## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Prior, Arthur Books on Amazon |
Propositions | I 12/13 Propositions/Prior: are logical structures (i.e. no real objects), (facts and phrases not) - therefore propositions are language independent. --- I 19 Proposition/fact/Prior: "Grass is not pink": complex sentence on grass, not sentence about "proposition" Grass is pink"". --- I 29 Proposition/Prior: you cannot only think P, but also about P, but other form than about objects: E.g. "__ thinks that the proposition __ is absurd": because the second gap is not for name but a sentence. --- I 29f "about"/Prior: belief-that, thinking-that: is never about propositions, but about what propositions are about. - "aboout" is systematically ambiguous, what it means depends on what kind of name or quasi-name (for example, numbers) follows it. --- I 42 Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter from what "order" are always truth functions of independent sentences. --- I 52 Propositions/Prior: have only Pickwick's importance. (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94), there is not a "special" meaning besides the "ordinary" B.) - Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property, "to be the concept of truth or falsehood". --- I 53 Proposition/Prior: when we speak of propositional identity, we are forced, to no longer see them as logical constructions. We need to treat them as real objects. (PriorVs). --- I 53 Name/proposition/Prior: "the proposition that p" only apparent name. --- I 64 Identity of propositions/Prior: no substantive equivalence |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |

> Counter arguments against **Prior**

> Counter arguments in relation to **Propositions**

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26