Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Laws of Nature, philosophy: laws of nature (physical laws) are descriptions of dependencies of physical quantities among each other. From the fact that these are descriptions, it follows that these are no regulations in the sense of e.g. legal regulations. N. Goodman suggests in “Fact, Fiction and Forecast” (1954) that natural laws should be formulated in the form of irreal conditional sentences (also known as counterfactual conditionals); If A were the case, B would have been the case. See also counterfactual conditionals, irreal conditionals, laws, lawlikeness, law statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Natural Laws - Dictionary of Arguments
III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. - - - II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. - - - Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. - - - III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Natural Laws
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27