Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jürgen Habermas on Self - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 115 Self/Habermas: As soon as the ego masters the orientation to claims of validity, it can repeat the internalization of the discursive relationship. Now alter already meets it with the expectation that ego not only assumes the communicative role of the first person naively, but, if necessary, develops it into the role of a proponent within the framework of argumentation. >Argumentation. When ego adopts this attitude of alter, when it looks at itself with the eyes of an opponent as it responds to its criticism, it gains a reflected relationship to itself. Ego becomes capable of self-criticism by internalizing the role of the participant in the argument. >Intersubjectivity, >Interaction. IV 116 The self to which it then refers is not a mysterious authority, but is already familiar to it even from everyday communicative practice: it is it in the communicative role of the first person, as it claims the existence of facts in an objectifying attitude, or in an attitude conforming to norms it enters into an interpersonal relationship considered legitimate or makes a subjective experience accessible to an audience in an expressive attitude. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas Accordingly, ego (...) can relate to itself as a) an epistemic subject that is capable of learning and has already acquired a certain knowledge, or to itself as a b) a practical subject that can act and in interactions with its related persons has a certain character or has already formed a super-ego or c) to itself as a pathic (sic) subject that is sensitive (...) and is already delimited from the outside world by facts and norms in a privilegedly accessible, intuitively present realm of subjectivity. The subject is the same subject in all three aspects (epistemic, practical, pathic), no subsequent identification is required. These self-designations can only be taken up by ego in such a way that it confronts itself as a communicatively acting subject. IV 117 If the performative attitude secures unity in the change of modes, practical self-confidence retains a certain priority over epistemic and pathological self-confidence in the reflected self-image. >Subject/Habermas, >Self-consciousness._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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