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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hedonism | Mill | Höffe I 351 Hedonism/Mill/Höffe: For Mill, as a follower of a qualified hedonism, the accumulation of wealth is not an end in itself. Against the lack of ability of his time to enjoy the accumulated wealth, he recommends that one should enjoy the present(1). Höffe I 348 According to Bentham's provocative aphorism that, with the same quality of pleasure, an undemanding children's game is as good as poetry, the qualitative differences between the various occasions and types of pleasure expressly do not count. Höffe I 349 Mill: Against this vulgarized hedonism, Mill argues with the pointed counter-thesis that it is better to be a discontented Socrates than a satisfied pig. He emphasizes the different ranks of the pleasures one can enjoy and at the same time the priority of scientific, artistic and humanitarian activities. The core [of Mill's foundation of utilitarianism] is the expression "desirable", which has two meanings. In an empirical-psychological sense it means what people actually consider desirable, in a normative-ethical sense what they should evaluate. Mill/Höffe: [One can interpret Mill in this way]: An ethics open to experience understands what is desirable in the sense of those enlightened people who know the various pleasures and prefer those which are higher-ranking in human terms. ((s)Cf. >Preference Utilitarianism). 1. J.St. Mill, Utilitarianism 1861 |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Hedonism | Rawls | I 554 Def Hedonism/Rawls: in tradition, hedonism is interpreted in two ways: a) as the view that the only intrinsic good is the feeling of something pleasant, or b) as the psychological thesis that enjoyment is the only thing that individuals aspire to. I 557 Rawls: I see hedonism as an attempt to impose the concept of the ultimate goal, i.e. to show that a rational decision is always possible, at least in principle. Although this attempt fails, it is worthwhile to show the difference between utilitarianism and contract theory in his example. >Rationality, >Utilitarianism, >Contract Theory. Hedonism/Rawls: therefore assumes that there must be an ultimate goal, because there is no rational way of weighing equal goals against each other. For him, enjoyment is simply a pleasant feeling and thus the only candidate for a superordinate goal, by eliminating competing goals, not by a principle. If there are rational choices, there must be a supreme goal and happiness or another objective goal cannot be it because that would be circular(1). >Goals, >Purposes. I 556 Hedonism/Sidgwick/Rawls: even if too little information is available, maximum pleasure conveys an idea of good. For Sidgwick, this is sufficient to ensure that pleasure as a rational goal is an orientation of thought(2). RawlsVsHedonism: he fails to define a reasonable superordinate goal, because once the pleasure is described in sufficient detail,... I 557 ...so that it can be included in the rational considerations of the actor, it is no longer plausible that it should be the sole rational objective(3). ((s) Explanation: For example, when it comes to experiencing the birth of a grandchild, there must be a superordinate goal, namely to live for so long. If the acting person is asked what is more important to him, his own life or the life of the grandchild, he will probably give up his hedonism.) Pleasure/Sidgwick/RawlsVsSidgwick/Rawls: it is difficult for him to weigh up and evaluate different forms of pleasure against each other(4). >H. Sidgwick. Pleasure/Aristotle/Rawls: Aristotle says that a good person gives up his life for a friend if necessary, on the grounds that he prefers a short period of intense pleasure to a long, dull life(5). Santayana/Rawls: means that we have to weigh up the relative value of pleasure and pain against each other. >The Good/Aristotle. Petrarca/Santayana/Rawls: when Petrarca says that a thousand pleasures cannot outweigh a single pain, he adopts a yardstick that goes back beyond both possibilities. The acting person must involve his whole life in the weighing process. So the problem of multiplicity of purposes comes back(6). I 558 Economic theory/demand theory/Rawls: It is a misunderstanding that in modern economic theory, e. g. demand theory, the problem of hedonism would be solved. Here, needs are arranged convexly and completely as a set of alternatives. Then there is a utility function that selects the best alternative for an individual. RawlsVs: however, this can only be taken as a guideline if an individual wishes to adhere to it. But then we have returned to the issue of rational choice(7)(8)(9). >Rational Choice. 1. See C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London, 1930). 2. See H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907), pp. 405-407. 3. Cf. Broad, p. 187. 4. Sidgwick, p. 127. 5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1169a17-26. 6. G. Santayana, The Life of Reason in Common Sense (New York, 1905) pp. 237f. 7. See L. Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, Homewood, Ill, 1954, p. 256. 8. P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 90-92. 9. R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, 1957), pp. 16, 21-24, 38. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Locke, J. | Verschiedene Vs Locke, J. | VsLocke Locke I 26/27 Knowledge/VsLocke: Problem: the ideas have to be fixed in words, but that does not mean recognizing yet, because the words have to be processed into statements. Locke, however, develops his idea analysis first in isolation. (Thereby lengthy repetitions arise). Locke I 42 VsLocke/VsSensualism: the critique of Locke always misses a clarification of the necessary preconditions of human knowledge in the subject itself. This is caught by Locke's introduction of reason at the end of the essay. Locke I 66 Ethics/Locke: the suspension force is of utmost importance for Locke's ethics: the "Angel" around which the freedom of rational beings revolves. Thus the possibility of a free decision for the morally good is to be justified. (Despite hedonism). VsLocke: this is not contradictory, but not very plausible. It has been criticized time and again that the motive of moral decision is not the independent value of the morally good, but the benefit determined according to desire/displeasure. Locke never clarified this despite the pressure of his contemporaries. Locke I 169 Sensualism/VsLocke: an old tradition of Locke-Criticism considers sensualism naive. (LeibnizVsLocke, KantVsLocke). Locke: Thesis: "Nothing is in the mind that was not in the senses before". LeibnizVsLocke: "except the mind itself!". Curl I 170 KantVsLocke: there are a priori forms of perception that enable us to have experiences in the first place. Language/Knowledge/VsLocke: (today): Locke misjudges the irreducible linguistic foundations of empirical perception. But in his thinking the correction is already applied in order to also include abstract and general ideas under the empirically given, from which every reconstruction of knowledge must already start. (L. Krüger). Economy/EuchnerVsLocke: Contradiction: Locke's mercantilism and its simultaneous praise of world trade. Locke I 188 Knowledge/Reality/KreimendahlVsLocke: restricts possible statements of reality to the realm of ideas and the "nominal" entities formed by them. In doing so, he questions his own empirical program. On the one hand it is correct that there can be no knowledge without mediation of ideas, which in their complex form are human art products, while on the other hand he claims that the source of all ideas is experience (circular). Experience/Locke: the combination of sensory experience and reflection ("inner experience"). Gravity/Locke: "Hoop and Ribbon" (Euchner: that was more naive than it should have been at the time). Locke II 187 Complex ideas/Locke: e.g. friend: from simple ideas: human, love, willingness, action, happiness, which in turn can be traced back to even simpler ideas. LambertVsLocke: he did not recognize the necessary connections of the terms. ArndtVsLambert: Locke was not interested in an axiomatic system. He was interested in separating the realm of "real knowledge" (mathematics) from the empirical, in which the complex idea is based solely on the observable factual co-existence of qualities. In empiricism, no necessary connection can be observed! Locke I 62 Law of Nature/EuchnerVsDoctrine of the Law of Nature: Locke does not treat it systematically, otherwise he would have had to deal with the following problems: the world as an order of creation, to the legal order of political structures under the aspects of natural and human law, as well as the the legal position of the individual, to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason, and to the question of how the unrevealed and written down natural law can be recognized with the help of reason. Reasons why the principles of natural law and morality are recognised as binding and followed. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Mill, J. St. | Mackie Vs Mill, J. St. | Stegmüller IV 209 VsUtilitarianism/Mill: (even U.) concedes that utilitarian theories often fail due to the vagueness and diversity of conceptions of justice. Mill: still, the utility principle has the same sanctions available as all other moral norms. MackieVsMIll: that is empirically false: violationy of the common good upset us far more than violations of special rules of justice. Rule-Utilitarianism: more indirect than U.: two stages: (Austin): IV 210 1. The benchmark of our rules should be usefulness 2. The benchmark of our actions should be the rules. Puts the rules far more to the fore and draws on utility only to justify the rules. These rules do not need to be explicit. VsRule-Utilitarianism: all problems of utilitarianism return on a higher level of abstraction. IV 211 Utilitarianism/Mill: transition from individualistic to universalistic hedonism. If happiness is a good for each individual, then general happiness is a good for the totality of all people. Utilitarianism/MackieVsMill: the alleged proof sneaks in ineligible premises. The entirety of human kind is falsely treated as a psychological subject. Humanity never has a choice. (IV 225) IV 212 Fallacy: from "everyone" to "all". In addition, in the transition from the individual to society, instead of subjectivism an objectivism of values (Wertobjektivismus) is introduced. IV 263 Morality/ethics/Mill: Thesis: believed in a gradual change of human nature toward "universal human kindness". J. F. StephenVsMill: that's "transcendental Utilitarianism": a person animated by "impartial charity" might behave in a Stalinist way. Anything can be used to justify violence. Mackie dito. IV 264 Morality/ethics/Mackie: must refer to anthropological conditions: different ideals require general (common) principles. IV 265 The rejection of objective values includes rejection of objective rights. Consequence: special rights cannot be deduced a priori from general reasons. IV 269 MackieVsMill: his utilitarian concept of justification is shaky: the "principle of non-intervention" would be better justified differently: IV 270 via the conception of the good for human kind. Good/MackieVsMill: 1. not everyone is able to always correctly assess their own good. 2. Mill's principle is too weak. Ex. freedom of thought, freedom of speech. Both cannot be justified by Mills principle alone! Mackie: instead, we need a "principle of legitimate intervention." |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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