﻿ Ruth Millikan on Relations - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Relations, philosophy: relations are that what can be discovered or produced in objects or states when compared to other objects or other states with regard to a selected property. For example, dimensional differences between objects A and B, which are placed into a linguistic order with the expression "larger" or "smaller" as a link, are determinations of relations which exist between the objects. Identity or equality is not accepted as a relation by most authors. See also space, time, order, categories, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 108
Definition Relation/Bradley's Paradox/Millikan: when facts consist of relations, there must again be relations connecting the objects to these relations. Regress.
Solution/Millikan: the facts (world affairs) are not decomposed into parts (or sets of objects) at all, they only have different aspects (see below: invariant and variable).
Solution/Millikan: a fact (state, world affair) is determined by a set of significant transformations. The same state can be articulated by different sets of transformations. (Depending on which icon of the same state they are relativized).
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I 194
Identity/Relation/Millikan: sometimes it is asked whether identity is a relation.
Millikan: Thesis: Identity is not a relation.
Relation/Identity/Millikan: between what should it be a relation: between a thing and itself? Or a relation between expressions?
Solution/Millikan: Thesis: the "is" of identity does not map anything at all. Just as little as "and" and "or" map something.
Reference/Identity sentence/Identity statement/Identity assertion/Millikan: the "A" and the "B" of the identity sentence "A is B" have a nonreferential function. ((s) descriptive?).
Identity: not only the referents, but also the senses of the lowest types of e.g. "Cicero" and "Tullius" must be the same.
Problem: the senses can be the same without the concepts being the same.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-08-24