Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositional knowledge, philosophy: the knowledge of whether certain propositions are true or false in contrast to a knowledge-how or possessing an ability. A problem with propositional knowledge are indexical theorems because the determination of the truth value (true or false) is context-dependent and situation-dependent here. See also propositions, opacity, example of the two omniscient Gods._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Propositional Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 16f Propositional knowledge/Lewis: There are attitudes that cannot be analyzed as A about propositions: E.g. 2 Gods could know all the propositions without being able to localize themselves - Proposition/Lewis: Never with index I, he, here, now - de se: includes de dicto, but not vice versa. >de se/Lewis, >de re/Lewis, >de dicto/Lewis. --- IV 143 Propositional knowledge/Lewis: E.g. wonder what time it is: - no propositional knowledge - he knows which world he lives in - he also knows which time-space position he occupies - solution: it is the time states of him, which wonder - a time section locates the whole insomniac enough in space and time and also in logical space - however, the time layer cannot localise itself enough in the population of time sections - it cannot attribute itself the property to lie awake at 3:49 - it is the time segment, not the person as a continuant that fails in self-ascription. >Continuants/Lewis, >Person/Lewis, >Knowing how._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositional Knowledge
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28