# Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David Chalmers on Propositions - Dictionary of Arguments

Schwarz I 207 (annotation)
Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.).
Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions.
Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f).
Newer Terminology:
Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions
Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions.
Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65)
Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions
Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension".
Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions.

1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a]
2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy
and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a]
3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a]
4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277
6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13
7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of
Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272
8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]

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Chalmers I 64
Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here.
>Two-dimensional semantics
,
See Kaplan's distinction >content / >character).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions