Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Sense Data Theory: The sense data theory holds that when we perceive an object, we are directly aware of a mental representation of the object called a sense datum. Sense data are supposed to be private and subjective, and they are not identical to the objects that they represent. See also Perception, Knowledge, Experience, Seeing, Qualia, Qualities, World/Thinking, Stimuli, Proximal theory, Distal theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Sense Data Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 78 Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content. I 107 Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object. I 109 Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic. I 114 Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul." >Colour. I 180 Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object. I 322 Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data. --- II 87 Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori. II 92 Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time. >Use, >Measurements. II 100 Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other. II 101 The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary. >Objects. II 101 Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms. II 102 The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects. II 129 Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum. II 134 Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data. >Causes, >Causation, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Sense Data Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27