Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Universals: Universals are expressions for what objects can have in common, such as a particular color. Examples of universals are redness, roundness, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. What is undisputed is that we form terms to generalize and use them successfully. See also General terms, Generality, Generalization, Ontology, Existence, Conceptual realism, Realism, Ideas, Methexis, Sortals, Conceptualism, Nominalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Universals - Dictionary of Arguments
I 88 Universals/Strawson: E.g. repeated tone - same chord in various concert halls. I 176 Universals/Strawson: Tradition: only universals and particular-universals (E.g. be-married to John) can be predicted. Particulars can never be predicted. >Particulars/Strawson. Cf. >Concept/Frege, >Object/Frege. I 215 a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars. But also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). I 216 Example of characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal death corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death - see copula/Strawson. I 251 Universals/Quine/Strawson: should only appear as predicates. Pro "nominalism". >Nominalism. StrawsonVsQuine: the language terms of this analysis, already presuppose the existence of subject-expressions. I 250 Essential feature-universals/essential feature-localizing findings/Strawson: E.g. it rains now - snow falls - here is water. No subject-predicate sentences: here no characterizing-universals, but types of material. Also no type-universals. - This is the least to make any empirical statements. Introduction with demonstrative does not require particulars. >Introduction/Strawson. E.g. Cat as an essential feature: a) for the same cat, b) for another cat. I 277 Essential-feature-universal/essential feature-localizing/Strawson: the corresponding essential feature-findings actually introduce things - but are not subject terms or subject phrases - "here"/"now" set no limits - (even if they are quantifiable, "there is no point in time "). I 279 Things are not introduced by space and time adverbs. >Essence._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Universals
