Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Method | Boyd | Fraassen I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is needed for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. This is to explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. >Theories, >Realism, >Explanation. I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. >Evidence, >Observation Consequences. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is stated there, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a completely different definition of empirical equivalence than he has. >Empirical equivalence. 2. Principle: (according to Boyd accepted by all philosophers): Suppose a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of epistemology to explain the reliability of this principle. >Reliability, >Likelihood, >Epistemology, >Principles. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree with that. It is itself a principle about principles. Boyd/Fraassen: they have a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it is most likely to fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is stated there. I 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he "understands" here "knowledge" as "light", i.e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms that are based on previously accepted theories. >Knowledge, >Prior knowledge, >Causal relations, >Causality. Boyd: e.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, the dosage of A and the time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls, but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L which is to be prooved, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. E.g. one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that mutates the cell walls. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. Knowledge/Fraassen: we must understand knowledge here as "implied by a previously accepted theory". >Supervenience, >a posteriori necessity, cf. >Morals/Wright. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Theoretical Entities | Craig | Field III 43 Theoretical Entities/Craig/Field: Re-interpretation of the sciences without theoretical entities. >Theoretical entities. FieldVsCraig: in contrast to numbers, these can very well be causally relevant, e.g. electrons. >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causation, >Measurements. Fraassen I 206 Craig/Craig's Theorem: we eliminate theoretical entities and replace a theory T by a description of an infinitely complex regularity which contains all the observation consequences of the original theory. >Regularities, >Description. The original theory is then finally axiomatized. Craig's transformation is infinitely axiomatized. >Axioms, >Axiom systems. SmartVsCraig: if the theory were only blackening, it would be a cosmic coincidence if the transformation were to work with names of theoretical entities instead of the theoretical entities themselves. >Blackening of the paper, >Cosmic coincidence. So the alleged recourse would only be the postulation of a coincidence. This means we do not need to go to infinity. >Regress, >Infinity, >Randomness. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Theories | Leeds | I 377 Theory/illustration/Leeds: false assumption: that the question of whether our theories depict the world, depends on whether "electrons really exist". >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Reference, >Existence, >Truth maker. I 381 Truth/theory/explanation/success/Leeds: an explanation of why true theories are successful. - (Even questionable!) - You must bring into play accordance with observation. - The theory has correct observational consequences. >Observation, >Observation consequences, >Observation conditional, >Empirical content, >Explanation, >Confirmation, >Justification. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Antirealism | Boyd Vs Antirealism | Fractions I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is necessary for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. To explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. --- I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is written down like this, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a quite different definition of empirical equivalence than he does. 2. Principle: (accepted by all philosophers according to Boyd): Suppose, a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of knowledge theory (epistemology) to explain the reliability of this principle. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree to that. It is itself a principle of principles. Boyd/Fraassen: has a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it will most likely fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is written down like this. --- 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he understands "knowledge" here "light", i. e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms, which are based on previously accepted theories. Boyd: E.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of the bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, dosage of A and time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L to be tested, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. For example, one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that allows the cell walls to mutate. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 |
| Carnap, R. | Putnam Vs Carnap, R. | Goodman II Putnam Foreword V Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48). Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself, PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate. Lewis IV 85 Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts. IV 85/86 Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there. They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas". Putnam V 244 Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private. PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability. V 250 Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). Putnam I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful. There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them). Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions: 1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions. I 43 2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". Putnam I (a) 46 Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence. PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"! (I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term). I (a) 48 Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem. I (a) 49 Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Cartwright Vs Fraassen, B. van | I 10 Asymmetry/Explanation/Causality/Fraassen: (The scientific image): Thesis: the asymmetries (by way of explanation) are not real!. CartwrightVsFraassen: I think he is mistaken. But his question is strong and could cause us to abandon certain explanation strategies. Cartwright Thesis: what we do not give up so easily are our strategies for action in everyday life. E.g. spraying marshes with anti-mosquito agents is effective E.g. burning sheets of malaria patients is not. I 89 FraassenVsTheoretical Entities/Cartwright: why should one believe in them?. CartwrightVsFraassen: theoretical entities exist, because there is no real regularity at the level of phenomena. Regularity/Cartwright: Only exists at the level of theoretical entities, not of phenomena. Law/Laws of Nature/Cartwright: their universal applicability does not only explain why the phenomena behave as regularly as they do, but also why we sometimes see exceptions. Van Fraassen admits that. Explanation/van Fraassen: Problem: but from the fact that a bunch of principles ensures the phenomena it cannot be concluded that they are true!. right: E.g. "I think therefore I am". wrong: E.g. "P explains Q. Q is true, therefore P is true". I 92 Electron/Cartwright: Important argument: is not an entity of any particular theory! (Electrons are not theory-dependent!). That means it is not about Bohr’s electrons in contrast to Rutherford’s electrons. CartwrightVsFraassen: I choose an E.g. of van Fraassen to show how we differ: E.g. Cloud chamber/Fraassen: unlike the contrails in the sky, we cannot see anything at the frond of the cloud chamber trail, no matter how well we look. Therefore, there are no theoretical entities. CartwrightVsFraassen: I agree with the premise, not the conclusion. I 93 Theoretical entities/Cartwright: The special thing about explanations that involve theoretical entities is that they are causal explanations (not inferring the best explanation). And existence assertion is characteristic of causal explanations. Cause/Causality/Fraassen/Cartwright: he does not believe in causes. The whole causality is a fiction. I 160 Theory//Fraassen/Sellars/Cartwright: both have extraordinary respect for the theory. Both expect it to grasp the facts about the observable correctly. For van Fraassen, theoretical assertions (about the unobservable) do not have to do that. CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsSellars: a good theory does not have either! The observation consequences ((s)> observation conditional) can be broadly what we believe to be true, but they are usually not the best we can expect. CartwrightVsFraassen: 2) For me, it is not only about the observable. I suppose theoretical entities and causal processes. This brings me closer to Sellars. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Leeds, St. | Verschiedene Vs Leeds, St. | Horwich I 381 Standard Interpretation/Truth/SI/Leeds: if that is true, we do not need standard interpretation, but maybe sometimes we do? Perhaps some statements about truth that are denied by naturalistic instrumentalism (NI), for example the idea that a truth theory is necessary to explain why our theory works. Theory/Success/Function/Truth: For example, the idea that a truth theory is necessary to explain why our theories work. Explanation/Leeds: the Explanandum must be formulated in such a way that it is clear that it must be explained systematically. For example, it is not enough to simply read "our theory works" as "our theories contain truth-sentences". Solution: Observation/Truth/Theory/Leeds: the agreement with observation must come into play. For example, we can say in a clear sense that humans are superior to animals because their predictions are more precise and more often apply. Theory/Success/Leeds: Success consists in having expectations that are fulfilled. I 381 Next: we might find that many sentences of our language are associated with certain stimulus patterns, so whoever believes these sentences will expect a certain stimulus type. Success/Theory: then we can say that our theories work because they have correct O consequences (observation consequences). Then we want to explain why they have these consequences. Observation consequence(s): For example "if I have observed this, this and that will happen afterwards". VsLeeds: the sharp distinction between theory and observation that I have made here is, of course, controversial. ((s) > Theoryladenness of observation). Leeds: but our thesis does not depend on this distinction. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 54 FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT. I 55 PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses. I 56 Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Rey, G. | Fodor Vs Rey, G. | IV 219 Sentence/formula/Fodor/Lepore: Georges Rey reads Quine in a way that he reconstructs sentences as formulas, but without semantic holism (SH): 1) Sentence means formula! 2) Peirce’s thesis identified sentence meaning with empirical meaning (not with confirmation!) i.e. the set of observation sentences that confirm them. Def Empirical Meaning/(s): (according to Fodor/Lepore IV 219): empirical meaning corresponds to a set of observation sentences that confirm one sentence. Important argument: an observation sentence is a formula that is conditioned/confirmed by proximal stimuli. 3) The Quine-Duhem thesis (QDT) applies. Then it follows that no formula has any meaning outside of the overall theory! Fodor/LeporeVsRey: this is a very strange kind of semantics: because the meaning of each sentence consists in the observation consequences of the overall theory in which they are embedded, it follows that every sentence in a theory has the same meaning as any other sentence in that same theory! Def sentence meaning/Rey/Fodor/Lepore: sentence meaning consists in the observation consequences of the embedding overall theory. This implies, in turn, that no theory can contain a contingent conditional (hypothetical) in such that, if a disjunctive sentence is true (false), then both disjuncts are true or false, etc. IV 219 Furthermore, every sentence in a theory translates each sentence from an empirically equivalent theory and there are no relations between sentences from not empirically equivalent theories at all. A Quinean could accept all that and say: "so much the worse for those who insist on a semantics for individual sentences". Fodor/Lepore: that may be true, but in any case the Quine-Duhem thesis is trivialized: the only thing you have to hold on to when changing theory is the pronunciation! |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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