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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjectives | Gärdenfors | I 116 Adjective/Noun/Word Classes/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the main semantic difference between adjectives and nouns is that adjectives such as "red", "big" and "round" typically refer to a single area and thus represent properties, while nouns such as "dog", "apple" and "city" contain information on several areas and therefore... --- I 117 ...represent object categories. But this is only a rule of thumb. > Categories/Gärdenfors. --- I 135 Adjectives/Word Classes/Functions/Gärdenfors: can A) be regarded as a means of specifying objects B) on a second level (for the coordination of similarities), the adjective has an informative function: e.g. The oven is hot. Logical form: in this case, the adjective is a complement to the copula "is". Problem: it is not clear that these two functions (specification and information) can be exercised by the same word class. (Dixon 2004, p. 30)(1). There are adjectives that can only be used specifically (e.g., alive), and those that are used only informatively (predicatively), e.g. "absolute". (Paradis, 2005)(2) Specification: can also be performed by nouns. --- I 136 Gärdenfors: Thesis on Adjectives: the meaning of an adjective can be represented in a convex region of a single area. E.g. colour words: no language has only one word for what is called "green" and "orange" in German. Conceptual Space/Colour words/Gärdenfors: for my thesis that there is a single area for adjectives, evidence has been found: I 137 See Taft and Sivik (1997)(3), Sivik & Taft (1994)(4), Jäger (2010)(5), Cook, Kay & Regier (2005)(6) Problem: Adjectives like "healthy" are at the limit of many dimensions e.g. having no pain,... --- I 138 ...having no infection, etc. Therefore, the importance of "healthy" of the one-area thesis for adjectives does not seem to apply here. Solution Gärdenfors: a) one can assume an area disease-health. This is how doctors proceed. Vs: Problem: we cannot create a product room here. B) A "health dimension" can be assumed as a diagonal in the product space, which covers all dimensions involved in disease and health. GärdenforsVs: I find this less attractive. 1. Dixon (2004) Dixon, R. M. W. (2004). Adjective Classes in typological perspective. In R. M. W. Dixon & A. Y. Aikhenvald (Eds.) Adjective classes: A cross-linguistic typology (pp. 1-49) Oxford. 2. Paradis, C. (2005) Ontologies and construals in lexical semantics. Axiomathes, 15, 541-573. 3. Taft, C., & Sivik, L. (1997). Salient color terms in four languages. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 38, 26–31. 4. Sivik, L., & Taft, C. (1994). Color naming: A mapping in the NCS of common color terms. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 35, 144–164. 5. Jäger, G. (2010). Natural color categories are convex sets. Amsterdam Colloquium 2009, LNAI 6042 (pp. 11–20). Berlin: Springer. 6. Cook, R. S. Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2005) The World Color Survey database: History and use. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of categorization in cognitive science (pp. 223-242). Amsterdam. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Colour | Deacon | I 116 Colour Words/Language Origin/Deacon: The development of color words in different languages and societies converges. >Color words. In principle, the combination of colour tones and sounds can be arbitrary. In fact, however, the mapping relations are in some respects universal. >Image, >Picture theory, >Word meaning, >Signs. I 117 But that does not mean they are somehow built into the brain. Colour word/colours/Berlin/Kay/Deacon: In different societies, black (dark) and white (light) are the first distinctions, later on the distinction red/green is added. If there are three or four colour terms in a language, yellow or blue will be added next. If there are more terms, the pattern is not so clear to predict(1). >Distinctions. Surprisingly, the colours that are considered to be typically red or green (best red/best green) are similar all over the world(2). I 118 Explanation: this is where the brain's ability to differentiate or highlight differences comes into play, which goes beyond the specifics of the use of language in individuals or societies. I 119 Language evolution/colour words: the patterns of typical errors contribute to the fact that the language use adapts itself to the neurophysiological conditions of perception. This is a case of neurological tendency as selection pressure in social evolution. >Language emergence, >Selection, >Perception. Suppose we wanted to introduce a new word for a very special hue of colour between known colours. In the long run, this new name will disappear again in favour of old colour words. Certain prominent colours will dominate. The tendency of our brains to remember certain colours better corresponds to the natural selection of certain variants instead of other variants. Thus, the reference of colour words will develop in adaptation to the human nervous system. >Reference, >Nervous system. I 120 However, this development is due to non-genetic forces. Without these social universals, the use of colour words would be idiosyncratic, i.e. limited to single individuals. Nevertheless, it is clear that colour terms are not firmly anchored in the brain. What is universally anchored is rather certain tendencies of the group, which are not linguistic. The division of colour terms as they are is not a necessary feature of language and is not an innate linguistic category. >Classification, >Order, >Categorization. 1. Berlin, B., und Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. (2) Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In: E. Rosch, & B. B. Lloyd (Hrsg.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 28-49). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Colour | Lyons | I 59 Colours/Colour words/Colour name/Linguistics/Lyons: The example of colour words shows that different languages make different distinctions: some objects fall under the same word in one language, in another under two different words, and vice versa. >Color words, >Classification, >Categorization. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Colour | Sellars | I 41 Epistemology/Color/Sellars: Traditional thesis: the expression "red" is released from the connections with the category of physical objects. SellarsVs. Tradition: E.g. we do not see the back. - E.g. a two-dimensional surface as a color carrier is not an object. >Aspects, >Perspective, >Objects, >Sense data. Colors/Sellars: The basic grammar of the attribute red is: the physical object x is red at location s and time t. However, the red color does not owe its redness in turn to a component that is red. You cannot find the place of the objects by analyzing the discourse of perception, just as entities in four-dimensional space are not due to the analysis of what we mean. >Meaning(Intending), >Colour words, >Language use, >Language game. I 42/43 Red color is not an extra component of an object - color cannot be gained from the analysis of the speech (as a component). Places in space cannot be found through analysis of what we mean. >Spatial order, >Spatial localization, >Reality, >World/thinking. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Colour | Wright | I 164 Color/Supervenience/Wright: Color supervenes other physical properties: E.g. there is a chaotic variety of physical conditions which is illustrated by scarlet things. >Supervenience. This conception is therefore weaker than that according to which color words have the semantics of concepts for natural kinds. >Stronger/weaker, >Natural kinds. It's the commitment to the idea that physically identical objects share their color, even if one of the objects offers the "best" conditions and the others don't. This supervenience is therefore, as it were, a force towards the uniqueness of color concepts. >Unabiguity, >Colour words. I 169 Color/Wright: However, I do not want to go so far as to assert that color predicates are semantically concepts for natural kinds. That would also be inconsistent with the thesis that the extension is partially determined by the best opinion. >Best explanation/Wright. Color/Wright: for our everyday understanding of color words there is no such risk (that there is nothing red): if it turned out that there are no interesting physical properties that red things have in common, then we learn by that that red things are, in fact, not a natural species, but that there are still indeed infinitely many red things. >Generality. This statement is, however, entirely consistent with the belief that red things do indeed have interesting physical properties in common! >Similarity, >Properties. The explanatory intuition does not have to be more than an epiphenomenon of the presumed accuracy of the conviction that something in which redness physically consists actually exists and that it is one of the reasons for the fact that there are best judgments about that which is red. >Euthyphro contrast/Wright, >Epiphenominology. --- II 247 Color Predicates/sorites/vagueness/Wright: a color word is not like "two meters long", but "less than two meters" (length ranges). Criterion: still measuring! But we can also say without measuring what the result would be. Solution/Wright: Actual distinction between cases where we can judge by eyesight, and cases where we cannot - then still observation predicates - which other base should this distinction provide? Crispin Wright: thesis: the methodological approach must be completely behavioristic and anti-reflexive. >Behaviorism, >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Judgments. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Imagination | Nida-Rümelin | Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in Hügli (Ed) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 Lanz I 277 On the 1st stage Mary may willfully cause the idea of something blue, without knowing that the sky appears in this color for people with normal vision. >Color researcher Mary >Colour, >Colour words, >Qualia, >Ideas, >Reference, >Knowledge, >Knowledge how. |
Nida I Martine Nida-Rümelin Was Mary nicht wissen konnte. Phänomenale Zustände als Gegenstand von Überzeugungen In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Language Acquisition | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 264 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when we teach a child a word, we teach a new behavior - e.g. new pain behavior: to make use of the word "pain". The word replaces the crying and does not describe it. The use is not based on criteria, nor on crying. >Learning, >Use, >Criteria. II 159 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Colour/Rules/Game/Wittgenstein: if the child confuses the colour words, it has not understood the game, it has broken the rules. If it does not guess the weather correctly, it has made a mistake. These two cases behave to each other like playing chess without observing the rules on the one hand, and playing chess and losing on the other. >Chess. II 204 Language/Learning/Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Augustinus: said he learned Latin by learning the names of things. >Names, >Words. Wittgenstein: let's assume someone learned the language that way. That would be a complete language. Because when we look at it we cannot see that something is missing. VI 143 Training/Language Learning/Wittgenstein/Schulte: when a technique is strange to us, we cannot even ask the right questions. Once the use is established it can no longer be questioned. Training: we do not learn any number of basic colors. Non-linguistic is a prerequisite for the understanding of the linguistic. >Colour. VI 159 Characters are not interpreted, but known - practical ability. >Knowledge. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Learning | Jackson | Schwarz I 157 Phenomenon/phenomenal properties/knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: in addition to the fact that there can be independent phenomenal facts next to the physical facts, and besides the zombie intuition this speaks in favour of being able to learn such facts! E.g. Jackson: Mary learns phenomenal facts about colours. >Colours, >Colour words, >Knowing how, >Phenomena. Schwarz I 158 Colour explorer Mary/Jackson/Knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. when she is released, she learns something new: "How it is" to have a red experience. LewisVs: for him, the gain in knowledge is a problem only if it can really rule out open possibilities with regard to the world. According to Lewis, such possibilities must not exist: the physical facts leave no alternatives open in reference to the world. No problem is Mary's new information about her own situation in the world. (Lewis pro: 1988e(1), 268ff, 287) Schwarz: only now she can ask if other people also have this (kind of) experience. Fact/Mary: It is also unproblematic that she now now internally represents facts that were previously known to her when she acquires new "terms" that were not previously available to her. (Lewis pro: she acquires new forms of representation (1983d(2), 131f) Mary-Example/Lewis: but this is not an interesting advance in knowledge! Mary-Example/McMullen, (1985)(3)/Perry (2001)(4): this is essentially indexical and/or demonstrative information. >Qualia. 1. David Lewis [1988e]: “What Experience Teaches”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57. 2. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 3. Carolyn McMullen [1985]: “‘Knowing what it’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical”. Philosophical Studies, 48: 211–233 4. John Perry [2001]: Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousnes. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Measurements | Logic Texts | Read III 135 ff Standard meter: at least one meter at a time was defined by reference to this Standard meter. Therefore, we could know a priori that the standard meter was one meter long. Nonetheless, it could be longer or shorter. "The Standard meter is one meter long" is only contingently true, but a priori knowable. >a priori, >a posteriori, >Contingency, >Standard meter. III 207 ff Measuring instruments: can they tell us what color the stains are? That one is a red, the other is green? They cannot. And this is because words like "red" are observation predicates. The reason of our judgments about the accuracy of the applications of "red" is based on observation. >Observation, >Colour, >Colour words. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Metaphors | Jackendoff | Deacon I 120 Metaphors/Jackendoff/Deacon: Jackendoff (1992(1), 1994(2)) has suggested that spatial metaphors such as "higher truth", "further developed", "remotely related" are the result of innate cognitive concepts. I 121 DeaconVsJackendoff: if we assume an evolutionary process of the common evolution of language and brain, we have an explanation that can dispense with fixed wiring in the brain. See >color words/Deacon. This is what I call social universals or language universals: for example the same grouping and opposition of colour contrasts in people all over the world. It is about trends in the grouping of perceptions, behaviour and feelings. These common tendencies are non-genetic! It is social evolution. These linguistic universals are only statistical, but supported by millions of speakers over tens of thousands of years. Deviations are short-lived. Innate/Deacon: one does not have to assume congenital structures in order to explain this consistency. >Colour words. (1) Jackendoff, Ray (1992). Languages of the Mind: Essays on Mental Representation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. (2) Jackendoff, Ray (1994). Patterns in the mind: Language and human nature. New York: Basic Books. |
Jackendoff I Ray Jackendoff Semantics and Cognition Cambridge, MA 1985 Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Method | Kripke | II 241 Theory/method/Kripke: there is no reason to preserve ambiguity in languages that are not connected with English. We would not expect it to occur in other languages in the same places. If English is ambiguous, one should expect that something similar occurs in other languages. Parallel ambiguities should incite us to be cautious but if unrelated languages preserve a single word, it is the evidence for a uniform concept. >Structures, >Order, >Covariance, E.g., >Colour words. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Predicates | Logic Texts | Hoyningen-Huene II 169 Relations are also predicates. E.g. "... is between ... and." --- Read III 154 Predication: the true logical form is: "There is something that is a mountain of gold, and that has been discovered." The apparent subject conceals a predicative expression. False: a complex predicate: "a-mountain-of-gold-and-to-have-been-discovered". Read III 214 Measuring instruments: Can you tell us what color the spots have, that the one is red, and the other green? You cannot! This is because words like "red" are observational predicates. The reason for our judgments on the correctness of the applications of "red" is based on observation. >Measuring, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence. Read III 214f Color: observational predicate (unconscious, frequencies) - not by measuring instruments - to name instruments, not color. >Coulour, >Colour words. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Predicates | Wittgenstein | II 80 Predicates/Wittgenstein: the use of predicates is always misleading in logic, since it indicates different "types" of terms, etc., which are differentiated by predicates, for example: "formally confirmed", "internal relations". The description by predicates must have the possibility that it is different! II 82 Experience/Wittgenstein: is not distinguished by predicates from what is not experience. It is a logical term, not a term like "chair" or "table". >Experience, >Reality, >Properties. II 157 Individual/Atom/Atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to come across the basic elements ("individuals") through the logical analysis. Russell believed that in the end subject-predicate sentences and double-digit relations would result. >Objects, >Individuals. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken idea of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. >Atomism. II 306f Predicate/WittgensteinVsRussell: For example "man" should not be used as a predicate - otherwise the subject would become a proper name. "Man" as a predicate: at best for a disguised woman. >Proper names. II 307 "Man" as a predicate cannot be denied to its bearer. Hintikka I 64 Colour predicates/Colour Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at first glance, their incompatibility violates Wittgenstein's principle of independence from elementary propositions. I 65 Hintikka: but from the logical simplicity of the colours does not follow that they do not have a "logical form" that allows only some connection possibilities and others do not. The problem is only to design an appropriate symbolism that reflects the scope. I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: a predicate of higher order is articulated only by the existential quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: Many philosophers think that this is only a technical implementation of the older idea that existence is not a predicate. I 156 et seqq. Phenomenology/Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there is often the view that a phenomenalistic or phenomenological interpretation of the Tractatus is made impossible by the phenomenon of color incompatibility and also otherwise by any other apparent dependence between simple phenomenalistic predicates of the same kind. (HintikkaVs) Colours/Predicates/Colour Incompatibility/Hintikka: In this view, "red" and "green" cannot refer to simple objects, because otherwise the two elementary propositions "this is red" and "this is green", which are mutually exclusive, would not be independent of each other. But this is not possible according to 2,062: "The existence or non-existence of one fact cannot be taken as an indication of the existence or non-existence of another. >Existence, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 170 Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein understands form as something that can be illustrated by a suitable logical notation. For example, the difference between a two-digit and a one-digit predicate. In 5.55 ff Wittgenstein argues that such differences in form cannot be predicted a priori. >a priori. I 172 Colour/colour words/Colour concepts/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is clear that he insists that colour attributions have no subject-predicate form. >Colour. VI 70 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Schulte: are not ordinary sentences, they are characterized by the fact that they cannot contradict each other. (Tractatus4.211). 1. This is the first time said that they do not contain any logical particles, otherwise they would have to contradict each other! 2. Their components do not have any complexes, otherwise it would be possible to derive an objection. >Complex, >Contradiction. Accordingly, there are no predicates ("table", "left of") in elementary propositions! What does remain? "The elementary proposition consists of names." (Tractatus 4.22). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Vocabulary | Lyons | I 56 Vocabulary/Structure/Meaning/Lyons: today: Assignment of words and meaning is convention. >Philosophical theories of meaning, >Convention, >Words, >Word meaning. I 57 Proof: by the fact that different languages have very different words for the same object e.g. tree, Baum, arbre. Problem: this encourages the false assumption that the vocabulary of a language is a list of names. >Lists, >Lexicon. But: Language/Meaning/Demarcation/Lyons: the meaning demarcations in the different languages are not congruent. E.g. Russian: for the German "Schwager" there are four words For example "light blue", "dark blue": here there are two completely different colour words in Russian. Culture/Language/Lyons: Thesis: The different distinctions (demarcations) reflect the culture of the community that speaks the language. Cf. >Culture, >Culture relativism. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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