Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Functionalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Dennett I 557 Function/Searle (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry). DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle. - - - Searle I 19 SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam): relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations. Cf. >Functions. I 59 ff VsFunctionalism: functionalism eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation. >Qualia, >Simulation. I 233f A machine is defined by effects and cannot be recreated from cheese. A computer is syntactically defined and can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese). Syntax is always relative to the observer but not intrinsical. However, the heart is an intrinsical pump. Also, water can be described as intelligent (lowest resistance). I 266f Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts. Causality only exists through interest-oriented description here. >Description dependence. Rules are no cause for action. >Rules. I 266 Function/Searle: a function has no separate layer. >Description level, >Levels(Order). I 269 Pattern: a pattern plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality) >Causality/Searle. - - - III 24 SearleVsMillikan: a function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent). Millikan: the function arose evolutionary. >Ruth Millikan._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Functionalism
