Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Wittgenstein | Nagel I 71 Assertibility: (this view was attributed to Wittgenstein): assertibility was an authorization to attribute an infinite concept to a person. - Using it in a finite number of appropriate cases in accordance with the naturalized use. (See also problems in relation to addition/"quaddition"). - NagelVs: this cannot have been Wittgenstein's belief. Cf. >Rule following, >Private language, >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Community | Blackburn | Esfeld I 119 Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn(1): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community. >Private language, >Rule following, >Language community, >Language use. KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Kripke's Wittgenstein. I 120 EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! >Dispositions. The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback. I 121 Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself? Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined. >Change, >Temporal identity, >Conceptual content. 1. S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301. |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Esfeld | I 99ff Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules. Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know that you should say 125, if you intend to act in accordance with your previous answers? There is nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - the term is independent of certain applications. >Concepts, >Nonfactualism, >Mental state. I 102 Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: dispositions do not help because they are also limited. Why would the act that you are dispositional be the one that should be done? >Dispositions. Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)? >Norms. I 105f Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results can only be obtained in assertibility conditions. No truth conditions: means there are no facts which make statements about meaning come true. >Assertibility conditions, >Truth conditions. Esfeld: solution: social practice is the middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and a direct solution which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world. KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition. Whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct. Current dispositions have always a privileged position. Change is not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first. >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Katz | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect. Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein). --- I 103 Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition). Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite. >Fregean sense. VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition? See also >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Schiffer | I 174 Belief/Meaning/Fact/Nonfactualism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: there is simply no property that is equivalent to the meaningful predicate "believes that Harvard lies not in Miami", and there is not a fact, that corresponds to the closed sentence that contains the predicate. Quaddition: for the past, there was not a fact, and a fortiori not for the present. Problem: it is not true that he meant addition instead of quaddition. Solution: "fact" is ambiguous: pleonastic and non-pleonastic. I 176 Nonfactualism/Solution: there is no (non-pleonastic) property which is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. Direct solution: physicalist reduction - this is impossible when it is about meaning (intending). >Private Language, >Rule Following, >Nonfactualism, >Meaning/Intending. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Stegmüller | Stegmüller IV 15 Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common language use and rule following instead of "facts" and truth conditions. >Language use, >Language community, >Rule following, >Facts, >Truth conditions. IV 19f "Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past. - Therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition". - So far only finitely many cases have been followed. An extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future. N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant. >Meaning/Intending, >Beliefs. IV 23 Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation". 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem. IV 27 N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all! IV 35ff Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past. >Dispositions. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all. a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another. IV 37 b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right". IV 38 Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions! IV 47 Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive. IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist. IV 63 Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus". Experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience. >Content. IV 65 Example experience: the beginner has another experience than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud. - But: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading. IV 72 Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet there is a problem of access to these entities: it is not clear whether I grasp the right sense. >Private Language, >Rule Following. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Wright | I 264ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: no behavior allows us to infer internal rules (in the past) about addition, so there are no rules about meaning, not in the present, therefore, not about truth. >Rules, >Behavior, >Language behavior. I 269 Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Vs: the skeptical thought confused mention and use by concluding that all that is true of meanings, also applies to truth. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following, >Quaddition, >Mention, >Use, >Necessity/Wright. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Reliability Theory | Schiffer | I 83 SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought. I 83ff Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary. We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds. Cf. >Quaddition. I 87 Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition, b) quaddition. Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. >Reliability theory. I 104 SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis". Solution: there must be an "designated role". I 104 Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) I 105 Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Rule Following | Kripke | Wright: Rule sequences/Kripke: Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox" negates any possibility of rules and meanings containing real limitations. At the end remains the attempt to keep afloat with the Charybdis. Wright I 264 McDowellVsKripke: it is false to understand the destruction of the Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is merely a logical sentence. >Divine standpoint, >Platonism. McDowell: Wittgenstein’s concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity. Wright I 264 ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any apparent assertion, e.g. that I formally meant addition when I said "+" in the past. Then I have defended this against a skeptic. Now one should conclude that even if I lost this fight, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules, and so on would be foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning would be no more understandable under the pressure of skepticism than the epistemology of the past or of the material world or the minds of others. >Quaddition. But that would be a mistake! E.g. in attempting to justify that I meant addition with "+" in the past, I am granted a complete reproduction of all aspects of my mental life. All relevant facts would have to show in my behavior and my mental life, and therefore be graspable by me. Now if I lose anyway, it becomes apparent that there are no such facts. Wright: in the argument, no over-objectification of the nature appears as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have appeared in my behavior. Wright I 264 ff WrightVsKripke: but that is vulnerable. However, it is not a mistake of sublimation of the rules (raise to a higher level). If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then a humanized Platonism is no less than the over-objectified version. Quietism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: Kripke's Wittgenstein is definitely obliged to quietism: because realism (that there are no facts regarding any rules) must be inflated to a comprehensive irrealism. An irrealism of the meaning must therefore trigger an irrealism of the truth. Global Minimalism/WrightVs: that is deceptive simplicity! Properly considered, the result of the irrealism based on Kripke’s skeptical paradox is that the discourse on rules is minimally capable of being true, at most. Wright I 264 ff. Kripke’s Wittgenstein: no behavior allows conclusions on internal rules (in the past) about addition, therefore these are also no rules about meaning, not even in the present, therefore also not on truth as well! >Kripke's Wittgenstein. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Rules | Habermas | III 148 Rules/Habermas: For example, rules of operation (e. g. calculation rules) have no explanatory power; following them does not mean, as in the case of following rules of action, that the actor refers to something in the world and orients himself/herself towards claims of validity that are linked to motivational reasons for action. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Rule following, >Kripkes' Wittgenstein, >Nonfactualism. IV 36 Rules/Habermas: based on the model by Mead (see Internalisation/Mead) we assume that A does not produce his utterance (gesture, symbol) with the intention of following a rule and not in the expectation that the listener or listeners recognize the utterance as conforming to the rules. >Internalization/Mead. Behavioural expectations have only prognostic meaning, the conventional meaning component is missing. This means that expectations can be disappointed, but incorrect behavior cannot be recognized. According to Mead, the interaction works up to here through a mutual anticipation of reactions. (1) IV 39 Only when context-dependence has been overcome does the symbolic use of expressions or gestures of interaction occur. According to Mead, we can then say that meaning identity results from conventionally defined rules of use for symbols. >Use, >Symbols, >Understanding. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 86. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rules | Rorty | VI 53 Addition / Wittgenstein: all previous additions may be construed, as if they correspond to countless different rules for your use of "plus". Every causal event can satisfy many input-output functions. >Quaddition, >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule Following. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rules | Wright | I 260f Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement. >Convention, >Community, >Language community. Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning. >Realism. And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning. >Truth, >Meaning. Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences. >Cognitive coercion, >Rule following. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us. >Nonfactualism, >Minimalism/Wright. I 288 Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences. These considerations may 1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all 2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents, 3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism. 4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity. >Objectivity. --- Rorty VI 55ff WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition". >Nonfactualism, >Cognitive coercion, >Quaddition, >Facts, >D. Davidson. --- II 225 Rules/Wright: not in the same language. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Exception: an expression of what someone understands when he understands "red": can be formulated in the same language. >Understanding. Chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules. >Chess. Prevailing view/Wright: the prevailing view is that rules can be recognized from the inside out. WrightVs: that would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules. - That excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired). II 226 Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping. >Vagueness, >Predication, >Attribution. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brentano, Fr. | Wittgenstein Vs Brentano, Fr. | Stegmüller IV 54 Mental states/WittgensteinVsBrentano: (also Locke, Hume): no such thing as "understanding" but something like a toothache, depression, great excitement (emotional state); understanding is at a different level. --- IV 59 N.B.: E.g. assuming even if my meaning (to mean) of the addition would always be connected with a particular headache, I could not decide if it would not be Quaddition because only previous given cases. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Disposition Theory | Kripke Vs Disposition Theory | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule? No distinction possible between correct/incorrect. Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein). I 103 Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite. VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition? Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones! I 104 Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to. Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position I 105 and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Disposition Theory | Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory | Stegmüller IV 34 Disposition/Mind/Ryle: mean, meaning, intentionality: are not occurrences in consciousness, but abilities, dispositions. IV 35 I.e. in the case of plus/quus as of grue exactly the same mental history runs off together with identical mental states and consciousness processes. Conclusion: the decisive dispositions were acquired in the past. The difference then does not only exist in the present, it already existed in the past! RyleVsKripke: then I would also have used the standard function of addition in the past. IV 35/36 KripkeVsRyle: triple criticism: 1. External criticism: denies that any assumptions about dispositions are relevant at all. The problem is not understood at all. How can he invoke disposition as justification? An instruction to myself shows nothing at all. VsVs: a) I just have a hypothesis about myself. VsVsVs: why should precisely this hypothesis of countless other possible ones be the right one? IV 37 VsVs: b) We let the past rest. Right is what seems right to me now! WittgensteinVsVsVs: this leads to the fact that one can no longer speak of "right" here! 2. Internal criticism: (some people mistakenly think that Wittgenstein himself represented them): consists in specifying a criterion for a function F, which I mean by such a symbol. Def "Finity Problem"/Stegmüller: the finite cannot simply be transferred to the infinite. (Not only experiences, but also dispositions are finite). IV 38 Def "quus"/grue/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Re-Definition: the skeptical problem is reproduced: the function is the quaddition that corresponds to the addition for all pairs that are sufficiently small to be added by me, and returns the result 7 for the others. Thus I have always had the same dispositions. VsDisposition Theory. Disposition Theory/Stegmüller: a) can try to defend itself by understanding disposition not literally, but as an idealization of actual practice. Ceteris paribus disposition. KripkeVs: then I would have to make more and more fantastic assumptions about what I would do if this and that happened to me. IV 39 b) The idealization could be interpreted differently: "if I had the ability..." KripkeVs: that becomes circular. It assumes that the function I mean is something fixed. The "fact" would have to be assumed that I have a very specific intention! Dilemma for the disposition theory: a) Either only disposition for a finite number of cases, or b) Idealization of the reaction. Problem: ba) if these conditions are specified precisely, nothing can be said about my reaction. bb) a fact is assumed. IV 40 KripkeVsDisposition Theory: it leaves no room for possible errors! The disposition theorist cannot defend himself here by saying that there is a gap between what he meant and what he "should mean". Because the "function that he actually means" is not fixed for him from the outset by a table independent of the disposition. IV 41 Rather, in the opinion of the dispositionalist, the function can be read from disposition. For this reason, the disposition, to make mistakes must be part of the overall disposition. Def "Skaddition"/Kripke: would be the disposition of our person including the disposition to make mistakes. IV 42 Rule/Competence/Kripke: Competence cannot explain rules because it requires rules. (This does not apply to VsChomsky). VsDisposition Theory: Similarities can also be based on the fact that we sometimes make mistakes. IV 47 Addition/Disposition Theory/Kripke's Wittgenstein: (see above "external criticism (1)"): Suppose it were true that by "+" I mean addition. Problem: what is the relation between this assumption and the kind of answer I will give to the question !117 + 159"? Disposition Theory: all variants falsely state that it is this and that descriptively comprehensible relation. Mean/intention/normative: but if one understands to mean in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should say in the future, that is normative, not descriptive. This is the main point VsDisposition. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Field, H. | Schiffer Vs Field, H. | I 105 SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.). I 109 Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Schiffer Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 175 Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/SchifferVsKripke: Paradox/Schiffer: Solution: Usually, by showing that one of the propositions must be rejected. Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: we represent so canonically: (P1) (1) Yesterday Clem meant addition instead of quaddition with "plus". (2) But there is nothing in Clem's past, which could find that he meant the one in place of the other, there is simply not a fact. (3). But (1) and (2) are incompatible: if there was not a fact that it stipulated, then it is not that he meant addition instead of quaddition in the past. (P2) The same for the present. I 176 Schiffer: if (P1) and (P2) are paradox, then also (P3): (1) Clem believes that there are lions in Africa (2)But there is nothing in Clem's past, which specifies that he believes that. There is no fact of belief about Clem, specifying this. (3) Because (1) and (2) are incompatible, it is not the case that he believes that there are lions in Africa. ((s) difference to Kripke's Wittgenstein: there it says in (3) that he believes either addition or Quaddition (wherein Quaddition can be any deviation). But in (P3) it is said that he cannot believe that there are lions in Africa, and even Clem itself would have to notice that.). So that it is not possible at all to have an attitude is something different than the inability to determine the exact content of the attitude). Schiffer: Here too it can be said that there is neither a "reducible" nor a "irreducible" fact. Pointe: Pointe: if there is a solution to (P3), it could also be used for Kripke's Wittgenstein. How would the solution look like? "Direct solution"/Kripke's Wittgenstein would ultimately be a physicalist reduction. That many want. But that is impossible. We cannot reduce "to mean". Fact/Schiffer: if we are talking about the fact, then from the non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact, that, however, does not exist for Kripke's Wittgenstein. Kripke’s Wittgenstein/solution/Schiffer: both (2) and (3) are ambiguous in terms of "fact", it can be read here pleonastic or non-pleonastic. pleonastic: here (3) is true and (2) false: Clem meant addition and believes that there are lions in Africa, so it is a fact that he does. ((s) in the "superfluous", non-ontological sense of "fact".) non-pleonastic: here (2) is true and (3) false: there is indeed no objective language-independent fact which stipulates that Clem thinks or believes this and that. Nonfactualism/solution: there is no property that is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. I 177 Belief-predicate/propositional attitude: E.g. "means by "plus" the addition" E.g. "believes that there are lions in Africa". SchifferVsKripke/Kripke's Wittgenstein: the fact that there are no non-pleonastic facts regarding belief and meaning, does not conclude that you cannot mean anything. Conclusion/Schiffer: (a) Clem means addition and believes that there are lions in Africa. (b) the propositions about Clem's meaning and belief are not reducible to propositions without semantic, Intentional or Mentalese vocabulary. (They are irreducible intentionalistic). (c) there is no non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact or property in respect of meaning or belief, that is in relation to the predicate "means addition" or "believes that lions ..." as the name "Greta Garbo" to Greta Garbo. Schiffer: which makes the way for the ontological physicalism. VsSchiffer: it could be argued: E.g. Clem died yesterday after he has used "plus" for 50 years. Now we have a complete sound film his life along with complete records of its neurophysiological life and his stream of consciousness. I 178 Then we can formulate two empirically adequate hypotheses which exclude each other: 1. Clem meant addition, 2. Clem meant Quaddition. That is a mystery, isn't it? SchifferVsVs: this is indeed a mystery. Here I have another one: there are two empirically adequate hypotheses about myself, one that my sensory experience originates from physical objects, 2. that they are caused by Descartes evil demon. ((s)> brains in a vat). Nevertheless, I believe in physical objects. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Various Authors | Schiffer Vs Various Authors | I 283 Quaddition/John Carroll: that goes without non-standard interpretations: one would only have to redefine Quaddition like this: that if numbers are> = # in the game, delivers x + y = zt + 1. ((s) then you cannot notice this at incredibly large numbers.) SchifferVsCarroll: if you understand general propositions about addition, one will also appreciate that the sum of two numbers can never be equal to this sum plus 1! ((s) So if you look at the general shape notated with variables. But for this z would at first has to be written as a sum and then + 1!). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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