Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Modalities: modalities are in modal logic possibility, necessity and contingency._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Modalities - Dictionary of Arguments
VII (a) 4 Modality/Quine: is limited to whole sentences. - - - VII (h) 143 Modality/QuineVsLewis, Cl.I./QuineVsStrict Implication: the concept of strict modality is based on the analyticity. VII (h) 144 Modality/Quine: the contexts with "necessary" and "possible" are referentially opaque. - - - X 107 Modality/Modal Logic/Quine: Problem: extension-like (coextensive) predicates are no longer interchangeable salva veritate. This is not a problem, but it complicates the logic. >Modal Logic/Quine. X 109 Logical Truth/Modality/Modal Logic/Quine: the modalities here give more than the settings: we can get valid schemes here: example "~(~p . notw p)" In addition, we receive another schema from each valid one by prefixing "necessary" e.g. "necessary (p or ~p)" from "p or ~p". X 126 Ontology/Quine: the real ontology is with the quantifiers of the standard language. The condition that this applies is very important. If modalities or other constructions are allowed in addition to truth functions and quantifiers, they increase the strength and thus the content of the theories incomparably. > Strength of theories. XI 175 Singular Term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other hand: i.e. between expressions that have a reference and expressions that have an extension. >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. I 337 Logical modality has nothing to do with personal attitude. The modal logic as we know it begins with Clarence Lewis' "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap later formulated even more sharply is as follows: Def Necessity/Carnap: A sentence beginning with "it is necessary that" is true only if the rest of the sentence is analytical. I 343 Church's system is different: he indirectly limits quantification by reinterpreting variables and other symbols in modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence, to which a modal operator is superior, is a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. I 422 Modality/Quine: the possible concrete objects, the unrealized possibilities represent another category of dubious objects. They can also be described as defective, because there is a complete lack of clarity as to identity, even more conspicuous than with intensions. II 121 Empirical modaltities: (what could have happened): These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. through ignorance, refrain from details._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Modalities
