|Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Roderick Chisholm on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
Ontology/Chisholm: only: "Ens": a) contingent: states (events), individuals (borders, substances) b) necessary: abstractions, substance - only 5 basic concepts: 1. "x exemplifies y", 2. "x is necessary so that it is F ", 3" x is a condition of y ", 4" x is part of y ", 5" x thinks that there is something that is F "- ontology/Chisholm : platonic, accepted eternal things - VsNon-Platonic Entities: E.g. "property to be identical with that thing", "living vis-a-vis " ("purified ontology") - we do not accept that, in addition to the matters still there are events - existence: non-obtaining things (situations) can exist.
Ontology/Chisholm: undefined basic concepts: thinking [conceiving] existence [obtaining], exemplify, relation, possibility de re, direct attribution._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004