Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Jackson | Black I 234 Conceptual analysis/Lewis/Schwarz: While for most authors the conceptual analysis is separated from philosophy, it is connected to it for Lewis and also for Jackson. SchwarzVs: Vs both positions: as, for example, Panprotopychism and the world as it is show, there are indeed metaphysical supervenience relations which are not associated with analytic reducibility. N.B.: this shows that they do not deserve the philosophical status: panprotopsychism is not a real physical position, the supervenience of all truths in the "world as it is" is an irrelevant formal curiosity. >Panprotopsychism, >Conceptual analysis, >Supervenience. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intrinsicness | Chalmers | Schwarz I 226 Intrinsic properties/Nature/Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: Chalmers (Chalmers 2002)(1)takes advantage of this gap: starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism: Thesis: Our physical theories describe how physical things and properties behave with each other, what they are, but leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. >Properties, >Laws of nature, >Naturalism, >Physics, >Explanation. Def Pan(proto)psychism: thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and qualities is mental. For example, what we know, from the outside as charge -1, turns out to be a pain from within. ((s) See also > two aspects theory, >Panpsychism. If our physical vocabulary is rigid (i.e., always refers, in the domain of modal operators, to what plays the causal structural role in us, that is to say pain), then the physical truths necessarily imply the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. >Rigidity, >Reference. Problem: The physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly what situation we are in, especially in regard to the intrinsic nature of the physical quantities. Cf. >Possible Worlds, >Twin Earth. 1. D. Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (Hg.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jackson, F. | Schwarz Vs Jackson, F. | Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessity/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsJackson: but from that does not follow that if the physical truths imply anything necessary - if they constitute a metaphysical basis for all truths about the situation on the actual situation that this implication then must be also a priori. It could be that the metaphysical basis only implies a posteriori: E.g. the phrase "everything is as it actually is". Implies necessary all truths, it is only in the actual world (actual world) true. A priori it implies nothing! ((s) it is not true for any possible world, but in every possible world itself). > Panpsychism: Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: (Chalmers 2002) takes this gap as an advantage: The starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism (see above 5.4): Thesis: our physical theory describe how physical things and properties relate to each other, what they are, but they leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. Def Pan(proto)psychism: Thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and properties is mental. E.g. what we know from the outside as a charge -1, turns out to be from the inside as pain. ((s)> Two Aspects teaching). Now, if our physical vocabulary is rigid (that means that it always applies in the field of modal operators on what plays for us the causal structural role (that means to pain), then the physical truths imply necessary the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. Problem: the physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly in what situation we are in, particularly with regard to the intrinsic nature of physical quantities. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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