Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conceptual Schemes | Davidson | I (c) 41/42 Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: Language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons. - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation is not intended, it only appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear. Conceptual relativism: The conceptual scheme is a human creation; it is arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty". I (c) 44 DavidsonVsQuine: There are no last data, therefore no subtraction. I (e) 87ff Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism. I (e) 96 Scheme/Contents: Both have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair. - Then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. >Representation/Davidson. I (e) 98 Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Deception/Davidson: Deception is no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds. - All the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality. Glüer II 133 Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (Third Dogma). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Conceptual Schemes | Esfeld | I 146 ~ Third Dogma/scheme/content/Davidson: instead of the third dogma we assume a direct relationship to the world, then there is no limit to understanding - no foreign conceptual schemes prevent us from having access to the beliefs of others. >Two Dogmas, >Beliefs, >Other minds, >Content, >World/Thinking. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Conceptual Schemes | McDowell | I 184 Meaning/Quine: the wit for him is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors - so he needs his conceptual scheme. >Meaning/Quine, >Third Dogma, cf. >Two dogmas. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Conceptual Schemes | McGinn | ad I 134 McGinn/(s): uses a (insurmountable) "conceptual scheme" to make his view of the natural limits of knowledge clear. McGinnVsDavidson. Cf. >Scheme/content, >Third Dogma. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Conceptual Schemes | Quine | VII (a) 10f Conceptual Scheme/Quine: in various conceptual schemes we judge differently. e.g. that red houses, red sunsets and so on have something in common. Minimum acceptance: the conceptual schemes bring our raw experience into an order. Simplicity depends on the conceptual scheme. Each conceptual scheme can be regarded as fundamental. Our physicalistic conceptual scheme simplifies our countless unconnected sensations. VII (d) 78 Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we are born into it, but we can change it. However, we cannot escape by an objective comparison with a non-conceptual world. It is meaningless to understand the conceptual scheme ((s) which is then assumed to be non-conceptual) as a reflection of reality. I 208 Identity/Hume: "We cannot say that an object is the same as it is, unless we mean that an object existing at one time is identical to itself than at another time". QuineVsHume: Identity sentences run empty as long as the conceptual scheme for physical objects is not yet included. I 469 Words and their graphical representations are, in contrast to points (kilometres, classes, etc.), tangible objects of a popular order of magnitude on the marketplace where people with different terminology communicate with each other in the best possible way. II 58 Conceptual Scheme/Third Dogma/DavidsonVsQuine: Davidson says that I make a mysterious use of "conceptual scheme". In my opinion, it is part of colloquial language and does not perform a technical task. II 59 A triad conceptual scheme - language - world is not what I have in mind, but, like Davidson: language and world. Terminology/Quine: Elsewhere I have proposed a measure of the spacing of a conceptual scheme. (Perhaps better: conceptual distance from languages). The definition is based on the differing length of translated sentences. If there is a pair of acceptable sentences in a translation, choose the shorter sentence. Length ratios are then to be determined. Cf. >Two Dogmas. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Deceptions | Davidson | Rorty VI 214 Deception/Davidson/Rorty: bring us through a causal process to represent true or false beliefs depending on the programming. >Beliefs/Davidson. Davidson I 38 Error/Belief/Davidson: that I do not deceive myself in the majority of cases is essential for the fact that I have a language - that makes "inner objects" superfluous. >Objects of Belief. Instead: history of language acquisition. >Language acquisition, >Causal theory of knowledge. Truth conditions for the speaker: sentence is true when e.g. the Kohinoor is a crown jewel. - ((s) conditional: non-empirical - for the listener: empirical.) --- Davidson I (e) 98 Third dogma/scheme/content/error/deception/Davidson: deception after abolition of the separation schema/content is no longer a problem, no question whether we are capable of the knowledge of the world and of the foreign-psychological - even more: how - but these are no longer epistemological questions, but rather questions about the nature of rationality. >Conceptual scheme. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Incommensurability | Davidson | Glüer II 133 Incommensuralibilty presupposes the >separation scheme/content (Third Dogma). Hacking I 129 DavidsonVsKuhn: incommensurability presupposes >conceptual schemes. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Indeterminacy | McDowell | I 184 Indeterminacy of the translation/Quine: the results of "conceptual sovereignty" are far from being determinable by means of scientific facts about the "empirical meaning". >Indeterminacy/Quine, >Gavagai. McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third Dogma, it has fatal consequences for Quine: for his reasoning, he needs the maintenance of the dualism endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. >Third dogma, >Scheme/Content, >Conceptual scheme, >interior/exterior, cf. >Two dogmas. I 189 Theories language/observation language/McDowellVsQuine: now it can be that both are actually distinguishable. Then the observation meaning of a single theoretical theorem would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general meaning indeterminacy from this. If we try to do that, we are confronted with the Third Dogma. Then we stand in front of a borderline of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into the theory and let the experience speak no language at all. Then, of course, the rational relation is lacking. We need this rational relationship, however, for Duhem's argument. This can only be of a local nature now. As we pave our way through the Third Dogma, we tailor Duhem's thoughts to the right size. (> Theory/McDowell). --- II 64 Indeterminacy/underdeterminedness/Conceptual Design/McDowell: the choice of a schema is always underdetermined by the data - requires terms that the subjects have not acquired. - This is not possible according to the strong verificationism, this equates verification with susceptibility for evidence. Conceptual design/McDowell: we need that in realistic science. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Limits | Esfeld | I 147 Conceptual scheme/third dogma/scheme/content/Davidson: instead of a conceptual scheme we assume an immediate relation to the world, then there is no limit to understanding and no alien conceptual schemes prevent us from having access to other beliefs. >Two dogmas, >Conceptual schemes, >Understanding, >Other minds. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Meaning | McDowell | I 160ff Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (See also >content/McDowell). Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors. I 184/5 McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (>distinction schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning". I 185 McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine. I 119 Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either). Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult. Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community. >Meaning/Kripke. I 119 Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. I 121 Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms. --- II XIV Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts. II XV Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Scheme/Content | Rorty | ~ I 133ff Scheme/content/3rd Dogma/world/Rorty: we cannot specify which "joints" of nature belong to the content and which to the scheme. >Content, >Conceptual Scheme. I 285 Truth/world/Russell/Rorty: thesis: every true statement contains both our own contribution and a contribution from the world. >Two Dogmas. 1) DavidsonVsRussell: Vsthird Dogma: separation of scheme and content. There is no content that is waiting to be organized. 2) PutnamVsRussell. > I 338 However, we have found no intelligible basis from which could be said that schemes are different. >Absoluteness. But with that we do not reveal the idea of an objective truth, quite the opposite! Without the dogma (scheme/content) this kind of relativity goes overboard. We do not reveal the world, but restore the direct contact with the familiar objects. >World/thinking. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sensory Impressions | Davidson | McDowell I 167 Phenomena/Davidson: exert a rational influence on our view of the world. It is not the case that the sensory impressions impose rational demands on our empirical thinking. At most in a very complex way: they lead to the formation of opinions, but they do not specify what the subject should think. (Terminology: Davidson does not speak even of phenomena). >Phenomena. McDowell I 181 Sensations/Davidson: seperate us ultimately from the world! (Third dogma: scheme). >Scheme/content, >Two dogmas. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Two Dogmas | Davidson | Glüer II 121 ff Incommensuralibility/Davidson: incommensurability presupposes a separation between scheme and content (3rd Dogma). Scheme/content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language - Content: "empirical meaning". (McDowell). >Scheme/content. >Language/Quine, >Meaning/Quine, >Conceptual scheme, >Content, >Propositional content, cf. >Incommensurability, >Empiricism. Glüer II 129 2nd Dogma/Quine/Davidson: reductionism: the claim that every meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience - ((s) Instead Carnap: proposes a network with purely logical truths in the center). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Two Dogmas | McDowell | I 158 1st Dogma/QuineVsFirst Dogma: (Differentiation between analytic and synthetic) against the idea that the truth of a synthetic sentence depends on two things: on meaning and on the world. ((s) One cannot have the meaning before the world). Quine, however, preserves the duality: "Obviously the truth depends both on language and on extraneous facts." >Analytical/synthetical. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we cannot just keep them apart from each other, sentence for sentence. >Quine-Duhem-thesis. I 158 2nd Dogma/QuineVsSecond Dogma: Instead, Holism. Science is, collectively seen, dependent on both language and experience. However, this double character cannot be pursued in a meaningful way up until the individual statements of science. ((s) We cannot ask: what in this sentence corresponds more to the world and what more to the language.) >Holism. I 158 Dogmas/McDowell: the first could only be correct, if the second is correct. If only "empiricist meaning" cannot be assigned to individual sentences, the idea of a "sentence without empiricist meaning" is questioned. >Empirical content, cf. for Third dogma: >Conceptual scheme. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Two Dogmas | Quine | IV 413 Quine Two Dogmas: Thesis: "The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs - from the most incidental things of geography to the most fundamental laws even of mathematics and logic - is a material knitted by humans, which meets experience only at its edges. The totality of science is like a force field whose boundary conditions are experiences." >Empiricism. II 55f Third dogma: capping the last connection with empiricism - but: empiricism is not a theory of truth anyway but it is creating beliefs. Third dogma: is preserved when empiricism has no theory of truth - not coherence, but of correspondence - creation of beliefs - scheme is part of the vernacular - not technical. >Conceptual schemes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | Quine Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 42 QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible. Davidson II 92 Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology). II 97 An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences. II 98 Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique. QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates. Quine II 56 Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth. QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world". Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction. Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory. Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas. Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence. VI 57 Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own. VI 58 Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects. VI 59 "Common situations" are too vague for me. VI 62 Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves! VI 63 In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way. VI 136 Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms. VI 137 If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory). In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis. Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts. VI 138 Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true. VI 139 Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory. The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially. VI 140 It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true. XI 156 Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dogmas (Quine) | Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine) | Brandom I 854 DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (>Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also >BrandomVsKant). >Scheme/Content ("Third dogma"). I 85 The idea of a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme. We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data." I 89 Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content. I 91 If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective. DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Duhem, P. | McDowell Vs Duhem, P. | I 188 Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex here is a black swan) can not be distributed among the sets of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning! McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our language of experience is distinguishable from the language of theory, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory. I 189 Language of theory/language of observation/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are in fact distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But from that we could derive a general indeterminacy of meaning! If we try that, we face the third party dogma. Then we are facing a borderline case of the separation of languages: we push the whole meaning into theory and don't allow experience to speak any language at all. Then, of course, a rational relationship is missing. However, we need this rational relationship for Duhem's argument. It can only be of a local character. By paving our way through the third dogma, we lop Duhem's thoughts to the right size. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Epistemology | Davidson Vs Epistemology | I (e) 96 Perception / cognition theory: There is an abundance of puzzles with regard to sensation and perception. But these puzzles are not of fundamental importance for the theory of knowledge. Although the sensory experience plays a major role in the causal process by which the beliefs of the world are connected, but it is a mistake to believe that it plays an epistemological role in determining the content of these beliefs! I (e) 97 We adopt the Third Dogma (separation scheme/content) and assert that empirical knowledge has no empirical basis and does not need one. >Perception/Davidson, >scheme/content. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I (c) 41 Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations. I (c) 55 So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) - I (c) 64 DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides. I (d) 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person. I (e) 93 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language? McDowell I 165 McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason. Fodor/Lepore IV 225 Note 13.> IV 72 Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 162 McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions. On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview. I 184 McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. I 185 McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine. I 186 Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema. I 188 DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory. I 189 Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma. Esfeld I 63 Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system. VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system? 2. Confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"? Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system! Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs. Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors! Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs). Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason? I 64 (S.McDowell I 157ff). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Rorty, R. | Davidson Vs Rorty, R. | II 131 The truth of a statement depends only on two things: on what the words mean the way they were used, and on the world. II 132 VsTranscendentalism: But you cannot separate linguistic competence and world influence. "Negative Transcendentalism". DavidsonVsRorty: this does not have the consequences Rorty wants. He wants to understand Davidson’s rejection of the third dogma as an argument against the possibility of epistemology. But Davidson only narrows the critical path, he does not leave it. Frank I 26 Def Myth of the Subjective/Davidson/Frank: the superstition that thoughts required "mental objects". Even in the supposed intimacy of the "first person authority" whose principal corrigibility is thus conceded, the social character of language and the external determinants of individuation are not canceled. We can make mistakes about what we believe! DavidsonVsRorty: authority of the 1st person not inherently contingent, it cannot disappear "like a face in the sand" (Foucault, Rorty pro Foucault). Davidson, late, pro externalism (pro Burge). Frank I 624 Mental/Davidson: Thesis: Primary to explain human actions. But only if attribution inter-subjectively verifiable. DavidsonVsRorty: not a purely private realm of mental phenomena, this would rule out any theory of human action a priori. The criteria for the attribution of mental states must be analyzed within our empirical psychological theory. I 641/642 Authority/Self-attribution/Rorty: Thesis: Self-attribution was originally carried out on the basis of the same kind of observation or behavior as external attribution! Later it was discovered that self-attribution could be performed without observation. It turned out to be the better behavior out explanations at the end. Davidson: Of course, this is not meant to be a serious anthropological information. DavidsonVsRorty: Question: what reason has Rorty presented for self-attribution which is not based on evidence (Wittgenstein) to concern the same conditions and events as the one based on observation? I 645 DavidsonVsRorty: the fact that the attribution of mental states is a convention, is uninformative and unsubstantiated. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 654 Incorrigibility/DavidsonVsRorty: Does not exist! We can make mistakes in terms of our own internal states and prop. att.s. But such cases are rare and cannot be the norm! Question: Can we think straight out that we have a belief which we do not have in reality? Many authors from of recent times: this could even happen quite easily. > Russell: Proposition. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Conceptual Scheme | Quine, W.V.O. | II 55ff Quine: but it is the rest of the couple, truth and belief, that seems to have gone unnoticed. Thesis: Davidson combines these two in a decisive position and therefore abandons his so-called third dogma and thus cuts the last mooring of empiricism, Davidson: "This dualism of scheme and content can neither be made understandable nor justified. For its part, it is a dogma of empiricism, a third dogma. II 56 If we drop that, it is not clear if there is anything left of empiricism." |
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| Concept/Scheme | Rorty, R. | I 299 Change of meaning/change of concept/Feyerabend/Rorty: thesis: the traditional empirical position had assumed a "postulate of meaning invariance". Like Kuhn, Feyerabend wanted to show that meaning and predictions change when a new theory emerges. I 300 Conceptual Scheme/Third Dogma/Rorty: as soon as conceptual schemata became something transient, the distinction between schema and content itself was in jeopardy and thus the Kantian concept of philosophy as a discipline made possible by the a priori knowledge of our own contribution to science. |
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