Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Ruth Millikan on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
Natural Law/Millikan: My theory of intentionality is determined on that a thing like a normal explanation is something outside in the world and that is something that supports our thinking rather than being supported by our thinking.
For it to be true, natural laws must be in nature, not merely a summation of the patterns of nature.
MillikanVsVerificationism: If my theory is correct, verificationism must be false.
Truth/world/relation/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaning and truth lie in relations between thought and the world,...
...therefore they cannot be in the head, we cannot internalize them.
>Putnam: Meanings ain't in the head, >Twin earth.
Meaning/language-dependent/language-independent/knowledge/knowing/Millikan: even if we take almost all the meanings of our words from linguistic communication, like adults, and no longer from direct perception, that does not exclude that we know "their meaning"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
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