Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rule following, philosophy: is an expression for a problem that L. Wittgenstein formulated by excluding that a person could follow a rule that applies only to them as an individual. See also private language, rules, feelings, meaning, beetle example._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Saul A. Kripke on Rule Following - Dictionary of Arguments
Wright: Rule sequences/Kripke: Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox" negates any possibility of rules and meanings containing real limitations. At the end remains the attempt to keep afloat with the Charybdis. Wright I 264 McDowellVsKripke: it is false to understand the destruction of the Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is merely a logical sentence. >Divine standpoint, >Platonism. McDowell: Wittgenstein’s concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Wright I 264 ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any apparent assertion, e.g. that I formally meant addition when I said "+" in the past. Then I have defended this against a skeptic. Now one should conclude that even if I lost this fight, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules, and so on would be foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning would be no more understandable under the pressure of skepticism than the epistemology of the past or of the material world or the minds of others. >Quaddition. But that would be a mistake! E.g. in attempting to justify that I meant addition with "+" in the past, I am granted a complete reproduction of all aspects of my mental life. All relevant facts would have to show in my behavior and my mental life, and therefore be graspable by me. Now if I lose anyway, it becomes apparent that there are no such facts. Wright: in the argument, no over-objectification of the nature appears as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have appeared in my behavior. Wright I 264 ff WrightVsKripke: but that is vulnerable. However, it is not a mistake of sublimation of the rules (raise to a higher level). If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then a humanized Platonism is no less than the over-objectified version. Quietism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: Kripke's Wittgenstein is definitely obliged to quietism: because realism (that there are no facts regarding any rules) must be inflated to a comprehensive irrealism. An irrealism of the meaning must therefore trigger an irrealism of the truth. Global Minimalism/WrightVs: that is deceptive simplicity! Properly considered, the result of the irrealism based on Kripke’s skeptical paradox is that the discourse on rules is minimally capable of being true, at most. Wright I 264 ff. Kripke’s Wittgenstein: no behavior allows conclusions on internal rules (in the past) about addition, therefore these are also no rules about meaning, not even in the present, therefore also not on truth as well! >Kripke's Wittgenstein._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Rule Following
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26