Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Introduction, philosophy: the introduction of objects establishes rules for the use of linguistic expressions for the objects, not a determination or description of these objects. See also definitions, use, language, expressiveness, localization.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Peter F. Strawson on Introduction - Dictionary of Arguments

I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing.
Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing.
>Terms
.
I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech. - One can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not.
>Assertion, >Predicates/Geach, >Predicates/Strawson, >Predication/Geach.
I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating.
I 193
Assertive mode primary.
I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode).
I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated.
>Unsaturated.
I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular.
>Particulars/Strawson.
I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement.
I 235
For universals nothing corresponding.
I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.)
I 238
When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed.
I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease".
>Description, >Intension.
I 239f
Universal/particular/introduction:
Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce
class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete
(1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight
(2) have no factual weight.
I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal:
3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete)
Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself.
I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact.
I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions.
I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition.
>Quantification.
New/Strawson: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also
E1: introduces particular,
E2: classes of particulars.
Then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced. - Where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal?
I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1.
I 263
Both theories are independend, but connectable.
I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur.
E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2
Problem: What is at the end of the chain?
>Feature-universals.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993


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