Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Conceptual scheme: Language and objects (ontology) are assumed as conceptual scheme by some authors. - In contrast, the content is formed by stimulus influences. In particular, between W.V.O. Quine and D. Davidson the status of the conceptual scheme is disputed. See also reference system, language, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John McDowell on Conceptual Schemes - Dictionary of Arguments
I 184 Meaning/Quine: the wit for him is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors - so he needs his conceptual scheme. >Meaning/Quine, >Third Dogma, cf. >Two dogmas._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, |
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> Counter arguments against McDowell
> Counter arguments in relation to Conceptual Schemes
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28