Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
II 214
Idea/Wittgenstein: is not something that is communicated by the words.
Hintikka I 239
Hintikka: his basic ideas are based on the insight that language cannot be transcended in language and thoughts cannot be transcended in thinking. ... "The thought is a symbol".
II 45
Def Plan/Wittgenstein: Thinking means operating with plans. The thought is not the same as the plan, because the thought needs no interpretation, the plan, on the other hand, does.
II 59
Thinking/World/Border/Wittgenstein: what is "common" to thought and reality must be articulated through the expression of thought. You cannot express it in another sentence.
II 66
Thinking/Thought/Wittgenstein: the thought is autonomous. Example "Schmidt is sitting on the bench". You would think three things are in his mind, as a proxy. There is something true about that, too. But what guarantee would we have that they represent anything at all? What is given in my thinking is present and essential! Everything else (which is represented) is irrelevant.
That is why thinking is complete in itself. And what is not given in my thinking cannot be essential for it! The thought does not point beyond itself, we believe that only because of the way in which we use symbols.
II 186
Unconscious thoughts, conscious thoughts: the word "thoughts" is used differently depending on which of these adjectives precedes it.
II 214
Thought/Wittgenstein: that a thought is communicated by words, and that it is different from the words, is a superstition.
III 134
Tractatus/Core Sentences: 3. The logical picture of facts is the thought.
4. The thought is the meaningful sentence.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-03-29
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