Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertions | Dewey | Putnam II 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: Justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture - norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. >Norms, >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. PutnamVsRorty: Assertibility is independent of majority, but not transcendent reality but property of the concept of justification. >Justification. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim that they can stand inside and outside of language at the same time. >Relativism, >Realism, >Circular reasoning. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Cultural Relativism | Deci | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Ryan | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 450 Cultural Relativism/Self-Determination Theory/SDT/Deci/Ryan: cultural relativists (e.g., Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996)(1) have claimed that the need for autonomy is not relevant for Eastern, collectivist cultures. Self-Determination TheoryVsCultural Relativism/DeciVsRelativism/ RyanVsRelativism: SDT argues that satisfaction of the basic needs is essential for all people, several cross-cultural studies have been done to confirm that need satisfaction is essential in cultures that are vastly different. >Self-Determination Theory, >Self-Determination. Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan (2003)(2) investigated the internalization of the values of individualism (a strongly endorsed Western value) and collectivism (a strongly endorsed Eastern value) within four disparate cultures (Turkey, Korea, Russia and the United States). [They] found that the higher people’s relative autonomy for both individualist and collectivist practices, the higher their level of psychological wellbeing in each of the four cultures. That is, to the degree that people in any culture can enact a value autonomously, even if it does not match the dominant value of their culture, those individuals will display higher levels of wellbeing. >Autonomy, >Culture, >Cultural psychology, >Cultural differences. 1. Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S. and Heiman, R. J. 1996. Culture and basic psychological principles, in E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, pp. 857–913. New York: Guilford Press 2. Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y. and Kaplan, U. 2003. Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: a self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84: 97–110 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cultural Relativism | Weber | Habermas III 258 Cultural Relativism/Weber/WeberVsRelativism/Habermas: When Max Weber speaks of "last points of view" under which life can be rationalized, he does not always mean the cultural values, the contents that develop within a sphere of life in historical configurations, but sometimes also those abstract ideas that are decisive for the autonomy of a value sphere as such: such ideas are truth and success for the cognitive value sphere; justice and generally normative correctness for the moral-practical value sphere, beauty, authenticity, truthfulness for the expressive value sphere. >Value spheres, >Truth, >Success, >Justice, >Rightness, >Norms, >Beauty, >Authenticity, >Truthfulness, >Interest, >Rationalization. Habermas: these ideas (or aspects of validity) must not be confused with the special contents of individual value spheres. >Ideas, >Content. According to Weber, cultural value spheres are important for the development of modern societies because they control the differentiation of social subsystems or spheres of life.(1) Habermas III 259 Habermas: We must not put the aspects of validity on a par with any value content, with historically changing particular value patterns. >Values, >Culture, >Cultural tradition, >Tradition, >History, >Relativism, cf. >Progress. 1.M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S. 259. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Nature | Aristotle | Gaus I 312 Nature/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras: >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth. Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist. Gaus I 313 Nature makes its first appearance in three basic theorems that stand as the portal to the Politics: (1) the polis exists by nature, (2) man is by nature a political animal, and (3) the polis is prior by nature to the individual (Pol. 1.2). These statements are referred to as theorems because they are not simply asserted but argued for. Problems: nothing concerning them or the arguments supporting them is uncontroversial. The very content of the theorems is contested, for it is unclear what 'nature' means in each of them. Aristotle distinguishes several senses of 'nature' (Phys. II.1; Metaph. V .4), the most important of which correspond to his four causes (final, formal, efficient, and material); but he usually relies on the context to indicate the intended sense of a particular occurrence of the term. It has even been suggested that 'nature' has an entirely different sense in the Politics than it has in the physical and metaphysical treatises. Questions: what is Aristotle tacitly assuming? Are the arguments valid or invalid? How plausible are his premises? The tenability of Aristotle's naturalism depends upon the answer to these questions. (For the controversy see Ambler, 1985(1); Keyt, 1991b(2); Depew, 1995(3); Miller, 1995(4): 27-66; and Saunders, 1995(5): 59-71.) Aristotle's analysis of nature leads to a complex treatment of the antithesis between physis and nomos. >Nomos/Aristotle. Phys.: Aristotle Physics Pol: Aristotle Politics Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics 1. Ambler, Wayne (1985) 'Aristotle's understanding of the naturalness of the city'. Review of Politics, 47: 163—85. 2. Keyt, David (1991b) 'Three basic theorems in Aristotle's Politics'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Depew, David J. (1995) 'Humans and other political animals in Aristotle's History of Animals'. Phronesis, 40: 159-81. 4. Miller, Fred D. (1995) Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Claredon. 5. Saunders, Trevor J. (1995) Aristotle Politics Books I and 11. Oxford: Clarendon. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nature | Plato | Gaus I 312 Nature/Plato/Keyt/Miller: Plato had already attempted to combat Protagorean relativism and conventionalism by an appeal to nature, but the nature to which he appealed was either divine reason (in the Laws) or a realm of incorporeal and changeless Forms existing beyond time and space (in the Republic). (For PlatoVsRelativism, PlatoVsProtagoras see >Protagoras/Plato, >Relativism/Protagoras). AristotleVsPlato: though Aristotle too wishes to combat relativism by an appeal to nature, he wishes to do so without invoking a suprasensible standard or a supernatural being: his aim is to avoid Platonism as well as relativism. (...) Aristotle, by identifying nature with the realm of sensible objects and of change (Metaph. XII.l.1069a30-b2), brings it down to earth. Nature/Aristotle: Aristotle's concept of nature, unlike Plato's, would be recognizable to a modern physicist or biologist. >Nature/Aristotle. Metaph.: Aristotle Metaphysics Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Realism | Putnam | Rorty I 305ff Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty: an anti-realist understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct descriptions of a solid inventory, but he/she does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals. >Antirealism. PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. Internal realism: (according to Rorty): is a position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment". >Internal realism. Putnam: by means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. >Conventions. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language >Relativism. --- Putnam VI 389 Realism/Putnam: realism explains why theories tend to convergence. Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world. VI 395 f Realism/fact/Putnam: e.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points, that is, into smaller and smaller segments. Then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments. Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. "Hard core" realism: the "hard core" realism would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions. VI 398 Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - this is stated b Quine in ontological relativity. >Metaphysical realism, >Ontological rellativity. --- Putnam VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) it has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention. --- Putnam I (c) 78 Realism/Putnam: realism must left it inexplicable that e.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. What has prediction to do with truth then? I (c) 95 Realism: a realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory. >Junctions, >Connectives. I (g) 175f PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism faces infinitely many correspondences. There are endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. Problem: to choose the right correspondence, without a metaphysical access. ((s)> Loewenheim, >Unintended models. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Relativism | Brandom | Rorty VI 179 ff Rorty: BrandomVsRelativism: we are committed to the validity of our assertions, that correspond to the way things are and not how they are perceived by anyone. De re - attributions bring our non-relativistic determinations on to express that a certain way of speaking is more suitable than others, about what it really is. E.g. "Ptolemy claimed about the orbits of the planets, that they result from the movement of crystal balls." >de re. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Relativism | Nagel | I 9ff Relativism/subjectivism/Nagel: the relativism is first, self-contradictory, because it is claimed, nothing is the case, second, meaningless, because everything arbitrary is the case, what we say or believe. I 31 ff E.g. Rorty (subjectivist): We cannot identify a hook which draws us out of mere coherence to something like the correspondence with the "per se subsistent reality". >Correspondence, >Coherence. NagelVsRorty et.al.: this is convincing at first glance, but: if you take these authors seriously, they are just contrary to that consensus on which, according to them the objectivity "is based": people who develop scientific or mathematical beliefs, are in agreement that these things are absolutely true, regardless of if we agree on them. >Realism/Nagel, > Reality/Nagel. I 136 Relativism/NagelVsRelativism/Nagel: the attempt to reinterpret the orderly world image as a projection of our mind, fails due to the need, to find a place for ourselves in the so-ordered world. Cf. >Centered world. I 134 If we consider the phenomena always as merely "for us", we need to show that they have no systematic relationship with observed regularities. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Relativism | Pollock | Field II 384 Rules/standards/assessment/PollockVsRelativism/PollockVsField: Pollock even tries to avoid the weak relativism thesis, the terms of each person are shaped by the system of epistemic rules that it applies, that there can be no real conflict between people with different systems. >Relativism, >Concepts. So the systems can not be considered as standing in a conflict - FieldVsPollock: this is quite implausible. >Reference systems, >systems, |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relativism | Putnam | VII 436 Realtivism/Putnam: my main concern in the book "Truth, Reason and History": Putnam: thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat. "Companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens (PutnamVsHarman). --- Williams II 503 PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: e.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. >Cultural relativism. --- Putnam III 139f Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: Williams acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. --- V 141 Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness, is a fact about our notion of consciousness. Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. V 165 Relativism/tradition: relativism is easy to refute, because relativsm itself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): it is a regress to say: "I think that I think that snow is white". PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. Modern Relativism/discourse relativity/Foucault: everything is relative, also the relativism. Vs: problem: if we say "absolutely true relative to person P", then there is no total relativism. No relativist wants the relativism apply to everything. --- I (i) 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture. >Assertibility. Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. PutnamVsRorty: justified assertibility exists regardless of the majority, but it is not a transcendental reality but a characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. I (i) 249 Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Relativism | Rorty | I 304 Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe. >Convention, >Language community. II (b) 36 RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". >HabermasVsFoucault, >Habermas, >Foucault. II (g) 152 Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. >Cultural relativism. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss. III 87 Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian". Isaiah Berlin: one must not ask for more. >Isaiah Berlin, >Joseph A. Schumpeter. IV 11 Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept. >Relativism/Putnam, >Truth/Putnam. V 20 Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it. >Culture, >Norms. VI 74 Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language. VI 77f Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. According to what other standards, the ones of the fascists?. >Norms/Rorty, >Correctness. VI 79 Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement. VI 246 Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible. >Cultural Relativism, cf. >Western Rationalism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Science | Sokal | I 10 Science/Sokal/Bricmont: our book(1) is directed against the notion that modern science is only a "myth", a "narrative" or "social construction". I 11 1. SokalVsRelativism: against an "epistemic relativism". 2. SokalVsPostmodernism/SokalVsPostmodernism. >Relativism, >Postmodernism. I 12 Our book(1) does not criticize the humanities as a whole. Those who claim this are showing their own disdain for these areas of expertise. I 17 Sokal's Hoax/Sokal's Joke: in 1996, Sokal submitted a non-serious text to the journal "Social Text" for publication, which absurdly linked scientific terms in a completely meaningless context. Surprisingly, the text was accepted for publication by this journal. It is the text "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity"(2). - Subsequently, Sokal made public in the magazine Lingua Franca that it was a parody. I 18 Contents of the parody: he derides the outdated "dogma" that there is "an outer world whose properties are independent of the individual and even of the entire human race" and then categorically claims that the "physical 'reality'[would be] no less than the social, basically a social and linguistic construct." - ..."the pi by Euclid and the G by Newton, which were once considered constant and universal, are seen today in their inevitable historicality". I 19 The quotes from authors appearing in the text are authentic. Sokal's parody consisted of linking them together in an absurd way. The authors parodied by Sokal are Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Félix Guattari, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan, Bruno Latour, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Serres and Paul Virilio. >G. Deleuze, >J. Derrida, >F. Guattari, >J. Lacan, >B. Latour, >J.-F. Lyotard, >M. Serres, >P. Virilio. The completion of the parody consisted in the surprising fact that the absurd text was actually accepted for publication by the magazine "Social Text". I 21 Examples of the pointless use of scientific terms by some authors who call themselves postmodern authors: Subject/psychology/Jacques Lacan: Lacan claims that the structure of the neurotic subject corresponds exactly to the torus. Poetry/Mathematics/Julia Kristeva: claims that the poetic language can be theoretically grasped by the powerfulness of the continuum. >Continuum, >Set theory, >Power. War/topology/Jean Baudrillard: claims that modern warfare takes place in a non-euclidean space. I 22 Footnote VsSokal/VsBricmont: some critics compared Sokal and Bricmont with teachers who give their students poor grades in mathematics and physics. SokalVsVVS/BricmontVsVs: in school, children have to learn these subjects - but no one has forced these authors to use scientific terms they have no idea about. I 23 Sokal/Bricmont: our doing was not concerned with accusing authors of "minor mistakes" in quotations, but this is about a deep indifference, if not contempt for facts and logic. What needs to be defended is a canon of rationality and intellectual honesty that should be inherent in all disciplines. >Rationality, >Logic, >Truthfulness. 1. A. Sokal und J. Bricmont. (1999) Eleganter Unsinn. München. 2. A. Sokal. (1996) „Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity“ – Deutsch:“ Die Grenzen überschreiten: Auf dem Weg zu einer transformativen Hermeneutik der Quantengravitation“. In: Social Text #46/47, pp. 217-252 (spring/summer 1996). |
Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Terminology | Weber | Habermas III 286 Ethics/Worldviews/Weber/Habermas: a world attitude (Weber distinguishes it from worldviews) expresses rationalisation to the extent that it is directed towards nature and society as a whole and thus presupposes a systematic concept of the world. A worldview can be considered rationalized to the extent that it highlights the "world" as a sphere of moral probation under practical principles and separates it from all other aspects. It presents the world a) As a field of practical activity at all b) As a stage on which the actor can fail ethical, c) As a totality of situations to be judged according to "last" moral principles and to be dealt with according to moral judgements and therefore d) As an area of objects and occasions of moral action. Habermas III 228 Def Rationalization/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization any expansion of empirical knowledge, of forecasting ability and of instrumental and organizational control of empirical processes. Habermas III 351 Def Positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Habermas III 318 Def Ethics of Conviction/Weber/Habermas: According to Weber, ethics of conviction is characterized by the following attitude: "The Christian does right and places success in God's hands."(1) Habermas: Weber thus enters into a philosophical discussion that was able to work out the stubbornness of moral-practical questions, the logic of the justification of norms of action, after morality and law had separated themselves from the terminology of religious (and metaphysical) world views. Habermas III 322 Value spheres/Weber/Habermas: The different (cultural) value spheres are: cognitive, normative and aesthetic ideas. Ideal goods exist within the scientific community, the religious community and the art business. Habermas III 258 Def Ideas/Cultural Relativism/Weber/WeberVsRelativism/Habermas: When Max Weber speaks of "last points of view" under which life can be rationalized, he does not always mean the cultural values, the contents that develop within a sphere of life in historical configurations, but sometimes also those abstract ideas that are decisive for the autonomy of a value sphere as such: such ideas are truth and success for the cognitive value sphere; justice and generally normative correctness for the moral-practical value sphere, beauty, authenticity, truthfulness for the expressive value sphere. Habermas: these ideas (or aspects of validity) must not be confused with the special contents of individual value spheres. Habermas III 258 value spheres/Weber: - cognitive value sphere: decisive: truth and success - moral-practical value sphere: decisive: justice and normative correctness in general - expressive value sphere: decisive: beauty, authenticity, truthfulness. Habermas III 231 Def rtionalization/law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. Gaus I 195 State/Weber/Morris: [a „definition“ of the state most often is] an abbreviated version of Max Weber's well-known characterization of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1919(2): 78). Weber says that 'the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the "right" to use violence. Habermas III 244 Def Value rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber: "He who acts purely value rationally, regardless of the consequences to be foreseen, in the service of his conviction of what seems to command duty, dignity, beauty, religious instruction, reverence, or the importance of a 'thing' of whatever kind. ... value rational acting is acting according to 'bids' or according to 'demands', which the actor has posed for him- or herself."(3) Habermas III 152 Procedural Rationality/Max Weber/Habermas: Weber subjectively refers to a purpose-oriented action, "which is exclusively oriented towards (subjectively) as appropriately presented means for (subjectively) unambiguously conceived purposes."(4) Habermas III 245 Weber calls actions that satisfy the conditions of the rationality of means and choice 'procedural rational' and actions that satisfy the conditions of normative rationality are called 'value-rational'. Both aspects can vary independently of each other. Progress in the dimension of procedural rationality can be made at the expense of value-rational actions.(5) 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. I Tübingen, 1963, S.552. 2. M. Weber (1946 [1919]) 'Politics as a vocation'. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociologv, eds and trans. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University 3. M.Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964. 4. M Weber, Methodologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M. 1968, p. 170. 5. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S. 22. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Values | Relativism | Gaus I 134 Values/Relativism/Kekes: Relativists regard the diversity of values as real: there are many values and there are many ways of combining and ranking them. There is no universal and objective standard that could be appealed to in resolving disagreements about the identity and comparative importance of values. A good society, however, requires some consensus about what is accepted as a possibility and what is placed beyond limits. The political arrangements of a good society reflect this consensus, and the arrangements change as the consensus does. What counts as a value and how important it is depends, then, according to relativists, on the consensus of a society. A value is what is valued in a particular context; all values, therefore, are context-dependent. Ultimate justification: the ultimate appeal of relativists is to point at their arrangements and say: this is what we do here. Fideism: Just as absolutism is naturally allied to a rationalistic orientation, so relativism is readily combined with fideism. If there is no discernible moral order in reality, then the best guide to good lives and to the political arrangements that foster them is the faith that has prevailed in a society. But the faith of one society is different from the faith of another. It is only to be expected therefore that good lives and political arrangements will correspondingly differ. VsRelativism: Relativism appears to avoid the dangers of dogmatism and repression that so often engulf absolutism, but it does not. Relativism is no less prone to dogmatism and repression than absolutism. From the fact that the political arrangements of the relativist's society are not thought to be binding outside of it, nothing follows about the manner in which they are held within. Cf. >Absolutism/Kekes, >Conservatism/Kekes, >Values/Conservatism. Kekes, John 2004. „Conservtive Theories“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| World | Gadamer | I 446 World/Language/Gadamer: The language is not only one of the equipments that are necessary for the human being, that is in the world, but is based on it, and in it it is shown that people have the world at all. For the human the world as a I 447 world is there, as it has no other existence for any living thing in the world. But this existence of the world is linguistically written. This is the actual core of the sentence that Humboldt expresses with a completely different intention, that languages are world views(1). What Humboldt is trying to say with this is that language asserts a kind of independent existence vis-à-vis the individual who belongs to a linguistic community and, as he or she grows into it, simultaneously introduces him or her to a certain world relationship and world behaviour. >W. v. Humboldt. More important, however, is what this statement is based on: that language, for its part, does not claim an independent existence in relation to the world that is expressed in it. Not only is the world only world, as far as it is expressed - language has its actual existence only in the fact that the world is represented in it. The original humanity of language thus means at the same time the original linguality of the human being-in-the-world. To have the world means: to relate to the world. However, to behave towards the world requires to keep oneself free from what is encountered from the world so far that one can put it in front of oneself as it is. This ability is in one having-world and having-language. Environment/Gadamer: The concept of the world thus stands in contrast to the concept of the environment, as it applies to all living beings in the world. >Environment/Gadamer, >World/Gadamer. I 453 (...) in language the world represents itself. The linguistic world experience is "absolute". It transcends all relativities of being, because it comprises I 454 all being-for-itself in whatever relationships (relativities) it manifests itself in. The linguistic nature of our experience of the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as being. The basic reference of language and world does therefore not mean that the world becomes the object of language. I 451 World/World "in itself"/Worldviews/Gadamer: As linguistically composed, every (...) world is of itself open to every possible insight and thus to every expansion of its own worldview and accordingly accessible to others. "Being-for-itself": (...) thus the use of the term "world in itself" becomes problematic. The yardstick for the progressive expansion of one's own world view is not formed by the "world in itself", which is situated outside of all linguisticality. Rather, the infinite perfectibility of human experience of the world means that no matter what language one uses, one never arrives at anything other than an increasingly expanded aspect, a "view" of the world. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. GadamerVsRelativism: The multiplicity of such views of the world does not mean a relativization of the "world". Rather, what the world itself is, nothing of the views in which it presents itself, is different. 1. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (first printed in 1836), § 9, p. 59 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Counterfactual Conditional | Rorty Vs Counterfactual Conditional | Putnam III 92 PutnamVsRorty: Ex if I think my kitchen needs new paint and do not talk to anyone about it, I also don't contradict anyone. Is my statement then right according to Rorty? According to most readers of Rorty my culture comrades would agree with me in terms of the kitchen, if they were present. But invoking counterfactual conditionals has been rejected by Rorty himself. One should not rely on "observational ghosts". >Counterfactual Conditionals. RortyVsCounterfactual Conditional. III 93 Relativism/Counterfactual Conditional/Putnam: since Rorty is too difficult to interpret, let us imagine a typical relativist who uses counterfactual conditionals impartially and says what is true in a culture were determined by what the members of the culture would say. Disagreements then would not belong to the "normal" discourse. Or, a sentence simply had no truth value. The problem lies especially in the impartiality. If the truth about my kitchen painting depends on what my cultural comrades say, the question remains what is relevant for those assertions. Counterfactual Conditional/Putnam: recent analyses: two factors are decisive: 1. Which possible situations are relevant. 2. what would happen in these possible situations. III 94 So then it were again about what would be regarded as relevant laws by the comrades. Of course, relativists are likely to deny that we ever need a semantics of counterfactual conditionals. III 94/95 Relativism/Putnam: the same applies to metaphysical innocence than for all other types of innocence: once she is lost, it is difficult to find it again. Once one has have realized how difficult it is to explain the truth of a counterfactual conditional, then hardly anyone who considers the truth a problematic concept in normal statements that should be abandoned, would portray the counterfactual truth as unproblematic. PutnamVsRelativism: Now, let's assume our typical relativist actually considers the counterfactual truth unproblematic. This leads to the following paradox: it is a fact of our present culture that no philosophical unity prevails in it, because there is no single philosophical theory we all accept and we are certainly not all relativists. If the majority would not agree with my comrades that relativism is true, then relativism is not true, according to its own definition! That would not be a logical, but an empirical contradiction. Rorty himself would say that his concept of truth is not supposed to apply to hermeneutic discourse, but only to normal discourse. The assertions of relativism as well as anti-relativism are therefore neither false nor true (as in a normal discourse). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Emotivism | Newen Vs Emotivism | New I 137 VsRelativism/Ethics/Newen: Solution: Non-descriptivism: it searches for new ways. Emotivism: denies that properties are attributed in moral statements. I 138 emotional statements: have no truth conditions! Rationality: a rational dispute is not possible then. VsEmotivism/Newen: it is precisely the dispute over values that is part of the political discourse in democratic societies. Non-Descriptivism/Hare/Newen: New variety: universal prescriptivism. (Literature: The Language of Morals). I 139 Universal Prescriptivism/Hare/Newen: the link between should-sentence and instruction is to be thought as narrow as possible conceptually. Conceptual contradiction: E.g "You should do X, but don't do it anyway". Moral/Imperative: E.g. "Get me a beer!" is not a moral statement. Moral Statement/Hare: for that, it must be possible to apply the statement universally. Universalizability/Newen: was first recognized by Kant as an essential characteristic of moral statements. Hare: Thesis: in the logic of should-sentences a universalizability is implicitly contained. I.e. you cannot say of two individuals that a should perform a certain action in a given situation, which is described in universal terms, but individual b should not. Should-Sentence/Hare: implicitly contains a principle according to which the statement is applicable to all similar situations. HareVsVs/Newen: there are three misunderstandings to be avoided here: I 140 1) the similarity includes similarity of desires and beliefs. I.e., there may be people with different desires and beliefs in similar situations. 2) Universalizability does not mean that the rules have to be simple 3) They can also refer to a single individual. E.g. "You should take care of your mother." |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Field, H. | Pollock Vs Field, H. | Field II 384 Rules/Standards/Evaluation/PollockVsRelativism/PollockVsField: even tries to avoid the weak relativism: Thesis: the concepts of each person are so shaped by the system of epistemic rules which applies them that there can be no real conflict between people with different systems. I.e. the systems themselves cannot be considered as being in conflict. FieldVsPollock: that is quite implausible: sure, it may be that someone with slightly different rules of induction has a slightly different concept e.g. of ravens. But not so much that one would say that there is no conflict between his belief: "The next raven will be black" and my belief "... not black ...". Concept/Pollock: at the object level, our concepts are determined by our rule system. Concept/FieldVsPollock: more plausible: our epistemic concepts like "reasonable" are determined like this: "reasonable means" "reasonable in terms of our rules." |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Realism | Putnam Vs Realism | I (c) 96/97 Realism/Putnam: argues ultimately that science should be taken "at face value", given the failure of all serious programs by philosophical reinterpretation of sciences without philosophical reinterpretation and that science, "taken at face value" implies realism. Realism is sort of "scientific theory of science". VsRealism: could be cited (in the absence of convergence) at the most that the realism would be refuted diachronically. --- I (i) 243 PutnamVsRelativism/PutnamVsRealism: both claim at the same time to be able to exist inside and outside the language. The Realism thus does not refute itself because it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But Relativism refutes itself with that. I (i) 249 PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism: both see the world as a product Realism: the world is a product ex nihilo. Relativism: product of our culture. Putnam: but the world is not a "product", it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Relativism | Black Vs Relativism | III 68 Scientific realism/Leopold von Franke: "... as it actually was". Black pro. G.H. Hardy/Black: (mathematician, Cambridge, 1940, pp. 63): equals "physical reality" with "mathematical reality", "laws with "theorems" and "notice" with "prove": Hardy: I believe that the is physical reality is outside of us and it is our function to discover it, or to watch it, and that the laws that we celebrate greatly as our "creations" are simply our comments to these observations. Outside world/Reality/Objectivity/Planck: it is of paramount importance that the external world is independent of us, something absolute. (Scientific Autobiography, NY, 1949 p. 13). ((s) Otherwise, there is no difference between knowing and doubting. How are we to determine what we believe and what we doubt if reality is determined by us?). Absolute/Black: we should not shy away from this word. Truth, knowledge and reality are not relative terms. Only their recognition is relative to the owner ((s)> epistemic). Relativism/Roszak: what is true for me is what I am convinced of. (Roszak pro). BlackVsRelativism/BlackVsRoszak: whoever believes that excludes themselves from the scientific pursuit of truth, III 69 reality and knowledge. Even worse: they also exclude themselves from everyday knowledge. Reality/Bishop Butler: Things and actions are what they are and their consequences will be what they will be. Why should we desire to be deceived? |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Relativism | Brandom Vs Relativism | Rorty VI 194 BrandomVsRelativism/Rorty: we are committed to the accuracy of our claims that correspond to how things are and not how they are perceived by anyone! De re attributions express our non-relativist determinations that one way of speaking is better suited than another to talk about what really exists (!). For example, "Ptolemy claimed of the orbits of the planets that they would result from the movement of crystal balls". |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Relativism | Foucault Vs Relativism | Putnam I 204 Relativism/Feyerabend: claims that there is no difference between "it rains" and "I mean it rains". FoucaultVsRelativism: we just have to wait for the future Copernican revolution. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Relativism | Nagel Vs Relativism | I 24 Relativism/Nagel: E.g. Suppose we were to believe that all our logical, mathematical and empirical considerations are rooted only in contingent, culture- and place-related habits. >Cultural relativism, >culture. NagelVsRelativism: any such radical and universal assertion would have to be supported by a sound argument, but the assertion, in turn, seems to rob us of the ability to make such arguments. If the verdict also applied to itself, it would deprive us of the ability to think at all. The thesis "everything is subjective" would have to be subjective itself. >Subjectivism/Weber. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Relativism | Putnam Vs Relativism | V 163 VsRelativism: it is obviously contradictory to represent a point of view, while one simultaneously claimes that no position is justified to a greater extent than any other. And if, any position is good as much as any other, why should the position that relativism is false, not be worth as much as another point of view? ((s) The Relativism has to put itself as absolutism). Relativism, modern form/VsVs: given the overabundance of relativistic theories that are thrown today on the market by clever people that seems insufficient. Why would an intelligent relativism admit that (for it) any other view is as true as any other? It cannot let you deter, to say that its view is not true for you, but it can respond that truth means for yourself much less (for it) than truth for it. It is important to note that if everything is relative, also the Relative is relative. --- V 166 Relativism/Putnam: could make the idea his own, that truth is the idealization of rational acceptability. ("If I only watch myself carefully enough"). But unreal conditional clauses (counterfactual conditionals, co.co.) are interpreted differently by different philosophers. VsRelativism: if now the relativist interprets statements about what he would think under such and such circumstances, in this realistic way, he would have stopped being the relativist, because he would have recognized a class of absolute truths. PutnamVsRelativism: when he claims that even in one's own case, one could not differentiate between being entitled to and believing being entitled to, then what is speaking except the generation of noise to generate feelings at its best? The relativist must ultimately deny that a thought invloves something. VsRelativism: the relativist overlooks the fact that it is a requirement of his own thinking itself, that there is such a thing as objective "accuracy". --- V 217 Relativism/Foucault/Ethnology: Foucault argues quite different than the ethnologists: he does not argue that earlier practices had more rationality, as it appears, but that all practices are less rational than we think. VsRelativism: falls into the trap of the conclusion, all rational argumentation is merely rationalization, to then keep trying to argue rationally for this position. --- V 22 VsRelativism: E.g. trough aggression and fantasy people can be inflamed, until all the people are getting bloodthirsty. But this does not show that all value judgments are irrational, but only that some are. --- PutnamVsRelativism: what relativist believes "true only for my subculture ...". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Relativism | Rorty Vs Relativism | Brendel I 132 Relativism/RortyVsRelativism/Rorty/Brendel: our constant causal contact with the environment prevents relativism. I 133 Pragmatism/Brendel: Thesis: the extent to which causality determines the truth of statements, cannot generally be specified. E.g. when it comes to the question of whether there is a table or whether God exists. >Pragmatism/Rorty. |
Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Relativism | Plato Vs Relativism | Putnam V 163 PlatonVsProtagoras (relativist): Protagoras: when I say X, I should actually say "I think X". No view has the same meaning for me as for anyone else. PlatonVsRelativism: Recourse: if every statement X means: "I think X", then you have to insert infinitely: (1) I think that I think that snow is white V 164 PutnamVsPlaton: in this form the argument is not much good. Protagoras might agree, but it does not follow that his analysis must be indefinitely applied to itself, but only that it could! Plato, however, had noticed something very deep. Relativism, modern form: every culture, and every discourse has its own views, standards, requirements, and truth (and justification) is relative in relation to them. Of course, it is naturally assumed that the question of whether X is relatively true to them, is something "absolute", in turn! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Rorty, R. | Putnam Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 178 Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards. Putnam I (a) 21 Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate. PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God. Putnam I (h) 204/205 PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever. Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is! Putnam I (i) 239 Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists. I (i) 240. Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant. I (i) 242 justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy. By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case! RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"". PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind? I (i) 242/243 A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language! Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself. Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors. Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement". I (i) 243/244 As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.) PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent! Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not. Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse. normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture. hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements. I (i) 244/245 PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936). If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image? PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it! Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God. Rorty VI 79 Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Vs Relativism | Pollock, J. | Field II 384 Rules /Standards /Sssessment / PollockVsRelativism / PollockVsField: he even tries to avoid the weak relativism thesis, that the terms of each person are shaped by the system of epistemic rules, that there can be no real conflict between people with different systems. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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