Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Aspect: perspective from which an object or a problem is considered. Problematic when aspects, views, perspectives are objectified. They are not part of the object, but consist in the relation to the object.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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John R. Searle on Aspects - Dictionary of Arguments

VI 169
Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true.
Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make.
There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect.
VI 169/170
Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there.
The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions.
For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer.
For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect).
Searle: this statement can also be true.
- - -
II 75
Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.)
Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus.
If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect!
II 76 ff
Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects.
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III 185
Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-09-20
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