Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 88
Sentence/World/Meaning/MillikanVsRorty/Millikan: 1. We assume that a sentence belongs to the world (at least if it is true). (MillikanVsRorty).
Mathematical equation: here it is perhaps different.
Truth/Millikan: Let us assume that it has to do with some mapping relation or mapping rule.
N.B.: this cannot be a natural status (status within the natural world).
e.g. wrong sentence: does not map anything, but still has meaning. But if it has a meaning, it must mean something. But not something actual. So not something in the natural world.
N.B.: then that what a true sentence means, cannot be something in the actual world.
Solution: the relation of a true sentence to something undoubtedly actual in the world is mediated by a relation that is not itself in the world. This relation is the meaning.
Meaning/Millikan: is not itself in the world, but the relation between a true sentence and what is in the world. Therefore, this relation is not causal.
Truthmaker/Millikan: Cannot be found in false sentences. And we do not understand false sentences by merely saying that it is not true.
Meaning/Millikan: meaning must be something that is common to true and false sentences.
Image/Meaning/Millikan: Meaning also seems to be irrelevant for actual mapping relations.
Solution/Millikan: our terms "Eigen ..." and "Normal". True and false sentences "are supposed to correspond" with facts in the world in accordance with certain mapping rules. This can be explained with the terms of normality and eigenfunction.
I 89
False/False sentence/Millikan: is then just as unproblematic as e.g. a chameleon, which does not adapt to the color of its environment. ((s)> mistake, error, disturbance).
Meaning/Millikan: 2. Sounds become sentences with meaning when they are interpreted.
Intentionality/language/tradition/Millikan: is therefore a dependent (on interpretation) intentionality . ((s) > derived intentionality).
Sentence/subject/world/Millikan: without the intentionality a sentence would be an ordinary object.
Thought/Thinking/Intentionality/Millikan: N.B.: then the intentionality of thoughts cannot be interpreted as that of sentences. Otherwise we would have a regress.
Representation/Millikan: those who think sentences are internal representations forget that sentences and images are only intentionally derived.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-25
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