Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Theological Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics is the theory and practice of interpretation, especially the interpretation of texts. It is concerned with the question of how we understand meaning. It is based on the idea that meaning is not fixed or objective, but rather is created through a process of interpretation. This means that the interpreter's own background and experiences will play a role in shaping their understanding of the text. See also Interpretation, Texts, Hermeneutc circle._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hans-Georg Gadamer on Theological Hermeneutics - Dictionary of Arguments
I 314 Theological Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The close connection that originally connected philological hermeneutics with juridical and theological hermeneutics was based on the recognition of the application as an integrating moment of all understanding. Both for juridical hermeneutics and for theological hermeneutics, the tension that exists between the set text - the law or proclamation - on the one hand, and on the other hand, the meaning that its application acquires at the concrete moment of interpretation, whether in judgment or in preaching, is constitutive. A law does not want to be understood historically, but should be concretized in its validity through interpretation. Likewise, a religious proclamation text does not want to be understood as a mere historical document, but it is to be understood in such a way that it exercises its salvific effect. In both cases this includes that the text, whether law or message of salvation, if it is to be adequately understood, i.e. in accordance with the claim that the text makes, in every moment, i.e. of each concrete >situation, must be understood in a new and different way. Understanding has always been application here. >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. I 315 Cognitive/normative: If one (...) distinguishes between cognitive, normative and reproductive interpretation, as E. Betti did in his "General Theory of Interpretation"(1) based on admirable knowledge and overview, one gets into difficulties in assigning phenomena to this classification. This applies first of all to the interpretation practiced in the sciences. Schleiermacher: If one compiles the theological interpretation with the juridical one and assigns it according to its normative function, one must, on the other hand, remember Schleiermacher, who, conversely, connects the theological interpretation in the closest possible way to the general, i.e. for him the philological-historical interpretation. In fact, the rift between cognitive and normative function runs right through theological hermeneutics and can hardly be closed by differentiating scientific knowledge from subsequent edifying application. It is clear that the same rift runs right through the middle of legal interpretation, in so far as recognition of the meaning of a legal text and its application to a specific case are not two separate acts but a single operation. I 336 Theological Hermeneutics/Gadamer: [in Protestant theology] there is insofar a correspondence to legal hermeneutics, because here too dogmatics cannot claim primacy. >Legal hermeneutics. The actual concretization of the proclamation happens in the sermon, just as that of the legal order happens in the judgment. But there is still a big difference. The sermon, unlike the judgment, is not a productive complement to the text it interprets. From the proclamation of the sermon therefore nothing grows out of the message of salvation in terms of content that could be compared with the supplementary legal force of the judgment. After all, it is not at all the case that the message of salvation only comes to its closer definition from the preacher's thought. As the preacher before the congregation, he does not speak with dogmatic authority, as the judge does. Admittedly, sermon is also about the interpretation of a valid truth, but this truth is proclamation, and whether it succeeds is decided not by the thoughts of the preacher, but by the power of the word itself (...). The proclamation of the word cannot be detached from their execution. All dogmatic fixation of the pure doctrine is secondary. >Theological Hermeneutics/Bultmann. 1. Cf. E. Betti »Zur Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Auslegungslehre«, and his monumental main work: Allgemeine Auslegungslehre 1967. (for this: „Hermeneutik und Historismus“ (Vol. 2 of Ges. Werke, p. 387—424) and my work „Emilio Betti und das idealistische Erbe“ in: Quaderni Fiorentini 7 (1978), p. 5—11 , Ges. Werke vol. 4.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Gadamer
> Counter arguments in relation to Theological Hermeneutics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27