Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Command and Control | Stavins | Stavins I 154 Command-and-Control Regulations/Aldy/Stavins: command-and-control regulatory standards are either technology based or performance based. Technology-based standards typically require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In the climate policy context, these could require firms to use particular types of energy-efficient motors, combustion processes, or landfill-gas collection technologies. Performance-based standards are more flexible than technology-based standards, specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or allowable emission rates, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels up to regulated entities. VsCommand-and-Control: (…) given the ubiquitous nature of greenhouse gas emissions from diverse sources in an economy, it is unlikely that technology or ordinary performance standards could form the centerpiece of a meaningful climate policy. Furthermore, these command-and-control mechanisms lead to non-cost-effective outcomes in which some firms use unduly expensive means to control pollution. Beyond considerations of static cost-effectiveness, conventional standards would not provide dynamic incentives for the development, adoption, and diffusion of environmentally and economically superior control technologies. Once a firm satisfies a performance standard, it has little incentive to develop or adopt cleaner technology. The key limitations of command-and-control regulations can be avoided through the use of market-based policy instruments. In the context of climate change, this essentially means carbon pricing. >Carbon Pricing Policy Instruments/Stavins. Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180. |
Stavins I Robert N. Stavins Joseph E. Aldy The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012 |
| Commodity | Marx | Habermas IV 492 Commodity/Marx/Habermas: Marx's approach owes its theory-strategic superiority over the designs developed since then at the same level of abstraction, to an ingenious coup: the analysis of the commodity form. By analyzing the dual character of the commodity ((s) with utility value and exchange value), Marx gains basic value-theoretical assumptions that make it possible to describe the process of unfolding capitalist societies simultaneously from the economic perspective of the observer as a crisis-like process of self-exploitation of capital, as well as from the historical perspective of the person concerned (...) as a conflict-prone interaction between social classes. In terms of value theory, the relationship between the exchange of labor for variable capital, which is fundamental to the mode of production and institutionalized in the employment contract, can be simultaneously explained as a control mechanism of a self-regulated reproduction process and as a reflection relationship that makes the entire accumulation process understandable as an objective, anonymous process of exploitation. Exchange value/Marx: is the medium that objectivistically covers and objectifies class dynamics at the same time, i.e. makes them more objective. The mechanism of the labour market, institutionalised under private law, assumes functions of the previously politically institutionalised relationship between social violence and economic exploitation. The class ratio becomes the basis of the Habermas IV 493 monetization of the labour force. The analysis of the class ratio must therefore start with the dual character of the commodity labour force. >Labor/Marx, >Labor Power/Marx, >Theory of Value. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Counterfactual Dependence | Counterfactual dependency: exists between measured value series and measured facts, e.g. pressure. If the pressures had been different, the measured values would have been different. Double counterfactual dependency exists in the case of control mechanisms, where one automatically reacts to the measured value. |
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| Hierarchies | Parsons | Habermas IV 371 Hierarchies/Systems/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons adopts a control mechanism for systems that in turn requires energy, but little compared to the consumption of the overall system. Parsons equates cultural values with controlling control values and treats the organic foundations of the action system as a source of energy. Then he establishes a hierarchy between behavioral system, personality, social system and culture in such a way that the lower level is in line with the respectively Habermas IV 372 higher system of energy used, which is superior to the lower system in terms of information and control performance. This gives the cultural system the position of a sovereign of control. Habermas: Parsons not only sets the course for a cultural determinism, but differentiates between two categories of environments: a) at the lower pole the natural or empirical environment, b) at the opposite pole an environment of a non-empirical, supernatural nature.(1) >Levels/order, >Description Levels. 1. T. Parsons, “Social Systems”, in: Parsons, Social Systems, 1977, p. 181. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Information | Kauffman | I 111 Order/Life/Human/Kauffman: the human is the product of two sources of order, not one. >Order/Kauffman, >Life/Kauffman, >Humans. I 112 Information/order/life/emergence/Kauffman: most people assume that DNA and RNA are stable stores of genetic information. However, if life began with collective autocatalysis and later learned to incorporate DNA and genetic code, we must explain how these formations could be subject to hereditary variation and natural selection, even though they did not yet contain a genome! >Genes, >Selection. On the one hand, evolution cannot proceed without matrices copying mechanisms, but on the other hand it is the one that combines the mechanisms. >Evolution. Could an autocatalytic formation evolve without it? Solution: Spatial compartments (spaces divided by membranes) that split are capable of variation and evolution! Solution: Assumption: every now and then random, uncatalysed reactions take place and produce new molecules. The metabolism (conversion, metabolism) would be extended by a reaction loop. Evolution without genome, no DNA-like structure as a carrier of information. >Life/Kauffman. I 114 Catalysis/Autocatalysis/Kauffman: in the case of autocatalytic formations, there is no difference between genotype and phenotype. >Genotype, >Phenotype. Life/emergence/Kauffman: this inevitably leads to the formation of a complex ecosystem. Molecules produced in a primordial cell can be transported into other primordial cells and influence reactions there. Metabolic-based life does not arise as a whole or as a complex structure, but the entire spectrum of mutualism and competition is present from the very beginning. Not only evolution, but also co-evolution. >Co-evolution. I 115 Order/life/emergence/Kauffman: the autocatalytic formations must coordinate the behaviour of several thousand molecules. The potential chaos is beyond imagination. Therefore, another source of molecular order has to be discovered, the fundamental internal homeostasis (balance). Surprisingly simple boundary conditions are sufficient for this. >Beginning I 148 Information/Genes/Kauffman: Question: What mechanism controls the implementation and suppression of certain genetic information? And how do the different cell types know which genes to use and when? J. Monod/Francois Jacob: Mid-1960s: Discovery of an operator that only releases a reaction at a certain point in time. >J. Monod. I 149 Also repressor. A small molecule can "switch on" a gene. I 150 In the simplest case, two genes can suppress each other. Two possible patterns. >Genes. Gene 1 is active and suppresses gene 2 or vice versa. Both cell types would then have the same "genotype", the same genome, but they could realize different gene sets. New horizon of knowledge: unexpected and far-reaching freedom at the molecular level. The addition of the repressor to the operator at different points results in different receptivity to the operator on the DNA. Regulation. I 151 This control mechanism by addition in two different places means complete freedom for the molecules to create genetic circuits of arbitrary logic and complexity. We must first learn to understand such systems. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Language | Papineau | I 284 Purpose-means-thinking/language/animal/Papineau: (also as "Spandrille", side effect): Thesis: supposedly purpose-means-thinking emerged in a piggyback manner with language in the evolution. >Evolution, >Purposes, >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. PapineauVs: there is a danger of circularity: the primary biological purpose of language could be to increase the supply of information, but this would not help if the purpose-means-thinking had not already been developed. >Circular reasoning. Papineau: language could also have developed first as an instrument for passing on information. E.g. "A tiger approaches". >Information. I 285 Problem/Papineau: to explain the last step: what is the additional biological pressure that led to the language with which general information are reported? >Selection. A) If for the purpose of facilitating the purpose-means-thinking, then the purpose-means-thinking is not a side effect. It might have been language-dependent. B) If, on the other hand, language developed the ability to represent and process general information on an independent basis, there are further problems: 1. Why should language be selected for reporting and processing at all? 2. Fundamental: If language is independent of the purpose-means-thinking, then we need a story about how this independent ability is subsequently expanded as a side effect for the purpose-means-thinking. Cf. >Epiphenomenalism. The point is that the purpose-means-thinking must exercise a behavioral control. >Behavior, >Control mechanism, >Behavioral control, cf. >Self-regulation. I 286 The ability for general information processing must be able to add something to the set of dispositions: E.g.: "From now on only fish instead of meat", E.g. "At the next mailbox I will post the letter". Without this, the purpose-means-thinking makes no difference for our actions. >Information processing, cf. >Problem solving. I 286 Language/Purpose-Means-Thinking/Evolution/Papineau: Problem: how could a new way to change our behavior arise without a fundamental biological change? As a side effect? This is a pointless assumption. It must have brought the ability to develop new dispositions. >Evolution, >Dispositions. It is hard to imagine how this should have happened without biological selection. I 287 But this is not yet an argument for a wholly separate mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking in the human brain. Weaker: there could be some biological mechanism for the purpose-means-thinking, e.g. that the language has developed independently of the processing and reporting. Thereafter, further steps allow their outputs to influence the behavior. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. I 290 Language/Evolution/Generality/Papineau: previously I distinguished the language for special facts from one for general facts. >Generality/Papineau, >Generalization. Perhaps the former has developed for communication, and the latter for the purpose-means-thinking. >Communication. Or language for general facts has evolved under the co-evolutionary pressure of purpose-means-thinking and communication. Presentation/figurative/Papineau: how could the results of the figurative representation gain the power to influence the already existing structures of the control of the action? >Imagination, >Thinking without language. I 291 Perhaps from imitation of complex action sequences of others. >Imitation. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Markets | Spencer | Habermas IV 176 Market/Spencer/Durkheim/Habermas: Spencer thesis (according to Durkheim): social life, like life in general, can only be organized through an unconscious and spontaneous adaptation, under the simultaneous pressure of needs, and not according to a deliberate, intelligent plan. (…) Cf. >Planning, >Rationality. Habermas IV 176 The type of social relationship would be the economic relationship (...).(1) Spencer/Durkheim: the unifying mechanism is the market. Integration by the market is "spontaneous" in so far as orientations for action are coordinated not by moral rules but by functional interrelationships. Question: how can the division of labour be both a natural law of evolution and the mechanism of production for a certain form of social solidarity?(2) Solution/Spencer/Durkheim: the division of social work, controlled by the non-normative market mechanism, merely finds its normative expression in the "giant system of private contracts". >Markets, >Contracts, >Contract Theory. Habermas IV 176/177 DurkheimVsSpencer: Durkheim, on the other hand, is not about a norm-free control mechanism, for in exchange relationships there is "nothing similar to a control effect".(3) Solution/Durkheim: the socially integrative power of moral rules. "Interest is ((s) on the other hand) the least stable in the world."“(4) >E. Durkheim. 1.E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Paris 1930, German Frankfurt 1977, p. 242f 2. Ibid. p. 81. 3. Ibid. p. 243 4. Ibid. |
Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Mind Body Problem | Descartes | Putnam V 108 Def Interactionism/Putnam: The interactionism is a theory, according to which spiritual events interact with physical ones. Whereby the direction of origin could be in one direction as well as in the other. Descartes: The mind could influence matter if it was very, very ethereal (pineal gland). This theory is notorious. V 109 The most naive version of interactionism assumes that the mind is a kind of ghost that lives in the bodies. Vs: But it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains at all, it could be a very simple control mechanism. >Interacitonism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain form a substantial unity. Somehow it is the mind-brain unity that thinks, feels, and represents a personality. I.e. that the mind is not what we commonly call the mind, but the unity of brain (body) and mind. >Brain, >Mind, >Spirit. PutnamVsDescartes: This is obscure: a unity of two substances. >Substance. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Nature | Butler | Brocker I 741 Nature/Culture/Butler: Butler shakes the scaffold of thinking that refers to human nature. Her book (1) presents a fundamental critique of identity thinking and the nature/culture distinction that Butler continues in her philosophy of the political and ethical subject. This theory conceives subjectivity and the possibility of political action as a balancing act of the self in intersubjective and political relationships. See Identity/Butler, Gender/Butler. Brocker I 748 ButlerVsPsychoanalysis: the assumption that there is a dangerous pre-social drive structure cannot be verified outside the psychoanalytic thinking movement. Social control mechanisms Brocker I 749 are identified as such, but at the same time rationalized with assumptions about their natural necessity. Butler criticizes this setting of a human nature and patriarchal laws that seem inevitable from its constitution. >Psycholanalysis, >Gender roles. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Psychoanalysis | Butler | Brocker I 744 Psychoanalysis/Butler: Like post-structuralist theories, psychoanalysis is also based on the nature of bisexualism that precedes the processes of the development of the ego and its identity. However these are determined, whether as an incest taboo, as heterosexual bisexuality or as polymorph-perverse of a bisexual predisposition, these presupposed rules and natural systems determine how socialization socializes the individual.(1) >Gender/Butler, >Gender roles. Brocker I 745 ButlerVsPsychoanalysis: Deviating desires and lusts become illegitimate and a problem. Brocker I 748 Psychoanalysis/Foucault/Butler: Butler uses Foucault's theory of power, according to which rules and laws are not only repressive, but at the same time productive: they produce appropriate expressions of character, gender and desire. >Power. ButlerVsPsychoanalysis: the assumption that there is a dangerous pre-social drive structure cannot be verified outside the psychoanalytic thinking movement. Social control mechanisms Brocker I 749 are identified as such, but at the same time rationalized with assumptions about their natural necessity. Butler criticizes this setting of a human nature and patriarchal laws. >Nature/Butler. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991, chap 2. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Social Sharing | Benkler | Benkler I 116 Social Sharing/Networked Information Economy/Benkler: With the right institutional framework and peer-review or quality-control mechanisms, and with well-modularized organization of work, social sharing is likely to identify the best person available for a job and make it feasible for that person to work on that job using freely available information inputs. (…) social-sharing systems are likely to tap in to social psychological motivations that money cannot tap, and, indeed, that the presence of money in a transactional framework could nullify. Because of these effects, social sharing and collaboration can provide not only a sustainable alternative to market-based and firm-based models of provisioning information, knowledge, culture, and communications, but also an alternative that more efficiently utilizes the human and physical capital base of the networked information economy. I 355 The emergence of social sharing as a substantial mode of production in the networked environment offers an alternative route for individuals and nonprofit entities to take a much more substantial role in delivering actual desired outcomes independent of the formal system. >Networked Information Economy/Benkler. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Descartes, R. | Putnam Vs Descartes, R. | V 108 Definition Interactionism/Putnam: theory according to which mental events interact with physical ones. Whereby the causation direction could run both in the one and in the other direction. Descartes: the mind could affect the matter when it is very, very ethereal (pineal gland). Notorious. --- V 109 Naive version of interactionism: the mind as a kind of ghost, who lives in the bodies. Vs: but it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains, it could be a very simple control mechanism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain are an essential unit. Somehow it should be the mind-brain unit that thinks, feels and represents a personality. That is, what we commonly call the mind, is not the mind, but the unity of the brain (body) and mind. PutnamVsDescartes: obscure: unity of two substances. Cf. >interactionism/Chalmers. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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