Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Omnipotence | Omnipotence: unlimited capacity for inducing situations, events or states of affairs. Problems arising in connection with consistency, which must rank higher than omnipotence. |
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| Omnipotence | Chisholm | II 85ff Omnipotence/action type/Gombocz: the action must but logically possible, i.e. its description must be coherent. >Actions. Fact omnipotence: the ability to generate a logically possible state of affairs. (therefore not in the past). >States of affairs. Continuum omnipotence: the ability to create any situation in time thje time after t0 - e.g. an unmarried person may now not be divorced. - Then there are only logically necessary situations. - Nothing Unintentional may be intended. - Therefore restriction to the contingent. >Situations, >Contingency. Problem: omnipotent beings should also be capable of inconsistencies or be able to cause something uncaused. Omnipotence must also include the ability, to get rid of this ability. Consequence: this ability can be exercised only once. >Omniscience. Wolfgang L. Gombocz. Maxima. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Descartes, R. | Kant Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking. Kant I 73 Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing. Field I 80 KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral. But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle! For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.) Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise. Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence. Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here). Stegmüller IV 362 Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis. 2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed. 3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim). IV 364 VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic. 4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula). MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it? Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege. IV 365 MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this. Strawson V 22 "Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them. V 23 StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system! V 103 KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis. Strawson V 140 Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim. KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity. V 143 KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject. V 145 Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Plantinga, A. | Mackie Vs Plantinga, A. | Stegmüller IV 367 Proof of the existence of God/Plantinga: new concept: "Maximal excellence": omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. "Unsurpassable greatness": maximal excellence in every possible world. Argument: "There is a possible world in which unsurpassable greatnessis exemplified." What is necessary or impossible, cannot vary between worlds. This is based on the system S5 of modal logic. Def S5/modal logic/Stegmüller: is distinguished in that it allows for consecutive (iterated) modalities in statements. However, they always coincide with a single modality, namely the last member of this sequence. Ex. MNNMp: Mp. MackieVsPlantinga: 1. works with "world marked" properties ((s)> world-indexed;> R. Stalnaker, Ways a world may be, Oxford 2003). Thereby, a world becomes dependent on another world. That is, the different possible worlds are no longer independent. IV 368 Thus his system no longer covers the full range of logical possibilities! Therefore, one must not say: system S5 is the appropriate logic for logical possibilities and necessities, even if appropriate for worlds with "world marked" properties. But Plantinga has to make use of a fact that is only valid in S5: that in a sequence of modal operators all may be eliminated but the last one. 2. As Plantinga noted himself, a counterargument by the name of "non-maximality" can be formulated : the property that there is no maximally great being. ((s) So, a property of a world, not of a being.). Argument: there is a possible world that exemplifies non-maximality (thus, maximal greatness is non-nichtexemplified). But if maximal greatness is not exemplified in each world, it is not exemplified at all, it is then impossible. The two premises: "maximality is possibly exemplified" and "non-maximality ....." can not simultaneously be true. 3. We have no reason to prefer the first premise. 4. Plantinga's decision for the first one does not even resemble the flip of a coin! Because we have the third option, to suspend from judgment entirely! 5. Due to the principle of Ockham we should then prefer the simpler one (non-maximality). Stegmüller IV 478 Theodicy/evil/possible worlds/Plantinga: "cross world depravity": every being that commits at least one reprehensible act in each possible world suffers from this property. IV 479 If it is possible that each created and free being suffers from this severe form of depravity, even God could not have created a world which didn't contain anything morally bad. MackieVsPlantinga: this option would only exist if God had to pick from a limited number of people. But earlier we saw the logical possibility of people freely choosing the good. The restriction of a selection of possible persons adopted by Plantinga is thus logically contingent. But how could there be logically contingent facts before the creation and existence of any creatures with freewill that an almighty God would have to accept? His omnipotence is indeed only limited by the logically impossible. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Theism | Mackie Vs Theism | Stegmüller IV 466 Theodicy/popular version: (i) logical necessity: God cannot create e.g. quadrangular circles. Since evil is logically a part of the good, one cannot exist without the others. Vs: firstly: this is not a conclusion from the premise! further: a) The principle is not compellent. 1. if there were a common property that each and every thing possessed automatically, there would be no need for a predicate for it in any language. 2. It could be that this property would not be noticed by anyone! However, one could not assert: if everything possessed this property, this property didn't exist at all. b) The argument would explain at most the occurrence of very few evils. (As a side effect, not as e.g. planned genocide). IV 467 Theodicy/popular version: (ii) frequently, the argument of "necessary means" is brought forward: The evil as a means for the good. Ex. children must learn from mistakes. StegmüllerVs: However, many children do not learn from the mistakes of the world, but perish from them! Ex. pain as a warning function. Stegmüller: all these truisms are irrelevant to the problem. They are relevant only for limited beings, but God is attributed omnipotence. IV 468 (iii) principle of the organic whole: like an aesthetic principle: evil is part of the "organic whole". Such a world were even better than a purely good world. It were not static, but dynamic. Gradual overcoming of evil by the good. Def. evil of 1st order: suffering, pain, illness Def. values of 1st order: joy, happiness Def. values of 2nd order: moral values, responses to evil of 1st order: compassion, assistance, kindness, heroism. Theism must then support the thesis that evils of 1st order are satisfactorily explained and justified by values of 2nd order. Stegmüller IV 469 Theism/Mackie: Question: can the theist rightly claim that there is only absorbed evil in this world? Only then can he defend his position, otherwise there is unnecessary evils that God in his omnipotence could have avoided. VsTheism: 1. there is much more unabsorbed evils of 1st order (suffering, pain, etc.) as can fit in a valuable whole. 2. the game would be repeated at the next level! The values of 2nd order are accompanied by evils of 2nd order: Ex. wickedness, callousness, gloating, cruelty, cowardice etc. IV 470 Oly possibility: Values of 3rd order: only candidate: free will. It need not be such a value itself, but is logically necessary for realization. IV 471 Theism/Theodicy/R. Gruner: the theist should not only concede the evils, but empasize them as particularly important. The most faithful people have always been those who were most convinced of the reality of evil. Paradox: that faith depends precisely on that fact of which one claims it refuted it. This position is taken in the dialogues of Hume of the Demea. IV 479 Theodicy/free will: in defense of theism the concept of free will could be modified: freedom as a high value, such that God did not know at creation, how people would make use of it. Therefore God is not omniscient. Vs: 1. If God is not omniscient, he is no longer omnipotent, because a limitation of information is a limitation of power. Vs: 2. God would have to be thought of in a timely manner. This renounces an essential element of monotheistic religion. Vs 3. If God did not know what people would do, he still had to know what they could do! IV 481 MackieVsTheism: canot be explained without contradiction, without changing major points. Hume: would say: our boundless ignorance prevents us from claiming to have conclusively refuted theism. IV 516 MackieVsTheism: the competing naturalism always has the better arguments and lower improbability on its side. IV 517 Religion/Theism/R. Robinson: Thesis: the main contradiction between religion and reason is that religion prefers the consolation of truth. God/Spinoza/Stegmüller: (relatively strong modification of the traditional concept of God): no creator God, but infinite. Metaphysical necessity is part of him and thus the universe itself. Theodicy/Spinoza: Thesis: God knows no mercy! It is not a person, even not an infinite one, but a being who does not care about human concerns. IV 518 Religion/theology/Mackie: the monotheistic religions rely on a for them indispensable assumption of existence that is probably wrong. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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