Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Proper Names - Dictionary of Arguments
Wolf II 14 Bundle theory/names: proposed by Wittgenstein and Searle > Essential properties; >Bundle theory/Kripke. Wolf II 150 Names/Wittgenstein: I use the name N with no fixed meaning - Philosophical Investigations §79. --- Hintikka I 302/303 Name/Object/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: as long as the links between language and the world are unanalyzed name-relations, the possible connections of the symbols are determined only by their own nature - by their own nature - name-relations are conventional - but the nature of the signs states itself - if we transform signs into variables, they are only dependent on the nature of the sentence -> logical form.- Meaningless connections must be prohibited by the convention - they are not excluded by the symbols themselves - so that the reflection is maintained - late : VsReflection - late: VsName-Relation. Hintikka I 22 Names/existence/border/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in a logically formed language all names must denote something. But one cannot specify how many objects there are. >Denotation, >Ontology. I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: to the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus counts the notion that what he calls "objects" does not include any relations and properties. Hintikka: the terminological counterpart of this error is: names are logically singular terms, so that predicates (including symbols for relations) cannot fall within that definition (falsely). I 60ff Signs/relation/name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: not the complex sign "aRb" says that it is in a certain relation to b, but that "a" stands in a certain relation to "b", says aRb. (3,1432) (quotation marks sic) - But Wittgenstein wants something else: The number of names that appear in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to Tractatus as the number of objects in the situation illustrated by the sentence. But about which situation it is, is not determined, however, solely by the name of a and b. Copi: (wrongly) thinks that Wittgenstein through the phrase "in certain respects" basically abstracts from relation-signs and performs an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). >Existential generalization. I 71 Names/existence/Wittgenstein: "I want to call 'name' only what cannot stand in the connection "X exists". And so one cannot say "Red exists" because, if red did not exist, it could not be talked about it. >Existence statements. Names/existence/Wittgenstein: the existence of an object is seen from the fact that its name is used in the language. For the logical rules of inference is then a well-formed language to be presupposed that the individual constants are not unrelated. >Individual constants. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation. Everything that actually exists, can only be described with names, another determination is not possible. Neither it is, nor it is not. So the language is also an interweaving of names. I 127 Elementary proposition: does not consist of a series of names for individual things that are held together by additional links, but it consists of a series of "names" for objects that belong to different but matching logic types. I 149 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false." >Sense. --- II 84 Name/Meaning/Wittgenstein: the meaning of the words "Professor Moore" is not the owner - 1. the importance does not go for a walk - 2. the same words also appear in a sentence like E.g. "Professor Moore does not exist" - meaning is set within the language - by explanations. II 88 Number/Wittgenstein: the numbers in a pattern book are the names of the patterns. II 365 Name/object/Wittgenstein: between the two there is no real relationship. >Object. --- VI 71 Name/elementary proposition/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the names of the elementary proposition are fundamentally different from the nature of proper names. They are primitive signs that cannot be defined closer by any definition - but they can be explained by explanations - explanations are sentences that contain primitive signs - unlike a code elementary propositions do not obey appointment rules. VI 172 Names/WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: late: the owner is not the meaning of the name. --- IV 22 Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the name means the object. (3.203). >Proper names._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Proper Names
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26