Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arbitrariness | Field | I 24 Identity/Identification/Field: in many areas, there is the problem of the continuous arbitrariness of identifications. - In mathematics, however, it is stronger than with physical objects. I 181 Solution: Intensity relations between pairs or triples, etc. of points. Advantage: that avoids attributing intensities to points and thus an arbitrary choice of a numerical scale for intensities. III 32 Addition/Multiplication: not possible in Hilbert's geometry. - (Only with arbitrary zero and arbitrary 1) Solution: intervals instead of points. II 310 Non-Classical Degrees of Belief/Uncertainty/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary is a good reason to not assume classical degrees of belief. - (Moderate non-classical logic: That some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded third party). III 31 Figure/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ("what line?"). - What should be zero - what is supposed to be 1? III 32 f Hilbert/Geometry/Axioms/Field: multiplication of intervals: not possible, because for that we would need an arbitrary "standard interval". Solution: Comparing products of intervals. Generalization/Field: is then possible on products of spacetime intervals with scalar intervals. ((s) E.g. temperature difference, pressure difference). Field: therefore, spacetime points must not be regarded as real numbers. III 48 FieldVsTensor: is arbitrarily chosen. Solution/Field: simultaneity. III 65 Def Equally Divided Region/Equally Split/Evenly Divided Evenly/Equidistance/Field: (all distances within the region equal: R: is a spacetime region all of whose points lie on a single line, and that for each point x of R the strict st-between (between in relation to spacetime) two points of R lies, there are points y and z of R, such that a) is exactly one point of R strictly st-between y and z, and that is x, and -b) xy P-Cong xz (Cong = congruent). ((s) This avoids any arbitrary (length) units - E.g. "fewer" points in the corresponding interval or "the same number", but not between temperature and space units. Field: But definitely in mixed products are possible.Then: "the mixed product... is smaller than the mixed product..." Equidistance in each separate region: scalar/spatio-temporal. III 79 Arbitrariness/Arbitrary/Scales Types/Scalar/Mass Density/Field: mass density is a very special scalar field which, due to its logarithmic structure, is "less arbitrary" than the scale for the gravitational potential. >Objectivity, >Logarithm. Logarithmic structures are less arbitrary. Mass density: needs more fundamental concepts than other scalar fields. Scalar field: E.g. height. >Field theory. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Calculus | Field | III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points - then there are no empty areas! >Empty space, >Space, >Geometry, >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. The region needs not to be contiguous nor measurable. >Measurements. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Comparisons | Field | III 121 Nominalization/Field: we use two topologies on the same set (the amount of space-time points) instead of topologies on two different sets, which are connected by a function. - Therefore, we do not have to quantify on functions. a) temperature-based region (warmer, colder or similar to) (region as a set of points) b) the amount of space-time points - thus we get temperature continuity. - Here: purely affine geometry. I.e. only intermediate relation without simultaneity relation or spatial congruence relation. This then applies for all physical theories that have no Newtonian space-time, but a space-time with flat four-dimensional space R4. - Also the special theory of relativity. - (Special theory of relativity: few changes because of gradients and Laplace equations that involve non-affine Newtonian space-time). III 64 Field Thesis: for the General Theory of Relativity we can get more general affine structures. >Relativity Theory. Product/Field/(s): Products of differences: = distances between = points = distance. - Pairs of intervals can only be multiplied if they are of the same kind (scalar or spatial-temporal). Solution: with "mixed multiplication" we can still say that a result is greater than the result of another multiplication with the same components. - That is possible when the spatio-temporal intervals themselves are comparable, i.e. that they lie on the same line or on parallel in affine space. III 68 Product/Comparison/Field: so far we have only spoken of products of absolute values. New: now we also want products with signs. Platonist: this is easy: with new representation functions. Suppose we only have points on a single line L. >Platonism. Old: φ is a coordinate function (representation function) attributing points of R4 (four dimensional space) points on line L. New: φL assigns real numbers to points of L - that's "comparable" with the old φ in the same sense that for each point x and y on L, I φL (x) - φL (y) I = dφ(x, y) are represented. - ((s) Space distance). - The comparison is invariant under choice of orientation. III 68f Product/Equality/Between/Field: we can now define equality and "between" for products with signs. >Definability, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Definitions | Quine | Rorty I 302 Definition: Quine’s attack on the first dogma had made it doubtful. Operational definition: along with Sellar’s doctrine that a "sensory fact" is a function of socialization it became twice as questionable with Quine’s holistic attacks. >Two dogmas, >Definability. Quine I 327 Definition: is an instructions for transformation. It reinstates the singular term. Definitions are flexible, without truth value gaps. II 109 Carnap quasi-analysis: encompasses a full reduction through definition. QuineVs: an assignment of sense qualities to spacetime points must be kept revisable. Therefore it is not attributable to definitions. VII (b) 24 Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: e.g abbreviation or more economic vocabulary (then longer chains). Part and whole are bound by translation rules. The definition key is neither for synonymy nor analyticity. Ad X 70 Definition/object language/meta language/Quine/(s): the term which is defined, cannot stand in the object language, even if the rest of the definition is (not always) in the object language. X 84 Definition/VsQuine: from appropriate method of proof is of no interest, because the property of being provable by a particular method is uninteresting. It is only interesting in connection with the completeness theorem. QuineVsVs: logical truth is not mentioned there. X 101 Context Definition: introduces merely a facon de parler. That creates eliminability at all times without ontological commitment. XIII 43 Definition/Quine: Lexicon entries are a distant echo of what philosophers and mathematicians call definition. Lexicon/Dictionary/Quine: is intended to facilitate our conversations. Def Definition/Quine: to define an expression means to explain how to do without it. XIII 44 Defining is eliminating. Definition/Quine: a) an expression. b) an object. >Expressions, >Objects. One way is reduced to the other, because we define people by defining "people" and numbers by defining numbers or the word "number". Expression/Definition: Definition of expressions is the broader term, because expressions like "or" are also included. Object Definition/Object: this is what we talk about when we think more about the nature of an object. Elimination/Quine: the concept of definition as elimination is especially helpful when definitions are not compatible as in the case of natural numbers. This also applies to the many possible definitions of the ordered pair. All that is required is that x and y can be uniquely obtained from Definition/Quine: has several purposes: sometimes to elucidate the use of the established language, XIII 45 sometimes an idiolect, sometimes philosophical considerations. Definition: if it requires translation from one structure to another, this can enable us to enjoy the advantages of each by switching back and forth. (See singular terms). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Distinctions | Armstrong | Martin I 72 Distinction/Martin: dicstinctions are always based on properties, not on objects. - This holds even for spacetime points or fields. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Events | Montague | Lewis V 246 Definiton Event/Richard Montague/Lewis: (Montague 1969)(1): certain properties of time. Lewis: that means it is identified with the property to be a time when it happens. >Properties, >Time, >Time points, >Space-time, >Spacetime points, >Temporal identity. LewisVsMontague: 1. in the Relativity Theory it is not always clear, what time is. >Relativity Theory. 2. With Montague we first have to find the place with it the region is already given. >Localization, >Spacetime region. Event/Quine: (as Lewis): can be easily identified with the region - then there cannot be two events in one region - if two in the same, it is a single event. >W.V.O. Quine. Wrong: to say e.g. that a "qua conference" the other "qua battle"(if it is the same). >Qua-objects. 1. Richard Montague. On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities. The Monist 53 (2):159-194 (1969) |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Existence Predicate | Simons | Chisholm II 181 Existence/Simons: propositional existence predicate. >Existence. --- Simons I 178 Time/Simons: we take time as dense and empty and as not relativized to events. Singulare term: a singular term is not temporally relativized. Identity predicate: the identity predicate is not temporally relativized either (unlike the existence predicate). >Singular terms, >Identity, >Time. Temporally relativized: "true-at-t": even points in time are not temporally relativized. >Spacetime points. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Four-Dimensionalism | Field | III 36 Space/quantification/four-dimensionalism/time slices/Field: we can quantify over points or regions, without obligation to absolute rest: Solution: We consider a statement about the space as an abbreviation for a statement about each time slice. Time slice/Field: is generated by the relation of simultaneity. - Example: the sentence that the space is Euclidean, is a sentence about the fact that each time slice of space-time is Euclidean. Punch line: then the objects in the range of quantifiers are really space-time points and no longer mere space points. >Scope, >Domains, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Ontology, >Mathematical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Geometry | Field | III 25 Axioms/geometry/Hilbert: geometry can do without real numbers. Quantifiers: go beyond regions of the physical space. Predicates: among others: "is a point"- "x is between y u z", "inclusive betweenness": i.e. it is permissible that y = x or y = z. >Quantifiers. III 26 Segment congruence/congruence: (instead of distance) four-digit predicate "xy cong zw" intuitively: "the distance between point x and point y is the same as that from point z to point w". Angle congruence: six-digit predicate "xyz-" W-Comg tuv-": the angle xyz (with y as the tip) has the same size as the angle tuv (with u as a tip). N.B./Field: Distance and angle size cannot be defined at all because it is not quantified using real numbers. III 32 Addition/multiplication: Addition and multiplication is not possible in Hilbert's geometry - (only with arbitrary zero point and arbitrary 1). Solution: intervals instead of points. III 32 f Hilbert/Geometry/Axioms/Field: Multiplication of intervals: not possible because we need an arbitrary "unity-interval". Solution: comparison of products of intervals. Generalization/Field: is then possible on products of space-time intervals with scalar intervals ((s) E.g. temperature difference, pressure difference). Field: therefore space-time points cannot be regarded as real numbers. >Spacetime points, >Real numbers. III 42 Geometry/Field: a) metric: platonistic, quantification via real numbers (> functions) b) synthetic: without real numbers: E.g. Hilbert, also Euclid (because he had no theory of real numbers). (This is also possible without functions). Advantage: no external, causally irrelevant entities. >Mathematical entities, >Theoretical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Individual Calculus | Field | III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist of the problem of points in regions: Individual calculus/Goodman: regions as sums of points. But then there are no empty areas. - Then a region needs not to be continuous or measurable. >Nominalism, >Relationism, >Substantivalism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points, cf. >Four-dimensionalism, >Mathematical entities. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Knowledge | Field | I 83 Knowledge/Logic/Field: logical knowledge: when logic is confined to the if-then form: then we have no knowledge about what does not follow. >Implication, >Conditional, >Logic. Solution: differentiated deflationism: two parts: (i) Knowledge, which mathematical statement follows from other mathematical statements. (ii) additional knowledge about the consistency of mathematical statements (and other fundamental). ((s) Knowledge about consistency is no conclusion of something). ((s) Consistency/(s): is itself not a conclusion.) Field: E.g. knowledge about all models is not a logical knowledge. Syntactically: E.g. "There is a derivative of B from A": is not a logical knowledge, but knowledge about existence. >Syntax. Deflationism: both is logical knowledge. VsDeflationism: the fundamental is metalogical. >Deflationism. I 88 Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. >Consistency, >Axioms, >Levels (Order). FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. Cf. >Truth/Kripke. Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. >Logical truth. Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical, because we find no contradiction. >Empiricism, >Contradictions, >Description levels, >Induction. I 93 Knowledge/Possibility/Field: there is knowledge of possibility that is not only based on knowledge of necessity. - Only by thinking about the logical form. Problem: E.g.: "There are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 apples": every statement of the same logical form as this is also a logical truth. - (But in terms of content, it is wrong). >Content. Then one no longer had to rely on the actuality. >Actuality, >Actualism, >Possible worlds, >Actual world. Then it would be categorical knowledge. E.g. apples/Field: here we have stronger reason to believe in the possibility than in the actuality. Field: but there are infinitely many physical entities: namely, space-time regions. >Spacetime points, >Infinity. I 94 Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem, whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. >Platonism. FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another? |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lawlikeness | Schurz | I 237 Laws of nature/natural laws/Schurz: Laws of nature do not refer to specific physical systems but express what is valid for any systems in all physically possible universes. E.g. Newton's nuclear axioms (E.g. total force = mass times acceleration, E.g. force = counterforce, E.g. gravitational force is proportional to the product of masses). Only if they are used system conditions, which explicitly list the present forces, we get a concretely solvable differential equation. There are only a few fundamental ones and they are found only in physics. However, most of the laws of physics are: Def system laws/Schurz: involve concrete contingent system conditions. Therefore they are not physically necessary but contingent. Example law of fall, example law of pendulum, example law of planets etc. Law-likeness/law-like/Schurz: a) in the broad sense: the law-like character of spatiotemporally limited general propositions is gradual. In this sense not only the laws of nature but also all system laws are law-like. Counterfactual conditionals: if we would agree to them are an indication of law-likeness. Problem: the counterfactual conditional also characterizes spatiotemporally bounded laws Ex "All ravens are black". Counterfactual conditionals/Schurz: on the other hand: we would not say Ex "If this apple had not been in the basket, it would not be green." >Counterfactual conditionals, >Laws of nature, >Laws. I 237 Similarity-metris/Possible Worlds/Counterfactual Conditional/RescherVsLewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1973b(1)): for philosophy of science, Lewis' logical semantics for counterfactual conditionals yields little, because the substantive interpretation of the similarity metric between Possible Worlds presupposes that we already know a distinction between laws and contingent facts. (Stegmüller 1969(2), 320-334). I 238 Law-like/law-like/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness resp. graduality of the broad term). Problem: Not all spatiotemporally unrestricted laws are law-like in the narrow sense. Universal but not physically necessary: Ex "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometer". Universality: is not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for law-likeness. E.g. the universal proposition "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if one replaces it by its contraposition: Ex "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965(3), 341). Strong Hume-thesis/Hume/Schurz: universality is a sufficient condition for law-likeness. SchurzVs: this is wrong Weak-Hume thesis/Schurz: universality is a necessary condition for law-likeness. >Causality/Hume. Stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than that it is necessary. BhaskarVWeak Hume-thesis. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell conditional/law-like: laws of nature or nomological predicates must not contain an analytic reference to particular individuals or spacetime points (spacetime points). This is much stronger than the universality condition. >Stronger/weaker. Ex "All emeralds are grue": is spatiotemporally universal, but does not satisfy Maxwell's condition. >Grueness. I 239 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Thesis: Laws of nature are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. >Laws of nature/Armstrong, >Causality/Armstrong. Maxwell-Conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): represent a physical symmetry principle: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry principles/principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! >Symmetries/Feynman, >Symmetries/Kanitscheider. Maxwell-condition/Schurz: is too weak for law-like character: e.g. "no lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km" also this universal theorem fulfills it. Law-likeness/Mill/Ramsey/Lewis/Schurz: proposal: all those general propositions which follow from those theories which produce the best unification of the set of all true propositions. (Lewis 1973b(1), 73). Vs: problem: it remains unclear why one should not add the proposition Bsp "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than 1 km". Because many true singular propositions also follow from it. Solution/Schurz: we need a clear notion of physical possibility. Problem: we have no consistent demarcation of natural laws and system laws. 1. Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 3. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Object | Putnam | Field IV 409 Object/thing/language/internal realism/world/Putnam: thesis: objects themselves are also made as they are discovered. FieldVsPutnam: then you would have to regard non-seperate parts as language-dependent, but they are language independent. >Internal realism. --- Putnam I (i) 247 Realism/reality/objects/spacetime points/Putnam: Kripke, Quine and Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the spacetime region, which it occupies? Quine: the chair and its constituent electromagnetic and other fields are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, however, have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could take another spacetime region. QuineVsKripke: this evidence is worthless because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. Lewis: Quine is right, in terms of the chair, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates. LewisVsKripke: not the chair, but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. Putnam: it is nonsense to ask whether the chair is identical with the matter or coexists with it. There is no convention: if the chair is blue. Convention: it is a convention whether it is a spacetime region, and if we have to decide that. Spacetime points are imagined by some authors as predicates. Then the spacetime region is a set of properties. Putnam: that is a matter of opinion >Four-Dimensionalism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ontology | Feynman | I 246 Ontology/Feynman: The "reality" of an object is a little bigger (roughly and intuitively spoken) than its "width" and "depth", because they depend on how we look at it. >Perception, >Seeing. Relativity theory: our brain has never had any experiences with speed close to c so that we could not integrate any experience, of the type that time and space are of the same kind. >Experience. It is as if we could always stand in a position and not turn in the other direction. If we could, we would see a little of the other man's time. We would "look back" a little. Space-Time/Feynman: In a world where space and time are "mixed" (this is actually our world, seen close to speed of light), objects are more like a kind of "blob", viewed from different perspectives when we move at different speeds. I 247 Measuring/Geometry/Feynman: there are properties which are independent of the particular type of measurement. For example, the distance between two points in a rotated coordinate system when one of the two points is in the origin. The square of the distance is x² + y² + z². What about space-time? Space-Time/Geometry/Feynman: it is easy to show that there is also an invariance here: I 248 The combination c²t² x² y² z² is the same before and after the transformation: c²t' ² x' ² y' ² z' ² = c²t² x² y² z². ( 17.3?) Ontology/Feynman: this quantity is something that is "real" like the distance in a sense. It is called the Def "interval" between two spacetime points. >Space, >Time, >Space-time, >Space-time points, >Reality, >Absoluteness, >Invariance. I 448 Existence/Ontology/Feynman: if the polarization changes faster than we can measure it, we call it light. This is unpolarized, because all polarization effects are eliminated. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Relationism | Field | I 171 Def Relationism: Thesis: no empty space exists. Def Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. Part-relation: exists in both. >Space, >Absoluteness, >Motion, >Spacetime points. I 181 Relationism/Field: makes field theory impossible - because it excludes empty space. I 182 Putnam: Relationism can take the field as an enormous (because of the infinity of the physical forces) object. - Then for each region one part of it. - FieldVs: this trivializes the relativism. I 183 Field theory/FT/Substantivalism/Field: for the substantivalism the field is not a gigantic object, but no entity at all. Field theory: is for the substantivalism only the attribution of causal predicates to regions. I 216 Problem of Quantities/FieldVsRelationism: the only way to show that there is a (narrow) spatial relation, is to assume that the double distance itself is a spatial relation. But relationism cannot do this because it wants to define it first, and cannot presuppose it as defined. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Second Order Logic, HOL | Field | I 37 Second Order Logic/Second Order Logic/Higher Order Logic/HOL/Field: Here, the the quantifiers have no recursive method of evidence. >Quantifiction, >Quantifiers, >Logic, >Recursion. Quantification/Field: therefore it is vague and indeterminate, but even then applies: (A > logically true (A)) & (~ A > logically true (~ A)) is always true. The vagueness refers to the A. --- II 238 Referential indeterminacy/logical operators/2nd order Logic/Field: special case: Question: can complex logical operators - e.g., unrestricted 2nd order quantifiers ((s) via properties) have any particular truth conditions? No: e.g. everything that you express with them can be reformulated (reduced) with a more restricted quantification (via sets). It does not help to say e.g. "with "for all properties" I mean for all properties". >"Everything he said"). >Truth conditions, >Sets, >Extensions, >Extensionality. All/Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. >All/Field. ((s) There could be a contradictory, still undiscovered property which should not be included under "all properties.") Field: E.g. Acceleration near speed of light - here the definitive operator would again help. VsDeflationism: Deflationism could simply say ".. all .. " is true iff all ... Vs: in addition one needs the definitive-operator (dft-operator), which demands conditions - but it does not specify them. Field: dito with Higher Order Quantification (HOL). --- III 39 First order Logic/2nd order/stronger/weaker/attenuation/Field: to weaken the second order logic to the 1st order, we can attenuate the second-order axioms to the axiom-schemata of first-order , namely the schema of separation. Problem: not many non-standard models come in. Namely, models in which quantities that are in reality infinite, satisfy the formula which usually defines straight finiteness. >unintended models. III 92 2nd Order Logic/Field: we have it at two places: 1. At the axiomatization of the geometry of the spacetime and at the scalar order of spacetime points we have III 93 The "complete logic of the part-whole relation", or the "complete logic of the Goodman sums". 2. The binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman's sums: Goodman's sum: it's logic is sufficient to give comparisons of powerfulness. For heuristic reasons, however, we want to keep an extra logic for powerfulness ("less than"). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Space | Field | III 35 Empty Space/Field: would be one without space-time points: senseless! - ((s) only for Platonism). >Platonism, >Spacetime, >Spacetime points. III 35 Space/time/Field: quantification over space-time points is something other than mere quantification over space points when a space point should be something that exists in time. Because that leads to the wrong question: whether a space point is identical to the same point in time - which in turn leads to the wrong question, if there was absolute rest. >Absolute rest, >Absoluteness, >Time. III 36 Regions/points/Field: solution for the nominalist: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. Then there are no empty areas! Regions then need not be contiguous, or can be measured. >Relationism, >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Space Time | Field | I 70 Space time points/space time/Field: space time points have complete causal action capability. Then one can even do without electrons. Instead: mass, charge, etc. of the electron as properties of the space time regions. >Physics/Field, >Ontology, >Theoretical entities. I 72 Space time should be given priority to the field, if there are several fields. --- III 31 Spacetime points/Field: are not abstract but empirical. III 47f Space-Time/Field: differs from space not only in that it is 4-dimensional, but also in the fact that it has no full Euclidean structure. And it also has an extra structure that is not present in the 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Spatial distance cannot be objectively compared with time, although one could arbitrarily define a comparison (e.g. with uniform movement). >Time, >Motion. III 52 ((s) Space time/space-time/(s): Non-Euclidean, since no common measure for lengths and durations is available. Different: R4 (four-dimensional space) - here there is a common measure in all dimensions.) |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Substantivalism | Field | I 13 Def substantivalism/Field: asserts that literal speech about space can be taken at face value, even without physical objects. Then it is also useful to say that the space is empty. >Space, >Empty Space, >Relationism. I 14 FieldVsSubstantivalism: is forced to answer a relationist in his own terms. I 47 Substantivalism/Field: (the thesis that there are empty spacetime regions). Space time regions are known as causally active: e.g. field theories such as classical electromagnetism or the general relativity theory or quantum field theory. Resnik: we should not ask "What properties of the spacetime points ..?" but "What is the structure of space-time?" FieldVsResnik: that's wrong. The theory of the electromagnetic field is also that of the properties of the parts of the space time that are not occupied by objects. I 171 Definition Substantivalism/Field: Thesis: empty space exists. - Definition Relationism: Thesis: there is no empty space. Part-of-relation: exists in both. >Part-of-relation. I 181 Substantivalism/Field: favors the field theory. >Field theory. I 184 Substantivalism/Newton pro: E.g. bucket experiment: shows that we need the concept of absolute acceleration and the one of the equality of place over time - (space that exists through time). --- III 34f Field pro substantivalism: there is empty space time. - Spacetimepoints are entities in their own right. - Field: that is compatible with the nominalism. - VsRelationism: this cannot accept Hilbert's axioms. VsRelationism: cannot accept physical fields. - Platonism: assumes at fields spacetime points with properties. - VsRelationism: this one cannot do it. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Time | Simons | I 90f Interval/time interval/mereology/van Benthem/Needham/Simons: interval is a term of time and terms of temporal intervals. Needham: an interval is temporal betweenness. Benthem: the term "interval" is part of time organization. >Time, >Parts, >Temporal identity. I 117 Object/thing/everyday language/time/existence/modification/terminology/Simons: we say, an ordinary material object lasts in time (enduring in time) but it is not extended in time (developing, extending, extended in time ). Cf. >Endurantism, >Perdurantism. Participants in the race (continuants) have no temporal parts. The race has temporal parts. I 178 Time/Simons: we assume time as being dense and empty and not relativized onto events. >Events. Singular Term: the singular term is also not temporally relativized. Identity predicate: the identity predicate is not time relativized (unlike the existence predicate). >Singular terms. Time relativized is written as follows: "true-to-t". Points in time themselves are not relativized temporal. >Spacetime points. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Counterfactual Conditional | Field Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 220 Problem of Quantities/PoQ/Modality/Field: but this does not exclude a possible modal solution to the PoQ: perhaps other operators can help? Anyway, I do not know how that could be excluded, even if I do not know what these operators should look like. I 221 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./PoQ/Field: one suggestion is to use Counterfactual Conditional to solve the PoQ: FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: 1) they are known to be extremely vague. Therefore, you should not rely on them when formulating a physical theory. Neither should we use Counterfactual Conditional for the development of geometrical concepts. 2) DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: They cannot be "barely true": if a Counterfactual Conditional is supposed to be true, then there must be some facts (known or unknown facts) that can be determined without Counterfactual Conditional, and by virtue of which the Counterfactual Conditional are true. (Dummett, 1976, p.89). Then the relationism cannot use the Counterfactual Conditional for the PoQ, because in that case the principle requires: if distance relations are counterfactually defined, then situations that differ in their distance relations (like situations A and B) must also differ in non-counterfactual respects!. Substantivalism: can guarantee that. Relationism: cannot, and if it could, it would need no Counterfactual Conditional. 3) VsCounterfactual conditionals: does not work for very similar reasons for which the version with impredicative properties (P3) did not work: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot also be counterfactually defined, (This is the formal reason for the metaphysical argument of Dummett, for why Counterfactual Conditional cannot be "barely true"). E.g. In order to prove the incompatibility of "double distance" and "triple distance" (given that z and w do not occupy the same point, i.e. given that zw is not congruent with zz - (logical form: local equality) - then you would need the incompatibility of the following: a) if there were a point u in the middle between x and y, then uy would be congruent with zw. b) if there were a point s between x and y, and a point t between s and y, so that xs, st and ty were all congruent, then ty would be congruent with zw. If these Counterfactual Conditional were somehow derivable from non-counterfactual statements, E.g. statements about spacetime points (ST points), then you could probably, and by way of derivation. I 222 Together with the demonstrable relations between the non-counterfactual statements win an argument for the incompatibility of (a) and (b). But if we have no non-counterfactual support, we would have to consider them as bare facts. That would not be so bad if you only needed a small amount of them, but we would need a very large number of them. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Armstrong Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Armstrong II (c) 88/89 ArmstrongVsQquine: (like Martin): even 4-dimensional spacetime points must be described as a carriers of properties. The properties cannot be "measured mathematically." There can be no quantities and numbers in the absence of properties which distinguish them. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Space Time | Field, Hartry | I 70 Spacetime points/Field: thesis: have complete causal action capability. They are not an arena in which electrons act, but one can even do without electrons as independent agents (or entities). I 171 Relationism/R/Spacetime/Time/Field: Thesis: there is no spacetime beyond the accumulation of physical objects or aggregates. This does not mean that there are no spacetime regions. But: Prerequisite: that we find a method how to "logically construct" regions from aggregates of matter. Thesis: spacetime only logical construction. There is no spacetime! Substantivalism/S/Field: thesis: that beyond ("over an above") the physical entities there is an ("empty", for itself existing) spacetime. This also means that the spacetime is not merely "logically constructed" from aggregates of matter. I 175 Def Monadicism/Horwich/Field: (Horwich, 1978): Thesis: denies, like relationism, that space time exists. ((s) empty, for itself existing spacetimes). Spacetime only logical construction! VsRelationalism: no aggregates of matter or relations between them. Instead: primitive monadic properties of spacetime locations. ((s) As basic concept). III 34 Relationism: thesis: that there is no empty spacetime >substantivalismVs). a) reductive relationism: points and regions of spacetime are only set theoretical constructions. b) eliminative relationism: one must not quantify via points and regions of the spacetime at all. FieldVsRelationalism: I support substantivalism: spacetime points (or spacetime regions) are entities in their own right. Def Substantivalism/Field: External: Field I: 13 (Def thesis that speech about space is literally true (independent of physical objects, then (empty) space is self-perceptible, empty space exists). Field pro. |
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