Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Correspondence Theory | Frege Vs Correspondence Theory | Dummett I 24 Context Principle: only whole sentences have meaning. Dummett/Frege: Context PrincipleVsCorrespondence Theory - Context PrincipleVsCoherence Theory: meaning not specified - they ask incorrectly for proposition instead of sentence. Frege I 104 Proposition here: what is expressed by a sentence. FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: the meaning of an expression which is not a sentence must be explained starting from its contribution to the determination of the meaning. IV 32 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: Correspondence is a relation, but this is contradicted by the manner of use of the word "true", which makes no reference to something else to which it should correspond. Correspondence: can only be complete if the objects coincide, i.e. there is only one item alone. Truth/Frege: does not tolerate a more or less. What is only half true, is false. If you wanted to try to define "certain respects", the game could start anew. (> Regress). ((s) E.g. "Respects"/Concept: some animals are mammals: that is no correspondence or coincidence relation.") Frege: therefore truth is indefinable: it would always be down to "certain features" being true. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Correspondence Theory | Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory | I 6 Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts. This has an important consequence: Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism. The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected I 7 not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world. I 8 Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple: VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory). Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around: Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!). Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind. I 10 It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"? Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then? Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept. The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning. I 86 Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things. Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty. Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation. This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations. On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied. I 87 Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Searle Vs Frege, G. | II 285 Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions. II 286 Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege! Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for. II 301 The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation. 2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification. 3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress). Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress.. II 303 Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words. II 228 Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement. III 229 Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not. 2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements. Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation. V 116 SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too). V 117 Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself. E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound! V 144 SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition! V 152 Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions. Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic). V 155 Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b). Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms. V 156 Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property! V 172 Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression. V 173 2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals. 4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals. 5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions. V 256 Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions. To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star. They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hilbert | Tarski Vs Hilbert | Horwich I 127 Truth/Philosophy/Mathematics/HilbertVsTarski: (only "philosophical" objection at all, from a mathematician!): the truht definition would have nothing to do with the "philosophical problem". But that should not be a criticism. Term/TarskiVsHilbert: I never understood what the "essential" of a term should be. ((s) >Frege: terms have features that can be regarded as necessary, because otherwise it is another term, in contrast to objects that can also turn out to have other properties, but are still the object under consideration.) Truth/Tarski: I do not think there is any "philosophical problem" here.(1) 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Hume, D. | Frege Vs Hume, D. | I 67 Number/Hobbes: presupposes in mathematics among themselves equal units, from which it is constituted. Number/Hume/Frege: the constituent parts of quantity and number he considers quite similar. Number/FregeVsHobbes/FregeVsHume: just as one might view individuals as completely different! If one disregards the features by which things differ, it does not get as Lipschitz says: "the concept of the number of things considered", but Frege: a general term under that these things fall. I 94 Number/Equality/Equality of Numbers/Numerical Equality/Frege: we have to explain the meaning of the sentence "The number (sic) which is belongs to the concept F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G" in such a way that the expression: "The number (sic) which belongs to the concept F" does not occur. (Otherwise, circular). Number Equality/Hume/Solution: assigning each unit of a number to a unit of another number. ((s)> unique representation). I 95 FregeVsHume: this will result in logical difficulties which we may not pass by: Equality/Quantity/FregeVsHume/Frege: equality also occurs independent of numbers (sic), so that you might think it was already established before the quantity, and that from the concept of quantity (sic) and that of equality it would have to result when two quantities are equal, without need for a definition. FregeVs: That would explain equality only for each individual case! (By always making an equation). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Montague, R. | Stechow Vs Montague, R. | I 44 Types/Stechow: Definition/Linguistics/Stechow: Example for definition of a definition using the semantic ranges defined by types: e.g. for an adjective and a prepositional phrase: "in". Logical Type/Linguistics/Stechow: is a semantic feature of a category symbol. Montague/Stechow: acts as if each syntactic category has exactly one logical type and therefore writes only the categories. He has made this popular. StechowVsMontague: but this is not possible, because a syntactic category does not only correspond to a logical type. Problem: for example, the nomina Fritz, student, father these probably have different meanings: Fritz: designates something of type e, student: type ep, father: Tap e(ep). Then there must also be three different noun categories for Montague. Since we only accept one noun category, we must already write the types in the lexicon. I 104 Intensional Functional Application/IFA/Intensor/Heim/KratzerVsMontague: the intensor can be replaced by the composition principle of the intesional functional application. (Intensional Functional Application): in the metalanguage it does what the interpretation of the intensor does. This makes the calculations simpler: for example Since Montague places a node before each argument, this saves a lot of money. 105 Extensional Functional Application/FA/Montague: with him you first have to dismantle the Intensor and then the FA Intensional Functional Application/Heim/Kratzer: merges both steps. 150 Lambda Abstraction/Stechow: can already be found in Frege (1884)! 151 Quantifying in/Montague/Stechow: Example Each rule consists of a syntactic and a semantic operation. Syntactic operation/Stechow: has always been very simple: just write side by side. Montagues syntactic operation f14,2 is much more complicated: take the first argument of the function (here "every linguist") and replace the first occurrence of the pronoun "him" in the second argument by this expression. The semantics of this rule is of course exactly the semantics of our quantifier relation. I.e. we apply the meaning of the quantifier to the meaning of the λ-abstract that we form from the second expression. VsMontague: Problem: there are infinitely many rules of quantifying in, one for each natural number. This is because we can choose any index for a pronoun. Lambda Calculus/Stechow: you can do almost anything with it. The original work does not contain semantics. (Lit: Lambek, 1958). 152 Type/Not/Stechow: cannot have the type (st)t, then it is a sentence adverb. Or (s(et)(et), then it is a VP modifier. ((s) > narrow range/>wide range). |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). Description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary Description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. Acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Various Authors | Frege Vs Various Authors | Brandom II 83 FregeVsBoole: no material contents, therefore unable to follow scientific concept formation. Boole: "scope equality". Frege I 32 Addition/Hankel: wants to define: "if a and b are arbitrary elements of the basic series, then the sum of a + b is understood to be that one member of the basic series for which the formula a + (b + e) = a + b + e is true." (e is supposed to be the positive unit here). Addition/Sum/FregeVsHankel: 1) thus, the sum is explained by itself. If you do not yet know what a + b is, you will not be able to understand a + (b + e). 2) if you’d like to object that not the sum, but the addition should be explained, then you could still argue that a + b would be a blank sign if there was no member of the basic series or several of them of the required type. Frege I 48 Numbers/FregeVsNewton: he wants to understand numbers as the ratio of each size to another of the same kind. Frege: it can be admitted that this appropriately describes the numbers in a broader sense including fractions and irrational numbers. But this requires the concepts of size and the size ratio!. I 49 It would also not be possible to understand numbers as quantities, because then the concept of quantity and the quantity ratios would be presumed. I 58 Number/Schlömilch: "Notion of the location of an object in a series". FregeVsSchlömilch: then always the same notion of a place in a series would have to appear when the same number occurs, and that is obviously wrong. This could be avoided if he liked to understand an objective idea as imagination, but then what difference would there be between the image and the place itself?. I 60 Frege: then arithmetic would be psychology. If two were an image, then it would initially only be mine. Then we could perhaps have many millions of twos. I 64 Unit/Baumann: Delimitation. FregeVsBaumann: E.g. if you say the earth has a moon, you do not want to declare it a delimited one, but you rather say it as opposed to what belongs to Venus or Jupiter. I 65 With respect to delimitation and indivisibility, the moons of Jupiter can compete with ours and are just as consistent as our moon in this sense. Unit/Number/Köpp: Unit should not only be undivided, but indivisible!. FregeVsKöpp: this is probably supposed to be a feature that is independent from arbitrariness. But then nothing would remain, which could be counted and thought as a unit! VsVs: then perhaps not indivisibility itself, but the be considering to be indivisible could be established as a feature. FregeVs: 1) Nothing is gained if you think the things different from what they are!. I 66 2) If you do not want to conclude anything from indivisibility, what use is it then? 3) Decomposabiltiy is actually needed quite often: E.g. in the problem: a day has 24 hours, how many hours have three days?. I 69 Unit/Diversity/Number/FregeVsJevons: the emphasis on diversity also only leads to difficulties. E.g. If all units were different, you could not simply add: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1..., but you would always have to write: 1" + 1"" + 1 """ + 1 """", etc. or even a + b + c + d... (although units are meant all the time). Then we have no one anymore!. I 78 ff: ++ Number neither description nor representation, abstraction not a definition - It must not be necessary to define equality for each case. Infinite/Cantor: only the finite numbers should be considered real. Just like negative numbers, fractions, irrational and complex numbers, they are not sense perceptible. FregeVsCantor: we do not need any sensory perceptions as proofs for our theorems. It suffices if they are logically consistent. I 117 - 127 ++ VsHankel: sign (2-3) is not empty, but determinate content! Signs are never a solution! - Zero Class/FregeVsSchröder: (> empty set) false definition of the zero class: there can be no class that is contained in all classes as an element, therefore it cannot be created by definition. (The term is contradictory). IV 14 VsSchröder: you cannot speak of "classes" without already having given a concept. - Zero must not be contained as an element in another class (Patzig, Introduction), but only "subordinate as a class". (+ IV 100/101). II 93 Euclid/FregeVsEuclid: makes use of implied conditions several times, which he states neither under his principles nor under the requirements of the special sentence. E.g. The 19th sentence of the first book of the elements (in each triangle the greater angle is located opposite the larger side) presupposes the following sentences: 1) If a distance is not greater than another, then it is equal to or smaller than the first one. 2) If an angle is equal to another, then it is not greater than the first one. 3) If an angle is less than another, it is not greater than the first one. Waismann II 12 FregeVsPostulates: why is it not also required that a straight line is drawn through three arbitrary points? Because this demand contains a contradiction. Well, then they should proof that those other demands do not contain any contradictions!. Russell: postulates offer the advantages of theft over honest work. Existence equals solvability of equations: the fact that √2 exists means that x² 2 = 0 is solvable. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Truth Definition | Versus | Frege IV 19/20 Truth / definition / FregeVsTarski: can not be defined! Reason: in a definition we indicate certain features. When applied to a specific case, it then comes down to whether they have been met. So came round in a circle on the definition of truth. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
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