Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analog/Digital | Dyson | Brockman I 35 Analog/digital/Dyson, George: Electronics underwent two fundamental transitions over the past hundred years: from analog to digital and from vacuum tubes to solid state. That these transitions occurred together does not mean they are inextricably linked. Just as digital computation was implemented using vacuum tube components, analog computation can be implemented in solid state. Analog computation is alive and well, even though vacuum tubes are commercially extinct. There is no precise distinction between analog and digital computing. Many systems operate across both analog and digital regimes. A tree integrates a wide range of inputs as continuous functions, but if you cut down that tree, you find that it has been counting the years digitally all along. In analog computing, complexity resides in network topology, not in code. Information is processed as continuous functions of values such as voltage and relative pulse frequency rather than by logical operations on discrete strings of bits. Brockman I 36 Digital computing, intolerant of error or ambiguity, depends upon error correction at every step along the way. Analog computing tolerates errors, allowing you to live with them. Nature uses digital coding for the storage, replication, and recombination of sequences of nucleotides, but relies on analog computing, running on nervous systems, for intelligence and control. The genetic system in every living cell is a stored-program computer. Brains aren’t. Analog computers also mediate transformations between two forms of information: structure in space and behavior in time. There is no code and no programming. (…) nature evolved analog computers known as nervous systems, which embody information absorbed from the world. They learn. Dyson, G. “The Third Law”. In: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Dyson I Esther Dyson Release 2.1: A Design for Living in the Digital Age New York 1998 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Beginning | Dawkins | I 40 Origin/Dawkins: In the beginning there was simplicity. Dennett I 208 Origin of Life/DawkinsDennett: The "creator" did not create a machine for producing tigers or lambs, he did something much simpler: he created a mechanism for self-replication. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Causes | Deutsch | I 260 Cause: two conditions if a variable is to be the cause of its own replication: 1) the size really has to be reproduced, 2) most of its variants may not be reproduced in the same situation. >Quantum theory. For x to be a cause of y, two conditions must apply: 1) both must occur, 2) y would not have to be allowed to occur if x had have been different. >Necessity, >Sufficiency, >Contrafactual conditional. I 261 Cause: thinking about causes and effects thus inevitably relates to variants of causes and effects. >Effect. |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Cultural Differences | McCrae | Corr I 151 Cultural differences/cultural psychology/psychology/psychological theories/McCrae: Over the past twenty years, researchers around the world have begun to translate instruments like the NEO-PI-R (McCrae and Allik 2002)(1) and the Big Five Inventory (BFI) (Schmitt, Allik, McCrae et al. 2007)(2), and have administered them to respondents in dozens of countries. Results are easily summarized: personality is much the same everywhere. The FFM structure ((s) >Five-Factor Model) itself is universal. McCrae and colleagues (McCrae, Terracciano and 78 others 2005)(3) reported an almost perfect replication of the American adult self-report NEO-PI-R structure using 11,985 observer ratings of college-age and adult targets from 50 cultures. The same study replicated the American pattern of age differences (although the age effects for N ((s) >neuroticism) and A ((s) >agreeableness) were much smaller in the international sample). >Cultural psychology, >Neuroticism, >Agreeableness, >Openness to experience, >Conscientiousness, >Intraversion, >Five-Factor Model. There is a plausible explanation for this universality: the FFM is strongly rooted in biology. Each of the five factors is heritable (Riemann, Angleitner and Strelau 1997)(4), and studies of twins (Yamagata, Suzuki, Ando et al. 2006)(5) and of family relatives (Pilia, Chen, Scuteri et al. 2006)(6) show that the five-factor structure of the observed traits mirrors the structure of their underlying genes. Apparently, Warmth and Assertiveness are both definers of E because they are influenced by some of the same genes. 1. McCrae, R. R. and Allik, J. (eds.) 2002. The Five-Factor Model of personality across cultures. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 2. Schmitt, D. P., Allik, J., McCrae, R. R., Benet-Martínez, V., Alcalay, L., Ault, L. et al. 2007. The geographic distribution of Big Five personality traits: patterns and profiles of human self-description across 56 nations, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 38: 173–212 3. McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A. and 78 Members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project 2005. Universal features of personality traits from the observer’s perspective: data from 50 cultures, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 547–61 4. Riemann, R., Angleitner, A. and Strelau, J. 1997. Genetic and environmental influences on personality: a study of twins reared together using the self- and peer report NEO-FFI scales, Journal of Personality 65: 449-75 5. Yamagata, S., Suzuki, A., Ando, J., Ono, Y., Kijima, N., Yoshimura, K., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., Spinath, F., Livesley, W. J. and Jang, K. L. 2006. Is the genetic structure of human personality universal? A cross-cultural twin study from North America, Europe, and Asia, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 987–98 6. Pilia, G., Chen, W.-M., Scuteri, A., Orrú, M., Albai, G., Deo, M. et al. 2006. Heritability of cardiovascular and personality traits in 6,148 Sardinians, PLoS Genetics 2: 1207–23 Robert R. McCrae, “The Five-Factor Model of personality traits: consensus and controversy”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Cybernetics | Foerster | Brockman I 209 Cybernectics/circles/circularity/Foerster: The substance of what we have learned from cybernetics is to think in circles: A leads to B, B to C, but C can return to A. >Circularity, >Recursion, >Thinking. Such kinds of arguments are not linear but circular. The significant contribution of cybernetics to our thinking is to accept circular arguments. This means that we have to look at circular processes and understand under which circumstances an equilibrium, and thus a stable structure, emerges. >Recursivity, >Processes, >Replication, cf. >Artificial Intelligence, >Artificial consciousness, >Robots, >Machine Learning. Obrist, H.U. “Making the Invisible Visible: Art Meets AI”, in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Förster I H. von Foerster Wissen und Gewissen Frankfurt 1997 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Language | Psychological Theories | Corr I 90/91 Language/personality traits/psychological theories/Deary: in relation to the assessment of personality traits (see >Five-Factor Model, >Agreeablenes, >Extraversion) there is especially good agreement across some languages. For example, English and German have very similar five factor structures in the lexicons (Saucier and Ostendorf 1999)(1). On the other hand, whereas the Greek lexicon did afford a five factor solution, there were also possible one, two, six and seven factor solutions (Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005)(2). >Personality traits. 1. Saucier, G. and Ostendorf, F. 1999. Hierarchical subcomponents of the Big Five personality factors: a cross-language replication, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 613–27 2. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 134 Language/psychological theories/personality traits/cultural differences/Five-Factor Model/De Raad: Support for (…) [a] sixth factor was observed in several languages (Ashton, Lee, Perugini et al. 2004)(1), but not, or not clearly, in all languages where this sixth factor was studied, as in American-English (Ashton, Lee and Goldberg 2004)(2), Turkish (Somer and Goldberg 1999)(3) and Croatian (Mlačić and Ostendorf 2005)(4). A seventh factor: was assumed by Almagor, Tellegen and Waller (1995)(5) and Benet-Martínez and Waller (1997)(6). Using a so-called ‘non-restrictive’ approach with respect to selecting personality descriptors, Almagor et al. (1995)(5) produced a Big Seven model in Hebrew, that included versions of some of the Big Five factors, and two additional factors, called Negative Valence (e.g., fabricator, envious and corrupted, versus honest, sincere and dependable) and Positive Valence (e.g., sophisticated, sharp and original, versus mediocre). Support for one or both of these factors was found in Spanish (Benet-Martínez and Waller 1997(6)), in Filipino (Church, Katigbak and Reyes 1996)(7) and in Greek (Saucier et al. 2005)(8). An eighth factor: De Raad and Barelds (2008) argued that on this point the psycholexical approach has not made use of its full potential. potential. In their study they not only used adjectives, but also nouns, verbs, adverbs and some standard expressions as the basis for the formulation of trait-descriptive items. Greek: dimensions. Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg (2005)(8) distinguished Morality (considerate, humble, responsible, versus bad-tempered, gross, disrespectful) and Dynamism (dynamic, exciting, energetic, versus gutless, hesitant, boring) when extracting only two factors to structure the Greek trait-language. Dutch: De Raad and Barelds (2008)(9) similarly distinguished at the two-factor level for the Dutch trait-language between Virtue (good, reliable, polite, versus unfair, indecent, annoying) and Dynamism (enthusiasm, energy, vividness). >Cultural differences, >Cultural psychology. 1. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., Perugini, M., Szarota, P., De Vries, R. E., Di Blas, L., Boies, K. and De Raad, B. 2004. A six-factor structure of personality-descriptive adjectives: solutions from psycholexical studies in seven languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 356–66 2. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K. and Goldberg, L. R. 2004. A hierarchical analysis of 1,710 English personality-descriptive adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87: 707–21 3. Somer, O. and Goldberg, L. R. 1999. The structure of Turkish trait-descriptive adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 431–50 4. Mlačić, B. and Ostendorf, F. 2005. Taxonomy and structure of Croatian personality-descriptive adjectives, European Journal of Personality 19: 117–52 5. Almagor, M., Tellegen, A. and Waller, N. 1995. The Big Seven Model: a cross-cultural replication and further exploration of the basic dimensions of natural language of trait descriptions, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69: 300–7 6. Benet-Martínez, V. and Waller, N. G. 1997. Further evidence for the cross-cultural generality of the Big Seven model: indigenous and imported Spanish personality constructs, Journal of Personality 65: 567–98 7. Church, A. T., Katigbak, M. S. and Reyes, J. A. S. 1996. Toward a taxonomy of trait adjectives in Filipino: comparing personality lexicons across cultures, European Journal of Personality 10: 3–24 8. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 856–75 9. De Raad, B. and Barelds, D. P. H. 2008. A new taxonomy of Dutch personality traits based on a comprehensive and unrestricted list of descriptors. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94: 347–64 Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Life | Kauffman | I 60 Primordial Soup/Kauffman: Earth's atmosphere mainly hydrogen, methane and carbon dioxide. Vs: it should have been extremely diluted. Solution: new theory by Alexander Oparin, biophysicist, Soviet Union: When glycerine is mixed with other molecules, gel-like structures are formed which are called coacervates. Inside these structures, the molecular processes are isolated from the diluted aqueous environment. Life/Emergence/Stanley Miller, 1952: received amino acids from the primordial soup tracted with lightning in the laboratory. DNA: pure DNA does not replicate itself. This requires complex mixtures of protein enzymes. I 68 Life/Development/RNA/Kauffman: a naked, replicating RNA molecule would be conceivable. It would be a more promising candidate for the first living molecule. Practically never succeeds in experiments. There are only balls instead of stretched structures. DNA/RNA/Kauffman: 10 years ago (until 1985) it was believed that the two are largely inert chemical information stores. Then it was discovered that the RNA itself can act as enzymes! Ribozymes. They cut out their introns themselves. I 71 Life/Emergence/Kauffman: Assuming that such a molecule had been created. Could it have defied mutation-related destruction? Could it have gone through a development? 1. Vs: Both times: probably no! Problem: Error catastrophe. 2. KauffmannVs: it is unlikely because those bare RNA molecules are not complex enough. All living beings have a certain minimum complexity which cannot be undercut! The simplest living organisms, the bacteria "Pleuromona" already possess cell membranes, genes, RNA, particles for protein synthesis, proteins. Question: why is a system simpler than Pleuromona not viable? I 77 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: Life is not bound to the magical power of matrix replication, but is based on a deeper logic. Life is an inherent characteristic of complex chemical systems. As soon as the number of different types of molecules in a chemical soup exceeds a certain threshold, an autocatalytic metabolism suddenly occurs in a self-sustaining network of reactions. >Self-organisation. Life was already complex at the time of its creation and has remained so to this day. The roots reach deeper down than to the level of the double helix, they are based on the laws of chemistry itself. >Complexity. I 79 Life/Development/Kauffman: Assuming that the laws of chemistry would be somewhat different, e. g. nitrogen four instead of five valence electrons and therefore only four instead of five possible binding partners. Key: Catalysis. Life: Condition of emergence: catalytic closure. This is necessary, but not yet sufficient. >Necessity, >Sufficiency Chemistry/Reaction/Kauffman: in general, chemical reactions are reversible. >Symmetries, >Asymmetry. I 97 Life/Kauffman: thesis: the emergence of autocatalytic formations is almost inevitable. >Emergence. In more complex systems, the number of edges compared to the nodes is increasing. Molecules with the length L can be composed of smaller polymers in L-1 ways. I 107 All we need is sufficient molecular diversity. I 108 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: simple systems do not achieve catalytic closure. Life emerged in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Memes | Dawkins | I 307 Meme/Dawkins: Thesis: In view of the great cultural differences, we must free ourselves from the notion that genes are the only foundation of evolution. - ((s) Vs: Dawkins refers to Margaret Mead's description of gentle Arapesh Indians, which is disputed today.) Dawkins's thesis: Darwinism is too powerful a theory to be confined to the narrow framework of the gene. I will include the gene as an analogue in my thesis, no more. I 308 Meme/Dawkins: For a short time, there has been a new type of replicator on our planet. The new "primordial soup" for its emergence is human culture. I 309 If a thought finds new followers, it multiplies by spreading from one brain to another. N. K. Humphrey: Memes should be understood as living structures, not only in the transmitted, but also in the technical sense. Dawkins: Memes are parasites in human brains. For example, the meme for believing in life after death. Memes are vehicles for their own distribution. I 313 Meme/tradition/replication/Gene/Dawkins: Everyone will change the idea a bit by passing it on, and in the rarest of cases use the same vocabulary. Thus, memes do not seem to have the particle characteristic of genes. I 314 Meme/Dawkins: For example, if part of a melody serves as jingle for a radio station, it deserves the designation Meme. I 318 Meme/Dawkins: Part of the mem of God is faith which renounces evidence. Nothing is as deadly to some memes as the search for evidence. Blind faith is a strong partner for spreading memes: e.g. civil war, religious hatred, retaliation, mutually reinforcing unscrupulousness. I 320 Gene/heredity/Dawkins: Queen Elizabeth II is a direct descendant of William the Conqueror. But it is quite likely that she does not carry a single gene from him. Meme/Dawkins: On the other hand, many memes of Socrates still exist. And unweakened at that! Perhaps one or two genes as well, but who is interested in the genes in this context? Memes spread, because it is useful for them! Nothing else is needed for that than brains capable of imitating. Then memes will be formed, which will exploit this ability to the utmost. Cf. >Genes/Dawkins. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Molecular Genetic Studies | Behavioral Genetics | Corr I 292 Molecular Genetic Studies/personality traits/behavioral genetics/Munafò: Problems with twin studies/VsTwin studies: Twin studies do not readily allow an estimation of gene × environment interaction effects, and these are typically included in the non-shared environment term, which also includes measurement error and other unmeasured effects such as developmental accidents due to chance. For these reasons, as genotyping of specific loci has become more cost-effective, research has moved towards the molecular genetic investigation of the biological basis of personality. >Personality traits, >Personality. Molecular genetic studies: a substantial literature has developed reporting data on the role of a variety of genetic variants, although only modest progress has been made in identifying molecular loci which robustly demonstrate association (Munafò, Clark, Moore et al. 2003)(1). Problems with molecular genetic studies/VsMolecular genetic studies: In common with genetic association studies in other disciplines, reports of highly significant associations between candidate genes and personality traits have typically not been followed by convincing replications. For instance, the report by Lesch’s group in 1996 (Lesch, Bengel, Heils et al. 1996)(2) of an association between variation in the promoter region of the serotonin transporter gene and emotional stability (or Neuroticism) generated much interest, but subsequent work has delivered inconsistent conclusions (Munafò, Clark and Flint 2005(3); Munafò, Clark, Moore et al. 2003(1); Schinka, Busch and Robichaux-Keene 2004(4); Sen, Burmeister and Ghosh 2004(5)). 1. Munafò, M. R., Clark, T. G., Moore, L. R., Payne, E., Walton, R. and Flint, J. 2003. Genetic polymorphisms and personality in healthy adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis, Molecular Psychiatry 8: 471–84 2. Lesch, K. P., Bengel, D., Heils, A., Sabol, S. Z., Greenberg, B. D., Petri, S. et al. 1996. Association of anxiety-related traits with a polymorphism in the serotonin transporter gene regulatory region, Science 274: 1527–31 3. Munafò, M. R., Clark, T. G. and Flint, J. 2005. Does measurement instrument moderate the association between the serotonin transporter gene and anxiety-related personality traits? A meta-analysis, Molecular Psychiatry 10: 415–19 4. Schinka, J. A., Busch, R. M. and Robichaux-Keene, N. 2004. A meta-analysis of the association between the serotonin transporter gene polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) and trait anxiety, Molecular Psychiatry 9: 197–202 5. Sen, S., Burmeister, M. and Ghosh, D. 2004. Meta-analysis of the association between a serotonin transporter promoter polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) and anxiety-related personality traits, American Journal of Medical Genetics B Neuropsychiatric Genetics 127: 85–9 Marcus R. Munafò,“Behavioural genetics: from variance to DNA“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Moscovici | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 101 Moscovici/psychological theories: the afterimage studies by Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)(1) was criticized for several reasons. >Experiment/Moscovici, >Social influence/Moscovici, >Minorites/Moscovici, >Conversion theory/Moscovici. 1. VsMoscovici: Machteld Doms and Eddy Van Avermaet (1980)(2) found afterimage shifts towards the complementary colour of green for both a majority and minority. These researchers also included a ‘no information’ condition in which the confederate called the slides ‘green’ but no feedback (percentage) information was given (i.e., the confederate’s responses were not linked to a majority or minority position). Interestingly, there was no shift in afterimages across the phases in the no-information condition. Explanation/Doms/Avermaet: the shifts might be part of a general tendency to pay closer attention to stimuli when a response is unexpected or unusual. Haslam I 102 2. VsMoscovici: Richard Sorrentino and colleagues (1980)(3) examined only minority influence. After their study they asked participants to rate how suspicious they were of the experimental procedure. Interestingly, they found afterimage shifts towards the complementary colour of green only for those participants who were highly suspicious of the experiment (see also Martin, 1998)(4). Explanation/Sorrentino: highly suspicious participants may stare more intensely at the stimulus than unsuspicious participants do, and that the shift in afterimages may be due to this greater attention to the stimulus. 3. VsMoscovici: Martin (1998(4), 1995(5)) draw attention to the fact that all the afterimage studies analyse changes in the overall afterimage response between each phase of the experiment but do not examine changes within each phase. Across five afterimage experiments, Martin (1998)(4) found a significant within-phase shift in afterimage judgments in all the phases (see also Laurens and Moscovici, 2005)(5), an effect that was more pronounced for participants who reported being suspicious of the study. This effect indicated that participants’ afterimage judgments shifted towards the complementary colour of green (i.e., red) over progressive trials within each phase of the experiment (see also Laurens and Moscovici, 2005)(5). Explanation/Martin: it may be due to a perceptual phenomenon that arises from repeated exposure to the same stimulus in the context of afterimage methodology. Haslam I 103 4. VsMoscivoci: Sorrentino and his colleagues (1980)(3) have criticized the afterimage judgment scale employed by Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)(1) in terms of the labels it employed (see also Laurens, 2001)(5). In their variant, they instead asked participants to select a coloured chip that best matched the colour they saw. No evidence of conversion due to minority influence was found with this method. Criteria/manifest/latent reponses: Martin and Hewstone (2001)(6) identified three important criteria that need to be satisfied in order to establish manifest and latent responses: 1) There needs to be a link between the manifest and latent response dimension, such that Haslam I 104 change on the manifest response results in a corresponding change in the latent response (manifest–latent correspondence). 2) The relationship between the manifest and latent response should be consistent and insensitive to situational factors (manifest–latent consistency). 3) Participants should not be aware of the link between the manifest and latent responses, and ideally they should use different response codes (manifest–latent perceived independence). 1. Moscovici, S. and Personnaz, B. (1980) ‘Studies in social influence: V. Minority influence and conversion behavior in a perceptual task’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 270–82. 2. Doms, M. and Van Avermaet, E. (1980) ‘Majority influence, minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 283–92. 3. Sorrentino, R.M., King, G. and Leo, G. (1980) ‘The influence of the minority on perception: A note on a possible alternative explanation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 293–301. 4. Martin, R. (1998) ‘Majority and minority influence using the afterimage paradigm: A series of attempted replications’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34: 1–26. 5. Laurens, S. and Moscovici, S. (2005) ‘The confederate’s and others’ self-conversion: A neglected phenomenon’, Journal of Social Psychology, 145: 191–207. 6. Martin, R. and Hewstone, M. (2008) ‘Majority versus minority influence, message processing and attitude change: The Source-Context-Elaboration Model’, in M. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 237–326. Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone, “Minority Influence. Revisiting Moscovici’s blue-green afterimage studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Negligence | Experimental Economics | Parisi I 92 Negligence/Experimental economics/Sullivan/Holt: Economic experiments are particularly valuable as a means of providing empirical insight into the incentive effects of different liability regimes. An early study by Kornhauser and Schotter (1990) illustrates the typical design. Subjects in the experiment were tasked with making individual choices in an abstract decision environment analogous to the basic carefulness decision in a single-actor accident. Over multiple rounds of the experiment, subjects were exposed to the risk of a random event (accidental injury of a third party) which occurred with some probability that the subject could reduce by investing in a costly resource (carefulness of conduct). In any period in which the event occurred, the subject’s earnings were reduced (tort liability for the injury) according to an abstract representation of a given liability regime (negligence, strict liability, etc.). Results: (...) observed care levels rapidly converged to the theoretic prediction under a negligence standard in which subjects were liable for injuries only if less than a fixed degree of care was exercised. Efficient care can thus be incentivized by an appropriate choice of negligence standard. By contrast, when operating under a strict liability standard, in which no degree of care suffices to escape liability for an injury, subjects never converged to the efficient level of care during the experiment. Two-actor accidents: Wittman et al. (1997)(2) extend the inquiry to subspecies of negligence liability in a related experiment on two-actor accidents. Convergence to equilibrium (and efficient) levels of care is observed more quickly under comparative negligence than contributory negligence,* perhaps reflecting the more intuitive apportionment rule of comparative negligence or the blurring of incentive effects under the comparative fault regime. In any event, a no-liability rule is observed to underperform both negligence standards. Experiments/problems: (...) reliable replication of key findings is currently lacking. ... VsKornhauser/VsSchotter: ... To the contrary, a recent experiment on single-actor accidents by Angelova et al. (2013)(4) reports stable and equivalent levels of care under both Parisi I 93 negligence and strict liability - a conclusion inconsistent with that of Kornhauser and Schotter (1990)(1). Experiments/method/problems: Another topic deserving of further attention is discussion of learning and convergence to equilibrium in this literature. If indeed efficient levels of care are something that must be learned experientially in practice, then the rare and idiosyncratic nature of many accidental injuries may imply that experiments would be better focused on the out-of-equilibrium behavior of inexperienced subjects when considering the relative efficiency of different liability standards. Behavior/incentives: (...) experimental work is needed on the closely related question of how different damages rules incentivize behavior under a given liability standard (e.g. Engel and Eisenberg, 2014)(5). Negligence: experimental economics can also provide a window for exploring issues such as how liability decisions are made under the negligence standard. In both Learned Hand’s infamous benefit versus expected loss formula as well as the more traditional reasonably prudent person definition, the negligence standard compels the fact-finder to consider the ex ante likelihood of accidental injury under the defendant’s conduct.** Cf. >Tort Law/Learned Hand. Hindsight bias/experiments: Unfortunately, substantial experimental evidence indicates that people are not very good at this type of ex post assessment of ex ante probabilities. A particularly uncomfortable problem is hindsight bias - the tendency of people who observe the outcome of a random event to overstate the ex ante probability of that outcome’s occurrence (Fischhoff, 1975(7); Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977(8)). Information asymmetry/introspection: A closely related observation in economics experiments is the general inability of informed subjects to introspectively reproduce the judgments of relatively uninformed subjects, even when incentivized to do so - a phenomenon termed the curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989(9)). >Experiments/Experimental economics. * For background and commentary on this distinction, see Schwartz (1978)(3). ** Zipursky (2007)(6) provides both context and provocative commentary on these competing formulations of the standard of care in negligence. 1. Kornhauser, L. and A. Schotter (1990). “Experimental Study of Single-Actor Accidents.” Journal of Legal Studies 19(1): 203–233. 2. Wittman, D., D. Friedman, S. Crevier, and A. Braskin (1997). “Learning Liability Rules.” Journal of Legal Studies 26: 145–162. 3. Schwartz, G. T. (1978). “Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal.” Yale Law Journal 87(4): 697–727. 4. Angelova, V., O. Armantier, G. Attanasi, and Y. Hiriart (2013). “Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence.” Theory and Decision 77(4): 531–556. 5. Eisenberg, T. and C. Engel (2014). “Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 11(2): 301–349. 6. Zipursky, B. C. (2007). “Sleight of Hand.” William and Mary Law Review 48: 1999–2041. 7. Fischhoff, B. F. (1975). “Hindsight ≠ Foresight: the Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1(3): 288–299. 8. Slovic, P. and B. Fischhoff (1977). “On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 3(4): 544–551. 9. Camerer, C., G. Loewenstein, and M. Weber (1989). “The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 97(5): 1232–1254. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Obedience | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 120 Obedience/Milgram experiment/psychological theories: (…) three new approaches to the experimental study of obedience have been developed that allow us to address real harm-doing without harming participants in the process. Cf. >Milgram experiment/psychological theories, >Vs Milgram. Haslam I 121 A. The first employs virtual reality simulations of the Milgram paradigm. In these it has been shown that behaviour in these simulations corresponds closely to that which is observed in the original paradigm (Slater et al., 2006)(1). B. The second involves using a technique called Immersive Digital Realism to train actors to play the role of normal participants in the Milgram paradigm (Haslam, Reicher and Millard, 2015)(2). C. The third is based on the observation that what people do at 150 volts is a very accurate predictor of whether they will obey up to 450 volts. So why not stop the studies at the 150-volt mark where one can see if people will obey without getting them to actually do something harmful? This was the strategy adopted by Jerry Burger (2009a)(3) in his replication of the Milgram paradigm. Haslam I 121 1. Several authors point to the need to consider the importance of disobedience as well as obedience (Bocchario and Zimbardo, 2010(4); Dimow, 2004(5); Jetten and Mols, 2014(6); Passini and Morselli, 2009(7); Rochat and Modigliani, 1995(8)). 2. A number of analyses point to features of the various relationships in the obedience paradigm that might help explain whether people obey or disobey authority. Wim Meeus and Quinten Raaijmakers (1995)(9), for instance, argue that obedience does not result from an inability to resist scientific authority but rather from a cultural tendency to identify with the social system, combined with a tendency not to identify with our fellow citizens but to see them in terms of specific role positions – an analysis which suggests that in the Milgram studies participants relate to the learner in terms of the different roles that the two of them occupy rather than in terms of their common citizenship. 3. Rochat and Modigliani (1995)(8): note that the villagers of Chambon were descendants of the persecuted Protestant minority in France (the Huguenots) and this meant that they likened the collaborationist Vichy Government to their own persecutors, and saw commonality between themselves and those who were persecuted. Their analysis concludes that once the persecutors became ‘them’ and the persecuted became ‘us’, the choice of whom to side with – of whether to obey or defy authority – became easy. See also >Goldhagen (1996)(10). Haslam I 123 Reicher/Haslam: Thesis: We harm others to the extent that we listen to the appeals of malicious authorities above those of its victims. At the same time, there is now converging evidence that this has something to do with the extent to which we identify with one over the other (Haslam et al., 2014(11), 2015(2); Reicher and Haslam, 2011a(12); Reicher et al., 2012(13)). There are three areas in particular that need to be addressed in the future 1) We need to investigate the way in which different situational arrangements affect group formation and identification between the participant and the different parties within the obedience paradigm (Reicher and Haslam, 2011a(12), 2011b(14)). Haslam I 124 2) We need to understand what sort of appeals make people side with the experimenter rather than with the learner, as well as the impact that participants’ own discourse has on their ability to disengage from these parties. 3) The aspect of language: only one of the exhortations, prods and prompts used be the experimenter in the studies is a direct order. In their replication study Burger and colleagues found that every time the experimenter gave this final prod, participants refused to continue (Burger, Girgis and Manning, 2011(15)), and in controlled studies of our own we observe that prod 4 (‘You have no other choice, you must go on’). is singularly ineffective in securing compliance (Haslam et al., 2014(11), 2015(16)). This is powerful evidence against the notion that participants in Milgram’s studies are simply following orders. 1. Slater, M., Antley, A., Davison, A., Swapp, D., Guger, C., Barker, C., et al. (2006) ‘A virtual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments’, PLoS ONE, 1: e39. 2 Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Millard, K. (2015) Shock treatment: Using immersive digital realism to restage and re-examine Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ research. PLoS ONE, 1O(3):e109015. 3. Burger, J. (2009a) ‘In their own words: Explaining obedience through an examination of participants’ comments’. Paper presented at the Meeting of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Portland, ME, 15—17 October. 4. Bocchiaro, P. and Zimbardo, P.G. (2010) ‘Defying unjust authority: An exploratory study, Current Psychology, 29: 155—70. 5. Dimow, J. (2004) ‘Resisting authority: A personal account of the Milgram obedience experiments’, Jewish Currents, January. 6. Jetten,J. and Mols, F. (2014) 5O:5O hindsight: Appreciating anew the contributions of Mi1grams obedience experiments, Journal of Social Issues, 70: 587—602. 7. Passini, S. and Morselli, D. (2009) 1Authority relationships between obedience and disobedience &, New Ideas in Psychology, 27: 9 6—106. 8. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (1995) 4The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram’s laboratory to the village of Le Chambon’, Journal of Social Issues, 51: 195—210. 9. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1995) ‘Obedience in modem society: The Utrecht studies’, Journal of Social Issues, 5 1: 155—75. 10. Goidhagen, D. (1996) Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. London: Little, Brown. 11. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Birney, M. (2014) ‘Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Miigram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70:473—88. 12. Reicher, S. and Haslam, S.A. (201 la) 4After shock? Towards a social identity explanation of the Milgram “obedience” studies’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 50: 163—9. 13. Reicher, S.D., Haslam, S.A. and Smith, J.R. (2012) 1Working towards the experimenter: Reconceptualizing obedience within the Milgram paradigm as identification-based followership’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7: 315—24. 14. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (201 lb) ‘Culture of shock: Milgram’s obedience studies fifty years on’, Scientific American Mind, 2 2(6): 3 0—5. 15. Burger, J.M., Girgis, Z.M., and Manning, C.C. (2011) ðln their own words: Explaining obedience to authority through an examination of participants’ comments’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2:460—6. 16. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. Millard, K. and McDonald, R. (2015) “Happy to have been of service”: The Yale archive as a window into the engaged followership of participants in Milgram’s “obedience” experiments’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 54: 55—83. Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Self-Replication | |||
| Self-Replication | Crick | Brockman I 56 Self-replication/Crick/Brooks: Francis Crick and James Watson (…) showed, in 1953(1), how (…) a tape could be instantiated in biology by a long DNA molecule with its finite alphabet of four nucleobases: guanine, cytosine, adenine, and thymine (G, C, A, and T). As in von Neumann’s machine (>Self replication/Neumann), in biological reproduction the linear sequence of symbols in DNA is interpreted - through transcription into RNA molecules, which are then translated into proteins, the structures that make up a new cell - and the DNA is replicated and encased in the new cell. 1. Crick, F, Watson J. “A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid,” Nature 171 (1953): 737-38. Brooks, RA. “The inhuman mess our machines have gotten us into” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Self-Replication | Neumann | Brockman I 56 Self-reproduction/self replication/universal contructor/Neumann/Brooks: In the 1940s, von Neumann developed an abstract self-reproducing machine called a cellular automaton. In this case it occupied a finite subset of an infinite two-dimensional array of squares each containing a single symbol from a finite alphabet of twenty-nine distinct symbols—the rest of the infinite array starts out blank. The single symbols in each square change in lockstep, based on a complex but finite rule about the current symbol in that square and its immediate neighbors. Under the complex rule that von Neumann developed, most of the symbols in most of the squares stay the same and a few change at each step. So when one looks at the nonblank squares, it appears that there Brockman I 57 is a constant structure with some activity going on inside it. When von Neumann’s abstract machine reproduced, it made a copy of itself in another region of the plane. Within the “machine” was a horizontal line of squares that acted as a finite linear tape, using a subset of the finite alphabet. It was the symbols in those squares that encoded the machine of which they were a part. During the machine’s reproduction, the “tape” could move either left or right and was both interpreted (transcribed) as the instructions (translation) for the new “machine” being built and then copied (replicated)—with the new copy being placed inside the new machine for further reproduction. >Self replication/Crick. Brooks, RA. “The inhuman mess our machines have gotten us into” in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
NeumJ I J. v. Neumann The Computer and the Brain New Haven 2012 Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Semantics | Eigen | Dennett I 221 Semantics/Syntax/Eigen: The structural stability is not related to semantic information. This is only expressed in the translation product. Nature prefers certain letters. G and C are preferred because they are the most stable as replicators and not because they are most common in genetic "words". >Stability, >Equilibrium, >Replication. The preference, which is initially syntactic, combines with a semantic imbalance: the logic of the code scheme results from purely physical or chemical conditions. >Code, >Syntax. Sense/Meaning/Eigen/Dennett: The whole thing has meaning because it works! >Sense, >Meaning, >Function, >Success. |
Eigen I M. Eigen Ruth Winkler Laws of the Game : How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance, Princeton/NJ 1993 German Edition: Das Spiel München 1975 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brandom, R. | Habermas Vs Brandom, R. | Seel III 149 HabermasVsBrandom: "turns the architecture of thinking by Hegel upside down". His "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human knowledge. The place of confrontation is taken by a mere replication of so-being contents. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Seel I M. Seel Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997 Seel II M. Seel Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000 Seel III M. Seel Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001 |
| Dawkins, R. | Dennett Vs Dawkins, R. | I 172 The "products" are not the gene strings, but the beings themselves DennettVsDawkins. DennettVsDawkins: no analysis of the isolated genome can open the dimension at issue in living beings. that would be like trying to judge a novel by how frequently letters occur. I 346 Dawkins: "... In genetic hyperspace exists a smooth path connecting the prehistoric bony fish lying on its side with the flatfish with twisted fish - but no such path that connects these ancestors with flatfishes that ly on their stomach." Explanation / DennettVsDawkins: Does Dawkins KNOW that? I 510 Mem / Dawkins: we have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and our education. As the only living beings we can oppose the tyranny of the selfish replication. DennettVsDawkins: this "we" is a myth. This grants also Dawkins. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Life | Kauffman, St. | I 77 Life / Kauffman: life is not in the magic power of the matrices replication, but is based on a deeper logic. I 97 KauffmanVsVs: maybe the details of this chemistry do not matter. The law of life is on an even deeper level. This emergence is rooted directly in mathematics itself I 108 Life / Kauffman: simple systems do not achieve catalytic seclusion. Life originated in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
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