Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Solipsism: is an expression for the thesis that the external world is a projection of a subject, and consequently this subject exists as the only one. See also skepticism, certainty, perception, methodical solipsism, internalism, externalism, will, self-attribution, foreign psychological, private language, privileged access._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Solipsism - Dictionary of Arguments
Nagel I 53 Wittgenstein, Solipsism: The truth of solipsism cannot be uttered, but is still shown in the fact that the world is always described in my language. In this language I cannot truly say that the world is my world, because that is wrong in my language. Nagel: but all this is said in my language, and this shows that the world is my world in a deeper sense, although exactly this cannot be said. --- Hintikka I 96ff World/Tractatus/Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: question whether Wittgenstein's world is not irretrievably egocentric. Finally, the sense data means my sense data. >Sense data, >World. I 97 Saying/Showing/Wittgenstein: 5,562 (entirety of all objects, limit of the world).. "question to what extent solipsism is a truth, what solipsism namely means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself." Hintikka: if we interpret the objects of the Tractatus as objects of my acquaintance, then Wittgenstein's cautious solipsism gets not only understandable but almost predictable. I 98 Solipsism/Tractatus/Hintikka: is not metaphysical here, he does not depend on that the objects are assigned to any specific subjective awareness-dependent status. It is about their phenomenal condition, so that I can refer them to my language. Nevertheless, what he considers as solipsism, has a specific content. Realism/solipsism/Hintikka: however, the realism is right in its assertion that this "reduction to the acquaintance" has no impact in terms of the metaphysical reality of the rest of the world. I 99 World/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: The relationship with me is not essential to the objects. "the ordinary way of speech could make a ((s) false) appearance as if the relationship with the owner of the hand would be something that is in the nature of the hand itself." ..therefore it might be useful, to give a hand a name during repeated use. (Philosophical Remarks VII. 71, 99f). --- II 132 Appearance/appear/seem/Wittgenstein: "It appears to appear" cannot be said. Solipsism and behaviorism are opposed to each other. >Behaviorism, >Appearance. II 172 WittgensteinVsSolipsism: if it is logically impossible that someone else has a toothache, then it is just as impossible for me. II 172/173 Solipsism/Wittgenstein: does not want a notation, in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego disappears. II 178 Temporal solipsism/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell E.g. the world was created five minutes ago. - This is not meaningless because there is a criterion - similar like in measurements. - E.g. "Every time there is no white rabbit sitting there." >Criteria. II 180 "Only the present is real": Problem: this pretends to give a picture that is in contrast with another picture. - But that does not succeed. --- VI 88 Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Schulte: to put my solipsistic position into words, I would have to be able to reach beyond both boundaries, of the world and the language - "My" is not opposed to "that". - Here we see that solipsism coincides with pure realism. >World, >Language, >Limits._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |