Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 26 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-Realism | Logic Texts | Read III 273 Antirealism/Dummett/Read: understanding must be shown - understanding must manifest itself - truth is not evidence-transcendent. VsTradition: Understanding of counterfactual situations can not be manifest, not communicated, and therefore not be acquired. >Ostension, cf. >Realism. "Manifestation challenge": what right do we have to give speakers an understanding of expressions that goes beyond what they can show in their linguistic behaviour? This is the third argument of ConstructivismVsRealism. Question: what can count as manifestation. >Constructivism. Read III 274 From a finite set of postulates one can recursively generate a potentially infinite output. Problem: how can the learning child understand the language if it is not fixed to this actual set but only to manifestations? Chomsky's answer: there are preprogrammed structures. Gap between evidence and theory: need not be closed in this way. Anti-Realism/Read: closes it by denying that theory is so beyond data! Meaning can be nothing other than speakers manifesting in its use. This denies that meaning can have a private element. >Meaning, >Speaker meaning, >Language behavior, >Use, >Use theory. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Assertibility | Strawson | Nagel I 71 Crispin Wright: considers the view that truth could range further than assertibility to be too extreme: how can a sentence be unrecognizably true? (VsRealism) >Realism, >Assertibility, >Truth. StrawsonVs this draws the image of what Wittgenstein has reportedly asserted: it simply does not correspond with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough to at least occasionally recognize inconsistencies and conclusions in what was said which are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what was said. >Sense, >Meaning, >Understanding, >Language community. Wright I 77 Wright: Assertibility/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional conception has "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he utters the sentence". >Language behavior, >Behavior, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. StrawsonVsSemantic Anti-Realists: it only makes sense to consider an assertion to be justified if this assertion supports the commitment to something that lies beyond its justification. ((s) "background", single, isolated sentences are not assertible but neither are they sensibly debatable.) cf. >Background. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Assertions | Dewey | Putnam II 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: Justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture - norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. >Norms, >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. PutnamVsRorty: Assertibility is independent of majority, but not transcendent reality but property of the concept of justification. >Justification. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim that they can stand inside and outside of language at the same time. >Relativism, >Realism, >Circular reasoning. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Beliefs | Dummett | III (c) 124 Def Belief/Dummett: Belief stems from the gap between truth conditions of a sentence and the conditions under which something is held to be true. >Truth conditions, >Understanding. Rorty IV 23 Dummett: (Plato ditto): some of our true beliefs are related to the world in a way, in which others are not related to it. - ((s) Explanation: that means not to define a basic attitude per or VsRealism.) |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Brains in a Vat | Putnam | VI 391 Brains in a vat/BIV/metaphysical realism/Putnam: brains in a vat is a part of metaphysical realism, not of internal realism. Then "verified" does not imply "true". >Internal realism, >Metaphysical realism. --- V 21f Brains in a vat/Reference/Putnam: the language of brains in the vat does not refer to anything in the outside world. There is no reference. They cannot even think "We are brains in a vat". V 77ff Bracketing/Putnam: parenthetical thoughts have no reference conditions that would make them true. Internalism: (existential questions only within a theory:) as brains in a vat we cannot think here that we are in the vat, except the bracketed sense. V 179 Brains in a vat/PutnamVsBrains in a vat: our worldview is coherent, because, taken as a whole, it includes an explanation of our activity of coping and developing a world theory. --- I (a) 21 Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat cannot refer to brains in a vat. Meanings are not in the head. I (f) 156f Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat is no problem for internalism, there are no possible worlds. Externalism: here it is possible that some brains are outside the vat. >Internalism, >Externalism. Realism: realism asserts extrinsic connections between signs and things that help explain the nature of the reference. PutnamVs: e.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of the word "electron" does not refer to these books. VsRealism: realism cannot determine the "right kind of causality". >Reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Coherence | Millikan | I 8 Coherence/Millikan: one will have to explain why coherence is good, how it helps us, not just what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in a total theory about the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of his task, it has not succeeded in overcoming the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. >Empiricism. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealism are very simple: VsRealism: "To find the meaning of a word, one must see what would justify its application, or what an application would cause. But the application is justified by earlier applications! And it was caused by past beliefs! ((s) also VsCausal theory, VsCorrespondence theory). >Causal theory of knowledge. >Realism, >Correspondence theory. Correspondence: does not play any role in the justification or the causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: this can be turned around just as well: Correspondence theory: pro: Correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond in a certain way to a part of the world. The fact that correspondence plays no role in the justification of an utterance can equally well be turned around: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification. (Millikan pro!). Sentence Meaning/Meaning/Millikan: are the special mapping functions of the sentence. But since we reject correspondence as a test for truth, the mapping function cannot exist in rules in the head. I 10 It cannot be the "user" who "assumes" that his sentences represent the world so and so. In addition, the "assumes" (the "should") that determines the meaning must be a different "assumes" ("should") than that of "assuming" from a person that it behaves in accordance with the expectation of others according to rules. ("Should behave"). Mapping function/image/meaning/Millikan: the questions become more and more difficult: What kind of things are that that map sentences? What kind of mapping functions are involved? What is the "should"? Knowledge/Self/Meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way, as I justify my utterances, defines my meanings, how can I grasp what I think myself? >Self-knowledge. Thesis: We will have to give up that we know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of consistency (the essence of coherence) fits into nature. For this I need Fregean sense as the main concept. As one can be mistaken in knowledge, so also in meaning. I 324 Coherence/Millikan: coherence is essentially consistency (consistent, consistency). The lack of contradictions can be a test for the adequacy of terms. Namely, before the theories were developed at all. Perception judgement/repetition/Millikan: if a judgment can be repeated, it is a test in which no conclusion (inference) plays a role at all. Then it is only about coherence (of judgments, not of theories). >Perception, >Judgment. Coherence/Millikan: can therefore also be viewed as a test for truth, without necessitating a holism. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Conceptual Schemes | Strawson | I 76ff System of concepts/conceptual scheme/particular/Strawson: attempt at an alternative object language, without preference of material bodies. (VsRealism) >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. Anyone can think of identifying pariculars, without talking about it. - But that could originally depend on the ability to communicate. >Understanding, >Identification, >Individuation. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Correspondence | Millikan | I 107 Correspondence/correspondence relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon. 2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides! 3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value. N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance). Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole). E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar. I 108 Transformation/sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair). Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations. I 307 Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways. Cf. >Picture theory. I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. >Representation. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked. >Reference, >Interpretation. Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers. Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself, E.g. COW Or by holding up a different sign, e.g. REFERS Or maybe CAUSES. Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know": The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head, ((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general"). PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer. >Intentionality. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Empiricism | Millikan | I 247 Empiricism/EmpiricismVsRealism/Hume/Millikan: revolutionary in Hume was that nothing should be in the mind, which had not previously been in the senses. Thus the previous distinction between perception and thought coincided. Problem: the problem is now no longer how we should construct the temporal from the eternal,... I 248 ...but how we should construct durable objects from momentary objects. (Hume/(s) thesis: an object exists only in a moment and later again it exists new). This led to forms of nominalism and phenomenalism. >Hume, >Empiricism/Hume, >Perception, >Knowledge. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Intentionality | Millikan | I 13 Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: Intentionality is not transparent: many processes that are "about" something are not aware for their users. E.g. von Frisch knew what a bee dance is about, the bees do not know. Bees react only appropriately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the referent is identified. >Reference, >Identification. I 93 Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: Intentionality is based on external natural relations. Relation: these relations are normal relations or eigenrelations. Normality: is explained by evolution. "In the head": nothing that is in the head, shows "by itself" consciousness or intentionality. 1. Nothing which can be observed in a single person (dispositions or neural patterns) will contain the intentional nature, let alone representational content. 2. Therefore we have no a priori knowledge of what we mean. >a priori/Millikan. I 244 Intentionality/Millikan: thinking-of (thinking-about) requires an identification of the value. I 245 Intentionality/Millikan: three questions must be separated: 1. What is it for a thought to be about an object? 2. What is it for a person to grasp the object of the thought? 3. What kind of test is there to determine whether an object is the one for which it is held? I 250 Intentionality/MillikanVsRealism/Millikan: Solution: There can be simple thoughts of complex objects. Furthermore, my theory allows you to know what you think while you discover the complexity of your thinking. Intension/Millikan: my theory does not confuse intentionality with having distinctive intensions. That is, a concept can change with time without losing the trace of the thing it is about. (Conceptual change, > meaning change). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mathematics | Bigelow | I VII Mathematics/BigelowVsField: can be understood realistically when viewed as a study of universals, properties and relations, of patterns and structures of things that can be in different places at the same time. >Universals, >Properties, >Relations, >Structures. I 346 Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: Pro Realism of Mathematics. ((s) The thesis that numbers exist as objects. And thus also sets, and all possible mathematical objects or entities. (FieldVs.) We agree with the antirealists that there are human creations: For example, words, ideas, diagrams, images, terms, theories, texts, academic departments, etc. >Antirealism. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: of mathematics: is well compatible with modal realism. >Modal realism, >Modalities. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: no one believes that everything in science is real. There must be (useful) fictions. Therefore, one can in principle be a realist in relation to everyday things and at the same time a mathematical antirealist. For example, Field: Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: is at the same time a realist regarding space-time, particles and fields. Vgl. >Hartry Field, >Relationism, >Substantivalism. I 347 Realism/Antirealism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there is something wrong with this marriage: mathematics is not a small element of science but a very large one. It is also not easy to isolate. Example: Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: did not know about instantaneous speed yet. For him, speed was simply a course divided by time. A falling object then had an average speed, although Galileo was not aware of this either. Therefore, he made the following mistake: if two bodies are dropped together and one of them continues to fly, they both have exactly the same speed until the first one stops. Galileo: but had to assume that this body was slower, because the other body needed less than twice as much for the eventual double distance. I 348 Rate of fall/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the average velocity cannot be proportional to the distance. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if anything is evidence for realism, it is this: an object that falls twice as far does not have twice the average velocity. If you find out, you are a realist in terms of how long it takes for an object to reach a given distance. This makes us realists in terms of velocity, time and distance. ((s) The problem arose from the fact that Galileo was forced to adhere to the definitions he had set up himself, otherwise he would have had to change his theory.). Average/VsRealism/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that average is only an abstraction. VsVs: we do not need the average here at all: it is simply true that the object falls faster in the second section, and that simply means that the average velocity cannot be the same. Velocity/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: he respects that it is physically real. And caused by forces and proportional to these forces, so velocity was causally effective for him. Velocity/today/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think today that it is the instantaneous speed which is causally effective, never the average velocity. I 349 Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the equations we use to describe the relations between different falling objects are human inventions, but not the relations themselves. Rate of fall/fall law/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: the distance is proportional to the square of the time traveled. How is this abstract law based on concrete physical facts? Galileo: in the first unit of time the body falls a certain distance, in the second unit not double, but triple of this distance, in the third five units, and so on. Predecessor/Bigelow/Pargetter: this had already been anticipated in the Middle Ages. >Numbers. I 350 Middle Ages/Thesis: an increment has been added to each section. One, three, five, seven... Now the sum of the first n odd numbers is n². Then it seems to be based on nothing but rules for the use of symbols that (1 + 3 +... + (2n - 1) = n². But this is a mistake: Numbers/Number/Bigelow/Pargetter: may be abstract, but they are present in an important sense in the physical objects: in a collection of objects that have this number, they are the common thing. For example, a collection of objects which has the number n². I 350 You can just see that the pattern has to go on like this. I 351 And so it is in Galileo's case. Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the differences to physical bodies should not blind us for the similarities. If objects instantiate the same numbers, the same proportions will exist between them. >Instantiation. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): For example, a collection of 3 objects instantiates the number three. I 352 Equation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (e.g. Galileo's fall rate, which was wrong) is a description of real relations between real objects. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: this view can roughly be called Platonist. Bigelow/Pargetter: pro Platonism, but without the usual Platonic doctrines: we do not assume forms or ideals taken from an earlier existence that we cannot see in our world, and so on. >Platonism. Realism/Universal Realism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is closer to Aristotle: the universals are here in our world, not in an otherworldly. >Realism, >Aristotle. BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative versus quantitative characteristics of objects. I 377 Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: (...) I 378 Patterns unfold patterns. The structures of mathematics show up not only in the hardware of physics, but also in the "mathware", through properties and relations in different areas of mathematics. For example, not only objects, but also numbers can be counted. Proportions, for example, stand in proportions to each other. This is the reflexivity within mathematics. Cf. >Hartry Field. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Nature | Millikan | I 247 Thing/nature/being/classical realism/Millikan: because permanent objects could not step in front of the (only momentary conscious) mind, the thing and its nature had to be separated. (Nature is eternal and necessary, the thing is transient and accidental). >Realism. Nature/classical realism: was sometimes interpreted in a simplistic way as a set of properties. Problem: how can the nature of a transient thing, its very identity, be a set of eternal properties? Identity/MillikanVsRealism: how can the identity of a thing be something other than this thing again? But that did not worry the philosophers back then. >Identity/Millikan, >Reality, >Properties/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Properties | Armstrong | III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Properties | Martin | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Properties | Place | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Quine | Fodor | IV 37 Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) which equals the >Quine-Duhem Thesis. (>Two Dogmas: phrases do not stand individually before the tribunal). IV 39f PragmatismVsRealism/QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions are not analytically included in statements. Confirmation Holism/Fodor/Lepore: confirmation holism does not have to be a pragmatist, it can also be a realist. This is compatible with the Quine-Duhem thesis (i.e. that sentences are not individually verifiable). Confirmation is not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). Quine: this is a priori equivalent to semantics. Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: is a method of verification. Quine-Duhem thesis: is highly consistent with realism. Quine-Duhem thesis: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided, b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori. Quine-Duhem thesis/Fodor/Lepore: the Quine-Duhem thesis can also be read as: a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation or b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning. IV 2189 Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Realism | Barrow | I 45 VsRealism/Barrow: ignores the limitations of our mind. - e.g. The limit of a sequence often has properties that no term of the sequence has. - E.g. Someone may be realist in terms of the existence of the muon, but hemust describe its properties pragmaticclly and anti-realistically. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theories, >Theory language, >Description. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Realism | Cartwright | I 3 Realism/Cartwright: says that if theoretical laws are wrong, the phenomenological, it must be more so. - CartwrightVsRealism: it is just the opposite: when it comes to experiments, the fundamental laws are worse off. - ((s) Because it does not predict the numerical values obtained in the experiment.) >Natural laws, >Laws, >Fundamental law/Cartwright, >Reality, >Experiments. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Davidson | Rorty IV 32 Realism/DavidsonVsRealism/Rorty: DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: terms such as "the nature of things" or "the world" (and a fortiori) "according to the World" are completely meaningless, and unable to explain anything. It is something completely unspecifiable. >Correspondence theory/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Fraassen | I 4 Realism/FraassenVsRealism: inverted error as in positivism: instead of making everything into language, it realizes everything that cannot be defined away. >Positivism. I 7 ((s) VsRealism/Fraassen/(s): realism cannot claim that the present best theory is false, i.e. it is ultimately denying progress.) I 9 However, the orientation to truth does not imply that we are ever entitled to believe a theory. I 21 Realism/Best Explanation/Fraassen: every regularity needs an explanation. Nominalism: there are only regularities, but they do not all have to be explained. >Nominalism. I 24 Regularities are "mere facts" (or: "naked facts"). I 32f Sellars: pro Realism - Theory/Sellars: explains not at all, but shows why observable objects obey so-called laws - there are no empirical laws - For example that water boils at 100°C is valid only under normal pressure. - (> Laws/Nancy Cartwright, Theories/Cartwright, Explanations/Cartwright). I 37 Realism/Dummett: new: realism should not relate classes of entities and expressions, but classes of statements - these can only be understood by reference to the kind thing we would accept as evidence - thus the nominalist becomes a realist. I 38 Realism/Dummett/Fraassen: this is where Dummett is concerned with language. - According to him, not all sentences must be true/false - but they can be! Constructive Empiricism: also the constructive empiricism adopts mind-independent truth values. FraassenVsDummett: this is not about language. >Empiricism. I 209 Realism/Fraassen pro: we know of some regularities - so there must be underlying reasons - according to Thomas Aquina's proof of God's existence. >Proof of God's existence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Realism | Putnam | Rorty I 305ff Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty: an anti-realist understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct descriptions of a solid inventory, but he/she does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals. >Antirealism. PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. Internal realism: (according to Rorty): is a position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment". >Internal realism. Putnam: by means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. >Conventions. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language >Relativism. --- Putnam VI 389 Realism/Putnam: realism explains why theories tend to convergence. Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world. VI 395 f Realism/fact/Putnam: e.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points, that is, into smaller and smaller segments. Then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments. Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. "Hard core" realism: the "hard core" realism would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions. VI 398 Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - this is stated b Quine in ontological relativity. >Metaphysical realism, >Ontological rellativity. --- Putnam VI 404 PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) it has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention. --- Putnam I (c) 78 Realism/Putnam: realism must left it inexplicable that e.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. What has prediction to do with truth then? I (c) 95 Realism: a realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory. >Junctions, >Connectives. I (g) 175f PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism faces infinitely many correspondences. There are endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. Problem: to choose the right correspondence, without a metaphysical access. ((s)> Loewenheim, >Unintended models. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Rorty | IV 29 ff Realism/method/Rorty: Realism has no special method. >Method. IV 29 f Realism asserts that science is a natural way. >Natural kind/Rorty. It is not enough to explain the success of the technique by the existence of elementary particles, when he realizes that such a statement is trivial. Realism needs a special relationship that plays a role in any other activity of man. VI 175 Realism/Anti-Realism: Rorty as Fine: better: a point of view beyond. >Antirealism/Rorty. VI 327 RortyVsRealism: wants to explain the success of predictions by reference to truth. But the success of a true theory must equally be explained historically and sociologically, as the success of a false theory. >Theory, >Success, >Explanation, >Science. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Schurz | I 211 Realism/theory of science/Schurz: two types: (a) metaphysical I 212 b) hypothetical constructive realism: thesis: the question whether a theoretical term refers cannot be decided a priori. It depends on the success of the term in experiential knowledge. Then the realist justification question converges with the instrumentalist meaning question! Miracle argument/PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsUnderdetermined: (pro realism): It would be a miracle if theories that have long been empirically successful were not also realistically true. Underdeterminism/QuineVsPutnam/QuineVsRealism: Proposition: It is always possible to construct empirically equivalent theories T* to a given theory T with strongly different or even incompatible theoretical superstructures, so that it is impossible for T and T* to be true at the same time. Such empirically equivalent theory transformations, however, are always post hoc. Miracle argument: (Worrall 1997(1), 153ff, Carrier 2003(2), §4): The miracle argument can only have validity if one understands empirical success as the ability to make qualitatively new predictions. CarrierVsQuine/WorrallVsQuine//Schurz: no post hoc constructed theory T* has ever been able to. >Theoretical terms/Schurz. 1. Worral, J. (1997). "Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?". In: Papineau, D. (ed., 1997) 139-165. 2. Carrier, M. (2003). "Experimental Success and the Revelation of Reality: The Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism", In: P. Blanchard et al (eds), Science, Society and Reality. Heidelberg: Springer. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Relativism | Putnam | VII 436 Realtivism/Putnam: my main concern in the book "Truth, Reason and History": Putnam: thesis: explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat. "Companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism, the total relativism threatens (PutnamVsHarman). --- Williams II 503 PutnamVsCultural Relativism/PutnamVsRelativism/M. Williams: internal contradiction: e.g. if I as a cultural relativist say that if you say that something is true according to the standards of your culture, then I say, in reality, that this is true according to the standards of my own culture. I cannot express the transcendental assertion which is the heart of relativism that all cultures are in the same position. Opposition: truth for a culture is something absolute, which contradicts the alleged relativity. >Cultural relativism. --- Putnam III 139f Relativism/PutnamVsWilliams: Williams acts as if science would consist of objective individual judgments, whereas one would have to take or reject the "culture" as a whole. --- V 141 Consciousness/PutnamVsLocke: that stones do not have consciousness, is a fact about our notion of consciousness. Problem: that makes truth ultimately dependent on our cultural standards. V 165 Relativism/tradition: relativism is easy to refute, because relativsm itself had to set absolutely, otherwise its position is not more secure than any other. PlatoVsProtagoras (relativist): it is a regress to say: "I think that I think that snow is white". PutnamVsPlato: it does not follow that it must be iterated indefinitely, just that it could. Modern Relativism/discourse relativity/Foucault: everything is relative, also the relativism. Vs: problem: if we say "absolutely true relative to person P", then there is no total relativism. No relativist wants the relativism apply to everything. --- I (i) 241 Justified Assertibility/Dewey/Rorty: justified assertibility depends on the majority in a culture. >Assertibility. Norms and standards are historical and reflect interests. PutnamVsRorty: justified assertibility exists regardless of the majority, but it is not a transcendental reality but a characteristic of the concept of entitlement. PutnamVsRelativism/VsRealism: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside the language. I (i) 249 Relativism/Putnam: the world is not a "product" (of our culture), it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Relativism | Rorty | I 304 Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe. >Convention, >Language community. II (b) 36 RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". >HabermasVsFoucault, >Habermas, >Foucault. II (g) 152 Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. >Cultural relativism. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss. III 87 Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian". Isaiah Berlin: one must not ask for more. >Isaiah Berlin, >Joseph A. Schumpeter. IV 11 Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept. >Relativism/Putnam, >Truth/Putnam. V 20 Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it. >Culture, >Norms. VI 74 Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language. VI 77f Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. According to what other standards, the ones of the fascists?. >Norms/Rorty, >Correctness. VI 79 Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement. VI 246 Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible. >Cultural Relativism, cf. >Western Rationalism. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sense Data Theory | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 78 Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: a) given by the senses, therefore deception possible - b) at the same time they do not belong to the psychic process of perception - but they are their objects, their content. I 107 Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: no physical objects. - Much broader: he needs them for semantic purposes: as the building blocks of all logical forms - as well as the substance of all possible situations. - Subject: is itself not an object. I 109 Whether an object is simple or complex, is empirically not question the logic. I 114 Sense data/Moore/Hintikka: makes a difference between spot and its color. Only the spot belongs to the sense data. WittgensteinVsRussell: they are logical constructions - they simplify laws but are not necessary for them. - Later: (note § 498): "private object before my soul." >Colour. I 180 Sense data/Russell/Hintikka: fails to uphold a strict distinction between a sense datum as a naked individual thing and a sense datum as a complex object. I 322 Sense data/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle and late period: the world in which we live is the world of sense data. --- II 87 Sense data/Wittgenstein: the sentence is a judgement on the sense data, a reading of one's own sense-data, for example, this is red. Here, there is no need for further verification, that is a priori. II 92 Sense data/physical event/Wittgenstein: the physical sound has a duration, the corresponding sense datum not - Listening and remembering are quite different. - Pointless: to say that one hears something and also recalls it - as e.g. one is seeing while one uses the thermometer at the same time. >Use, >Measurements. II 100 Sense data/WittgensteinVsRealism: sense data and physical objects are not in a causal relationship with each other. II 101 The relationship between objects and sensations is linguistically - and therefore necessary. >Objects. II 101 Sense data/term/Wittgenstein: sense data is the source of our terms. II 102 The world in which we live, is the one of sense data - but the one of which we speak is that one of physical objects. II 129 Sense data/Wittgenstein: it is nonsense to speak of the relationship between object and sense datum. II 134 Senseless: to speak of the causes of my sense data. >Causes, >Causation, >Causality, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antirealism | Read Vs Antirealism | Read III 273 Anti-realist: understanding must be shown understanding must manifest itself - truth is not evidence-transcendent. - VsTradition: Understanding of counterfactual situations can not be manifest, not be communicated, and thus not be acquired "Manifestation challenge": what right do we have to attribute speakers an understanding of expressions, which goes beyond what they can show in their linguistic behavior? This is the third argument of ConstructivismVsRealism. Question: what should count as a manifestation? |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Correspondence Theory | Millikan Vs Correspondence Theory | I 6 Sign/Millikan: I will lay out a general theory of signs based on Frege's senses, but in the sense of Peirce; it will cover conventional signs, but also thoughts. This has an important consequence: Sense/Millikan: is the basic intentional or semantic feature, but it is not reference nor intension. It is not even determined by intension! Therefore, there is an epistemological problem of intentionality: Intentionality/Millikan: thesis: we can not know a priori what we think! Because the mind is not determined by reference! This provides an argument for realism. The given/Millikan: MillikanVsMyth of the given. Leads to a false "foundationalism" of epistemology. VsCorrespondence theory: hence the correspondence theory is rejected I 7 not only as a "test of truth" but also as the "nature of truth". At least according to a popular perspective. But this is not without paradoxes. Knowledge/Naturalism/Millikan: the skills of knowing are a product of nature, like the knower themselves. Knowledge must be something you do in the world.. It is a natural relation to the world. I 8 Coherence/Millikan: you will have to explain what it is good for, how it helps us, not only what it is. Ultimately, this is only possible in an overall theory of the world. "New Empiricism"/Millikan: has so far only managed half of its task, it has not managed to overcome the myth of the given, which is embedded in the theory of meaning. Realism/Millikan: the arguments VsRealismus are very simple: VsRealism: "in order to find the meaning of a word, you have to see what would justify its use, or what would cause an application. But the application is justified by previous applications! And it was caused by previous convictions! ((S) also VsCausal theory). Correspondence: therefore plays no role in the justification or causal explanation of an utterance. So correspondence has nothing to do with the meaning of "true". MillikanVsVs: one can just as well turn that around: Correspondence theory: pro: correspondence is involved in the nature of truth, because for a sentence to be true means to correspond to a part of the world in a certain way. Correspondence not playing a role in the justification of an utterance, might as well be turned into this: that the meaning has nothing to do with justification (!). (Millikan pro!). Meaning of a sentence/meaning/Millikan: are the special projective functions of the sentence. But we reject correspondence as a test of truth, the projective function can not consist of rules in the mind. I 10 It may not be the "user", that "assumes" that their sentences project the world as such and such. Also, the "assumed" ("should"), which defines the meaning, must differ from the "assumed" ("should") that denotes how we "asssume" of a person that they behave in accordance to the expectation of others according to rules. ("should behave"). Projecting function/projection/meaning/Millikan: the questions becomes more difficult: What kind of things project sentences?, What kind of projection functions are involved? What is a "should"? Knowledge/self/meaning/Millikan: if something other than the way I myself justifying my statements, defines my meanings, how can I capture what I myself think then? Thesis: We will have to give up, to know that a priori! We also do not know a priori what we mean. Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Frege's sense as the main concept. The same way we can be wrong about knowledge, we can also be wrong about meaning. I 86 Intentionality/Millikan: is not a sharply limited phenomenon. It is not of one piece. It generally has to do with what is normal or what is an function of its own. Not so much with what is actual. Intentionality/Millikan: generally has to do with projecting rules between signs and things. Correspondence/Millikan: therefore a pure correspondence theory is empty. Def pure correspondence/correspondence theory/Millikan: would be one that would claim a correspondence would be true only because there is a projecting relation. This does not work, because mathematically there can be infinite projecting relations. On the other hand: Representations: are not as ubiquitous and varied. I 87 Correspondence Theory/Millikan: to not be empty, it must explain what is so special about the projective relations that project representations onto what is represented. Projective Relation/Millikan: must have to do with real causality in real situations, not with logical order. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Externalism | Putnam Vs Externalism | V 75 Putnam: per internalism. (Coherence) VsCorrespondence. Thesis: it is about compliance with our belief system, not with mental independent or speech independent "issues". (Metaphysical realism). --- V 76 Brains in a Vat/BIV/internalism/Putnam: the whole problem will be solved when you look at it from internalism. From whose point of view is the story actually told? Obviously not from the viewpoint of the sentient beings in this world. Externalism (PutnamVs): viewed from here, the problem cannot be so easily solved. --- V 77 Nevertheless: if we are really brains in a vat, we cannot think that we are, except in the bracketed sense, and this bracketed thought does not have reference conditions that would make it true. So it is not possible here that we are brains in a vat. Magical theory of reference: we would have to presuppose "noetic rays" or "self-identifying objects", and the realism does not want that, of course. --- V 78 Externalism: popular answer today: although there is no sign that corresponds necessarily with certain things, there are contextual (causal) connections. PutnamVs. E.g. "Electron" is contextually related to textbooks, but it does not refer to textbooks. The externalism will respond that this was no causal chain of the appropriate type. PutnamVs: but how can we have intentions that determine which causal chains are "appropriate", if we do not already refer to something? Internalism: here the situation is quite different: characters are used within the conceptual scheme of a community. Objects and characters are equally internal elements of the scheme, so it is possible to specify what corresponds to what. (> conceptual scheme). Within a language, it is trivial, what "rabbit" refers to: to rabbits, of course. --- V 79 Externalism: is of course also of the opinion that "rabbit" refers to rabbits, and "alien" to an element of the set of aliens. But this is no information for him what reference is. For him, it is a problem to find out what reference actually is. PutnamVsExternalism: the idea that a causal connection is necessary, is refuted by the fact that "alien" certainly refers to aliens no matter if we have ever been interrelated with them or not. Yes, even in such simple words as "horse" or "rabbit" the externalist could have noted that the extension includes many things with which we are not causally related (E.g. future horses or rabbits that live in the deep forest and have not seen a human yet). --- I (f) 158 PutnamVsExternal Realism/VsExternalism: E.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of "electron" does not refer to textbooks. RealismVs: this is not the "correct causal chain". VsRealism: but how could we have intentions that determine which causal chains: are of the right kind, if we were not already be able to refer? I (f) 160 InternalismVsExternalism: "of the same kind" does not make sense outside the category system. In some respects, finally everything is "of the same kind" as anything else. The whole apparatus of "correct causal chains and facts that make that future horses belong to the same kind" as the "with whom I have interacted" are far too complicated. There are simply horses. (Metaphysical position). InternalismVsExternalism: in a certain sense, the world is actually made of "self-identifying objects" but not in a sense that is accessible to the externalists. If "objects" are made as discovered, as well as products of our conceptual invention as the "objective" factor in the experience, then objects belong intrinsically to certain labels. I (f) 161 Because these labels were initially our tools to construct a version of the world with such objects. But this kind of "self-identifying objects" is not mentally independent. Realism/externalism: wants to imagine a world of objects that are at the same time mentally independent and self-identifying. Internalism/VsExternalism: one cannot do that. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Grice, P.H. | Cartwright Vs Grice, P.H. | I 129 As if/Physics/Cartwright: (from a seminar by Grice): Is there an "as-if-operator" in physics? Grice: E.g. a) helium gas behaves as if it were a collection of molecules that interact only in case of collision. b) ... helium gas is composed of molecules that behave as if they only interacted in case of collisions. CartwrightVsGrice: early: at the time I made objections that only apparently contradicted this: There are well known cases with the "as-if" operator. E.g. the radiating molecules in an ammonium-Maser behave as if they were normal electronic oscillators. As if/False realism: realistic question: how densely are the oscillators packed? VsRealism: this question is absurd, normal electron oscillators themselves are a mere theoretical construct, a fiction! The behavior of atoms is amazingly similar to a normal electron oscillator. Helium-neon laser/Cartwright: (...) behaves as if it were a collection of 3-level atoms(...). I 130 As if/Behavior/Existence/Ontology/Explanation/Theory/Cartwright: early: but by saying "as if", I do not deny the existence of 3-level atoms in this situation! I recognize these existential facts, and yet put the "as-if operator" in front of them! CartwrightVsCartwright: later: back then I confused two functions that the as-if the operator may have: as-if-operator/Cartwright: a) writing things left from the as-if-operator means to enter into an existential commitment. E.g. ... molecules as if ... b) things to the right of the as-if operator: have a different function: what is at the right side (a description) is what we need to know in order to be able to apply a mathematical formulation. Description/Equation/Law/Physics/Cartwright: the description on the right side is the kind of description for which the theory provides an equation. E.g. we say a "real quantum atom" behaves like a normal electron oscillator. The theory tells us beforehand which equation this oscillator obeys. I 131 Description/Equation/Theory/Cartwright: it might be assumed: in order to obtain a description according to which we can establish it, we must depart from what we assume to exist. (to be the case). CartwrightVs: it but does not work like that: Principles/Theory/Cartwright: the theory has only few principles to get from descriptions of equations. And these principles certainly demand structured information. And the "descriptions" on the right side must satisfy many mathematical requirements. Description/Theory/Equations/Cartwright: thesis: the descriptions that best describe are just not the ones which best apply to the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Hacking, I. | Cartwright Vs Hacking, I. | I 12 Unit/Nature/Realism/Cartwright: Realism calls upon the "unity of nature". CartwrightVsRealism/CartwrightVsHawking: I do not believe in unifying laws (unifying laws) and I do not think that there are enough bridge laws to connect all areas. I 13 Another reason is methodological: for choosing our models freely (simple or complex, random or legal) we have no a-priori reasons. Nature/Cartwright: we learn best how it is if we consider our knowledge of it. If our best supported theories are probabilistic, we should not insist on determinism at all. How uniform is our knowledge after all? |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Nagel Vs Mackie, J. L. | III 61 Ethics/Objectivity/Nagel: assumption of objective values and reasons can be challenged if a subjective opinion is more plausible. Not even the assumption of a radical falsity of our ethics is contradictory. Realism then helps, however, to consider certain alternatives more plausible than others. Realism/Ethics/Nagel: I believe that, in principle, the possibility of realism cannot be proven by anything. We can only refute arguments for its impossibility. III 62 ArgumentsVsRealism: 1) VsRealism/Ethics/Mackie: petitio principii: if values are something real, they must be real objects of an ontologically fundamentally different kind. Mackie: Thesis: values are not a part of the fabric of the world. If they were, they would be "beings, qualities or relations of a very strange kind that would be quite different from all other things in the world". (Position). NagelVsMackie: he is obviously in possession of a very particular image of the world (e.g. without the "non-natural qualities" of Moore). But the assumption is not correct! The aspect of being bad in the impersonal sense is not a mysterious additional property of pain. The recognition of values does not mean that they are something occult, but that they are real values! That means in consequence that our statements about reasons related to these values can be true or false! III 63 MackieVsNagel: he had shown him in the wrong light: his doubts did not refer to strange entities, but to the reasons themselves. And precisely those reasons are not needed to explain something that happens. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in their existence. NagelVsMackie: this raises the problem at another level again: petitio principii: the assumption that utility is a criterion for existence. NagelVsMackie: the thesis that there are special reasons, is a normative thesis and not a statement about the best explanation! Best Explanation/BE/Nagel: if we presume that only that is real which needs to occur in the best explanation of the world, we assume that there are no irreducible normative truths. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Metaphysical Realism | Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism | Millikan I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified. Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously. Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex COW Or by holding up another sign e.g. REFERENCES Or maybe CAUSES. To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning: The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head, ((s)> the "overarching general"/Leibniz). PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nominalism | Armstrong Vs Nominalism | Arm III 81 Nominalism/Armstrong: some allow the existence of objective relations of similarity between particulars. But they cannot analyze them in terms of common property, because that would lead them to realism. (Lit: 1978(1), ch 5: ArmstrongVsNominalism). Vs: here: In his opinion there is nothing common of F and G. F is similar to all other Fs, but one other F also resembles many other things. The same applies to the Gs. It is doubtful whether this wavering reason is sufficient to provide the necessary uniform connection between being-F and being-G. 1. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978 Arm II (c) 97 Similarity/ArmstrongVsNominalism: if one, on the other hand, regards the situation in a way where similarity is analyzed in terms of identity: Martin and Armstrong: agree that one thing causes the things it causes by virtue (of a subset) of its properties. If now causally effective property can also be identical between different instantiations, then one can explain why the same property produces the same effect in the same circumstances. Schiffer I 234 Realism/Schiffer: Realism equates these two relations: 1. between name and object 2. between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiates the second. Schiffer: this can be paraphrased: (b) Mother Teresa has the quality of being modest. Here the second singular term ((s) "property to be modest") has the same status as the first one. NominalismVsRealism/Schiffer: reasonable (sensitive) nominalism denies all this. FN I 288 The unreasonable nominalist takes the reference to properties too seriously. E.g. ArmstrongVsNominalism (Armstrong 1978), besides the exchange between Armstrong 1980, Devitt 1980, Quine 1980. (SchifferVsArmstrong) I 235 Schiffer: there is no entity "the quality of being modest" that is related to "modest", as Mother Teresa is related to "Mother Teresa". Understanding/Schiffer: example (a) only requires knowledge (awareness) of Mother Teresa, not modesty. Property/Schiffer: Thesis: Properties do not exist, they are not to be found among the things that really exist. Existence/"there is"/Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Schiffer: nevertheless, the rational nominalist should be careful and not say "there is no quality to be modest". Realism/Nominalism/Referential Quantification/Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer: the dispute arises over what kind of quantification is present in (b). I 236 Nominalism: the apparent singular term refers to nothing at all. The "logical form" of (b) is not Fab With "F" = "x has a", "a" for Mother Teresa, "b" for modesty. But only Fa. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Nozick, R. | Nagel Vs Nozick, R. | I 196 Robert Nozick: Thesis: Evolution theoretical explanation of human reason. (Naturalistic epistemology). Proposes a reversal of the Kantian dependency on the facts of reason. "Reason is a dependent variable which is shaped by the facts. Reason gives information about reality, because reality shapes reason, and because it selects what appears as "obvious"." "The evolution theoretical explanation itself is something where we get by leveraging reason to support the evolution theory. I 197 Therefore, this interpretation does not belong to the initial philosophy, but to our current scientific opinion." NagelVsNozick: that is no guarantee that the thing is true at all, or necessary. There could also have been a different adaptation to evolution. Nor is it a justification of reason. I.e. the whole thing is not circular. I 199 NagelVsNozick: I must be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is consistent with the proposition that I act upon the rules of logic, because they are right and not only because I'm biologically programmed to this behavior. (Also applies to mathematics). I 200 The only form that can really assume rational thinking is to understand the validity of arguments based on what they say! I 201 This is not to deny the importance of our thinking for survival. (Although there are a lot of species that have lived on happily without this capability). VsRealism/Ethics/Nihilism: nihilism tries to portray it as a discovery that there are no objective values. Then all positive value statements must be false. Only of people in the world it could be said that it is anything of importance to them. III 64 NagelVsNihilism/Ethics: that is tempting from the objective point of view, but it is a misconception to presuppose that objective judgments can only be made from a distant point of view. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Putnam, H. | Quine Vs Putnam, H. | Schurz I 211 Realism/Philosophy of Science/Schurz: two kinds: a) metaphysical I 212 b) hypothetical constructive realism: Thesis: the question of whether a theoretical term (TT) refers cannot be decided a priori. It depends on the success of the concept in empirical insight. Then realistic question of reasons converges with the instrumentalist question of meaning! Miracle Argument/PutnamVsQuine/PutnamVsUnder-Determinacy: (pro realism): it would be a miracle if theories that have long been empirically successful, were not also realistically true. Underdeterminacy/QuineVsPutnam/QuineVsRealism: Thesis: it is always possible to construct empirically equivalent theories T* to a given theory T with greatly different or even incompatible theoretical superstructure, so that it is impossible for T and T* to be true at the same time. However, such empirically equivalent theory transformations are always post hoc. Miracle Argument: (Worrall 1997 153ff, Carrier 2003 §4): can only be valid if we mean by empirical success the ability to make qualitatively new predictions. CarrierVsQuine/WorrallVsQuine//Schurz: no post hoc constructed theory T* was ever able to do that. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Realism | Antirealism Vs Realism | Read III 273 Antirealist: Begreifen muß gezeigt werden, Verstehen muß sich manifestieren - Wahrheit nicht beweis-transzentdent -VsTrad: Verstehen von kontrafaktischen Situationen kann nicht manifestiert, nicht mittgeteilt , folglich nicht erworben werden. III 274 "Manifestationsherausforderung": welches Recht haben wir, Sprechern ein Verständnis von Ausdrücken zuzusprechen, das über das hinausgeht, was sie in ihrem sprachlichen Verhalten zeigen können? Das ist das dritte Argument des KonstruktivismusVsRealismus. Frage: was als Manifestation zählen darf .Aus einer endlichen Menge von Postulaten kann man rekursiv eine potenziell unendliche Ausgabe erzeugen. Problem: wie kann das lernende Kind die Sprache verstehen, wenn es nicht auf diese tatsächliche Menge festgelegt ist, sondern nur auf Manifestationen? Chomskys Antwort: es gibt vorprogrammierte Strukturen. Logik III 275 Lücke zwischen Beweismaterial und Theorie: braucht freilich nicht auf diese Weise geschlossen zu werden. Der Anti-Realist schließt sie dadurch, dass er bestreitet, dass die Theorie derartig über die Daten hinausgeht! Bedeutung kann nichts anderes sein, als Sprecher in ihrem Gebrauch manifestieren. Damit wird bestritten, 1. daß Bedeutung ein privates Element haben kann. es wird bestritten, daß Wahrheit, als beweis-transzendenter Begriff verstanden, der zentrale Begriff in der Bedeutungstheorie sein kann. Ein solcher Wahrheitsbegriff (der Realisten, also unabhängig von der Erkenntnis) könnte im Begriff der Bedeutung keine Rolle spielen. Wir müssen im Stande sein ihn mit unserem Gebrauch zu manifestieren.(>Dummett, Anti-Realismus) Konstruktivismus: Die Bedeutung muss in einem Begreifen dessen bestehen, was als ihre Verifikation zählen würde. Das heißt, die Bedeutung kann nicht in dem Vorliegen einer Situation bestehen, ohne dass wir im Stande sind diese Situation zu erkennen. III 276 Klassische Erklärung: versucht die Bedeutung auf möglicherweise beweistranszendente Tatsachen zu gründen. III 278 Die Herausforderung liegt darin, dass eine derartige Identifikation von Bedeutung mit Wahrheitsbedingungen, die von Verifikation getrennt ist, solche Aussagen bedeutungsleer lassen wird. Der Skeptiker fordert uns zu Recht auf, zu sagen, wie solche Aussagen als wahr erwiesen werden können. (Jones). Er lehnt es zu Unrecht ab, auf eine Antwort zu warten. Cartwright I 87 Anti-Realismus/Wissenschaft/Cartwright: Operationalismus, Instrumentalismus, Positivismus und konstruktiver Empirismus (Van Fraassen). Der Schluß auf die Beste Erklärung ist niemals gerechtfertigt. Anti-RealismusVsRealismus: das ist eine falsche Sicht dessen, was wir tun, wenn wir etwas erklären: Erklärungen sind Organisation von Wissen. Und organisierende Kraft hat nichts mit Wissen zu tun. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Berkeley Vs Realism | Chisholm II 33 Reality/Review/Berkeley: the experiences and their progressions provide verifiers for the acceptance of externalities. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when they deny the outside world. We cannot invoke any instance other than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causers, we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the outside things without our experiences. But that is impossible. The same order of experience could exist if there were no external things at all. BerkeleyVsRealism: with this, realism becomes superfluous! VsBerkeley: but the same applies now also to spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (That it is superfluous like realism). |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Realism | Duhem Vs Realism | Cartwright I 76 DuhemVsRealism: uses the argument of redundancy: also PutnamVsRealism: for every explanation of any amount of data, there is always an alternative. Cartwright: both do not distinguish between causal explanations and theoretical explanations. Cartwright. I 95 Nature/Duhem/Cartwright: Duhem thesis: the phenomena of nature disintegrate roughly in natural species. DuhemVsRealism: there is no unification. It’s just a raw fact that some things can sometimes behave like certain other things. And that can be an indication of the behavior of other things. Explanation/Duhem: draws up a scheme that allows the use of these indications. Unification/Duhem/Cartwright: is only fictional: E.g. It’s easier for us to postulate Maxwell’s four laws and an electromagnetic field in order to display both light and electricity as a manifestation of a single property, but the unification itself does not exist. The phenomena are also completely different! Truth/Explanation/Duhem/Cartwright: We cannot expect to find a explanatory law for two different phenomena, which is also true. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Dummett Vs Realism | Cresswell II 163 Truth Conditional Semantics/Truth Conditional/DummettVsTruCo Semantics/Cresswell: Dummett (1976)(1) has argued against truco semantics, because he is VsRealism or against an analysis of meaning in terms of truth conditions. DummettVsRealism/Cresswell: even if the concept of truth is relativized on possible worlds. 1. M. Dummett, "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: Evans/McDowell (Eds). Theories of Truth, 1976. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Realism | Fraassen Vs Realism | Hacking I 92 Def realism / Fraassen: aims to tell a true story about the Suchness of the world with the help of theories (FraassenVs). Acceptance here means considered a theory is true. Cartwright I 88 van FraassenVsRealism: it is a mistake to say that if a theory received the phenomena, then its laws must be true. Nor do we have to assume that the corresponding theoretical entities exist. That the theory is true is merely an additional assumption. Duhem: ditto, as van Fraassen. Cartwright: This has nothing to do with skepticism or Kant’s transcendental idealism. I 1 Modern Science/Realism/Fraassen: has apparently circumnavigated this dilemma: Experiment/Robert Boyle: to produce qualities mechanically. I 2 FraassenVsRealism: the old problems re-surface at the level of the behavior of parts of atoms: here no mechanical explanations are possible because atoms have no parts! ((s) for science at Boyle’s time?). So, once again, skills qualities had to be attributed. Nominalism/Fraassen: brings another problem: part of its motivation was epistemic: the observation of phenomena does not clearly show the suspected causal connections. Phenomenon/Fraassen: does not decide about the truth or falsity of hypotheses about atoms. I 4 FraassenVsRealism: commits the reverse error (for positivism which puts everything in words): by reifying everything that cannot be defined away. I 7 VsRealism/Fraassen/(s): Cannot argue that the current best theory is wrong, i.e. ultimately denial of progress. Fraassen I 7 Existence/Ontology/Theory/Sellars: Thesis: a good reason to defend a theory is ipso facto a good reason to consider the entities postulated by this theory existent. Brian Ellis: (a realist in terms of theoretical entities): stronger thesis: theoretical statements are true generalized descriptions of reality or at least pretend to be. Fraassen: This has the advantage of avoiding the epistemic focus on belief reasons, and also the assumption that one is set on considering current theories to be true. VsRealism/Fraassen/(s): Cannot assert that the currently best theory is wrong, i.e. ultimately denial of progress. FraassenVsEllis: the "pretending" brings its own problems. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Goodman Vs Realism | Searle III 172 GoodmanVsRealism/GoodmanVsExternal Realism: external realism leads to inconsistent descriptions of the supposedly independently existing world. Goodman: E.g. stellar constellations: there is no rule for drawing the boundaries here. We even define stars after we have previously drawn boundaries. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Realism | Locke Vs Realism | II 199 LockeVsRealism: general substances are not "general things". |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Realism | Nietzsche Vs Realism | Rorty V 30 NietzscheVsRealism/Rorty: the human character passes its test if it is able to live with the notion that there is no convergence. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Putnam Vs Realism | I (c) 96/97 Realism/Putnam: argues ultimately that science should be taken "at face value", given the failure of all serious programs by philosophical reinterpretation of sciences without philosophical reinterpretation and that science, "taken at face value" implies realism. Realism is sort of "scientific theory of science". VsRealism: could be cited (in the absence of convergence) at the most that the realism would be refuted diachronically. --- I (i) 243 PutnamVsRelativism/PutnamVsRealism: both claim at the same time to be able to exist inside and outside the language. The Realism thus does not refute itself because it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But Relativism refutes itself with that. I (i) 249 PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism: both see the world as a product Realism: the world is a product ex nihilo. Relativism: product of our culture. Putnam: but the world is not a "product", it is only the world. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Realism | Searle Vs Realism | Searle III 170 VsRealism/Searle: there are three arguments against realism: 1. the conceptual realism 2. the verification argument 3. the thing in itself-argument V 161 SearleVsRealism: realism said a lot of nonsense about universals: e.g. where are the universals, can you see them, how much do you weigh? V 162 Nominalism/Searle: right: the existence of particular entities of facts in the world and the existence of universals depends merely on the meaning of words. >Conceptual realism, >realism/Searle, >nominalism, >thing in itself, >universals. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Realism | Verschiedene Vs Realism | Hacking I 113 Instrumentalism / Hacking: Most theorists: anti-realism in terms of science, theories are tools or calculation methods for structuring the descriptions of phenomena and to conclude on the future. Theories and laws therefore contain no truth. They are nothing more than literal assertions. Vollmer I 226 Manche Autoren VsRealismus: "Die ( wenig "realistische") QM lehrt uns doch wohl, dass es bestens bestätigte Theorien gibt, die mit der "Realität" nicht viel zu tun haben! Bellsche Ungleichung/VollmerVsVs: die BU lehren nicht, dass der Realismus falsch ist. sie lehren nur, dass die folgenden Behauptungen nicht miteinander vereinbar sind: 1. Atomare Objekte existieren unabhängig von menschlichen Beobachtungen (Realismus) 2. Physikalische Objekte sind voneinander trennbar in dem Sinne, dass ihre Wechselwirkung mit wachsendem Abstand geringer wird. (Lokalität) 3. Die Quantenmechanik ist richtig. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Realism | Cartwright Vs Realism | I 3 Realism/Cartwright: tends to say that if theoretical laws are wrong, the phenomenological ones have to be even more so. CartwrightVsRealism: it is just the other way round: when it comes to experiments, the fundamental laws are worse off. I 12 Unit/Nature/Realism/Cartwright: realism calls upon the "unity of nature". CartwrightVsRealism/CartwrightVsHawking: I do not believe in unifying laws (unifying laws) and I do not think that there are enough bridge laws to connect all areas. I 13 Another reason is methodological: for choosing our models (simple or complex, random or legal) we have no a-priori reasons Nature/Cartwright: We learn best how it is, when we consider our knowledge of it. If our best-supported theories are probabilistic, we should not insist on determinism. How uniform is our knowledge at all? I 145 Bridge principles/Realism: we therefore need only few bridge principles, because there is only a small number of fundamental interactions in nature. CartwrightVsRealism: It is just that which is wrong! 1) This is not only an image of physics that we do not have, we should not even have it. The assembly would be infinitely complex. Physics/Cartwright: the beauty and rigor of current, modern physics is to allow easy handling of simple models. Thus, at least, the behavior within a model can be understood and equations cannot be simply written down, but also nearly solved. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Idealism Vs Realism | Frank I 467 "I think"/Kant/Castaneda: "I think" puts everything into indirect speech! Consequence: VsFrege: according to Kant all his reference objects are not part of the semantics of singular terms! ((s) According to Frege, embedded sentences do not have a reference object of their own, but only denote the meaning of an object. Conversely, according to Kant, Frege's objects can only function as transcendent objects. (IdealismVsRealism). Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983), pp. 313-327. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Realism | Grover Vs Realism | Horwich I 354 Propositions/Camp.Grover,Belnap/CGBVsRealism/GroverVsRealism: Is it enough that we have found a construction for the manner of speech about truth that never makes "true" as referring to a proposition necessary to answer to the realist that we do not need any propositions as belief objects? We are not sure, but we make some suggestions. (See propositions). Belief/Problem: even if we do not need propositions for discourse about truth, they might be necessary in the case of sentences about belief and psychological attitudes. I 355 Suppose there is a viable adverbial theory to solve these problems. Propositional Attitudes/Belief/Generalization/Pro-Sentence Theory/CGB: Advantage: the pro-sentence theory allows generalizations about belief without introducing propositions! At least not if they are not already assumed in simpler sentences. E.g. (33) Everything is so that if Charley beliefs it is true, it is true. If "it is true" is used here as quantificatorical pro-sentence instead of a combination of quantificatorical pronoun and T-predicate, then (33) does not need to be regarded as analogous with 1st order quantification with individual variables over propositions. Rather, it is comparable with the propositional quantification in Ramsey with variables about sentences. roblem: it might still seem that (33) requires propositions. Solution/CGB: Substitutional Quantification/SQ/CGB: then we assume that the truth of (33) is equivalent with the truth of all its substitution instances. Important argument: then the reference to propositions does not take place at the level of individual beliefs, and then no obligation on propositions emerges from the generalization. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Realism | Barrow Vs Realism | I 45 VsRealism: er ignoriert die Begrenzung unseres mit Vorurteilen behafteten und oft völlig in die Irre gehenden menschlichen Verstands. Wir können nie vorhersehen, wie subtil und flüchtig diese von uns gesuchte zugrundeliegende Wirklichkeit schließlich sein mag. Sie könnte ganz buchstäblich unvorstellbar sein. Bsp Der Grenzwert einer Folge hat oft Eigenschaften, die kein Glied der Folge aufweist. Bsp Jemand könnte Realist sein, soweit es um die Existenz eines Myon genannten Teilchens geht, dieses Teilchen aber theoretisch, ganz pragmatisch und anti realistisch beschreiben. I 46 Bsp Die Idealisten in einem Volksstamm werden von den Löwen und Tigern verspeist, die sie für Ideen halten. Der Realismus setzt sich durch. Natürlich nur in der primitiven Welt! Daraus kann man aber auch den Schluss ziehen, dass die Evolution den Glauben an den Realismus auch nährt, wenn dieser irrt! Willim James Z: "Das Wort Hund beißt nicht." Wenn alle Idealisten sind, verhungern alle, oder werden durch den Einfall eines räuberischen realistischen Wesens verdrängt. I 48 Wir leugnen aber gar nicht, dass einige Teile unseres Bildes der Welt idealisisert sind, andere schlichtweg falsch. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Realism | Millikan Vs Realism | I 245 Classical Realism/thinking/Millikan: for classical realism thinking about a thing was to bring this thing or its nature before the conscious mind. Plato/Aristotle/Husserl: the nature of the thing alone occurs in the mind. formerly Russell/Moore/phenomenalism: the thing alone comes before the mind, (without "nature"). Locke/Hume: Thesis: instead of the thing we are dealing with a representation that embodies its nature by copying it. Descartes/Whitehead: a way or an aspect of the thing embodies its nature. Knowledge/thinking/realism/Millikan: So we know ipso facto what we think. The following four things are not distinguished by classical realism: 1. that it seems that one thinks something of something 2. really thinking 3. that it seems that one knows what one is thinking 4. really knowing what one thinks. Identification/classical realism/Millikan: to identify the real value of one'S thoughts is then not the identification with something, or recognition, because one only has a single encounter with the thing. Clear and precise/Realism: if a thought is clear, it is necessarily real and known about the nature of this thing, real or possible. I 246 Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object happens in the moment and never has a reference to past or future acts of consciousness. Problem: how then a thing should be identified as the same as earlier. Classical realism makes a mystery of that. Item/object/thing/classical realism: an object may then have no permanent existence. Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: nothing can be identified by perception alone, recognition: is an act of pure thought in the re-encounter in the volatile flux of things that are given to the senses. Sense/Platon/Descartes/Locke: to somehow direct the mind on eternal objects. thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: Then one could only ever have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects. Solution: taking properties and kinds as the eternal objects one could think of directly. I 247 Problem: how should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could being involved in the world be essential to them? Then it had to be assumed that there are features and kinds that are not exemplified. Thing/nature/essence/classical realism/Millikan: because durable items could not appear before the (only momentarily conscious) mind, the thing and its nature had to be separated. (Nature is eternal and necessary, the thing transitory and accidental). nature/classical realism was sometimes simplistically interpreted as a set of properties. Problem: how can the nature of a transitory thing, its very own identity, be a set eternal characteristics? Identity/MillikanVsRealism: how can the identity of a thing be something other than this thing again? But this has not troubled philosophers at that time. Empiricism/EmpirismVsRealism/Hume/Millikan: revolutionary with Hume was that nothing should be in the mind which had not previously been in the senses. This means that the previous distinction between perception and thought coincided. Problem: now is no longer how to construct the temporal from the eternal, I 248 but how we should construct permanent objects from current objects. ((S) Hume/(S): Thesis: an object only exists in one moment and later again).This led to forms of nominalism and phenomenalism. Realism/thinking/judgment/nature/thing/existence/Millikan: a solution: if there is rather the nature than the object that comes before the mind, then the accidental object is not necessary for nature, it does not necessarily have to exist. Then the realization that there is really the object corresponds to a judgment rather than contemplation about its nature. Existence: that the thing existed became something additional that was added. Ontology/Millikan: Problem: that something should exist "in addition to its previously existing nature". Thinking/Classic Realism/Millikan: applying a term was then equated to judging that a thing exists. So thinking-of = Identifying. I 249 Identification/realism/Millikan: takes place only in a moment and involves only a single encounter with the object. Then this is a kind of aesthetic experience in which consciousness bathes in a becoming aware of the thing. What good would that do? Identification/Millikan: which purpose does it serve normally? Thesis: a) it supposed to help apply prior knowledge to a current case. b) it should match up experiences that were mediated by a medium with experiences from another medium Ex seeing and language. Identity/Relation/Millikan: then identification needs to be described as essentially relational! But classical realism is not able to. Identification/classical realism/Millikan: assumes that the identification of the object is involved in thoinking of it. And since thinking of an object is a momentary act that has nothing to do with other acts, it is impossible to match the capturing of one aspect of an object and capturing a different aspect of that object! Ex knowing that Kant lived in Konigsberg has nothing to do with knowing that he was a philosopher. I 250 Recognition/classical realism/Millikan: recognizing the object as the same is another achievement, it has nothing to do with the repeated thinking of the object. Intentionality/MillikanVsRealism/Millikan: Solution: there may be simple thoughts of complex objects. Also, my theory allows that one knows what one thinks while discovering the complexity of one's thoughts. Intension/Millikan: my theory does not confuse intentionality with having differing intensions. That is, a term can transform with time, without losing track of the thing at issue. (Conceptual change, >meaning change). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Realism | Wheeler Vs Realism | John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 215f Realism/WheelerVsRealism: the universe exists only as observed - Bohm thesis: the warmth makes the borders of the quantum world blurred. |
Wheeler I J. A. Wheeler Quantum Theory and Measurement Princeton 2014 |
| Reductionism | Cartwright Vs Reductionism | I 100 Book of Nature/Science/BoN/17th Century/Boyle/Hooke/History/Cartwright: God wrote down the fundamental laws in the BoN. Then the phenomenological ones are a consequence of it. I 101 A lot of these cann still be found even in today’s philosophy of science, especially in the reductionism and the deductive-nomological model (although not by its authors Hempel, Grünbaum and Nagel). Cartwright: I myself have formerly used such stories in the classroom with the students: namely two creation stories: a) Reductionism: E.g. God writes the book of nature, Peter was his assistant. God writes down the fundamental laws and then leaves the hard-working Peter with a bit of a poor imagination to establish the phenomenological laws. b) God takes special care of the regularities in the world, there are no distinctions between different kinds of laws, God himself dictates every single one of them. Now Peter’s task is much more demanding: he must find the possible initial conditions! According to this view, all the laws are true together. I 102 Cartwright: I have searched long for a non-metaphorical analysis of these metaphors. Today I believe that it cannot be found. Laws/Derivative/Important argument/CartwrightVsReductionism: without the story of God and the Book of Nature, there is no sense in assuming that in nature something is derived from something else. I.e. that the fundamental laws are more "fundamental" and that the others apply "by virtue of them". Deductive-nomological model/Cartwright: here is only an apparent help: because here we can look for quasi-causal relation between LoN. If we do not find any, we focus on language. Then we have formal placeholders for relations between laws. CartwrightVsRealism: but the deductive-nomological model itself is not an argument for realism. Truth/Cartwright: without all the metaphysics, the success in the organization of our knowledge is no argument for the truth of the theory. We still need a story about how the connection between fundamental equations and complex laws should be. > Grünbaum (see above I 94). |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Rorty, R. | Putnam Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 178 Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards. Putnam I (a) 21 Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate. PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God. Putnam I (h) 204/205 PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever. Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is! Putnam I (i) 239 Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists. I (i) 240. Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant. I (i) 242 justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy. By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case! RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"". PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind? I (i) 242/243 A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language! Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself. Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors. Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement". I (i) 243/244 As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.) PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent! Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not. Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse. normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture. hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements. I (i) 244/245 PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936). If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image? PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it! Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God. Rorty VI 79 Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Sellars, W. | Fraassen Vs Sellars, W. | I 32 Empirical Laws/Sellars: We don’t have them! E.g. that water boils at 100 ° applies only when the pressure is normal. (> Cartwright). Fraassen: that’s only methodically so far, because we have no confidence in the generalization of our everyday experiences. Problem: but we expect of a theory that postulates microstructure (theoretical entities) that it shows actual universal regularities. FraassenVsSellars/FraassenVsRealism: thus an unobservable reality is postulated behind the phenomena. E.g. Suppose at an early stage of chemistry it was discovered that different samples of gold dissolved at different speeds in aqua regia. But the samples were identical in terms of observation. I 33 Solution: (then): for the two samples a different microstructure was postulated. Then, the variation was explained with that the samples were mixtures of these two substances (which are identical in terms of observation). Thus, the laws have no observation-wise counterpart. Without that no explanation seems possible. And that is the goal of science, so we have to believe in an unobservable microstructure. This leads to three questions: 1) Does the postulation of the microstructure really have new consequences for the observable phenomena?. 2) Does science really always have to provide explanations?. 3) Could there be another rationale for the use of the image of the microstructure in the development of theories?. FraassenVsSellars: Ad 1): it seems that these hypothetical chemists very well postulated new observable regularities: Suppose two substances A and B with dissolution rates x and x+y. Every gold sample is a mixture of the two substances. Then it follows that every sample dissolves at a rate between x and x+y. And that is not implied by the fact that different samples have dissolved in this scope in the past. Thus Sellars is refuted in the first point. Suppose (for the sake of Sellars’ argument), there is still no way to predict the dissolution rates more accurately. Do we then need a categorical statement that is not based on the observable? (That was Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, or the demand for the existence of hidden parameters). Sellars/Hidden Parameters: clearly recognizes that this would counter the current quantum mechanics, accordingly, he says that their mathematical models are incompatible with it. I 34 So he is limits himself to those cases where it is consistent to assume hidden variables. Consistency/Fraassen: is, of course, a logical hold point. FraassenVsHidden Variables/FraassenVsSellars: this does not prevent the disaster: although there is some evidence that hidden variables cannot be introduced in a classical deterministic theory, this evidence demands something much more stronger than consistency: E.g. the assumption that two different physical variables cannot have the same probability distribution in the measurement across all possible states. So if we are unable to specify differences in the forecast for the observable, there is no real difference. (No distinction without difference. Stronger demand than consistency stronger/weaker). Ad. 3) How can anti-realism make sense of that? Apart from the actually new empirical consequences (see above) he will cite methodological reasons. With the assumption of a particular microstructure we could come to new implications of empirical regularities. This is, of course, only a hope. But: Science/Fraassen: Thesis: it is not about explanation as such, but about new statements about observable regularities. I 30 FraassenVsHidden Parameters: if this is empirically equivalent to the orthodox quantum mechanics, it leads to non-logical correlation of non-classical nature, which would still violate the principle of the common cause. But this question is also academic, because modern physics does not need hidden parameters. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Tarski, A. | Brendel Vs Tarski, A. | I 49 Truth-Def/Tarski/Brendel: contains no object constants and only one relation expression for class inclusion. Testimony/Property/Name/Model Theory/Brendel: compared to Tarski we need some changes: 1. Statements no longer result from the fact that free variable n AF are bound by universal quantification, but e.g. that object constants are assigned property or relation expressions. Example "Hans loves Paula". 2. Property/Model Theory: here you also have to specify for each property what it means that I 50 a sequence of objects satisfies this property or relation. 3. Naming/Model Theory: a semantic relation of the naming of objects by object constants must be formulated. Interpretation/Model Theory/Brendel: (instead of fulfillment) new: now the constants as well as the variables and the property and relation expressions can be used as descriptive signs. This is done by a function of assignment. (Assignment function). Variables/Model Theory: new: now also variables are interpreted semantically. Therefore also formulas with free variables are truthful statements. Truth-Def/Modell Theory/BrendelVsTarski: new: now also a recursive truth definition about the structure of statements is possible. Example for the language L with countable infinite property and relation expressions ...+.... I 51 Model Theory/T-Def/BrendelVsTarski: this model theoretical truth definition is more general than Tarski's definition, since it cannot only make statements about set-theoretical entities. Semantic: but it is also because "truth" is defined by "interpretation in an area of objects", i.e. a function is described that connects linguistic entities with non-linguistic ones. I 58 Semantic Truth/T-Concept/Brendel: should be ontologically neutral in relation to truth value-bearers. VsRealism: should the T-concept force a realistic position, it could not function as minimal consensus of all knowledge conceptions. VsTarski: he is often accused of his T-concept being based on an uncritical realism. (Because of the existence of state of affairs as truth makers.) TarskiVsVs: no realism is implied, but only that if a statement is rejected, then also the assertion of the truth of this statement. (Tarski 1944, 169). I 59 JenningsVsTarski: his T-term is ambivalent: a) semantic, as relation between statements and the state of affairs b) that only an equivalence of two statements (e.g. "snow is white" and, "sn..."is true") (Jennings 1987). I.e. the assertiveness conditions are the same. But then the semantic dimension is abandoned! Brendel: Thesis: we should keep the semantic T-concept, which however is not ontologically neutral. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Realism | Versus | Cartwright I 159 Lager: Realismus/Wissenschaft: Sellars pro. - Van FraassenVsRealismus. - Statt dessen: (Fraassen 1970) Semantische Sicht von Theorien. - Auch Suppes (1967), Sneed (1971) - Bsp Die Schrödinger-Gleichung trifft auf Modelle zu, nicht auf Realität. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Realism | Pro | Cartwright I 191 Quantum Mechanics: Realism: Born, Bohm - VsRealism/QM/(s): David Deutsch? |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 |
| Realism | Versus | Gribbin III 215 WheelerVsRealismus -" das Universum existiert nur als Beobachtetes (QM) - |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature | Duhem, P. | Cartwright I 94 Nature/Duhem/Cartwright: Duhem thesis: the phenomena of nature decay roughly speaking into natural species. DuhemVsRealism: there is no union. It's just a raw fact that some things sometimes behave like certain other things. And this can be an indication of the behavior of other things. Explanation/Duhem: sets up a scheme that allows these clues to be used. Unification/Duhem/Cartwright: is only fictitious: For example, it is easier for us to postulate Maxwell's four laws and one electromagnetic field to see both light and electricity as manifestations of a single characteristic, but the unification itself does not exist. The phenomena are very different! Truth/Explanation/Duhem/Cartwright: we cannot expect to find an explanatory law for two different phenomena that is also true! |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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