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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aggression | Psychological Theories | Slater I 178 Aggression/imitation/psychological theories: the idea that children learn through imitation is taken for granted and regarded as obvious today. [Anyway] this was by no means the case when the Bobo doll study was published in Bandura (1961)(1). >Bobo doll study/Bandura, >Aggression/Bandura. Notably, even today, several domains have generated fierce debate about whether children learn aggressive behavior through imitative processes. For example, in the case of children viewing violent television programs or playing violent video games, the entertainment industry has tried to argue that there is no evidence that exposure to violent media causes increases in children’s aggressive behavior (see Bushman & Anderson, 2001)(2). Slater I 179 While Bandura et al. did not yet have an adequate theory to describe the mechanisms underlying imitative learning, Anderson and Bushman (2001)(2) developed a General Aggression Model describes how individuals’ cognition, affect, and arousal are altered through repeated exposure to violent media, thereby contributing to aggressive behavior. According to the model, each exposure to violent media teaches individuals ways to aggress, influences beliefs and attitudes about aggression, primes aggressive perceptions and expectations, desensitizes individuals to aggression, and leads to higher levels of physiological arousal. These mediating variables then lead to more aggressive behavior. Although more aggressive children tend to seek out violent media, there is also convincing empirical evidence that even controlling for initial levels of aggression, exposure to violent media contributes to increases in aggressive behavior (Huesmann, Eron, Berkowitz, & Chafee, 1991)(3). >Aggression/Developmental psychology, >Aggression/Moffitt. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)(4). It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. Slater I 185 Forms of aggression: Some (…) advances in understanding aggression since the time of the Bobo doll studies have been in understanding different forms of aggression. Bandura et al. distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression: has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(5). Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. For differences between the sexes see >Aggression/Gender Studies. Forms of aggression: Researchers today also distinguish between proactive aggression and reactive aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Proactive aggression: is described as being unprovoked and goal-directed (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), and is predicted by having aggressive role models (Bandura, 1983)(8), friendships with other proactively aggressive children (Poulin & Boivin, 2000)(9), and physiological under arousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(10). Reactive aggression: is described as being an angry retaliatory response to perceived provocation (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Precursors of reactive aggression include a developmental history of physical abuse (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997)(11), peer rejection (Dodge et al., 1997)(11), more reactive temperament (Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002)(12), and physiologic overarousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(9). Proactive aggression is associated with evaluating aggression positively (Smithmyer et al., 2000)(13) and holding instrumental (e.g., obtaining a toy) rather than relational (e.g., becoming friends) goals in social interactions (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), whereas reactive aggression is associated with making inappropriate hostile attributions in the face of ambiguous or benign social stimuli (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological Science, 12, 353—359. 3. Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Berkowitz, L., & Chafee, S. (1991). The effects of television violence on aggression: A reply to a skeptic. In P. Suedfeld & P. Tetlock (Eds), Psychology and social policy (pp. 19 2—200). New York: Hemisphere. 4. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27— 51. 5. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 6. Dodge, K. A., & Coie, J. D. (1987). Social information processing factors in reactive and proactive aggression in children’s peer groups .Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1146—1158. 7. Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social information-processing mechanisms in reactive and proactive aggression. Chi id Development, 67, 993—1002. 8. Bandura, A. (1983). Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In R. Geen & E. Donnerstein(Eds), Aggression: Theoretical and empirical reviews, Vol. 1. Theoretical and methodological issues (pp. 1—40). New York: Academic Press. 9. Poulin, F., & Boivin, M. (2000). The role of proactive and reactive aggression in the formation and development of boys’ friendships. Developmental Psychology, 36, 233—240. 10. Scarpa, A., & Raine, A. (1997). Psychophysiology of anger and violent behavior. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 20, 3 75—394. 11. Dodge, K. A., Lochman, J. E., Harnish, J. D., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1997). Reactive and proactive aggression in school children and psychiatrically impaired chronically assaultive youth. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106,37—51. 12. Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., & Tremblay, R. E. (2002). Reactively and proactively aggressive children: Antecedent and subsequent characteristics. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43,495—505. 13. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Agreeableness | Neuroimaging | Corr I 315 Agreeableness/Neuroimaging/Canli: Agreeableness can be viewed as a trait associated with affective processing (readers interested in Impulsivity are referred to Congdon and Canli (2005)(1)). For example, Agreeableness is associated with greater effort to regulate negative affect (Tobin, Graziano, Vanman et al. 2000)(2). >Affects, >Information processing. This tendency to minimize negative affect is even on display in implicit processing paradigms, suggesting that the regulation of negative affect can be automatic (Meier, Robinson and Wilkowski 2006)(3). >Regulation, >Self-Regulation. One key region appears to be the right lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) in the conscious regulation of negative affect (Ochsner, Knierim, Ludlow et al. 2004(4)). However, it was unknown whether this region also activates during implicit emotion regulation, and whether it does so as a function of Agreeableness. We tested this hypothesis using the standard gender discrimination emotional face processing task (Haas, Omura et al. 2007b)(5). >Emotion. 1. Congdon, E. and Canli, T. 2005. The endophenotype of impulsivity: reaching consilience through behavioural, genetic, and neuroimaging approaches. Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience Review 4: 262–81 2. Tobin, R. M., Graziano, G., Vanman, E. J. et al. 2000. Personality, emotional experience, and efforts to control emotions, Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 79: 656–69 3, Meier, B. P., Robinson, M. D. and Wilkowski, B. M. 2006. Turning the other cheek: Agreeableness and the regulation of aggression-related primes, Psychological Science 17: 136–42 4. Ochsner, K. N., Knierim, K., Ludlow, D. H. et al. 2004. Reflecting upon feelings: an fMRI study of neural systems supporting the attribution of emotion to self and other, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16: 1746–72 5. Haas, B. W., K. Omura, et al. 2007b. Is automatic Haas, B. W., K. Omura, et al. 2007b. Is automatic emotion regulation associated with agreeableness? A perspective using a social neuroscience approach, Psychological Science 18: 130–2 Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Empty Set | Quine | IX 218 Empty set/zero class/Quine: Λ is not equal to 0! (For Frege 0, namely {L}). ad IX 226ff Empty set/zero class/(s): is unlike the definition gap (e.g. divide continuity through zero). Real gap: is when a well-defined condition is not met, e.g. primes between 31 and 37: 5 natural numbers do not satisfy the condition, 0 natural numbers fulfill the condition. For an infinite number of rational numbers and real numbers the condition is not defined. Universal class/(s) if there is nothing that fulfills the condition it is questionable whether we can talk of a set (because it does not match a term). The other way around: what is should be the condition for the universal class? >Zero, >One, >Sets, >Set theory, >Subsets. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Finiteness | Heyting | I 66 Finiteness/Heyting: what the finitist denies in intuitionism is the notion that mathematics has something to do with the infinite. >Infinity, >Mathematics. Intuitionism: of course, its extreme finiteness guarantees maximum security. Every student, however, understands the natural numbers and can see that they go on infinitely. >Induction, >Numbers. Letter: that a person understands it, is suggested to him or her. Intuitionism: this is not an objection, because communication with language can always be regarded as a suggestion. >Understanding. Euclid also knew what he was talking about when he proved that the set of prime numbers is infinite. >Euclide, >Primes. |
Heyting I Arend Heyting "Disputation", in: Intuitionism, Amsterdam 1956 German Edition: Streitgespräch In Kursbuch 8/1967, H. M. Enzensberger Frankfurt/M. 1967 Heyting II Arend Heyting Intuitionism: An Introduction (Study in Logic & Mathematics) 1971 |
| Goedel Numbers | Godel number: natural number that encodes mathematical and logical statements by a certain method. The symbols such as +, -, =,(, etc. are in turn encoded by primes and subsequently multiplied, so they can be uniquely reconstructed by prime factorization. Gödel numbers make it possible to create directories of formulas and perform proofs of completeness or incompleteness. |
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| Incompleteness | Gödel | Thiel I 227 ff Incompleteness Theorem/Goedel/Thiel: ... this metamathematical statement corresponds in F to a one-digit statement form G(x) which then must occur somewhere in the counting sequence. If G(x) takes the h'th place, it is therefore identical with the propositional form called Ah(x) there. Goedel's result will be, that in F neither the proposition G(h) arising from G(x) by the insertion of h nor its negative ~G(h) is derivable. "Undecidable in F". Suppose G(h) is derivable in F, then only the derivation of true statements would be allowed, so G(h) would also be true. Thus, since G(x) was introduced as an image of $Ax(x) in F, $Ah(h) would be valid. But that would mean, since Ah(x) is identical with G(x), $G(h). G(h) would therefore be non-derivable in F - this is a contradiction. >Derivation, >Derivability. This derivation first only proves the validity of the "if-then-statement" S G(h)>$ G(h). This must now be inserted: (S G(h)>$ G(h))> $ G(h). This follows from the general scheme (A>~A)>~A. On the other hand, if we then assume that the negative ~G(h) is derivable, then ~G(h) would also be true. This would be equivalent to the validity of ~$ Ah(h) thus with S Ah(h). Thiel I 228 This in turn agrees with S G(h), so that both assertion and negative would be derivable, and we would have a formal contradiction. If F is contradiction-free at all, our second assumption S ~G(h) is not valid either. This is an undecidable assertion. Cf. >Decidability, >Indecidability. Thiel I 228 This proof sketch establishes a program. Important roles in the execution of this program are played by the "Goedelization" and the so-called "negative representability" of certain relations in F. Def Goedelization: Goedelization is first of all only a reversibly definite assignment of basic numbers to character sequences. We want to put the expressions of F into bracket-free form. >Goedel numbers. For this we write the logical connective signs not between, but in front of the expressions. We write the logical operators as "indices" to the order functor G. Terminology order functor G. Quantifiers: we treat quantifiers as two-digit functors whose first argument is the index, the second the quantified propositional form. >Quantifiers, >Quantification. Thiel I 229 Then the statement (x)(y)(z) ((x=y)>(zx = zy) gets the form (x)(y)(z)G > G = xyG = G times zxG times zy. We can represent the members of the infinite variable sequences in each case by a standard letter signaling the sort and e.g. prefixed points: thus for instance x,y,z,...by x,°x,°°x,...As counting character we take instead of |,||,|||,... zeros with a corresponding number of preceding dashes 0,'0,''0,... >Sequences. With this convention, each character in F is either a 0 or one of the one-digit functors G1 (the first order functor!), ', ~. Two-digit is G2, three-digit is G4, etc. Thiel I 229 E.g. Goedelization, Goedel number, Goedel number: Prime numbers are assigned in each case:.... Primes. Thiel I 230 In this way, each character string of F can be uniquely assigned a Goedel number and told how to compute it. Since every basic number has a unique representation as a product of prime numbers, it can be said of any given number whether it is a Goedel number of a character string of F at all. Metamathematical and arithmetical relations correspond to each other: example: Thiel I 230 We replace the x by 0 in ~G=x'x and obtain ~G = 0'0. The Goedel number of the first row is: 223 x 313 x 537 x 729 x 1137, the Goedel number of the second row of characters is: 223 x 313 x 531 x 729 x 1131. The transition from the Goedel number of the first row to that of the second row is made by division by 56 x 116 and this relation (of product and factor) is the arithmetic relation between their Goedel numbers corresponding to the metamathematical relation of the character rows. Thiel I 231 These relations are even effective, since one can effectively (Goedel says "recursively") compute the Goedel number of each member of the relation from those of its remaining members. >Recursion. The most important case is of course the relation Bxy between the Goedel number x, a proof figure Gz1...zk and the Goedel number y of its final sequence... Thiel I 233 "Negation-faithful representability": Goedel shows that for every recursive k-digit relation R there exists a k-digit propositional form A in F of the kind that A is derivable if R is valid, and ~A if R does not (..+..). We say that the propositional form A represents the relation R in F negation-faithfully. Thiel I 234 After all this, it follows that if F is ω-contradiction-free, then neither G nor ~G is derivable in F. G is an "undecidable statement in F". The occurrence of undecidable statements in this sense is not the same as the undecidability of F in the sense that there is no, as it were, mechanical procedure. >Decidability. Thiel I 236 It is true that there is no such decision procedure for F, but this is not the same as the shown "incompleteness", which can be seen from the fact that in 1930 Goedel had proved the classical quantifier logic as complete, but there is no decision procedure here, too. Def Incomplete/Thiel: a theory would only be incomplete if a true proposition about objects of the theory could be stated, which demonstrably could not be derived from the axiom system underlying the theory. ((s) Then the system would not be maximally consistent.) Whether this was done in the case of arithmetic by the construction of Goedel's statement G was for a long time answered in the negative, on the grounds that G was not a "true" arithmetic statement. This was settled about 20 years ago by the fact that combinatorial propositions were found, which are also not derivable in the full formalism. Goedel/Thiel: thus incompleteness can no longer be doubted. This is not a proof of the limits of human cognition, but only a proof of an intrinsic limit of the axiomatic method. Thiel I 238 ff One of the points of the proof of Goedel's "Underivability Theorem" was that the effectiveness of the metamathematical derivability relation corresponding to the self-evident effectiveness of all proofs in the full formalism F, has its exact counterpart in the recursivity of the arithmetic relations between the Goedel numbers of the proof figures and final formulas, and that this parallelism can be secured for all effectively decidable metamathematical relations and their arithmetic counterparts at all. >Derivation, >Derivability. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Induction | Poincaré | Waismann I 70 Induction/Brouwer/Poincaré/Waismann: the power of induction: it is not a conclusion that carries to infinity. The sentence a + b = b + a is not an abbreviation for infinitely many individual equations, as well as 0.333 ... is not an abbreviation, and the inductive proof is not the abbreviation for infinitely many syllogisms (VsPoincaré). In fact, with the formulation of the formulas we begin a+b = b+a a+(b+c) = (a+b)+c a whole new calculus, which cannot be inferred from the calculations of arithmetic in any way. >Calculus, >Infinity, >Abbreviations, >Equations. But: Principle/Induction/Calculus/Definition/Poincaré/Waismann: ... this is the correct thing in Poincaré's assertion: the principle of induction cannot be proved logically. >Proofs, >Provability. VsPoincaré: But he does not represent, as he thought, a synthetic judgment a priori; it is not a truth at all, but a determination: If the formula f(x) applies for x = 1, and f(c + 1) follows from f(c), let us say that "the formula f(x) is proved for all natural numbers". --- A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 46 Induction/PoincaréVsHilbert: in some of his demonstrations, the principle of induction is used and he asserts that this principle is the expression of an extra-logical view of the human mind. Poincaré concludes that the geometry cannot be derived in a purely logical manner from a group of postulates. >Geometry, >Postulates, >Derivation, >Derivability. 46 Induction is continually applied in mathematics, inter alia also in Euclid's proof of the infinity of the prime numbers. >Euclid, >Primes. Induction principle/Poincaré: it cannot be a law of logic, for it is quite possible to construct a mathematics in which the principle of induction is denied. Hilbert, too, does not postulate it among his postulates, so he also seems to be of the opinion that it is not a pure postulate. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Infinity | Thiel | I 59 Infinity/Thiel: to the "potentiality" of the election one does not have to march up all basic numbers in their "actuality". Even if finiteness occurs in a certain sense in infinity, not every sentence about finiteness is normally a special case of sentences about infinity. I 60 For example, study whether there might be a series of properties of the basic numbers, similar to the series of basic numbers themselves. To do this, we have to distinguish between properties and forms of expression through which we represent them. Here is a one-digit form of statement: For example, the property of being an even number. By means of a tally list I 60 ...+ Question: whether in any arithmetically suitable language the forms of statements representing a property of basic numbers can be arranged in a series: Cantor Diagonal Procedure/Thiel: There will be infinitely many such forms of statements. We would have the infinite series Aq(m), A2(m), A3(m), ... I 62 ... the statement form "~An(n)" represents a well-defined property of basic numbers, as long as we only have a series like the one above. In this series, however, no logically equivalent statement form to the newly constructed statement form can occur, and in particular no statement form itself! Thiel I 157 Infinite/Thiel: Example "There are infinitely many prime numbers". To capture this sentence it is of course not sufficient to formulate "There is one more prime number for each prime number". For this would also apply if 2 and 3 were the only prime numbers! What is meant, however, is that there is always at least one different to them to any number of primes. I 158 In another way, it is much easier to indicate this, namely by means of an order relation. (m)(En) (m This expresses that there are infinitely many basic numbers. Although there are infinitely many prime numbers, we cannot simply arrive at a clothing of the Euclidean theorem in a way parallel to the one we have just chosen, by using p and q for m and n. Because a comparable calculation is not yet known for prime numbers. The "in the broader sense calculatory" procedure, however, to calculate a further one for each finite number of primes, is itself the proof of the Euclidean theorem. ..+...I 160 Justification of the Euclidean theorem. I 161 Infinite: For example, even numbers form only "half" of the range of basic numbers, yet there are infinitely many even numbers, and as many as one experiences by pairwise assignment: 1 2 3 4 5 ... 2 4 6 8 10... Galilei also applied this to square numbers, explaining that we erroneously "attribute properties to the infinite that we know of in the finite". But the attributes "great" and "small" do not apply to the infinite. Long after Galileo's "Discorsi", mathematics found ways to speak of "greater" and "smaller", although not in the sense of removing a sub-area, so that the objects of the sub-area or the remaining ones could be assigned to each other unambiguously. I 162 What was new was that the ranges of e.g. prime numbers, even lines, odd lines, wholes etc. all seemed to contain "the same number" of items. I 163 This is shown by reversibly unambiguous assignment of number pairs. >F. Waismann. I 164 These discussions show the conflict between two views of infinity: Property or process. >Infinite/Cantor. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Proofs | d’Abro | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 28 E.g. If Euclid introduces factors in the proof of the infinity of the prime numbers, this is a device and does not follow from a logical necessity. >Logical necessity, >Necessity, >Provability, >Methods, >Infinity, >Primes. |
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| Questions | Belnap | Fraassen I 137 Questions/Belnap/Fraassen: ((FN 37): Theory of the questions: the theory is based on a theory of propositions, which we assume here, a question is an abstract entity. I 138 Interrogative: as a sentence expresses a proposition, a question expresses an interrogative. Answer: almost anything can be an answer to a question that depends on the context. But nevertheless, not everything is an answer. This is gradual. Answer/types/Belnap/Fraassen: E.g. Can you get to Victoria by ferry and by plane? (A) yes (B) Definition direct response: you can get to Victoria by ferry as well as by plane. ((s) Repeats the proposition (the interrogative). "Yes" is a code for a direct response. (C) Definition partial response: you can take the ferry to Victoria (D) says more: you can do both, but you should not miss the ferry. (E) You can of course take the ferry to Victoria and you should not miss this. (We leave this unclassified at first). >Answers. Answer "tout court"/Fraassen: one should resist the temptation to call a response simply a combination of a partial response and additional information. Definition partial answer/Belnap/Fraassen: a partial answer is a proposition implied by a direct answer (which repeats the question). Definition complete answer: a complete answer is a proposition that implies itself a direct response. (A repetition of the proposition). (Implication, X is implied by A/Y implies A itself). 139 Definition containing questions/Belnap/Fraassen: a question Q contains a different question Q' if Q' is answered, as soon as Q is answered. That is, every complete answer to Q is also a complete one to Q'. Definition Empty question/Belnap/Fraassen: a question is empty, if all their direct answers are necessarily true. An empty question is included in all questions. Definition foolish question/Belnap/Fraassen: ("foolish"): a foolish question is present if none of its answers can be true. For example, did you wear a hat that was both black and not black, or one that was white and not white? A foolish question involves all questions. Definition dumb question/Belnap/Fraassen: ("dumb" also "stupid"): a dumb question is present if there is no direct answer to them: E.g. which three different primes are there between 3 and 5? I 140 Presupposition/Questions/Belnap/Fraassen: a presupposition is an important semantic term: what is assumed by a question? >Presupposition. For example, the two direct answers "I wore the black hat" "..the white .." could both be wrong. Then you can answer "neither nor", which has not yet been considered. Definition Presupposition/Questions/Belnap/Fraassen: of Question Q is any proposition implied by all direct answers to Q. (FN "40"). Definition Corrections/Questions/Belnap/Fraassen: of Q is the denial of any presupposition of Q. Definition basic presupposition/questions/Belnap/Fraassen: a basic presupposition is the proposition, which is true, iff. a direct answer to Q is true. Answer/Belnap/Fraassen: there is another kind: e.g. "I did not wear the white hat": this is not even a partial answer: neither is it implied by a direct answer because I could have worn both hats yesterday, one after the other. On the other hand, because the questioner makes the presupposition that at least one of the hats was worn, the answer to him is a complete one. Because the answer plus presupposition together include the direct answer that she wore the black hat. Therefore: Definition relatively complete answer/Belnap/Fraassen: a relatively complete answer is a proposition which, together with the presupposition of Q, implies a direct response to Q. I 141 Interrogative/Belnap/Fraassen: which question is expressed by it is strongly context-dependent. Partially, because index words are usually found in them. E.g. "Which one do you want?". Here the context determines what is possible at all. >Context. Definition elementary questions/Belnap: A) "If" questions. B) "What/Which" questions. Set of direct responses: is specified by two factors: 1. Set of alternatives ("theme") 2. Desire for selection. |
Beln I N. Belnap Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World Oxford 2001 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Representation | Attachment Theory | Corr I 230 Representation/Attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: mental representations of attachment figures (see relations/Bowlby) and self-sub-routines that develop through the internalization of caring and soothing qualities of attachment figures can serve as symbolic sources of support, comfort and protection (Mikulincer and Shaver 2004(1)). They can also provide models of effective, loving behaviour that influence the way a person regards and treats him- or herself in the temporary absence of an actual attachment figure. >Representation/Bowlby, >Attachment theory/Bowlby. Using contemporary research techniques, we (Mikulincer, Birnbaum and Woddis and Nachmias 2000(2); Mikulincer, Gillath and Shaver 2002(3)) have found Corr I 231 that adults react to even minimal threat cues with activation of proximity-related thoughts and mental representations of security-providing attachment figures. In these studies, subliminal priming with a threat word (e.g., illness, failure) was found to heighten the cognitive accessibility of attachment-related mental representations, indicated by faster lexical-decision times for proximity-related words (e.g., love, closeness) and the names of people nominated as providing protection and security (e.g., the name of a parent, spouse or close friend). >About the Attachment theory. 1. Mikulincer, M. and Shaver, P. R. 2004. Security-based self-representations in adulthood: contents and processes, in W. S. Rholes and J. A. Simpson (eds.), Adult attachment: theory, research, and clinical implications, pp. 159–95. New York: Guilford Press 2. Mikulincer, M., Birnbaum, G., Woddis, D. and Nachmias, O. 2000. Stress and accessibility of proximity-related thoughts: exploring the normative and intraindividual components of attachment theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 509–23 3. Mikulincer, M., Gillath, O. and Shaver, P. R. 2002. Activation of the attachment system in adulthood: threat-related primes increase the accessibility of mental representations of attachment figures, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 881–95 Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Stereotype Threat | Forbes | Haslam I 250 Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The original studies suggested that stereotype threat can be cued for Black college students by how a task is described or whether one’s group identity is made salient. >Experiment/Aronson/Steele; >Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele. Triggers: Along with our colleague Michael Johns, we proposed that stereotype threat is triggered when a situation simultaneously primes three incongruent cognitions: a) I am a member of Group X, b) Group X is thought to do poorly in this domain, c) I care about doing well in this domain (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Cues to subtle sexism, a cartoon demeaning women’s math performance on a lab wall, can for example impair women’s math performance (Adams et al., 2006(2); Oswald and Harvey, 2000(3)). But simply being outnumbered by men in a math or science context can also trigger a concern among women that they might not belong or perform well in the setting (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev, 2000(4); Murphy, Steele and Gross, 2007)(5). Importantly, individuals often need to feel person ally invested in doing well, as individual anonymity often reduces effects (Jamieson and Harkins, 2010(6); Wout et al., 2008(7); Zhang et al., 2013(8)). Haslam I 251 Moderators: A key assumption of the theory is that to experience stereotype threat, one must have knowledge of a negative stereotype about one’s group in relevant domains (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(9); Keifer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007(10); McKown and Weinstein, 2003(11)). Although believing the stereotype is true is not necessary to experience effects, suspicions that the stereotype might be accurate can magnify performance impairments (Schmader et al., 2004)(12). Likewise, individuals are more susceptible to stereotype threat effects when they are more stigma conscious, or attuned to these negative stereotypes (Brown and Lee, 2005(13); Brown and Pinel, 2003(14)). (…) gender gaps in performance are non-existent in countries where there is no evidence of a strong math = male association or where there is greater evidence of gender equality in the culture as a whole (Else-Quest et al., 2010(15); Nosek et al., 2009(16)). Although correlational, this variability might suggest that women in these more gender egalitarian cultures experience less stereotype threat. Even in cultures where stereotypes are prevalent, not all members of a stigmatized group will be vulnerable to effects. As Steele’s (1997) vanguard hypothesis posits, individuals who are most invested in performing well might ironically show the largest performance impairments because the stereotypes themselves pose a greater threat to their identity (Lawrence et al., 2010(17); Nguyen and Ryan, 2008(18)). Such effects could help explain why among one sample of students, racial minorities who initially placed a high value on academic pursuits were later the most likely to drop out of high school (Osborne and Walker, 2006)(19). Just as identification with the domain raises the stakes for one’s performance, so too does the identification with the stigmatized groups to which one belongs (Davis et al., 2006(20); Ployhart et aL, 2003(21); Schmader, 2002(22). Those who are highly group identified perform poorly when scores will be used to compare groups, even if their personal performance is anonymous (Wout et al., 2008(7)). Explanation of the stereotype threat >Explanation/Forbes/Schmader. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Adams, G., Garcia, D.M., Purdie-Vaughns, V. and Steele, C.M. (2006) ‘The detrimental effects of a suggestion of sexism in an instruction situation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 602—15. 3. Oswald, D.L. and Harvey, R.D. (2000) ‘Hostile environments, stereotype threat, and math performance among undergraduate women’, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 19: 3 38—56. 4.. Inzlicht, M. and Ben-Zeev, T. (2000) ‘A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males’, Psychological Science, 1 1: 365—71. 5. Murphy, M.C., Steele, C.M. and Gross, J.J. (2007) ‘Signaling threat: How situational cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings’, Psychological Science, 18: 879—85. 6. Jamieson, J.P. and Harkins, S.G. (2010) ‘Evaluation is necessary to produce stereotype threat performance effects’, Social Influence, 5: 75—86. 7. Wout, D., Danso, H., Jackson, J. and Spencer, S. (2008) ‘The many faces of stereotype threat: Group- and se1f-threat, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44:792—99. 8. Zhang, S., Schmader, T. and Hall, W.M. (2013) L’eggo my ego: Reducing the gender gap in math by unlinking the self from performance’, Self and Identity, 12: 400—12. 9. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 10 .Keifer, A.K. and Sekaquaptewa, D. (2007) ‘Implicit stereotypes and women’s math performance: How implicit gender—math stereotypes influence women’s susceptibility to stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43: 825—32. 11. McKown, C. and Weinstein, R.S. (2003) ‘The development and consequences of stereotype consciousness in middle childhood’, Child Development, 74:498—515. 12. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Barquissau, M. (2004) The costs of accepting gender differences: The role of stereotype endorsement in women’s experience in the math domain’, Sex Roles, 50: 83 5—50. 13. Brown, R.P. and Lee, M.N. (2005) ‘Stigma consciousness and the race gap in college academic achievement’, Self and Identity, 4: 149—5 7. 14. Brown, R.P. and Pinel, E.C. (2003) ‘Stigma on my mind: Individual differences in the experience of stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 626—33. 15. Else-Quest, N.M., Hyde,J.S. and Linn, M.C. (2010) ‘Cross-national patterns of gender differences in mathematics: a meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 136(1): 103—2 7. 16. Nosek, B.A., Smyth, F.L., Sriram, N., Lindner, N.M., Devos, T., Ayala, A. ... and Kesebir, S. (2009) Nationa1 differences in gender—science stereotypes predict national sex differ- 17. Lawrence, J.S., Marks, B.T. and Jackson, J.S. (2010) ‘Domain identification predicts black Students’ underperformance on moderately-difficult tests’, Motivation and Emotion, 34(2): 105—9. 18. Nguyen, H.-H.D. and Ryan, A.M. (2008) ‘Does stereotype threat affect test performance of minorities and women? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 93: 1314—34. 19. Osborne, J.W. and Walker, C. (2006) ‘Stereotype threat, identification with academics, and withdrawal from school: Why the most successful students of colour might be the most likely to withdraw’, Educational Psychology, 26: 563—77. 20. Davis, C.I., Aronson, J. and Salinas, M. (2006) of threat: Racial identity as a moderator of stereotype threat’, Journal of Black Psychology, 32: 399—417. 21. Ployhart, R.E., Ziegert, J.C. and McFarland, L.A. (2003) iJnderstanding racial differences on cognitive ability tests in selection contexts: An integration of stereotype threat and applicant reactions research, Human Performance, 16: 231—59. 22. Schmader, T. (2002) ‘Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38: 194—201. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Stereotype Threat | Schmader | Haslam I 250 Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader: The original studies suggested that stereotype threat can be cued for Black college students by how a task is described or whether one’s group identity is made salient. (>Experiment/Aronson/Steele; >Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele). Triggers: Along with our colleague Michael Johns, we proposed that stereotype threat is triggered when a situation simultaneously primes three incongruent cognitions: a) I am a member of Group X, b) Group X is thought to do poorly in this domain, c) I care about doing well in this domain (Schmader et al., 2008)(1). Cues to subtle sexism, a cartoon demeaning women’s math performance on a lab wall, can for example impair women’s math performance (Adams et al., 2006(2); Oswald and Harvey, 2000(3)). But simply being outnumbered by men in a math or science context can also trigger a concern among women that they might not belong or perform well in the setting (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev, 2000(4); Murphy, Steele and Gross, 2007)(5). Importantly, individuals often need to feel person ally invested in doing well, as individual anonymity often reduces effects (Jamieson and Harkins, 2010(6); Wout et al., 2008(7); Zhang et al., 2013(8)). Haslam I 251 Moderators: A key assumption of the theory is that to experience stereotype threat, one must have knowledge of a negative stereotype about one’s group in relevant domains (Forbes and Schmader, 2010(9); Keifer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007(10); McKown and Weinstein, 2003(11)). Although believing the stereotype is true is not necessary to experience effects, suspicions that the stereotype might be accurate can magnify performance impairments (Schmader et al., 2004)(12). Likewise, individuals are more susceptible to stereotype threat effects when they are more stigma conscious, or attuned to these negative stereotypes (Brown and Lee, 2005(13); Brown and Pinel, 2003(14)). (…) gender gaps in performance are non-existent in countries where there is no evidence of a strong math = male association or where there is greater evidence of gender equality in the culture as a whole (Else-Quest et al., 2010(15); Nosek et al., 2009(16)). Although correlational, this variability might suggest that women in these more gender egalitarian cultures experience less stereotype threat. Even in cultures where stereotypes are prevalent, not all members of a stigmatized group will be vulnerable to effects. As Steele’s (1997) vanguard hypothesis posits, individuals who are most invested in performing well might ironically show the largest performance impairments because the stereotypes themselves pose a greater threat to their identity (Lawrence et al., 2010(17); Nguyen and Ryan, 2008(18)). Such effects could help explain why among one sample of students, racial minorities who initially placed a high value on academic pursuits were later the most likely to drop out of high school (Osborne and Walker, 2006)(19). Just as identification with the domain raises the stakes for one’s performance, so too does the identification with the stigmatized groups to which one belongs (Davis et al., 2006(20); Ployhart et aL, 2003(21); Schmader, 2002(22). Those who are highly group identified perform poorly when scores will be used to compare groups, even if their personal performance is anonymous (Wout et al., 2008(7)). Explanation of the stereotype threat: >Explanation/Forbes/Schmader. 1. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Forbes, C. (2008) ‘An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance’, Psychological Review, 115: 336—56. 2. Adams, G., Garcia, D.M., Purdie-Vaughns, V. and Steele, C.M. (2006) ‘The detrimental effects of a suggestion of sexism in an instruction situation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 602—15. 3. Oswald, D.L. and Harvey, R.D. (2000) ‘Hostile environments, stereotype threat, and math performance among undergraduate women’, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 19: 3 38—56. 4.. Inzlicht, M. and Ben-Zeev, T. (2000) ‘A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males’, Psychological Science, 1 1: 365—71. 5. Murphy, M.C., Steele, C.M. and Gross, J.J. (2007) ‘Signaling threat: How situational cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings’, Psychological Science, 18: 879—85. 6. Jamieson, J.P. and Harkins, S.G. (2010) ‘Evaluation is necessary to produce stereotype threat performance effects’, Social Influence, 5: 75—86. 7. Wout, D., Danso, H., Jackson, J. and Spencer, S. (2008) ‘The many faces of stereotype threat: Group- and se1f-threat, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44:792—99. 8. Zhang, S., Schmader, T. and Hall, W.M. (2013) L’eggo my ego: Reducing the gender gap in math by unlinking the self from performance’, Self and Identity, 12: 400—12. 9. Forbes, C.E. and Schmader, T. (2010) ‘Retraining attitudes and stereotypes to affect motivation and cognitive capacity under stereotype threat’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99: 740—5 4. 10 .Keifer, A.K. and Sekaquaptewa, D. (2007) ‘Implicit stereotypes and women’s math performance: How implicit gender—math stereotypes influence women’s susceptibility to stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43: 825—32. 11. McKown, C. and Weinstein, R.S. (2003) ‘The development and consequences of stereotype consciousness in middle childhood’, Child Development, 74:498—515. 12. Schmader, T., Johns, M. and Barquissau, M. (2004) The costs of accepting gender differences: The role of stereotype endorsement in women’s experience in the math domain’, Sex Roles, 50: 83 5—50. 13. Brown, R.P. and Lee, M.N. (2005) ‘Stigma consciousness and the race gap in college academic achievement’, Self and Identity, 4: 149—5 7. 14. Brown, R.P. and Pinel, E.C. (2003) ‘Stigma on my mind: Individual differences in the experience of stereotype threat’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39: 626—33. 15. Else-Quest, N.M., Hyde,J.S. and Linn, M.C. (2010) ‘Cross-national patterns of gender differences in mathematics: a meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 136(1): 103—2 7. 16. Nosek, B.A., Smyth, F.L., Sriram, N., Lindner, N.M., Devos, T., Ayala, A. ... and Kesebir, S. (2009) Nationa1 differences in gender—science stereotypes predict national sex differ- 17. Lawrence, J.S., Marks, B.T. and Jackson, J.S. (2010) ‘Domain identification predicts black Students’ underperformance on moderately-difficult tests’, Motivation and Emotion, 34(2): 105—9. 18. Nguyen, H.-H.D. and Ryan, A.M. (2008) ‘Does stereotype threat affect test performance of minorities and women? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 93: 1314—34. 19. Osborne, J.W. and Walker, C. (2006) ‘Stereotype threat, identification with academics, and withdrawal from school: Why the most successful students of colour might be the most likely to withdraw’, Educational Psychology, 26: 563—77. 20. Davis, C.I., Aronson, J. and Salinas, M. (2006) of threat: Racial identity as a moderator of stereotype threat’, Journal of Black Psychology, 32: 399—417. 21. Ployhart, R.E., Ziegert, J.C. and McFarland, L.A. (2003) iJnderstanding racial differences on cognitive ability tests in selection contexts: An integration of stereotype threat and applicant reactions research, Human Performance, 16: 231—59. 22. Schmader, T. (2002) ‘Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38: 194—201. Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Structures | Bourbaki | Thiel I 270 Bourbaki speaks of a reordering of the total area of mathematics according to "mother structures". In modern mathematics, abstractions, especially structures, are understood as equivalence classes and thus as sets. >Sets, >Set theory, >Structures/Mathematics, >Abstracta, >Mathematical entities, >Equivalence classes. Thiel I 307 Bourbaki opposes the "modern" structures to the classical "disciplines". The theory of the primes is closely related to the theory of algebraic curves. >Primes. The Euclidean geometry borders the theory of integral equations. The principle of organization will be one of the hierarchies of structures that goes from simple to complex and from general to particular. >Geometry. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Understanding | Wolfram | Brockman I 282 Understanding/extraterrestrials/Wolfram: If we were to observe a sequence of primes being generated from a pulsar, we’d ask what generated them. Would it mean that a whole civilization grew up and discovered primes and invented computers and radio transmitters and did this? Or is there just some physical process making primes? There’s a little cellular automaton that makes primes. You can see how it works if you take it apart. It has a little thing bouncing inside it, and out comes a sequence of primes. It didn’t need the whole history of civilization and biology and so on to get to that point. >Irreducibility/Wolfram. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Hilbert | Poincaré Vs Hilbert | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik in Kursbuch IV S 46 Frankfurt 1967 PoincaréVsHilbert: in some of his demonstrations, the principle of induction is used, and it is claimed that this principle is the expression of an extra-logical perspective of the human mind. Poincaré concludes that geometry cannot be derived in a purely logical way from a group of postulates. (>Induction). Induction is applied continually in mathematics, among others even in Euclid's proof of the infinity of primes. Induction Principle/Poincaré: this cannot be a law of logic, since it is quite possible to construct a mathematics in which the induction principle is denied. Even Hilbert does not mention it among his postulates, he therefore also appears to be of the opinion that it is not a pure postulate! |
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| Hume, D. | Kripke Vs Hume, D. | Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume). E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45 A posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181 |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Idealism | Ryle Vs Idealism | I 23 RyleVsIdealism/RyleVsMaterialism/Ryle: both idealism and materialism are the answer to a question asked wrongly. Either there is mind or there is body (but not both). E.g. As if someone wanted to say: either I bought a left and a right glove, or a pair. But not both. Ryle: you can speak in a logical tone of mind and in a different tone of the body (of the existence), but these expressions do not to indicate different types of existence, because "Existence"/Ryle: is not a generic word like "color" or "sex". Rather, they show two different meanings of the word "exist". E.g. "rising" can have different meanings: "The tide is rising", "The expectation is rising", "The average age at death is rising". It would be a bad joke to say that now three things have risen. Likewise, a bad joke would be to say that primes, Wednesdays, public opinion and fleets existed. Or that both mind and body exist. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Rorty, R. | Nagel Vs Rorty, R. | I 47 Reality/World/Rorty: we believe it is pointless to ask whether neutrinos are real entities or merely useful heuristic fictions. This is what we mean when we say that it is pointless to ask whether the reality is independent from our statements. There certainly were mountains before we started to talk about mountains. The usefulness of these language games is however unrelated to the question of whether the self-existent reality, regardless of the functional way of describing this reality to people, contains mountains. (>Reality/Rorty) I 47/48 NagelVsRorty: he won't get away so easily: his thesis contradicts the categorical statements about which it claims to be: e.g. there are infinitely many primes, racial discrimination is unjust, water is a mixture, Napoleon was less than two meters tall. Although the subjectivist may insist that he does not dispute those platitudes, he is not able to explain them: 1) There are many truths about the world that we will never know ((s) Why then "about"?) 2) Some of our beliefs are wrong, which will never be discovered. 3) If a belief was true, would it even be true if no one believed it. If Rorty (~) says: "Injustice is nothing more than a violation of the laws of my community.", then he has to add: "Of course, the laws of my community state that not all injustice is a violation of the law." |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Fictionalism | Field, Hartry | I 3 Field: the meaning in which "2+2=4" is true, is rather the meaning in which "Oliver Twist lived in London" is true: namely according to a well-known story, respectively in relation to standard mathematics. I.e. he does not literally believe that "2+2=4"! Field pro fictionalism: this view is the correct one. I 5 Def strong fictionalism: weak fictionalism plus the doctrine that weak fictionalism and platonism must be distinguished. Field pro strong fictionalism: Thesis: weak fictionalism and platonism do not coincide. I 22 Solution/Wagner: (1982): we have a good story about natural numbers and a good story about amounts etc. Within these stories it is completely unimportant whether you identify numbers with quantities or with something else. II 323 Fictionalism/Mathematics/Objectivity/Field: Thesis: there are no mathematical objects at all. a) This leads to the same limitation of mathematical objectivity: "anything goes", as long as it satisfies consistency in the above (broad) sense. II 324 b) Modal Interpretation/Fictionalism/Field: could say a non-direct view of mathematical language according to the example "There are primes greater than a billion" does not claim the existence of anything, but only makes a modal assertion. III 2 Instead: Thesis: Understanding mathematics as fiction. |
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