not all things that function syntactically as names are real names, in the sense that they can be used for variables in valid wff. This also applies to the intensional object viewVsStalnaker. > universal instantiation: it, too, will fail ... + ... |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Tichy, P. | Armstrong Vs Tichy, P. | Arm III 90 ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlaton: Universals are abstractions, but not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers: III 91 Abstract/Quine: called Platonic universals "abstract". (Different meaning than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions.) Abstraction/Armstrong: A relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction. Laws of nature/LoN/Abstraction/Armstrong: So if they also are abstractions, what kind of A and from what? We get a fairly clear answer: they are abstractions of particulars (P) which instantiate the law (positive). Vs: here one could mention another objection than Tichy’s: we really need the complex formula: ((N (F, G)(a’s being F, a’s being G))? Could we not just represent the instantiation of the laws as follows: N(a’s being F, a’s being G)? The fact that these two states of affairs involve the two U F and G, and only those, seems sufficient to ensure that the necessity exists by virtue of universals. So it is a rel of U. Whether this instantiation would then be an instance of N(F,G), i.e. whether N(F,G) itself is a universal, is less clear, see below: in the next section we see that we might not need the more complex representation. III 97 ArmstrongVsTichy: so in the end we have the right view of the entailment: N(F,G)>(x) Fx>Gx) (s) necessity includes reg. (= universal proposition, universal quantification). Armstrong: if we accept the necessity of individual cases, we can add an intermediate term: N(F,G)>(x) N(Fx,Gx)>(x)(Fx>Gx). In no case shall the inversion is also true!. III 98 Necessity of individual cases/ArmstrongVsTichy: if we introduce them between individual states, we have an intuitively satisfying picture: on the first stage, we have nothing else but states of affairs of the first stage which make another first stage state necessary: be N(a’s bein F, a’s being G). At the second stage, we have a universal 1st stage, a type state 1st stage which makes another Universal 1st stage and a type 1st stage state necessary. E.g. ((N(F,G) (a’s being F, a’s being G)). With this necessity between universals we have laws of nature. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Mentalese | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 55 Mentalese/Propositional Attitude/Fodor: Thesis: A belief sentence is a sentence in the speaker's thought language. CresswellVsFodor: Problem; then the original speaker and the attribution speaker must have the same sentence in mentalese in their inner system; Newen/Schrenk I 131 Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with the assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: thesis that thinking is lived in such a way that it already has all the core characteristics of natural language (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. For example, fuel gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized by brain states. I 215/216 Mentalese/Fodor: (Language of Thought, p.199) Thesis: One cannot give a construction of psychology without assuming that organisms possess a proper description as instantiation (embodiment) of another formal system: "Properly" requires: a) There must be a general procedure for assigning formulae to states of the organism. b) For each propositional attitude there must be a causal state of the organism, so that c1) the state can be interpreted as a relation to a formula and c2) it is nomologically necessary and sufficient (or contingent identical) to have propositional attitudes for it. d) Mentalese representations have their causal role by virtue of their formal characteristics. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Supervenience | Lewis, D. | Staln I 98 Supervenience/Contingent/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis combines the intuition that some supervenience theses are contingent with a liberal reductionist approach. Lewis Thesis: In every possible world there is a set of basic properties and relations sufficient and necessary to determine these worlds. Def Materialism/Stalnaker: one could define it (here) as: contingent thesis that the physical properties in our real world are the basic properties. Other worlds may have others that are "alien" to our real (actual) world. Def alien property/Lewis/Stalnaker: a property that does not exist. A distinction is made between existence and instantiation. Existence/Instantiation/Lewis: Difference: an existing property does not have to be instantiated. For example the complex property "golden mountain" (uninstantiated). |
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| Exemplification | Meixner, U. | I 108 Exemplification is simply the actuality of the instantiation of the state of affairs. |
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