Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Parts, philosophy: in contrast to elements of a set, parts of a whole can stand in hierarchical relations. There may be dependencies, in particular ontological dependencies between parts and whole, as well as between parts of a whole, because parts may not exist if a questionable part does not exist. See also extrinsic, transitivity, reflexivity, symmetry, mereology, set theory, elements, order, overlap, dependency, ontological dependence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Simons on Parts - Dictionary of Arguments
I 26f Real part/mereology: there must be at least a second real part. BrentanoVs: e.g. a man is a real part of the event "sitting human" but here there is no second real part. Otherwise: Thatcher qua Prime Minister: is not part of Thatcher. >Qua-objects. Solution: supplement principles: there must be at least two real parts (if at all). There must be the possibility of separate parts and not only overlapping. >Overlapping. I 135 Predicate/part/whole/mereology/Simons: certain predicates are true of their objects because other predicates are true of their parts: e.g. Socrates was snub-nosed, because his nose was blunt, e.g. a table mountain is flat, because its upper part is flat. Predication of the whole is inherited by predication of the parts (local predication). For continuants this is even the only kind of predication. >Predicates, >Predication. Variation/continuants/mereology/McTaggart/Simons: e.g. the poker which is hot at the front and cool at the back: that is a variation on the object, but no change of the properties. It is a complex condition. On the other hand: e.g. when the entire poker gets hot, we have to say that the point in time is not the same.> >Change, >Temporal identity, >Properties. I 210 Part/whole/Simons: thesis: we reject the antisymmetry between part and whole. Then different objects can have the same parts - and these are necessarily in the same place at the same time. >Superposition. I 229 Part/Simons: the wit of this expression is that without it, we have no concept of space restrictions or perhaps of the space at all. I 235 Part/plural designation/multiplicity/Simons: (1): b is part of a: here b is a mass term (e.g. dough) or individual term (e.g. an apple) (2): b is part of a: here b must be an individual term (e.g. an apple) (3): b are parts of a: here b must be a plural term (e.g. wolves, e.g. blueberries are part of the cake, they are not "a part" of the cake. "Are part of": is the plural of "is part of". "Are parts of": is the plural of "is part of". (4): b are parts of a: here any b must be part of a, e.g. crankshaft and transmission are parts of the car, e.g. "the front" is part of the car, but not a part of the car. Whatever is a part of something, is also part of it but not vice versa. "A part of" has extra sense opposed to "part of". Component ("a part of") exists before installation and survived replacement. I 334 Part/fragment/relation/function/mereology/Simons: an arbitrary conceptual cut, e.g. "northern part of the house" is typically not closed under the relation, under which the whole is closed. >Mereology. I 337 Part/pure mereology/Simons: a mere relation of co-parts could not distinguish which objects are more unified (integrated). >Part-of-relation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26