Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conceptual Role | Block | Fodor IV 163 Meaning/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Semantics/Block: Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its role in a language. Fodor/Lepore: this invites to the conclusion that expressions belonging to different languages have different meanings. This leads to "translation holism" rather than to content holism. >Translation-Holism, >Holism. Lit: Block "Advertisement for a semantics for psychology"(1) is much quoted. CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory". Theory of the conceptual role, semantics of the conceptual role. Thesis: The meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). >Inferential role. Block: believes that a version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. In any case, according to Block, it is the only one that satisfies the conditions of cognitive science. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: his arguments for CRT are not the deciding ones. But this does not lead to Semantic Holism anyway. It should be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. IV 165 Semantics/Content/Computation/Naturalism/CRT/Block: a semantic theory must satisfy the following conditions to be appropriate to a naturalistic, computational psychology: 1) Explain the relation between meaning/reference 2) What gives meaning to expressions? 3) Explain the dependence of the meaning of representation systems 4) Explain compositionality 5) Explain the relation between meaning mind/brain 6) Explain the relation between autonomous and inherited meaning 7) Explain the connections between knowledge/learning/use of expressions and their meaning 8) Explain why different aspects of meaning are differently relevant to reference and psychology. IV 168 Semantics of Conceptual Role/CRT/Block Fodor/Lepore: equates meaning with inferential role. (Naturalistic version: causal role). >Causal role. 1. Ned Block, Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678 (1986) |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Consciousness | Block | II 458 Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access-consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept) Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness. Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious. II 524 Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request. This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control. II 530 Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. ((s) Part or basis as a counterpart). II 531 Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points. II 535 Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering 2) is available for rational control of actions 3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious). p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck. Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other. Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action. p-consciousness/Block: p-consciousness is not functional! It is about sensations. a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes". >Propositional attitudes. Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain. Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness. II 555 Consciousness/Dennett: 1) Cultural construct! 2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects. BlockVsDennett: Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product. Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept. Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Content | Block | Fodor IV 172 Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles throws no light on the distinction of meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to determine the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed. Categories/Block: he himself says that most empirical taxonomies do not provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the application of their own categories. Narrow Content/Categories/Twin Earth/Block/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Problem: how narrow contents can be expressed. E.g. if the mental states of the twins ipso facto share their contents, what then is the content that they share? It cannot be determined by what both share, namely the use of "water is wet": for that expresses the narrow proposition that water is wet. What then are the truth conditions? >Truth conditions. IV 173 Wide Meaning/Block: may be better suited to explain behavior. ((s) not only meaning in mind but also the circumstances). >Circumstances. Circumstances/Twin Earth/Wide Content/(s): Problem: if the circumstances consist in that once H2O and once XYZ is effective, the circumstances are something that the individual is unable to recognize. I.e. we do not know in which circumstances we are or which circumstances are given, since you cannot hold both situations up to one another.) >Twin earth. Fodor/Lepore: ... but only as far as there are nomological relations between world and belief. Psychological laws: if there are psychological laws, then there are ipso facto generalizations that work with wide, but not with narrow content. Fodor/Lepore pro. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it misses the main point: some of these psychological laws would then be fixed with regard to intentional content: IV 174 "Ceteris paribus, if someone believes this and that and wants this and that, then he will act in this and that way". Problem: there is then an appeal to these intentional laws and not to the non-contingent connections between mind and behavior, which supposedly define the functional definitions of the content. And these intentional laws are then supposed to support the psychological explanations. >Behavior. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Fine-grained/ coarse-grained | Block | Fodor IV 169 Fine-Grained/Twin Earth/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Theory/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problems with the twin earth point in to a different direction than Frege's problems (intension/extension). Frege: needs more fine-grained concepts as extensions Putnam: needs less fine-grained than extensional equivalence. (Narrower conception): Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally distinguished. (Water/Twin-Earth Water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT) will hardly work. Solution/Block: "Two Factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: A) Actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 B) Independent, possibly causal, theory of the reference: (Twin Earth/Water/Twin-Earth Water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: this has almost nothing to do with CRT. Moreover, neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) is available. But let's assume it anyway: For example, we make the distinction of meaning/reference with the "two-factor" theory: we then have enough distinction ability, but pay a high price: Question: What actually holds the two factors together? E.g. what prevents the existence of an expression whose inferential role corresponds to the expression "4 is a prime number" and whose content is "water is wet"? But what would it mean? And what would be expressed? The problem is repeated at the level of metatheory: What holds a theory of extension and a theory of meaning together? BlockVsVs: it is clear to him, and what he says about it is puzzling: "the conceptual role is primarily in the determination of the nature of the reference, but not vice versa." IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to say that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is, after all, causally determined according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): Difference: a) Conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water, B) a word class, e.g. name. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that excludes the confusion between extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime number/wetness"? Block: T is not a kind-term, if the causal theory of kind-terms is not true for it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that just does not prevent "water" from having the extension of a kind-concept and at the same time the logic of a number concept. >Twin Earth, >Extension, >Intensions, >Causal theory of names. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Holism | Block | Fodor IV 163 Holism/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Block's argument is not transcendental like that of the other authors. He proposes a theory about what content is to then conclude that this theory must be holistic. Fodor IV 174 Holism/Semantics of the Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Theory/CRT/Block: Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its role in the language. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Problem: Dilemma: assuming there is no distinction between analytical/synthetic (a/s), we can conclude translation holism: "The meaning of an expression is its entire role in the language". This was not good enough in the above and will not get better if it is used for CRT. >Analyticity/synthecity. New: Block's conditions can only be met by a form of CRT that is either a) incompatible with the distinction analytic/synthetic, or b) wrong for reasons which have nothing to do with holism. So: 1) CRT is not well motivated, 2) it cannot serve as a reason for holism in its serious form. >Conceptual role. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Morning Star/Evening Star | Block | Fodor IV 168 Conceptual Role/Fine-Grained/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problem: whether the conceptual (inferential) roles of morning star and evening star differ depends on how inferential roles themselves are individuated. This, in turn, depends on how fine-grained or coarse-grained they are perceived. a) as coarse-grained as the individuation of extensions: then the roles of MS/ES are not distinguished! (s) This is, in turn, distinguished from the distinction between the meta-language and the object language, for example, that "bachelor" starts with B). E.g. Suppose our concept of inference was based on material equivalence: IV 169 Then all coextensive expressions will have the same inferential roles. Conversely: E.g. if the inferential roles are as fine-grained as orthography (not only ES/MS but also distinction "bachelor" and "unmarried man"), then we lose the explanatory power for the (presumable) fact that synonymous expressions, other than merely coextensive ones, are substitutable salva veritate. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) now we see: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege's problem if there is an adequate individualization principle for them. But there is no criterion for this! Block also called this the main problem. Thus it is not easier to distinguish between inferential roles than between meanings. > Fine grained/coarse grained. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Qualia | Chalmers | I 251 Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978)(1) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does! We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either! >Analogies, >Thought experiments, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Comparisons, >Comparability. I 252 Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. >Functions, >Experience. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines. BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example). I 253 Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980)(2), Savitt (1982)(3), Cuda (1985)(4), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. I 254 ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. I 256 A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... I 257 ...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible. >Logical possibility, cf. >Metaphysical possibility, >Physical possibility, >Possibility. I 261 ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. I 262 Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! >Invariance, >Behavior. VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981)(5). So something must be wrong with the argument. ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented. 2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips. I 263 A system like this would be rational in any case. I 266f Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... I 267 1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences. Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites/Chalmers). Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time. I 268 After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference! I 269 A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes! I 270 The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle: Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism. >Skepticism. I 271 VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... I 272 ...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... I 273 ...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument. Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible. Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded. >Functionalism, >Functionalism/Chalmers. 1. N. Block, Troubles with functionalism. In: C. W. Savage (Ed) Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundatzion of Psychology. Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1, Cambridge 1980. 2. Z. Pylyshyn, The "causal power" of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 1980: pp. 442-44 3. S. Savitt, Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences5, 1982: pp. 342-43 4. T. Cuda, Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 111-27. 5. N. Block Psychologism and behaviorism Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43 (1981). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Self- Consciousness | Shoemaker | Frank I 37f Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: selfconsciousness is immune to misidentification. >Inverted spectra, >Qualia, >Incorrigibility, >Misidentification, >Immunity. Shoemaker per Qualia: Functioal state identity theory. (VsBlock). >Qualia/Block, >Qualia/Shoemaker. Self-reference does not imply self-identification. >Self-reference. Frank I 65 Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: radically different from the consciousness of perception. I cannot learn from from any object, not even learn from the mirror, that I myself am displayed unless I had known previously. >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >I, Ego, Self, >Perception, cf. >He/He himself, >Quasi-indicator. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Strength of Theories | Schiffer | I 44 Stronger/weaker/SchifferVsPsycho-Functionalism/SchifferVsBlock: it is unlikely that there is a theory that is weak enough to be true of all believers - and strong enough to apply to any individual belief - (to define the conditions). E.g. for sighted and visually impaired. Problem: there would have to be necessary conditions for belief defined. Strong/((s): determines the details weak/((s): applicable to many cases. >Psychofunctionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Twin Earth | Block | Fodor IV 167 (Fodor/Lepore: extremely controversial!) Assumes that the the same intentional psychological explanations apply to the twins, not just the same neurological ones. Conceptual Role/CRT/Block: its advantage is to allow such an explanation. IV 168 If Block argues here for the narrow content, he moves towards "individualism". Lit.: (>Fodor: "A modal argument for narrow content"). HarmanVsBlock: Harman: "Wide functionalism": here the broad content is analyzed with regard to conceptual role. >Conceptual role. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blanshard, B. | Harman Vs Blanshard, B. | Fodor/Lepore IV 167 Twin Earth/Block: (Fodor/Lepore: extremely controversial) assumes that for twins the same intentional psychological explanations apply, not only the same neurological ones. (>Position). Conceptual Role Theory/Block: its advantage is that it allows such an explanation. IV 168 By pleading in favor of the narrow content, Block is moving in the direction of "individualism". Lit.: (>Fodor: "A modal argument for narrow content"). HarmanVsBlock: Harman: "Wide functionalism": here, the wide content is analyzed in terms of conceptual role. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Block, Ned | Burge Vs Block, Ned | II 583 Burge pro Block: pro distinction P-consciousness (phenomenal) - a-consciousness (access consciousness, rational control). BurgeVsBlock: 1) a-consciousness presupposes p-consciousness. 2) Access conscious states, even events themselves must not be phenomenally conscious. 3) It is possible to have phenomenal states or events with phenomenal qualities, of which one is not conscious. So phenomenal qualities do not guarantee a phenomenal consciousness, for that they need to be perceived by a subject. II 588 BurgeVsBlock: what makes rational access conscious states conscious are not primarily their representational aspects. Nor is access-consciousness is a functional concept. No concept of consciousness is a purely functional concept. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Block, Ned | Searle Vs Block, Ned | Metzinger II 561 SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the meaning of a-conscious. Searle: A total zombie can have no consciousness at all. ((s) a-conscious/Block: access-conscious, >p-consious: phenomenal consciousness. BlockVsSearle: he packs p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference whether Armstrong's truck driver does not notice what is going on, or if he avoids accidents.) He also tried to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality, these are degrees of a-consciousness. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
| Block, Ned | Shoemaker Vs Block, Ned | Block I 188 Block: And if there are no homunculi, they cannot be identical with a qualitative structure. ShoemakerVsBlock: asserts that the Def "argument of the missing qualia" is logically impossible. That means it is logically impossible that two systems are in the same functional state but one has a qualitative state, the other, however, does not! (I 218) (BlockVs). ShoemakerVsBlock: the problems with brains in the tank can be avoided if we introduce the concept of a "paradigm embodied person". Thus, a functioning sensory apparatus and a will control over movement is assumed. Then you can extend it to the functional character of non-paradigmatic: a physical structure that is not part of a paradigm embodied person, then passes as a realization of mental states, if it can be included without changing its internal structure and the types of relations between their states into a larger physical system, namely the body of the embodied paradigmatic person. Frank I 61 FodorVsFunctionalism/BlockVsFunctionalis/Frank: the so combined F. does not capture the Qualia, that is the actual mental states. E.g. inverted spectra: functionalism then no longer explains this consciousness experiences. ((s) For him, the inverted spectrum would be identical to the non-exchange?). Fodor/Block: nothing would be a token of the general type of state of pain, even if it was linked to all other mental states at all typical ways for pain. Fra I 62 "absent qualia argument"/argument of the missing qualia/Block/Fodor: even more fatal: the organism could behave exactly like that without qualia. ShoemakerVsBlock: defends the compatibility of the concession of qualia with functionalism. Qualia are intuitive for the consciousness, given without a transmission of a perception and their becoming a feeling is a completely adequate identification of their existence. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Block, Ned | Stalnaker Vs Block, Ned | I 222 Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content. E.g. if their experience when they see a ripe tomato is (and always has been) as mine when I see unripe pepper and vice versa, then the same experience that will represent the tomato as red to them will represent the tomato as green to me. We have then different experiences if we look at a ripe tomato but the tomato appears as red to both of us. Representational content/inverted spectra/Stalnaker: but the representational content (of whose ones spectrum is reversed) for the two persons is the same! ((s) Both have the experience "red"). ((s) representational/(s): here: on the word "red". So the language use plays a role. One can, for example, not say that the stimulus represents something neutral.) ((s) Representation/Stalnaker: appearance! ((s) So something more indirect than the phenomal experience "how it is".) Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: if that is correct then we cannot explain the qualitative character of visual experiences in concepts of properties that the things seem to have. Def representationalism/terminology/Stalnaker: thesis: that appearance is the basic, not "how it is". Representation: how things appear to us. Representative: Block. Stalnaker: it is here for me not about to defend the representationalism. StalnakerVsRepresentationalism/StalnakerVsBlock: I do not quite understand how representational content is to fully grasp the phenomenal character of experience. However, I believe that the strategy to explain qualitative content that way is the right one. Thought experiment/th.e./Stalnaker: I am skeptical about th.e. as the reversed spectra that want to separate representational and qualitative content. Inverted qualia/StalnakerVscommon sense-view: the common sense does not speak with one voice on comparison of qualia over time and between people. It can also be interpreted in a way that it supports a conceptual link between qualitative character and appearances (representation). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow Content/categories/twin earth/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Psychofunctionalism | Schiffer Vs Psychofunctionalism | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): should be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology). SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief property of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block must say that there must be a theory Ts nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: to be a token of the z-type, that has the Ts-correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). That means the role that is indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a posteriori knowable after the theory Ts was excavated. Science: might just might find all phenotypic (apparition moderate) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from it, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion of to be a dog = to be of this and that genotype, if... and b) includes in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be of this and that genotype. ((s) without additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there should be a philosophical theory of this strength, it is not known to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.type concepts, are unsuitable for belief predicates. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Searle, J.R. | Block Vs Searle, J.R. | II 560 SearleVsBlock: it is not legitimate to use "conscious" in the definition of a-consiousness. Searle: A total zombie can have absolutely no consciousness. II 561 BlockVsSearle: he puts p-consciousness and a-consciousness together. (But there is a difference between whether E.g. Armstrong truck driver notices nothing, or whether he avoids accidents.) Also, he tries to replace the a-consciousness by the idea of degrees of p-consciousness. Block: in reality they are degrees of a-consciousness. II 568 Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: question: E.g. why the thirsty Blindsight patient does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That’s right. But it’s a mistake to move from one function of the machinery of the a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness. Fallacy: drawing the premature conclusion that p-consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is absent (without being clear what kind of consciousness it is). |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
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