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Propositions/Prior: are logical structures (i.e. no real objects), (facts and phrases not) - therefore propositions are language independent.
Proposition/fact/Prior: "Grass is not pink": complex sentence on grass, not sentence about "proposition" Grass is pink"".
Proposition/Prior: you cannot only think P, but also about P, but other form than about objects: E.g. "__ thinks that the proposition __ is absurd": because the second gap is not for name but a sentence.
"about"/Prior: belief-that, thinking-that: is never about propositions, but about what propositions are about. - "aboout" is systematically ambiguous, what it means depends on what kind of name or quasi-name (for example, numbers) follows it.
Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter from what "order" are always truth functions of independent sentences.
Propositions/Prior: have only Pickwick's importance. (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94), there is not a "special" meaning besides the "ordinary" B.) - Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property, "to be the concept of truth or falsehood".
Proposition/Prior: when we speak of propositional identity, we are forced, to no longer see them as logical constructions. We need to treat them as real objects. (PriorVs).
Name/proposition/Prior: "the proposition that p" only apparent name.
Identity of propositions/Prior: no substantive equivalence
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003