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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Change | Adorno | Rorty III 103 Meaning Change/Adorno/Dialectic of Enlightenment: Adorno thought that concepts were subject to historic change! Period provides the right concepts for each case. Dissolution of these concepts deprives the period of the right to further existence. >History/Adorno, >Concepts, >Texts/Adorno, >Theory change. Meaning Change/Adorno: E.g. "general validity in contrast to the relative validity" "morality in contrast to intelligence." Even the concepts of the mind, the truth, even of the Enlightenment itself have become animistic magic. (Ricouer: "hermeneutics of suspicion"). >P. Ricoeur, >Mind, >Truth, >Hermeneutics. --- XIII 208 Meaning Change/Theory Change/SchopenhauerVsFichte/Schopenhauer/Adorno: it is sometimes the case that strictly identical motifs assume completely different meanings. For example, Schopenhauer's philosophy of will is not so far away from the philosophy of action. Nevertheless, even the same concepts, for instance, the absolutely self-imposed principle, which in Fichte is called the subject, and in Schopenhauer will, mean in both truths exactly the opposite. Therefore all the categories that arise from it have a completely different meaning. >A. Schopenhauer, >J.G. Fichte. XIII 237 Meaning Change/Theory Change/Adorno: To do justice to a thinker always means doing wrong to him at the same time. The philosophies require the reflections (...) so that they may come to their own right or possibly to their own wrong. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Myth | Gadamer | I 278 Myth/GadamerVsRomanticism/Gadamer: In truth, the precondition is the mysterious dark, in which lies a mythical collective consciousness that precedes all thinking, just as dogmatic-abstract as that of a state of perfection of completed enlightenment or that of absolute knowledge. Cf. >Enlightenment/Romanticism, >Myth/Romanticism. Primordial wisdom is only the counter-image of the "primordial dumb". All mythical consciousness has always been knowledge, and by knowing about divine powers, it goes beyond a mere trembling before power (if one should take such for the primordial stage) I 279 but also beyond a collective life banished to magical rituals (as we find it for example in the early Orient). It knows about itself, and in this knowledge it is no longer simply beside itself(1). This is connected with the fact that the contrast between genuine mythical thinking and pseudo-mythical poetic thinking is also a romantic illusion based on a prejudice of the Enlightenment: namely that poetic action, because it is a creation of the free imagination, no longer has any part in the religious obligation of the myth. 1) Horkheimer and Adorno seem to me to be quite right with their analysis of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (even if I can see a lack of historical reflection, if not a confusion of Homer with Johann Heinrich Voss in the application of sociological terms as in Odysseus, as already criticized by Goethe). (GadamerVsHorkheimer, GadamerVsAdorno.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reason | Horkheimer | Habermas III 462 Reason/Horkheimer/Habermas: Horkheimer introduces instrumental reason as 'subjective reason' and contrasts it with 'objective reason'. >Objectivity, >Subjectivity, cf. >Intersubjectivity. Habermas III 463 Objective Reason/Horkheimer: stands for the ontological thinking that advanced the rationalization of the world views that had understood the human world as part of a cosmological order. (1) The background for the modern history of consciousness are those metaphysical-religious worldviews from which Max Weber first read the process of disenchantment. >Worldviews, >Disenchantment. Like Weber, Horkheimer sees the result of this development in world views in the fact that cultural value spheres are formed that obey specific laws of their own: Horkheimer: "this division of cultural spheres results from the fact that the general objective truth is replaced by formalized, innermost relativistic reason." (2) >Relativism. Horkheimer/Habermas: the subjectivization of reason corresponds to the irrationalization of morality and art. >Morals, >Art. De Sade/Moral/Enlightenment/Adorno/Horkheimer: thesis in Horkheimer/Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: even in the paradigmatic century of Enlightenment, the dissociation of reason and morality came to consciousness right up to the last consequences: one "did not pretend that formalistic reason was more closely related to morality than to immorality. (3) >Enlightenment, >de Sade. Art/Horkheimer/Habermas: Horkheimer asserts the same of modern art development: The dissociation of art Habermas III 464 from reason makes works of art into cultural goods and their consumption into a series of random feelings that are separate from our real intentions and aspirations. (4) >Artworks. 1. M. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, Frankfurt 1967, p.22. 2. Ibid. p 28. 3. M. Horkheimer, Th. W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, Amsterdam 1947, p. 141. 4. Horkheimer (1967) p. 47. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Reification | Lukács | Habermas III 474 Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Lukács thesis: "in the structure of the relationship of goods (can) the archetype of all forms of representationalism and all corresponding forms of subjectivity be found in bourgeois society". (1) Habermas: Lukács uses the new Kantian expression "representational form" in a sense shaped by Dilthey as a historically created "form of existence or thought" that distinguishes the "totality of the stage of development of society as a whole". >Neo-Kantianism, >W. Dilthey, >About Dilthey. He understands the development of society as "the history of the uninterrupted transformation of the representational forms that shape people's existence". LukácsVsHistorism/Habermas: Lukács does not, however, share the historicist view that the particularity of each unique culture is expressed in a representational form. The forms of representationalism convey "the confrontation of the human Habermas III 475 with his/her environment, which determines the representationalism of his/her inner and outer life".(2) >Historism. Def Reification/Lukács/Habermas: Reification is the peculiar assimilation of social relationships and experiences to things, i.e. to objects that we can perceive and manipulate. The three worlds (subjective, objective and social ((s) shared) world) are so miscoordinated in the social a priori of the living world that category errors are built into our understanding of interpersonal relationships and subjective experiences: we understand them in the form of things, as entities that belong to the objective world, although in reality they are components of our common social world or of our own subjective world. >Objective world, >Subjective world, >Social world, >Life world. Habermas: because understanding and comprehending are constitutive for the communicative handling itself, such a systematic misunderstanding affects the practice, not only the way of thinking but also the "way of being" of the subjects. It is the lifeworld itself that is "reified". Habermas: Lukács sees the cause of this deformation in a Habermas III 476 method of production that is based on wage labour and requires "becoming goods of a function of humans"(3). Habermas III 489 AdornoVsLukács/HorkheimerVsLukács/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno shift the beginnings of reification in the dialectic of the Enlightenment back behind the capitalist beginning of modernity to the beginnings of the incarnation. >Dialectic of Enlightenment, >M. Horkheimer, >Th.W. Adorno. The reason for this is that Lukác's theory of the unforeseen integration achievements of advanced capitalist societies has been denied. >Society, >Capitalism. 1. G. Lukács, „Die Verdinglichung und das Bewusstsein des Proletariats“ in: G. Lukács, Werke, Bd. 2. Neuwied 1968, S. 257-397. 2.G.Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke, Bd. 2, 1968, S. 336 3. Ebenda S. 267. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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