Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rationality, philosophy: rationality is the ability of a being to consciously adapt to a situation due to the generalizations of his experiences. It can also be rational to want to learn something new. See also system, order, creativity, discoveries, evaluation, repetition._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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AI Research on Rationality - Dictionary of Arguments
Norvig I 614 Rationality/AI research/Norvig/Russell: an agent’s preference behavior does not necessarily mean that the agent is explicitly maximizing that utility function in its own deliberations. (…) rational behavior can be generated in any number of ways. By observing a rational agent’s preferences, however, an observer can construct the utility function that represents what the agent is actually trying to achieve (even if the agent doesn’t know it). >Utility theory/Norvig, >Preferences/Norvig. Norvig I 615 [A preference] might be unusual, but we can’t call it irrational. Norvig I 619 Irrationality/Norvig/Russell: Decision theory is a normative theory: it describes how a rational agent should act. A descriptive theory, on the other hand, describes how actual agents (…) really do act. The application of economic theory would be greatly enhanced if the two coincided, but there appears to be some experimental evidence to the contrary. The evidence suggests that humans are “predictably irrational” (Ariely, 2009)(1). >Allais paradox/Norvig, >Ellsberg paradox/Norvig, >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky, >Utility/AI research. Norvig I 638 Literature: popular books on human irrationality: Sway (Brafman and Brafman, 2009)(2), Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009)(3), Kluge (Marcus, 2009)(4), How We Decide (Lehrer, 2009)(5) and On Being Certain (Burton, 2009)(6). They complement the classic (Kahneman et al., 1982)(7) and the article that started it all (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)(8). 1. Ariely, D. (2009). Predictably Irrational (Revised edition). Harper. 2. Brafman, O. and Brafman, R. (2009). Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior. Broadway Business. 3. Thaler, R. and Sunstein, C. (2009). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Penguin. 4. Marcus, G. (2009). Kluge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind. Mariner Books. 5. Lehrer, J. (2009). How We Decide. Houghton Mifflin. 6. Burton, R. (2009). On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You’re Not. St. Martin’s Griffin. 7. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 8. Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, pp. 263–291._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
AI Research Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26